{"id":4231,"date":"2016-07-31T22:20:20","date_gmt":"2016-08-01T02:20:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/?page_id=4231"},"modified":"2025-08-19T12:55:31","modified_gmt":"2025-08-19T16:55:31","slug":"hblr-online-volume-6","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-6\/","title":{"rendered":"Volume 6 (2015\u20132016)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">SECURITIES &amp; FINANCIAL REGULATION<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/2016\/08\/it-aint-broke-the-case-for-continued-sec-regulation-of-p2p-lending\/\"><strong>IT AIN&#8217;T BROKE: THE CASE FOR CONTINUED SEC REGULATION OF P2P LENDING<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><i>Benjamin Lo<\/i><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission made waves by deciding to regulate the nascent peer-to-peer lending industry. Only two lending platforms survived the SEC\u2019s entry into a previously lightly-regulated market. Under this regulatory setup, the SEC would regulate the lending-investing process, while other agencies like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Federal Trade Commission would regulate the borrower side of the business. This Article argues that the existing bifurcated system works and is continually getting better as the SEC amends existing exemptions and introduces new regulations to smooth the path for financial innovation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">LEGAL &amp; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/2016\/04\/memorandum-to-the-compliance-counsel-united-states-department-of-justice\/\"><strong>MEMORANDUM TO THE COMPLIANCE COUNSEL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><i>Jonathan J. Rusch<\/i><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>Since 1977, with the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the United States Department of Justice has played a leading role in applying the Act\u2019s anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions in enforcement proceedings against numerous companies and individuals worldwide. In November 2015, the Department of Justice took the unprecedented step of hiring a Compliance Counsel to guide its prosecutors in decision-making in corporate prosecutions and in benchmarking corporate compliance. This Memorandum is composed as an open letter to the Compliance Counsel, focusing on how she and the Department of Justice should go about that critical benchmarking function.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">CONSUMER PROTECTION \u2022 BANKING<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/2016\/03\/can-voluntary-price-disclosures-fix-the-payday-lending-market\/\"><strong>CAN VOLUNTARY PRICE DISCLOSURES FIX THE PAYDAY LENDING MARKET?<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><i>Jim Hawkins<\/i><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>Eric J. Chang\u2019s provocative article,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/2015\/12\/www-paydayloans-gov-a-solution-for-restoring-price-competition-to-short-term-credit-loans\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">www.PayDayLoans.gov: A Solution for Restoring Price-Competition to Short-Term Credit Loans<\/a>\u2014which, as its title suggests, proposes to facilitate price competition in the payday lending market by creating a federal online exchange for payday lenders to post lending rates\u2014has sparked thoughtful reactions among consumer borrowing experts. This Response provides constructive criticism to Chang\u2019s proposal, arguing that such an exchange is unlikely to meet its goal of restoring price competition and offering tweaks that would raise the likelihood of doing so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">POLITICS &amp; ECONOMICS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/2016\/03\/king-henry-ii-and-the-global-financial-crisis\/\"><strong>KING HENRY II AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><i>James W. Giddens<\/i><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>A significant portion of the failure that fueled the 2008 financial crisis has been attributed to a systemic lapse in senior executive oversight at the major financial institutions. Notwithstanding this failure, these executives have not been held personal liable for their \u201cKing Henry moments,\u201d instances where senior executives have allegedly been aware of, or turned a blind eye to, questionable acts that occurred on their watch\u2014often for the executives\u2019 own personal benefit. This Article outlines the current state of the law governing senior executive liability, summarizes recent headline events in the financial industry, and provides a series of recommendations for proportionate reforms to correct current incentive imbalances in the financial industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">SECURITIES &amp; FINANCIAL REGULATION<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/2015\/12\/the-role-of-section-20b-in-securities-litigation\/\"><strong>THE ROLE OF SECTION 20(B) IN SECURITIES LITIGATION<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><i>William D. Roth<\/i><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>In response to a 2011 Supreme Court ruling that restricted the use of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act as a cause of action for fraud, SEC Chair Mary Jo White expressed in 2014 her agency&#8217;s intent to use Section 20(b) to litigate cases where Section 10(b) would no longer be viable. This Article assesses whether Section 20(b) can be an effective litigation tool for the SEC and private plaintiffs by dissecting the provision&#8217;s function and purpose, and by delving into its relevant legal doctrinal questions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">BANKING<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/2015\/12\/the-swaps-pushout-rule-much-ado-about-the-wrong-thing\/\"><strong>THE SWAPS PUSHOUT RULE: MUCH ADO ABOUT THE WRONG THING?