{"id":4067,"date":"2011-11-26T23:05:40","date_gmt":"2011-11-27T04:05:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/crcl\/?p=4067"},"modified":"2016-11-16T20:13:45","modified_gmt":"2016-11-17T01:13:45","slug":"scotus-to-hear-oral-arguments-in-prisoners-sentencing-appeal","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/crcl\/scotus-to-hear-oral-arguments-in-prisoners-sentencing-appeal\/","title":{"rendered":"SCOTUS to Hear Oral Arguments in Prisoner&#039;s Run-on Sentencing Appeal"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Next week, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in <em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/case-files\/cases\/setser-v-united-states\/\">Setser v. United States<\/a><\/em>.\u00a0 The cases addresses whether a federal court has authority to order a federal sentence to run consecutively with a yet-to-be-imposed state sentence.<\/p>\n<p>In 2007, petitioner Monroe Setser was sentenced in federal court for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.\u00a0 Setser\u2019s crime represented both a federal and state offense, and as such, Setser could be expected to do time in both state and federal prison.\u00a0 Yet at the time of his federal sentencing, Setser had yet to be convicted of the state charge.\u00a0 In anticipation of such a conviction, the district court directed that Setser\u2019s federal sentence would run consecutively to any state sentence Setser might eventually receive.<\/p>\n<p>At issue in the case is the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3584(a), which provides:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively. . . .\u00a0 Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or the state mandates that the terms are to run consecutively.\u00a0 Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Both <a href=\"http:\/\/www.americanbar.org\/content\/dam\/aba\/publishing\/previewbriefs\/Other_Brief_Updates\/10-7387_petitioner_brief.authcheckdam.pdf\">Setser<\/a> \u2013 and the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.americanbar.org\/content\/dam\/aba\/publishing\/previewbriefs\/Other_Brief_Updates\/10-7387_petitionerusa.authcheckdam.pdf\">United States<\/a>, which is not opposing Setser\u2019s appeal \u2013 argue that \u00a7 3584(a) does not give district courts authority to order a federal term to run consecutively to a hypothetical state imprisonment.\u00a0 Section 3584(a) applies in two situations and two situations only: (1) when the federal court imposes multiple terms of imprisonment \u201cat the same time\u201d; and (2) when the federal court sentences a defendant who is \u201calready subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>To be sure, language in the statute refers to \u201c[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times.\u201d\u00a0 This does not provide license, however, to structure the service of sentences yet to be imposed.\u00a0 To do so would read \u00a7 3584(a)\u2019s limitation out of the statute.\u00a0 As the government writes: \u201cIf district courts could order consecutive or concurrent service whenever \u2018multiple terms of imprisonment\u2019 are imposed or anticipated,\u2019 Congress would have no reason to specify that the district court\u2019s authority extends to defendants with \u2018undischarged\u2019 sentences.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Evan Young, <a href=\"http:\/\/sblog.s3.amazonaws.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/80\/2011\/11\/Setser-v-US-Br-for-Ct-appted-Amicus-Supporting-Jmt.pdf\">arguing<\/a> against the petitioner by invitation of the Court, contends that \u00a7 3584(a) should be construed as providing default rules for some, but not all, sentencing situations.\u00a0 According to Young, \u201c[d]etermining the length of a criminal sentence [has always been] the province of the judge, not the jailer.\u201d\u00a0 The common law has long afforded judges discretion in sentencing, which Congress would not have withdrawn without a clearer indication.\u00a0 The bulk of the brief then goes on to repudiate the petitioner\u2019s and <em>amici<\/em>\u2019s arguments.<\/p>\n<p><em>Setser<\/em> is an interesting case \u2013 both a technical analysis of statutory text and a philosophical debate about the relationship between the executive and judicial branches in the context of sentencing.\u00a0 Throughout their briefs, both sides articulate a vision of sentencing that depicts the process as a necessarily reasoned inquiry.\u00a0 After all, a proper sentence serves to \u201cprovide just punishment,\u201d \u201cafford adequate deterrence,\u201d and \u201cprotect the public from the future crimes of the defendant.\u201d\u00a0 Yet when a judge must make assumptions about what kind of sentence a colleague will impose at a later proceeding, is she really able to fashion a term of years that is just?\u00a0 Is not the second judge, possessing all the relevant facts, in a better position to structure a suitable sentence?\u00a0 Though there is certainly more to <em>Setser<\/em> than the answer to these two questions, it is important not to lose sight of the underlying policy considerations in an appeal otherwise resting on a meticulous parsing of statutory text.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Next week, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Setser v. United States.\u00a0 The cases addresses whether a federal 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