{"id":4373,"date":"2017-06-03T11:04:45","date_gmt":"2017-06-03T15:04:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/?page_id=4373"},"modified":"2025-02-18T18:22:27","modified_gmt":"2025-02-18T23:22:27","slug":"volume-7-issue-1","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-7-issue-1\/","title":{"rendered":"Volume 7, Issue 1 (2017)"},"content":{"rendered":"<h5>TAXATION<\/h5>\n<h3><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2017\/06\/The-State-Administration-of-International-Tax-Avoidance.pdf\">THE STATE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE<\/a><\/h3>\n<h6><em><strong>Omri Marian<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\">This Article documents a process in which a national tax administration in one jurisdiction is consciously and systematically assisting taxpayers to avoid taxes in other jurisdictions. The aiding tax administration collects a small amount of tax from the aided taxpayers. Such tax is functionally structured as a fee paid for government-provided tax avoidance services. Such behavior can be, and probably is, easily copied by other tax administrations. The implications are profound. On the normative front, the findings should fundamentally change our conceptual understanding of international tax competition. Tax competition is generally understood to be the adoption of low tax rates in order to attract investments into the jurisdiction. Instead, this Article identifies an intentional \u201cbeggar thy neighbor\u201d behavior, aimed at attracting revenue generated by successful investments in other jurisdictions, without attracting actual investments. The result is a distorted competitive environment in which revenue is denied from jurisdictions the infrastructure and workforce of which support economically productive activity. On the practical front, the findings suggest that internationally coordinated efforts to combat tax avoidance are missing an important part of the tax avoidance landscape. Current efforts are largely aimed at curtailing aggressive taxpayer behavior. Instead, this Article proposes that the focus of such efforts should be on curtailing certain rogue practices adopted by national tax administrations.<\/p>\n<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 1\">\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\n<div class=\"column\">\n<hr \/>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h5>SECURITIES &amp; FINANCIAL REGULATION<\/h5>\n<h3><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2017\/06\/We-Have-a-Consensus-On-Fraud-On-The-Market-And-Its-Wrong.pdf\">WE HAVE A CONSENSUS ON FRAUD ON THE MARKET \u2014 AND IT&#8217;S WRONG<\/a><\/h3>\n<h6><em><strong>James Cameron Spindler<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 1\">\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\n<div class=\"column\">\n<p>Recent scholarship contends that the fraud on the market securities class action has neither deterrent nor compensatory effect and should be cut back or even abandoned entirely. This scholarship largely focuses on two critiques: circularity, which holds that shareholder class action claimants are suing themselves, making compensation impossible; and diversification, which holds that fraud constitutes a diversifiable risk, such that diversified shareholders both gain and lose from fraud in equal measure and hence are not negatively impacted. These critiques are arguably the most important and widely-used theoretical development of the last two decades in securities law, and enjoy a broad consensus.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h5>CORPORATE LAW &amp; GOVERNANCE<\/h5>\n<h3><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2017\/06\/Gone-But-Not-Forgetten-Does-Or-Should-The-Use-of-Self-Destructing-Messaging-Applications-Trigger-Corporate-Governance-Duties.pdf\">GONE BUT NOT FORGOTTEN: DOES (OR SHOULD) THE USE OF SELF-DESTRUCTING MESSAGING APPLICATIONS TRIGGER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DUTIES?<\/a><\/h3>\n<h6><em><strong>Laura Palk<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 1\">\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\n<div class=\"column\">\n<p>This Article examines the prevalent use of ephemeral, self-destructing messaging applications in publicly traded companies, and whether such use violates existing securities regulations, corporate preservation duties, and fiduciary obligations. Seemingly, the business judgment rule immunizes officers and directors from liability resulting from the use of transitory media, prohibiting shareholder-plaintiffs from successfully maintaining lawsuits and necessitating regulatory intervention. Current jurisprudential thought severely constrains a shareholder-plaintiff\u2019s ability successfully to hold officers and directors accountable for their lack of corporate oversight and their failure to disclose material information, including risks associated with the types of information systems a company uses in its daily operations. Regulatory intervention is needed to ensure the board, external auditors, and the trading public may assess the extent to which such media jeopardizes the company\u2019s finances, risk posture, and cybersecurity, and provide plaintiffs with a viable avenue of redress for lackadaisical oversight.