{"id":5073,"date":"2024-03-27T16:06:00","date_gmt":"2024-03-27T20:06:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/?page_id=5073"},"modified":"2025-08-19T12:57:44","modified_gmt":"2025-08-19T16:57:44","slug":"volume-13-issue-2","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-13-issue-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Volume 13, Issue 2"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">BANKING<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2024\/03\/HLB201_crop-1.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">BANKING ON A CURVE: HOW TO RESTORE THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>Peter Conti-Brown and Brian D. Feinstein&nbsp;<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>This Article suggests that the federal government\u2019s primary financial-regulatory tool for combating wealth inequality is broken. Intended to push banks towards deeper engagement with lower-income and minority communities, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 has failed to meaningfully reduce the prevalence of \u201cbanking deserts\u201d across lower-income communities or to reduce the racial wealth gap. As regulators circulate a proposed overhaul and the prospect of generational reform appears within reach, there is a danger that the CRA\u2019s current moment in the sun will pass without the law being substantially improved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">SECURITIES &amp; FINANCIAL REGULATION<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2024\/03\/HLB202_crop-1.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">SHADOW TRADING AND MACROECONOMIC RISK<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>Yoon-Ho Alex Lee and Alessandro Romano&nbsp;<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>This Article explains that &#8220;shadow trading\u201d occurs when a corporate insider uses sensitive inside information pertaining to her own firm to buy or sell shares of other companies whose stock price movements can be predicted given the information. These transactions are highly profitable but not systematically regulated, and there is evidence that they are a widespread phenomenon among corporate insiders. Un- like classical insider trading, shadow trading by a corporation\u2019s insiders does not result in a direct harm to the corporation\u2019s own shareholders, and to some extent, shareholders may even benefit from such transactions. In this Article, we argue nevertheless that shadow trading poses three issues: (i) it can create a moral hazard problem for corporate insiders, which can lead them to engage in excessive corporate risk-taking and to even invest in negative-expected-value projects; (ii) it can increase the level of macroeconomic risk to which the economy is exposed; and (iii) it can exacerbate the severity of economic crises. Our analysis thus offers novel rationales for regulating shadow trades. This Article concludes by suggesting a menu of possible policy reforms that can address the problems created by shadow trading.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">CORPORATE LAW &amp; GOVERNANCE<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/87\/2024\/03\/HLB203_crop-1.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">THE 401(K) CONUNDRUM IN CORPORATE LAW<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>Natalya Shnitser&nbsp;<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>This Article discusses how as institutional investors like BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street have accumulated ever larger stakes in U.S. public companies, their voting behavior has come under increasing scrutiny. Scholarship analyzing voting by institutional investors\u2014and particularly mutual funds\u2014has focused on the passivity of mutual funds as shareholders and their reluctance to vote against the preferences of management. While scholars have explored a variety of theories for such deference, a recurring explanation has emphasized that the largest fund managers also have business lines that offer services to 401(k) retirement plans sponsored by U.S. companies. Accordingly, numerous scholars have advanced the theory that institutional investors\u2014and particularly mutual funds\u2014have been deferential to corporate management out of fear of losing the corporations\u2019 retirement plan business.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>BANKING BANKING ON A CURVE: HOW TO RESTORE THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT Peter Conti-Brown and Brian D. Feinstein&nbsp; This Article [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":109,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-5073","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/PgKEUK-1jP","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":5191,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/banking\/","url_meta":{"origin":5073,"position":0},"title":"Banking","author":"wgu","date":"February 15, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS RULE IN GIBBS: THE CONTINUATION OF TERRITORIALISM BY OTHER MEANS? 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In response, others have critiqued the airline and banking studies and argued\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":1214,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-1-issue-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":5073,"position":3},"title":"Volume 1, Issue 1 (2011)","author":"wpengine","date":"June 24, 2011","format":false,"excerpt":"FOREWORD Lucian A. Bebchuk SECURITIES & FINANCIAL REGULATION ON THE DODD-FRANK ACT Edolphus \"Ed\" Towns SECURITIES & FINANCIAL REGULATION ON THE DODD-FRANK ACT Bobby L. Rush SECURITIES & FINANCIAL REGULATION DERIVATIVES AND THE LEGAL ORIGIN OF THE 2008 CREDIT CRISIS Lynn A. Stout Experts still debate what caused the credit\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4236,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":5073,"position":4},"title":"Volume 1 (2010\u20132011)","author":"ehansen","date":"July 31, 2016","format":false,"excerpt":"BUSINESS & CORPORATIONS LLCS AND CORPORATIONS: A FORK IN THE ROAD IN DELAWARE? Joshua P. Fershee The limited liability company (LLC) has evolved from a little used entity option to become the leading business entity of choice. The primary impetus for this change was an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":2514,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-2-issue-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":5073,"position":5},"title":"Volume 2, Issue 2 (2012)","author":"wpengine","date":"November 6, 2012","format":false,"excerpt":"SECURITIES & FINANCIAL REGULATION COMPLEXITY, INNOVATION, AND THE REGULATION OF MODERN FINANCIAL MARKETS Dan Awrey The intellectual origins of the global financial crisis (GFC) can be traced back to blind spots emanating from within conventional financial theory. These blind spots are distorted reflections of the perfect market assumptions underpinning the\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/5073","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/109"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5073"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/5073\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5073"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}