{"id":10468,"date":"2017-03-29T14:58:22","date_gmt":"2017-03-29T18:58:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/crcl\/?p=10468"},"modified":"2017-03-29T15:13:17","modified_gmt":"2017-03-29T19:13:17","slug":"supreme-court-declines-to-consider-challenge-to-mandatory-life-sentences-for-juveniles","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/crcl\/supreme-court-declines-to-consider-challenge-to-mandatory-life-sentences-for-juveniles\/","title":{"rendered":"Supreme Court Declines to Consider Challenge to Mandatory Life Sentences for Juveniles"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ahmad Bright was sixteen years old when he was involved in the shooting death of 19-year-old Corey Davis in 2006.[1]<\/a> In one sense, Ahmad was the last person you would expect to be caught up in a murder: he was a hardworking and ambitious full-scholarship student at Cambridge\u2019s prestigious Buckingham, Browne & Nichols School.[2]<\/a> He was a talented tennis player and was touring top-tier colleges. But in another sense, the turn of events wasn\u2019t surprising at all. Ahmad\u2019s troubled home life consisted of housing insecurity, an absentee father, and a drug dealing brother. In fact, the deadly altercation occurred when\u00a0Ahmad\u2019s brother hired a friend to kill Davis\u2014another drug dealer\u2014because Davis owed him money.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n

Ahmad was convicted of second-degree murder on a joint venture theory. The prosecution did not contend that Ahmad killed Davis, but rather that he drove the car to and from the murder.[4]<\/a> In Massachusetts, a second-degree murder conviction triggers a mandatory sentence of life in prison, with the possibility of parole after 15 years.[5]<\/a> Ahmad has spent the last eight years in prison. All of his appeals have been unsuccessful, including his recent petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was denied last Monday.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n

Ahmad\u2019s petition to the Supreme Court relied on its 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama<\/em>, which declared life sentences without the possibility of parole unconstitutional for children under the age of eighteen.[7]<\/a> In Miller<\/em>, the court reaffirmed its stance that \u201cchildren are constitutionally different from adults,\u201d and that a sentencer must \u201chave the ability to consider the mitigating qualities of youth.\u201d[8]<\/a> To do otherwise would violate the Constitution\u2019s Eighth Amendment prohibition of \u201ccruel and unusual punishment.\u201d[9]<\/a> It was this line of reasoning that had previously led the Court in 2005 to declare unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles.[10]<\/a><\/p>\n

While Ahmad\u2019s sentence was life imprisonment with <\/em>the possibility of parole, his lawyers argued that the Massachusetts sentencing scheme is inconsistent with the principles of Miller.<\/em>[11]<\/a> Because Ahmad was convicted of second-degree murder, his sentence was statutorily prescribed; the judge could not take account of Ahmad\u2019s youth at all.[12]<\/a> Indeed, any mandatory sentence inherently removes a judge\u2019s ability to individualize. And \u201cindividualization\u201d has been the Supreme Court\u2019s buzzword in this line of cases; as Justice Kagan wrote for the majority in Miller<\/em>, \u201cour individualized sentencing cases that youth matters for purposes of meting out the law\u2019s most serious punishments.\u201d[13]<\/a><\/p>\n

Whether or not a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole is one of our system\u2019s most \u201cserious punishments\u201d is admittedly a normative question. In a brief to the Supreme Court opposing Ahmad\u2019s request for review, the government reiterated the Massachusetts appellate court\u2019s opinion that because a parole board may review Ahmad\u2019s sentence in the future, a life sentence is constitutional.[14]<\/a> This implies that the Massachusetts courts believe the opportunity for parole renders a life sentence something less than a \u201cmost serious punishment.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ahmad\u2019s lawyers disagreed. They argued that the mere possibility of discretionary parole does not satisfy the constitutional prerogative of individualization for juveniles. This is especially true in Massachusetts, where parole rates have dropped precipitously[15]<\/a> in the past several years under a reconstituted \u201ctough on crime\u201d board.[16]<\/a> Ahmad\u2019s lawyers also made the broader argument that parole board decisions in general\u2014which can be highly susceptible to political influences, notes the American Law Institute[17]<\/a>\u2014are no substitute for the individualized determination of a judge.<\/p>\n

Unfortunately the Supreme Court denied Ahmad\u2019s petition, which will certainly be devastating for Ahmad and his family. The denial comes a little under two years after Ahmad\u2019s failed petition to former Massachusetts governor Deval Patrick for a commuted sentence.[18]<\/a> But the Court\u2019s decision not to weigh in on the constitutionality of mandatory life sentences with the possibility of parole for juveniles has consequences beyond Ahmad. Judges will continue to impose life sentences on children, without the ability to consider individual circumstances\u2014like \u201cimmaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences\u201d \u2014that the Supreme Court has deemed highly relevant in fashioning juvenile sentences.[19]<\/a><\/p>\n

A mandatory sentence to life imprisonment with or without the possibility of parole may be a distinction without a difference. This is especially true in the context of increasingly harsh parole boards, like the one in Massachusetts Ahmad will face in a few years. (Troublingly, the fact that Ahmad has appealed his conviction means he is even less <\/em>likely to be paroled.) If we truly believe that children deserve individualized sentences, then the Supreme Court made a mistake last week. If and when a similar challenge comes before the Court again, it should address the issue head on.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Ahmad maintains his innocence.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> See<\/em> Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Bright v. Massachusetts, No. 16-579 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016).<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> See id.<\/em> at 5.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> See id.<\/em> at 6.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> See id.<\/em> at 7.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Bright v. Massachusetts<\/em>, SCOTUSblog, at http:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/case-files\/cases\/bright-v-massachusetts\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> See<\/em> 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 2464\u201366.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> U.S. Const. amend. VIII<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> See<\/em> Roper v. Simmons<\/em>, 543\u00a0U.S.\u00a0551 (2005).<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> See <\/em>Brief for Petitioner, supra <\/em>note 2, at 10.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> See<\/em> id.<\/em> at 14.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Miller v. Alabama<\/em>, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> See <\/em>Respondent\u2019s Brief in Opposition at 7, Bright v. Massachusetts, No. 16-578 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016).<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> In 2009, the overall parole rate was 78%; just two years later, it had plummeted to 26%. The rate is even lower for those prisoners with life sentences\u2014just 12% in 2011. See <\/em>Patricia Garin, et al., White Paper: The Current State of Parole in Massachusetts,<\/em> 2\u20133 (Feb. 2013), http:\/\/www.cjpc.org\/2013\/White-Paper-Addendum-2.25.13.pdf<\/a>; see also Gordon Haas et. al., The Massachusetts Parole Board<\/em>, i (2012), http:\/\/www.cjpc.org\/2012\/MA-Parole-Board-2012.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> See <\/em>Brief for Petitioner, supra <\/em>note 2, at 18.<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> See <\/em>Thomas Farragher, Slim chance for 2nd chance commutation,<\/em> Boston Globe, Nov. 5, 2014, at https:\/\/www.bostonglobe.com\/metro\/2014\/11\/05\/governor-patrick-weighs-request-for-commutation-from-man-convicted-homicide\/7dJAYcuXa4wGQBOEZ51xaP\/story.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> See<\/em> Miller v. Alabama<\/em>, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ahmad Bright was sixteen years old when he was involved in the shooting death of 19-year-old Corey Davis in 2006.[1] 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