{"id":2108,"date":"2015-06-03T15:48:58","date_gmt":"2015-06-03T19:48:58","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/?p=2108"},"modified":"2023-07-25T15:58:33","modified_gmt":"2023-07-25T19:58:33","slug":"jumbo-sized-mouseholes-comforting-thoughts-on-the-clean-power-plan-part-ii","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/2015\/06\/03\/jumbo-sized-mouseholes-comforting-thoughts-on-the-clean-power-plan-part-ii\/","title":{"rendered":"Jumbo-Sized Mouseholes: Comforting Thoughts on the Clean Power Plan, Part II"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Elephant<\/a>
Elephant on a circus train<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

This summer, the Environmental Protection Agency (\u201cEPA\u201d) is expected to promulgate the final version of its Clean Power Plan, a set of regulations aimed at decreasing the carbon dioxide (\u201cCO2\u201d) emissions of U.S. power plants to 30% below 2005 levels over the next 15 years. Critics have argued that the plan oversteps the bounds of EPA\u2019s power to regulate air pollution. In this two-part post, David Baake \u201914, a former editor and writer for ELR, argues that the Clean Power Plan is well within EPA\u2019s regulatory authority. This is the second part, addressing the contention that \u00a7 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 7411), which gives authority for the Clean Power Plan, was not intended to give rise to any regulations of such a sweeping nature: the \u201celephant in a mousehole\u201d argument. You can read the first part here<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

Opponents<\/a> of the Clean Power Plan<\/a> have attempted to characterize \u00a7 111(d) as an insignificant provision that was not designed to support a major regulatory initiative; in more colorful terms, an attempt to fit a regulatory \u201celephant\u201d into a statutory \u201cmousehole.\u201d In support of this characterization, the Plan\u2019s opponents note that EPA has established \u00a7 111(d) emission guidelines for only four pollutants from five source categories over the last forty years (79 F.R. 34,830<\/a>, 34,844). While the precise contours of this argument remain unclear, the suggestion seems to be that the scant historical use of \u00a7 111(d) is evidence that this provision must be construed narrowly, perhaps by limiting EPA\u2019s ability to consider measures like renewable energy and energy efficiency that are implemented \u201cbeyond the fenceline\u201d of the facility containing the regulated source.<\/p>\n

The problems with this argument begin with the statutory text. \u00a7 111(d) delegates in expansive terms, providing that EPA \u201cshall\u201d establish emission guidelines reflecting the best \u201csystem\u201d of emission reduction for \u201cany\u201d existing source that emits \u201cany\u201d air pollutant not controlled under the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) program or the hazardous air pollutant (HAP) program. \u00a7 111(d)(1) and (2) further provide that these emission guidelines will be implemented by state and federal plans similar to those required by \u00a7 110, the centerpiece of the Clean Air Act\u2019s most significant regulatory program. Under \u00a7 110(a)(2)(A) and (y), these plans may incorporate a wide range of pollution control measures, means, and techniques, including \u201ceconomic incentives, such as marketable permits or auctions of emissions allowances.\u201d Congress\u2019s decision to delegate in expansive terms and to model the \u00a7 111(d) program on \u00a7 110\u2019s NAAQS attainment program indicate that it intended for \u00a7 111(d) to provide EPA with significant regulatory authority.<\/p>\n

The structure of the Clean Air Act confirms that \u00a7 111(d) is not a mousehole, but an essential component of the Act\u2019s comprehensive framework for controlling existing source emissions. The report on one Senate version of the Clean Air Act noted that the drafters sought to establish a regulatory framework with \u201cno gaps\u201d<\/a> in its coverage of existing source emissions. Reflecting its understanding that there were \u201cthree general categories\u201d<\/a> of air pollutants, Congress enacted three different programs to control existing source emissions. As EPA explained it<\/a> (subscription only), the NAAQS program (CAA \u00a7\u00a7 108\u201310) was designed to control emissions of air pollutants known to affect ambient air quality, the HAP program (CAA \u00a7 112) was designed to control emissions of air pollutants known to cause the most severe health effects, and \u00a7 111(d) was designed to control all other dangerous air pollutants. The scant historical use of \u00a7 111(d) does not indicate that the provision is insignificant; it simply reflects the fact that every major air pollution problem EPA has previously encountered could be adequately addressed under the NAAQS or HAP programs (this has been pointed out in an article by Nordhaus and Gutherz<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The statutory context provides additional evidence that Congress understood \u00a7 111(d) to be a significant delegation of regulatory authority. \u00a7 317<\/a>, enacted in 1977, requires EPA to perform an economic impact assessment before promulgating or revising regulations under seven provisions of the Clean Air Act, including \u201cany regulation under \u00a7 [1]11(d).\u201d An assessment under this provision must contain an analysis of, inter alia<\/em>, \u201cthe potential inflationary or recessionary effects of the standard or regulation,\u201d \u201cthe effects on competition of the standard or regulation with respect to small business,\u201d \u201cthe effects of the standard or regulation on consumer cost,\u201d and \u201cthe effects of the standard or regulation on energy use.\u201d The fact that Congress required EPA to study the macro<\/em>-economic effects of \u00a7 111(d) regulations indicates that Congress understood that this statute was no mousehole.<\/p>\n

The text, structure, and statutory context all point to one conclusion: \u00a7 111(d) is a major grant of regulatory authority, and the Clean Power Plan fits well the overall design. If the Plan is an elephant, then \u00a7 111(d) is a circus train.<\/p>\n

Want more elephants? David Baake has a forthcoming article<\/a> in the Environmental Law Reporter and another post<\/a> up on the blog of the American Constitution Society.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This summer, the Environmental Protection Agency (\u201cEPA\u201d) is expected to promulgate the final version of its Clean Power Plan, a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":164,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2108","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-helr-online"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/peZkUb-y0","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2108","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/164"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2108"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2108\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2108"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2108"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/elr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2108"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}