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h5>BANKRUPTCY &amp; RESTRUCTURING \u2022 ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, &amp; GOVERNANCE<\/h5>\n<h3><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2017\/06\/Too-Important-to-Fail-Bankruptcy-Versus-Bailout-of-Socially-Important-Non-Financial-Institutions.pdf\">TOO IMPORTANT TO FAIL: BANKRUPTCY VERSUS BAILOUT OF SOCIALLY IMPORTANT NON-FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS<\/a><\/h3>\n<h6><em><strong>Shlomit Azgad-Tromer<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 1\">\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\n<div class=\"column\">\n<p>Systemically important financial institutions are broadly considered to impose a risk to the entire economy upon failure; thus taxpayers act upon their failure, providing them with an implied insurance policy for ongoing liquidity. Yet taxpayers frequently provide de facto liquidity insurance for non-financial institutions as well. Taxpayer money is used to rescue hospitals, utility providers, and major employers.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>TAXATION THE STATE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE Omri Marian This Article documents a process in which a national tax [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-4373","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/PgKEUK-18x","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":5256,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/taxation\/","url_meta":{"origin":4373,"position":0},"title":"Taxation","author":"wgu","date":"February 15, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"VOLUME 11 \u2022 COLUMNS RETHINKING TAX FOR THE DIGITAL ECONOMY AFTER COVID-19 Tarc\u00edsio Diniz Magalh\u00e3es and Allison Christians Before COVID-19 arrived, policymakers from around the world were busy working on the makings of a new global tax consensus to reflect structural changes in the world economy as a result of\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4332,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-6-issue-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":4373,"position":1},"title":"Volume 6, Issue 2 (2017)","author":"ehansen","date":"January 5, 2017","format":false,"excerpt":"TAXATION EVALUATION BEPS: A RECONSIDERATION OF THE BENEFITS PRINCIPLE AND PROPOSAL FOR UN OVERSIGHT Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu The Financial Crisis of 2008 and Great Recession that followed have exacerbated income inequality within and between countries. In the aftermath of the economic turbulence, politicians have turned their attention\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4637,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/blog\/","url_meta":{"origin":4373,"position":2},"title":"Blog","author":"Harvard Law Development","date":"February 11, 2019","format":false,"excerpt":"[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text] Current Accounts About Current Accounts Welcome to Current Accounts, the Harvard Business Law Review\u2019s biweekly online blog that seeks to keep our readers up to date on key legal and business developments as they occur in real time. Every other week during the academic semester, Current Accounts will publish\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4298,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-7\/","url_meta":{"origin":4373,"position":3},"title":"Volume 7 (2016\u20132017)","author":"ehansen","date":"November 26, 2016","format":false,"excerpt":"TAXATION WHEN THE IRS PREFERS NOT TO: WHY DISPARATE REGULATORY APPROACHES TO SIMILAR DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS HURTS TAX LAW Leon Dalezman and Philip Lenertz This Article examines decisions made by the Internal Revenue Service on whether to promulgate regulations pursuant to three different but related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code:\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4844,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-11\/","url_meta":{"origin":4373,"position":4},"title":"Volume 11 (2020\u20132021)","author":"wgu","date":"January 11, 2021","format":false,"excerpt":"TAXATION \u2022 TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION RETHINKING TAX FOR THE DIGITAL ECONOMY AFTER COVID-19 Tarc\u00edsio Diniz Magalh\u00e3es and Allison Christians Before COVID-19 arrived, policymakers from around the world were busy working on the makings of a new global tax consensus to reflect structural changes in the world economy as a result\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":5257,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/technology-innovation\/","url_meta":{"origin":4373,"position":5},"title":"Technology &amp; Innovation","author":"wgu","date":"February 15, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS THICKER THAN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Olivia Schwartz Saudi Arabia and the United States have a strong history together. As Saudi Arabia implements Vision 2030, it may do so in a way that jeopardizes this longstanding relationship. Saudi Arabia is in the midst of creating an artificial intelligence\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4373","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4373"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4373\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4373"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}