{"id":5191,"date":"2025-02-15T20:19:58","date_gmt":"2025-02-16T01:19:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/?page_id=5191"},"modified":"2025-08-19T12:43:53","modified_gmt":"2025-08-19T16:43:53","slug":"banking","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/banking\/","title":{"rendered":"Banking"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

RULE IN GIBBS: THE CONTINUATION OF TERRITORIALISM BY OTHER MEANS?<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Louis Noirault1<\/a><\/sup>LL.M. 2025, Harvard Law School, Master\u2019s in Law and Finance 2024, Sciences Po Law School, Bachelor\u2019s of Art 2020, Sciences Po. I am grateful to Yun Kei Chow, Christopher Kies, Felipe Gomes De Almeida Albuquerque, and the Harvard Business Law Review editors for their help and insightful comments. All errors are mine.<\/span><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

The 19th-century Rule in Gibbs has recently been given a new life by the England and Wales High Court: the Court held that a debt can only be discharged under the law chosen by the parties to govern the contract. This principle strikes at the core of the debate over which jurisdiction should be in charge of the insolvency proceedings of international companies. Universalists argue in favor of centralizing proceedings in one single jurisdiction, while territorialists believe that each jurisdiction should govern the assets located in its territory. This Column argues that the Rule in Gibbs has been mistakenly lumped together with territorialism. It questions both the efficiency and the moral rationales for favoring universalism over the Rule in Gibbs. In doing so, it opens the way for the Rule in Gibbs to be given more serious consideration by scholars and policymakers in this normative debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

BASEL III ENDGAME: SHOULD WE STRENGTHEN CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BANKS?<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Nick Wu2<\/a><\/sup>J.D. Candidate (2026), Harvard Law School. I am deeply thankful for the patience of my friends and their valuable feedback during the drafting process.<\/span><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Policymakers, agencies such as the Federal Reserve and other regulators, and financial institutions all have a vested interest in the health of the American financial system. And the health of the banking system largely depends on the level of bank capital. Therefore, since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, regulators have been working on a supervisory framework\u2014aptly named \u201cBasel III endgame\u201d\u2014that would strengthen capital requirements for banks. An initial proposal was released in July 2023, followed by a re-proposal in September 2024. Both have generated a lot of discourse and vehement support and opposition. Supporters argue that strengthening capital requirements would mitigate risk and help prevent financial panics, but critics are quick to point out that doing so would hurt banks\u2019 profitability while raising borrowing costs. After analyzing policy arguments on both sides, this piece will make a normative argument that Basel III endgame should be further rolled back and will also briefly explore the future (or lack thereof) of Basel III endgame under President Trump\u2019s second administration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 14 \u2022 ISSUE 2 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

PRIVATIZING DEPOSIT INSURANCE<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Christina Parajon Skinner<\/h6>\n\n\n\n

For the past 90 years, the federal government has provided insurance to bank depositors against the risk of loss associated with a bank\u2019s failure. In many ways, this insurance scheme\u2014managed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (\u201cFDIC\u201d)\u2014is the bedrock of banking law. FDIC insurance aims to preempt bank runs by ensuring that depositors remain confident in the security of their funds, even when turbulent times hit. In practice, however, FDIC insurance has suffered from one key design flaw\u2014it has never managed to reconcile the tradeoffs between the moral hazard it produces and the financial stability it ensures. In large part, this is due to policymakers\u2019 inability to credibly commit to maintaining the limits on insurance payouts that Congress statutorily sets. Over the past forty years, the cap has consistently been lifted to protect uninsured depositors in each successive banking crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 14 \u2022 ISSUE 2 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

BANK RUNS DURING CRYPTO WINTER<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Gary B. Gorton & Jeffery Y. Zhang<\/h6>\n\n\n\n

\u201cCrypto Winter\u201d refers to a systemic event that occurred in the cryptocurrency ecosystem\u2014what we call \u201ccrypto space\u201d\u2014in 2022. Crypto space was wracked by plummeting crypto prices, the troubles of a large crypto hedge fund, and runs on many crypto lending platforms. Several large crypto firms went bankrupt. Collectively, everyday people lost billions of dollars. And crypto investors are still feeling the aftershocks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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OLUME 13 \u2022 ISSUE 2 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

