{"id":13417,"date":"2025-03-12T09:33:14","date_gmt":"2025-03-12T13:33:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/crcl\/?page_id=13417"},"modified":"2026-06-08T14:39:36","modified_gmt":"2026-06-08T18:39:36","slug":"forum","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/crcl\/forum\/","title":{"rendered":"Forum"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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What is the CR-CL <\/em>Forum<\/em>?<\/strong><\/h2>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
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For the CR-CL Blog<\/em>, the short-form counterpart to the Forum<\/em>, click here!<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
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The Forum<\/em> is the online counterpart to the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review<\/em>. Launched in 2026, the Forum<\/em> platforms progressive, radical, and revolutionary legal commentary and scholarship that responds to contemporary legal issues in an accessible, expansive, and timely manner.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Read our inaugural edition below!<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stay tuned for a forthcoming special edition of the Forum<\/em> to be published in connection with our 60th Anniversary Symposium.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Volume 61<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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From Slavery to Dependency: How Courts Misinterpret the Fair Labor Standards Act to Justify Prison Labor<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

By: Nicole Plante<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was designed to ensure fair wages and put an end to exploitative labor conditions. Despite recent reconsideration of the FLSA as it applies to incarcerated workers, courts continue to reject the idea that they fall within the Act\u2019s purposes. This Note seeks to understand why courts maintain this exclusion\u2014particularly when they have begun to reconsider other aspects of FLSA coverage for incarcerated labor.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

To answer this question, this Note presents the dependency framework\u2014a legal rationale that assumes incarcerated workers are fully dependent on prisons and, therefore, have no needs beyond those provided for by prisons. Ultimately, this Note argues that this framework has its roots in slavery, and that is why courts continue to misinterpret the purposes of the FLSA to exclude incarcerated workers.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

To make this argument, the Note begins by showing how, even in the generous holding of <\/em>Scott v. Baltimore County, the Fourth Circuit perpetuated the dependency framework and denied that incarcerated workers fall within the FLSA\u2019s purpose due to impacts on their well-being. It then takes a step back and examines the origins of the dependency framework, tracing its foundations to 1990s case law. From there, the Note shows how the framework and courts are out of touch with reality, highlighting how incarcerated workers have unmet needs and fall within the original purposes of the FLSA. Finally, the Note situates the dependency framework within the broader historical context of slavery and post-Reconstruction convict leasing, revealing how modern prison labor practices remain tethered to America\u2019s legacy of racial and economic exploitation.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Vol. 61 | No. 1 | June 2026<\/mark><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Read here!<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
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Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic<\/em>: Spending Clause Legislation and the End of Thiboutot<\/em><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

By: Ariel Vasser<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 1980, the Supreme Court has held that 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 is available to redress violations of all federal laws. However, in June 2025, the Court decided <\/em>Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, severely curtailing litigants\u2019 ability to use Section 1983 as a vehicle for vindicating violations of federal \u201cspending-power\u201d statutes. This decision departed from the Court\u2019s most recent precedent in <\/em>Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, which was decided only two years prior. This Comment analyzes <\/em>Medina and argues that it is both an incorrect and misleading application of precedent and that its core distinction between Spending and non-Spending Clause statutes is analytically unsound. In doing so, it argues for the first time that <\/em>Medina has impliedly overruled <\/em>Maine v. Thiboutot\u2019s application to spending-power statutes.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By analyzing the Court\u2019s Section 1983 \u201cand laws\u201d jurisprudence, beginning in the 1980s and ending in 2025 with <\/em>Medina, this Comment explains how and why <\/em>Medina is different and has shifted the landscape. The new aspects of its test\u2014which use the language at issue in <\/em>Talevski as a talisman and rely on doctrinally unclear distinctions between Spending and non-Spending Clause statutes\u2014are unprecedented and will drastically impact litigants across the country. <\/em>Medina\u2019s scope can be best understood by its effect on previously enforceable provisions of \u201cspending-power\u201d statutes, particularly under the Medicaid Act. Using two illustrative provisions as examples, this Comment analyzes how <\/em>Medina has effectively rendered these provisions dead letters and restricted individuals\u2019 abilities to sue to enforce their rights.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Vol. 61 | No. 2 | June 2026<\/mark><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Read here!<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
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\"CRCL<\/a><\/div><\/div>\n\n\n