<\/strong><\/a><br>\n<i><\/i><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><i>John Crawford and Tim Karpoff<\/i><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>A notably bitter battle over financial reform in the wake of the crisis of 2008 has centered on the Swap Pushout Rule: a Dodd-Frank mandate that federally insured depository institutions\u2014i.e., banks\u2014refrain from entering into certain derivatives contracts. After several of the largest U.S. financial institutions successfully lobbied to roll back the Rule, the rollback inspired intense criticism, but the critiques have not accurately reflected what is really at stake for the banks or the public. While the Rule was sold as an anti-bailout measure, this Article argues that the Rule would have been ineffective as a means of preventing further bailouts of systematically important bank holding companies. The Article further argues that the primary reason systematically important bank holding companies care about the Rule is that it costs more to fund these swaps if they are booked at a different legal entity, such as a broker-dealer, rather than at a bank.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">CONSUMER PROTECTION<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/2015\/12\/www-paydayloans-gov-a-solution-for-restoring-price-competition-to-short-term-credit-loans\/\"><strong>WWW.PAYDAYLOANS.GOV: A SOLUTION FOR RESTORING PRICE-COMPETITION TO SHORT-TERM CREDIT LOANS<\/strong><\/a><i> <\/i><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><i>Eric J. Chang<\/i><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>Much of United States financial regulation has been predominantly based upon using mandated disclosure to facilitate price-competition. However, in the realm of payday lending, disclosure based regulation has received significant criticisms from regulators and consumer advocates. While federal action may be necessary to solve the payday lending problem, this Article argues that a movement towards stricter and more stifling regulations is an overreaction to the statement that disclosure is not working. Instead, this Article proposes a less burdensome but much more effective alternative: a federal online exchange for payday lenders to list and post lending rates.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>SECURITIES &amp; FINANCIAL REGULATION IT AIN&#8217;T BROKE: THE CASE FOR CONTINUED SEC REGULATION OF P2P LENDING Benjamin Lo In 2008, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-4231","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/PgKEUK-16f","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":4235,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":4231,"position":0},"title":"Volume 2 (2011\u20132012)","author":"ehansen","date":"July 31, 2016","format":false,"excerpt":"BANKRUPTCY RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT UNDER LOCAL LAW: ARE RETROFIT COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES EXPROPRIATORY? Melissa A. Boudreau The European sovereign debt crisis has generated a number of controversial restructuring proposals that would have seemed appropriate only for emerging markets just a few years ago, but now are among the few options\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":3487,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-3-issue-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":4231,"position":1},"title":"Volume 3, Issue 2 (2013)","author":"wpengine","date":"October 15, 2013","format":false,"excerpt":"SECURITIES & FINANCIAL REGULATION \u2022 LEGAL & REGULATORY COMPLIANCE PRIVATE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN THE SHADOW OF LAX PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM CANADIAN FIRMS Laura Nyantung Beny and Anita Anand Like firms in the United States, many Canadian firms voluntarily restrict trading by corporate insiders beyond the requirements of\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4298,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-7\/","url_meta":{"origin":4231,"position":2},"title":"Volume 7 (2016\u20132017)","author":"ehansen","date":"November 26, 2016","format":false,"excerpt":"TAXATION WHEN THE IRS PREFERS NOT TO: WHY DISPARATE REGULATORY APPROACHES TO SIMILAR DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS HURTS TAX LAW Leon Dalezman and Philip Lenertz This Article examines decisions made by the Internal Revenue Service on whether to promulgate regulations pursuant to three different but related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code:\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4332,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-6-issue-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":4231,"position":3},"title":"Volume 6, Issue 2 (2017)","author":"ehansen","date":"January 5, 2017","format":false,"excerpt":"TAXATION EVALUATION BEPS: A RECONSIDERATION OF THE BENEFITS PRINCIPLE AND PROPOSAL FOR UN OVERSIGHT Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu The Financial Crisis of 2008 and Great Recession that followed have exacerbated income inequality within and between countries. In the aftermath of the economic turbulence, politicians have turned their attention\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":3822,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-4-issue-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":4231,"position":4},"title":"Volume 4, Issue 1 (2014)","author":"Dayme Sanchez","date":"August 8, 2014","format":false,"excerpt":"SECURITIES & FINANCIAL REGULATION \u2022 BANKING REGULATING CAPITAL Prasad Krishnamurthy Most observers agree that the excessive debt or leverage of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) was a central reason why the housing crash of 2007\u20132009 led to a recession. The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":5259,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/securities-financial-regulation\/","url_meta":{"origin":4231,"position":5},"title":"Securities &amp; Financial Regulation","author":"wgu","date":"February 15, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS THE DUAL CLASS DILEMMA AND THE SUNSET-CLAUSE SOLUTION\u00a0 Adrian Brown The desirability of dual-class stock has been a source of substantial controversy. Some scholars, commentators, and industry participants are wholly in favor of such arrangements. Others are wholly opposed. While neither of these diametrically opposed views\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4231","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4231"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4231\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4231"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}