{"id":4672,"date":"2019-05-09T16:55:31","date_gmt":"2019-05-09T20:55:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/?page_id=4672"},"modified":"2025-08-19T12:54:40","modified_gmt":"2025-08-19T16:54:40","slug":"hblr-online-volume-9","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-9\/","title":{"rendered":"Volume 9 (2018\u20132019)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">HUMAN RIGHTS &amp; LABOR<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2019\/05\/Yadin-Formatted-for-Online.pdf\">SAVING LIVES THROUGH SHAMING<\/a><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>Sharon Yadin<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) routinely employs shaming tactics toward employers, using public denunciations disseminated through social media, press releases, and online databases. These tactics, termed by the agency \u201cregulation by shaming,\u201d aim to name and shame companies into compliance with worker-safety regulations. In the face of heavy criticism of this practice, as well as legislative initiatives that aim to scale back OSHA\u2019s regulation by shaming, this Article argues not only that shaming employers is an important regulatory tool that can help save workers\u2019 lives, but also that OSHA\u2019s \u201cprovocative\u201d shaming tactics are in fact soft in comparison to other forms of regulatory shaming, and should be amplified.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">CONSUMER PROTECTION \u2022 INDUSTRY<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2019\/05\/Golden-Formatted.pdf\">HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN REGULATION AFTER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS COMPARISON<\/a><\/strong><br>\n<i><\/i><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><i>Marlan Golden<\/i><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>In a rapidly evolving healthcare landscape, particularly since the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, regulators have confronted a number of challenges in crafting general rules of prospective applicability for health insurance plans. These challenges include quantifying costs and benefits of regulatory actions that seem difficult to predict, monetizing certain benefits, satisfying the demands of a robust cost-benefit analysis regime, and accounting for heightened uncertainty in the healthcare markets and recently, on Capitol Hill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"\/\/D34949EC-6F54-44D4-AA71-098CA80D0829#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\"><\/a><a href=\"\/\/D34949EC-6F54-44D4-AA71-098CA80D0829#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\"><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">CONSUMER PROTECTION<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2019\/05\/HBLR-Online_Palmer.pdf\">THE CFPB ARBITRATION RULE<\/a><\/strong><em><br>\n<\/em><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>Andrew Palmer<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>This paper analyzes the recent enactment and subsequent rescission of the Arbitration Agreements Rule<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"1\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000002030000000000000000_4672\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000002030000000000000000_4672-1\">1<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000002030000000000000000_4672-1\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"1\">Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040).<\/span>(Arbitration Rule or Rule) promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau), which bans the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in many types of financial contracts. Specifically, the paper will examine the life and death of the Rule through the lens of the types of cost-benefit analyses (CBA) undertaken by the Bureau in issuing the Rule. This analysis will consider the unique structure and administrative position of the CFPB, and use its authorizing legislation in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"2\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000002030000000000000000_4672\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000002030000000000000000_4672-2\">2<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000002030000000000000000_4672-2\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"2\">Formally, the statute is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).<\/span>(Dodd-Frank or DFA) to compare and contrast its cost-benefit analysis procedures with that of other administrative agencies, particularly in the financial regulatory space. Beyond the narrow scope of the application to the Arbitration Rule\u2014and its rescission\u2014this analysis will necessarily touch on larger constitutional, procedural, and governance challenges to the existence structure of the CFPB, a major contributor to the ire over the Rule in question.<a href=\"\/\/3281923B-2614-4E23-9DD9-FAC506D2C030#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\"><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">BUSINESS &amp; CORPORATIONS \u2022 CORPORATE LAW &amp; GOVERNANCE<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2019\/05\/HBLR-Online_Klimon.pdf\">BEYOND THE BOARD: ALTERNATIVES IN NONPROFIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE<\/a><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>William M. Klimon <\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>The diversity of the nonprofit sector is manifold. There is great variety in organizational form; nonprofit organizations have long been structured as corporations, charitable trusts, and unincorporated associations. Now the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has recognized the exempt status of standalone limited liability companies.