{"id":9200,"date":"2016-03-04T17:57:01","date_gmt":"2016-03-04T22:57:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/crcl\/?p=9200"},"modified":"2017-03-23T09:42:30","modified_gmt":"2017-03-23T13:42:30","slug":"felony-disenfranchisement-in-2016","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/crcl\/felony-disenfranchisement-in-2016\/","title":{"rendered":"Felony Disenfranchisement in 2016"},"content":{"rendered":"

Earlier this month, the Maryland General Assembly expanded voting rights to around 44,000 people<\/a> with felony convictions, overriding six vetoes by Republican Governor Larry Hogan. The vote means that Maryland will soon join the ranks of thirteen states and the District of Columbia<\/a>\u00a0where those with felony convictions can now vote after they have been released from prison.<\/p>\n

In a political climate in which voting rights feel increasingly under threat, felony disenfranchisement stands out as surprisingly unpopular. A 2004 public opinion survey<\/a>, for example, showed that eight in ten U.S. residents supported restoring voting rights for citizens who had completed their sentences. In 2014, then-Attorney General Eric Holder urged states to reform their felony disenfranchisement statutes, calling restrictions\u00a0\u201cunnecessary,\u201d \u201cunjust\u201d and \u201ccounterproductive.\u201d<\/a>\u00a0 And increasing numbers of states are taking\u00a0steps<\/a> to roll back laws barring\u00a0those\u00a0with felony convictions from voting after they have been released from prison.\u00a0Politicians as ideologically far-ranging as Rick Santorum<\/a>, Rand Paul<\/a> and Hillary Clinton<\/a> have argued for the expansion\u00a0of voting rights for those who have been convicted of a felony.<\/p>\n

Despite the growing momentum in favor of reform, the number of disenfranchised individuals continues to grow. According to a report from\u00a0The Sentencing Project, 5.85 million<\/a> American citizens will be unable to vote in the 2016 presidential election as a result of felony convictions, up from approximately five million<\/a> in 2008. Those individuals are concentrated primarily in the twelve states<\/a> that restrict felony voting post-sentence, some of which impose lifetime voting bans on those convicted of a felony.<\/p>\n

Not surprisingly, felony disenfranchisement overwhelmingly impacts low-income people of color. Nearly 8%<\/a> of adult black Americans are disenfranchised under these laws (at a rate over four times greater<\/a> than the rest of the population). In states such as Florida, where an estimated 1.5 million people<\/a> are disenfranchised,\u00a0\u00a0nearly 25%<\/a> of adult black citizens are\u00a0unable to vote as a result of felony convictions.<\/p>\n

Policies that systematically disenfranchise such a large voting bloc are fundamentally at odds with the values of democracy and equal protection espoused by politicians and academics. They also have a real impact on local and national elections, and will have an impact this November. It is hard to estimate exactly how disenfranchisement will affect this year’s presidential election, and guessing if or how currently disenfranchised citizens might vote if they could is inherently challenging. Many advocates\u00a0and political analysts agree, however, that the political implications of felony disenfranchisement are dramatic and far-reaching. The effects of felony disenfranchisement are magnified in close presidential elections, as many\u00a0of the nation\u2019s strictest bans are in traditional \u201cswing states\u201d (as Desmond Meade of the Florida Rights Restoration Coalition put it, \u201cIf these people were able to vote\u2026Florida would no longer be a swing state.”<\/a>)<\/p>\n

The political implications of disenfranchisement were particularly acute in 2000, when George Bush defeated Al Gore in Florida by only 537 votes. According to one estimate, if just 1% of Florida\u2019s disenfranchised population had voted, 60% Democrat to 40% Republican, the national election would have come out differently.<\/a> Presidential elections in subsequent years may have been less dramatic, but felony disenfranchisement still has the potential to dramatically change the dynamics<\/a> in a close election.<\/p>\n

The Maryland legislature\u2019s decision is a victory for voting-rights advocates, but the extent of felony disenfranchisement should continue to alarm those concerned with equal protection, voting rights, and racial justice. Problems with the criminal justice system have been widely discussed in the lead-up to the 2016 Presidential election. Yet\u00a0nearly six million people with the most at stake in criminal justice reform will be unable to participate in the political dialogue in the most basic way. The Supreme Court has addressed challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws twice, in Richard v. Ramirez\u00a0<\/em>(1974) and\u00a0Hunter v. Underwood<\/em> (1985). In\u00a0Hunter<\/em>, the court\u00a0held\u00a0that, absent a showing of discriminatory intent, states could\u00a0continue to deny the vote to citizens with past felony convictions. But it is time for advocates to capitalize on the growing momentum in favor of reform and to mount a concerted political effort to re-enfranchise individuals with felony convictions. Restrictive voting bans, particularly in light of their racially disparate impact, violate basic notions of fairness and allow for a political process that is unjustifiably unrepresentative.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Earlier this month, the Maryland General Assembly expanded voting rights to around 44,000 people with felony convictions, overriding six vetoes 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