{"id":4129,"date":"2016-06-05T11:02:06","date_gmt":"2016-06-05T15:02:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/?page_id=4129"},"modified":"2025-02-18T18:14:59","modified_gmt":"2025-02-18T23:14:59","slug":"volume-6-issue-1","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-6-issue-1\/","title":{"rendered":"Volume 6, Issue 1 (2016)"},"content":{"rendered":"
INVESTING & ASSET MANAGEMENT \u2022 CORPORATE LAW & GOVERNANCE<\/h5>\n

DISENTANGLING MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE FROM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE<\/a><\/h3>\n
Eric D. Roiter<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n

This Article addresses mutual fund governance, explaining how it has recently\u00a0become entangled with the norms and rules of corporate governance. At\u00a0one level, it is understandable that the Securities and Exchange Commission\u00a0(SEC) and courts have viewed mutual funds as a type of ordinary corporation.\u00a0Both mutual funds and corporations are separate legal entities, having directors\u00a0and shareholders. Directors of each are held to fiduciary duties, charged with\u00a0serving shareholders\u2019 interests, and expected to aspire to best practices. However,\u00a0there are fundamental differences between mutual funds and ordinary corporations.<\/p>\n

\n
BUSINESS & CORPORATIONS \u2022 ENTREPRENEURSHIP & STARTUPS<\/h5>\n

WHERE HAVE ALL THE IPOS GONE? THE HARD LIFE OF THE SMALL IPO<\/a><\/h3>\n
Paul Rose and Steven Davidoff Solomon<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n

We examine firm lifecycles of 3,081 IPOs from 1996\u20132012. We find that small IPOs have a different lifecycle than other, larger companies. Within five years of an IPO, only 55% of small capitalization companies remain listed on a public exchange, compared to 61% and 67% for middle and large capitalization companies, respectively. Small capitalization companies generally delist either voluntarily or involuntarily, while mid and large capitalization companies largely exit the public market through takeover transactions. Those small companies that remain listed largely fail to grow, remaining in the small capitalization category. We use our findings to examine various theories explaining the decline of the small IPO. We find only minor evidence that regulatory changes caused the decline of the small IPO. The decline appears instead to be more attributable to the historical unsuitability of small firms for the public market. Absent economic or market reforms that change small firm quality, further regulatory reforms to enhance the small IPO market are thus unlikely to be effective or bring firms into the public market that have the horsepower to remain publicly listed.<\/p>\n

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ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, & GOVERNANCE \u2022 HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR<\/h5>\n

THE CONFLICT MINERALS EXPERIMENT<\/a><\/h3>\n
Jeff\u00a0Schwartz<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n

In Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress instructed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to draft rules that would require public companies to report annually on whether their products contain certain Congolese minerals. This unprecedented legislation and the SEC rulemaking that followed have inspired an impassioned and ongoing debate between those who view these efforts as a costly misstep and those who view them as a measured response to human rights abuses committed by the armed groups that control many mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

INVESTING & ASSET MANAGEMENT \u2022 CORPORATE LAW & GOVERNANCE DISENTANGLING MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE FROM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Eric D. Roiter This […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"footnotes":"","_members_access_role":[],"_members_access_error":""},"class_list":["post-4129","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/PgKEUK-14B","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":5252,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/investing-asset-management\/","url_meta":{"origin":4129,"position":0},"title":"Investing & Asset Management","author":"wgu","date":"February 15, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"VOLUME 13 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT PROMISE & PERIL OF PLAIN ENGLISH: MUTUAL FUND DISCLOSURE READABILITY Anne M. Tucker & Yusen Xia The SEC requires mutual funds to write disclosures for the average investor using plain English. These requirements make funds\u2019 investment strategies and associated risks transparent and accessible\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":3430,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-3-issue-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":4129,"position":1},"title":"Volume 3, Issue 1 (2013)","author":"wpengine","date":"August 20, 2013","format":false,"excerpt":"FOREWORD Marc Weingarten CORPORATE LAW & GOVERNANCE IMPROVING DIRECTOR ELECTIONS Bo Becker and Guhan Subramanian It is well known that U.S. director elections are largely a formality: incumbents typically nominate themselves, for elections that are almost always uncontested, and are re-elected with virtual certainty. The result, as illustrated by the\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":5073,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-13-issue-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":4129,"position":2},"title":"Volume 13, Issue 2","author":"wgu","date":"March 27, 2024","format":false,"excerpt":"BANKING BANKING ON A CURVE: HOW TO RESTORE THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT Peter Conti-Brown and Brian D. Feinstein\u00a0 This Article suggests that the federal government\u2019s primary financial-regulatory tool for combating wealth inequality is broken. 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While neither of these diametrically opposed views\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4761,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-9-issue-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":4129,"position":4},"title":"Volume 9, Issue 2","author":"wgu","date":"January 16, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR \u2022 CONSUMER PROTECTION THE ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS IN CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATIONS Howell E. Jackson & Paul Rothstein Over the past decade, cost-benefit analysis in the field of financial regulation (\u201cfinancial CBA\u201d) has emerged as a topic of intense public interest. 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