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"3\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000002030000000000000000_4672\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000002030000000000000000_4672-3\">3<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000002030000000000000000_4672-3\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"3\">See Instructions for Part II, line 2 of IRS Form 1023.<\/span> Likewise, the range of activities across the sector is stunning: healthcare, education, welfare, religion, the arts, and the environment. And even within those fields the diversity astounds: from a tiny free clinic to the Adventist Health System; from a new public charter school to Harvard University; from a Primitive Baptist chapel to the thousands of Roman Catholic congregations, orders, and organizations; from a community theater to the Metropolitan Opera. That immense diversity has affected even the relatively uniform world of nonprofit corporate governance.<sup class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote \" data-mfn=\"4\" data-mfn-post-scope=\"00000000000002030000000000000000_4672\"><a href=\"javascript:void(0)\"  role=\"button\" aria-pressed=\"false\" aria-describedby=\"mfn-content-00000000000002030000000000000000_4672-4\">4<\/a><\/sup><span id=\"mfn-content-00000000000002030000000000000000_4672-4\" role=\"tooltip\" class=\"modern-footnotes-footnote__note\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mfn=\"4\">See William M. Klimon, Recent Developments in Nonprofit Corporate Governance, in National Business Institute,Tax Exempt Organizations Boot Camp283, 303-04 (2016).<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"\/\/DFFE10F0-C116-478E-839D-ECC608CD4E21#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\"><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>HUMAN RIGHTS &amp; LABOR SAVING LIVES THROUGH SHAMING Sharon Yadin The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) routinely employs shaming [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":109,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-4672","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/PgKEUK-1dm","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":5250,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/human-rights-labor\/","url_meta":{"origin":4672,"position":0},"title":"Human Rights &amp; Labor","author":"wgu","date":"February 15, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"VOLUME 12 \u2022 ISSUE 2 \u2022 PRINT SHOULD LABOR ABANDON ITS CAPITAL?\u00a0A REPLY TO CRITICS David H. Webber Several recent works have sharply criticized public pension funds and labor union funds (\u201clabor\u2019s capital\u201d). These critiques come from both the left and right. Leftists criticize labor\u2019s capital for undermining worker interests\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4857,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-11-issue-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":4672,"position":1},"title":"Volume 11, Issue 1","author":"wgu","date":"May 16, 2021","format":false,"excerpt":"[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text] CORPORATE LAW & GOVERNANCE AN EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF DEFENSIVE TACTICS Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz For thirty-five years, courts and scholars have been divided over the effects of defensive tactics in the market for corporate control. 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SECURITIES & FINANCIAL\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":3487,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-3-issue-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":4672,"position":4},"title":"Volume 3, Issue 2 (2013)","author":"wpengine","date":"October 15, 2013","format":false,"excerpt":"SECURITIES & FINANCIAL REGULATION \u2022 LEGAL & REGULATORY COMPLIANCE PRIVATE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN THE SHADOW OF LAX PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM CANADIAN FIRMS Laura Nyantung Beny and Anita Anand Like firms in the United States, many Canadian firms voluntarily restrict trading by corporate insiders beyond the requirements of\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4892,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-14-issue-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":4672,"position":5},"title":"Volume 14, Issue 1","author":"wgu","date":"December 17, 2021","format":false,"excerpt":"BUSINESS & CORPORATIONS RETHINKING COMMERCIAL LAW'S UNCERTAIN BOUNDARIES Steven L. Schwarcz Although it is an essential part of business law, commercial law has uncertain boundaries. That uncertainty creates significant legal ambiguities and inconsistencies, confusing lawyers and courts and causing misinterpretations that disrupt commerce and reduce efficiency. This Article hypothesizes and\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4672","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/109"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4672"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4672\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4672"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}