BANKING ON A CURVE: HOW TO RESTORE THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Peter Conti-Brown and Brian D. Feinstein <\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

This Article suggests that the federal government\u2019s primary financial-regulatory tool for combating wealth inequality is broken. Intended to push banks towards deeper engagement with lower-income and minority communities, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 has failed to meaningfully reduce the prevalence of \u201cbanking deserts\u201d across lower-income communities or to reduce the racial wealth gap. As regulators circulate a proposed overhaul and the prospect of generational reform appears within reach, there is a danger that the CRA\u2019s current moment in the sun will pass without the law being substantially improved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 10 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

THE DEMOCRATIC DIGITAL DOLLAR: A DIGITAL SAVINGS & PAYMENTS PLATFORM FOR FULLY INCLUSIVE STATE, LOCAL, AND NATIONAL MONEY & BANKING SYSTEMS<\/a><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Robert Hockett3<\/a><\/sup>\u2020 Edward Cornell Professor of Law and Finance, Cornell Law School; Visiting Professor of Finance, Georgetown McDonough School of Business; Senior Counsel, Westwood Capital, LLC; Co-Founding Director, Digital Fiat Currency Institute; Board Member, Public Banking Institute. The author has drafted legislation that would institute a version of the plan here discussed in the State of New York. This legislation has now been proposed by Assemblyman Ron Kim in the New York State Assembly and Senator Julia Salazar in the New York State Senate. See Empire State Inclusive Value Ledger Establishment & Administration Act, H.R. 8686, 2019 Assemb. Reg. Sess. 2019-2020. (N.Y. 2019), https:\/\/assembly.state.ny.us\/leg\/?default_fld=&bn=A08686&term=2019&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Text= Y&Committee%26nbspVotes=Y&Floor%26nbspVotes=Y.<\/span><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Many national and subnational units of government see a need for more inclusive money, payment, and retail banking systems for the capture, storage, and transfer of spendable value among their constituents. Existing and still proliferating payments platforms, most provided by for-profit private sector entities, exclude too many people, and extract too much value in the form of needless transaction charges and other rents, to be up to the task of efficiently affording this essential commercial and financial utility to the full public on sensible terms. This Article sketches a smart-device-accessible platform\u2014 the \u2018Digital Dollar Platform Plan\u2019\u2014which, thanks to new payment technologies, can easily be put in to place and administered by any unit or level of government with a view to supplying this critical commercial and financial infrastructure to all of its constituents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 9 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

NONBANK CREDIT<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Christina Parajon Skinner<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Investment funds increasingly substitute for banks in supplying credit to the economy. Regulators have paid considerable attention to the potential financial stability risks of this migration to nonbank credit. This Article, however, argues that certain private investment funds (and the asset management institutions that house them) can enhance financial stability by promoting economic resilience. Specifically, it argues that certain private funds are incentivized and structured to supply the economy with a countercyclical source of credit\u2014turning on their credit spigots precisely when banks are likely to turn theirs off. In doing so, these private funds have the potential to keep the economy buoyant in periods of economic downturn or distress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 6 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

CAN VOLUNTARY PRICE DISCLOSURES FIX THE PAYDAY LENDING MARKET?<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Jim Hawkins<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Eric J. Chang\u2019s provocative article, www.PayDayLoans.gov: A Solution for Restoring Price-Competition to Short-Term Credit Loans<\/a>\u2014which, as its title suggests, proposes to facilitate price competition in the payday lending market by creating a federal online exchange for payday lenders to post lending rates\u2014has sparked thoughtful reactions among consumer borrowing experts. This Response provides constructive criticism to Chang\u2019s proposal, arguing that such an exchange is unlikely to meet its goal of restoring price competition and offering tweaks that would raise the likelihood of doing so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 6 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

THE SWAPS PUSHOUT RULE: MUCH ADO ABOUT THE WRONG THING?<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
John Crawford and Tim Karpoff<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

A notably bitter battle over financial reform in the wake of the crisis of 2008 has centered on the Swap Pushout Rule: a Dodd-Frank mandate that federally insured depository institutions\u2014i.e., banks\u2014refrain from entering into certain derivatives contracts. After several of the largest U.S. financial institutions successfully lobbied to roll back the Rule, the rollback inspired intense criticism, but the critiques have not accurately reflected what is really at stake for the banks or the public. While the Rule was sold as an anti-bailout measure, this Article argues that the Rule would have been ineffective as a means of preventing further bailouts of systematically important bank holding companies. The Article further argues that the primary reason systematically important bank holding companies care about the Rule is that it costs more to fund these swaps if they are booked at a different legal entity, such as a broker-dealer, rather than at a bank.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 5 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

WHY THE LACK OF INTEREST IN INTEREST? ANOTHER LOOK AT PREFERENCES AND SECURED CREDITORS<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Samuel D. Krawiecz<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

The Bankruptcy Code (sometimes referred to herein as the Code) disallows preferential payments made to creditors. Preference law is \u201cdesigned to prohibit insolvent debtors, on the eve of filing for bankruptcy, from paying off their debts held by \u2018preferred\u2019 creditors\u2014those creditors whom the soon-to-be bankrupts wish to favor.\u201d The preference rule has five elements. The payment must be (1) a transfer to a creditor, (2) for the benefit of an antecedent debt, (3) while the debtor was insolvent, (4) within ninety days of the filing of the petition (unless the creditor is an insider), and (5) the payment must \u201cenable such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive\u201d in a Chapter 7 liquidation. This Article will analyze how the fifth and last element is applied, particularly with regard to fully secured creditors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 5 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

ANTI-HERDING REGULATION<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Ian Ayres and Joshua Mitts<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

In some contexts, an individual\u2019s choice to mimic the behavior of others, to join the herd, can increase systemic risk and retard the production of information. Herding can thus produce negative externalities. And in such situations, individuals by definition have insufficient incentives to separate from the herd. But the traditional regulatory response to externality problems is to impose across-the-board mandates. Command-and-control regulation tends to displace one pooling equilibrium by moving behavior to a new, mandated pool. Mortgage regulators, for example, might respond to an unregulated equilibrium where most homeowners start with 2% down by imposing a requirement that causes most homeowners instead to place 10% down. But this Article shows that society can at times be better off if regulation induces separating behaviors by regulated entities. We evaluate a variety of mechanisms including licenses, subsidies, and regulatory variances as well as regulatory menus and heterogeneous altering rules that can incentivize a limited number of regulated entities to take the path less chosen. Anti-herding regulation provides a new means to attend to ways that mimicry can both suppress the production of information and exacerbate systemic risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 4 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

REGULATING CAPITAL<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Prasad Krishnamurthy<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Most observers agree that the excessive debt or leverage of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) was a central reason why the housing crash of 2007\u20132009 led to a recession. The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Federal Reserve to adopt new prudential standards for regulating these institutions. A fundamental challenge for these standards is how to restrain the leverage of SIFIs by prescribing a minimum amount of capital or equity they must hold relative to their assets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 2 \u2022 ISSUE 2 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

DYNAMIC RESOLUTION OF LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Thomas H. Jackson & David A. Skeel, Jr.<\/strong><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

One of the more important issues emerging out of the 2008 financial crisis concerns the proper resolution of a systemically important financial institution. In response to this, Title II of Dodd-Frank created the Orderly Liquidation Authority, or OLA, which is designed to create a resolution framework for systemically important financial institutions that is based on the resolution authority that the FDIC has held over commercial bank failures. In this Article, we consider the various alternatives for resolving systemically important institutions. Among these alternatives, we discuss OLA, a European-style bail-in process, and coerced mergers, while also extensively focusing on the bankruptcy code. We argue that implementing several discrete modifications to Dodd-Frank, as well adopting an ambitious Chapter 14 proposal written by a working group at the Hoover Institution is the best way forward for establishing a strong resolution framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 2 \u2022 ISSUE 2 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

THE NEED FOR SPECIAL RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS\u2014THE CASE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Martin \u010cih\u00e1k and Erlend Nier<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

The global financial crisis has demonstrated weaknesses in resolution regimes for financial institutions around the globe, including in the European Union (EU). This paper considers the principles underlying resolution regimes for financial institutions, and draws out how a well-designed resolution regime can expand the toolset available for crisis management. Introducing, or in some cases expanding the scope, of these regimes is pressing to achieve more effective responses to ongoing financial sector weaknesses across the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 1 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

THE COCONUNDRUM<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Frederick Ryan Castillo<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Digging deeper into their analytical toolbox, policymakers, academics, and regulators are increasingly exploring whether, and to what extent, a system of contingent capital can strengthen the resilience of the banking sector. The global financial crisis unearthed fragile and troubled banks, riddled with excessive leverage, poor quality capital buffers, and liquidity problems. Because these institutions were deemed \u201ctoo big to fail,\u201d governments were forced to intervene and prop them up by way of costly, taxpayer-funded bailouts. With the benefit of hindsight, regulators are now looking at contingent capital as a potentially speedy and less costly alternative for recapitalizing banks in periods of financial distress.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS RULE IN GIBBS: THE CONTINUATION OF TERRITORIALISM BY OTHER MEANS? Louis Noirault The 19th-century Rule in […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":109,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-5191","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/PgKEUK-1lJ","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":5412,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-15-issue-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":5191,"position":0},"title":"Volume 15, Issue 2","author":"wgu","date":"July 5, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"VOLUME 15 \u2022 CONSUMER PROTECTION HOW TO USE THE RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass Many significant changes to contract law over the past hundred years have been driven by changes in the technology of contracting\u2014the mechanisms people use (or try to use)\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":5248,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/consumer-protection\/","url_meta":{"origin":5191,"position":1},"title":"Consumer Protection","author":"wgu","date":"February 15, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"VOLUME 15 \u2022 ISSUE 2 HOW TO USE THE RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass Many significant changes to contract law over the past hundred years have been driven by changes in the technology of contracting\u2014the mechanisms people use (or try to use)\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4672,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-9\/","url_meta":{"origin":5191,"position":2},"title":"Volume 9 (2018\u20132019)","author":"wgu","date":"May 9, 2019","format":false,"excerpt":"HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR SAVING LIVES THROUGH SHAMING Sharon Yadin The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) routinely employs shaming tactics toward employers, using public denunciations disseminated through social media, press releases, and online databases. These tactics, termed by the agency \u201cregulation by shaming,\u201d aim to name and shame companies\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4916,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-12\/","url_meta":{"origin":5191,"position":3},"title":"Volume 12 (2021-2022)","author":"wgu","date":"February 26, 2022","format":false,"excerpt":"ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, & GOVERNANCE \u2022 INVESTING & ASSET MANAGEMENT BROWN ASSETS FOR THE PRUDENT INVESTOR Alon Brav and J.B. Heaton Most commentary on climate-themed investment treats climate change as a one-way risk to brown assets from a hoped-for transition to a low-carbon economy. But the converse holds as well. Brown\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":5347,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-15-issue-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":5191,"position":4},"title":"Volume 15, Issue 1","author":"wgu","date":"March 4, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"SECURITIES & FINANCIAL REGULATION CAN SECTION 11 BE SAVED?: \u201cTRACING\u201d A PATH TO ITS SURVIVAL John C. Coffee, Jr. & Joshua Mitts Last term, a unanimous Supreme Court held in Slack Techs. v Pirani that purchasers of securities must \u201ctrace\u201d their shares to the registration statement that contains the alleged\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4844,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-11\/","url_meta":{"origin":5191,"position":5},"title":"Volume 11 (2020\u20132021)","author":"wgu","date":"January 11, 2021","format":false,"excerpt":"TAXATION \u2022 TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION RETHINKING TAX FOR THE DIGITAL ECONOMY AFTER COVID-19 Tarc\u00edsio Diniz Magalh\u00e3es and Allison Christians Before COVID-19 arrived, policymakers from around the world were busy working on the makings of a new global tax consensus to reflect structural changes in the world economy as a result\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/5191","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/109"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5191"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/5191\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5191"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}