{"id":5255,"date":"2025-02-15T20:20:59","date_gmt":"2025-02-16T01:20:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/?page_id=5255"},"modified":"2025-08-19T12:50:20","modified_gmt":"2025-08-19T16:50:20","slug":"politics-economics","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/politics-economics\/","title":{"rendered":"Politics & Economics"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

THICKER THAN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Olivia Schwartz1<\/a><\/sup>Olivia Schwartz is currently a 2L at Harvard Law School. This summer, Olivia will be working at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett. The author would like to thank the Harvard Business Law Review editors and staff for their assistance with this Column.<\/span><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Saudi Arabia and the United States have a strong history together. As Saudi Arabia implements Vision 2030, it may do so in a way that jeopardizes this longstanding relationship. Saudi Arabia is in the midst of creating an artificial intelligence hub in Saudi Arabia. However, with continuing U.S.-People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) tensions, Saudi Arabia will likely have to choose between the United States and the People\u2019s Republic of China, as intimated by Executive Order 14105 and the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018. While Saudi Arabia has announced that it would divest from Chinese AI if the United States required it to, it also has a history of hedging with the country that will help it accomplish its security and economic goals. This Column predicts that Saudi Arabia will abandon the People\u2019s Republic of China\u2019s AI to appease the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VOLUME 12 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

BETTER RULES FOR WORSE ECONOMIES: EFFICIENT LEGAL RULES OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Yair Listokin and Peter Bassine<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

This article argues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. The economic effects of many legal rules change over the business cycle.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Most legal rules do not change over the business cycle.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. The time-invariant legal rule chosen tends to be the rule that performs best in ordinary economic conditions.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  4. The efficient time-invariant legal rule considers both performance in ordinary economic conditions and performance in recessions.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  5. Because recessions cause extraordinary harms, a rule\u2019s performance in recessions deserves a surprising amount of weight when calculating the best time-invariant legal rule.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  6. The pursuit of efficiency in law and economics needs to change accordingly.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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    VOLUME 10 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    TRUTH<\/a><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    Max Stul Oppenheimer2<\/a><\/sup>Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S., Princeton University; J.D., Harvard Law School.<\/span><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    The internet has spawned two major policy debates: the extent and control of protection of personal data privacy, and the impact and control of interference in public policy, most notably elections. On the one hand, there is a concern that social media privacy controls are deficient and that personal data is being shared without informed consent, while the increased speed and reduced costs of data processing has enabled aggregating fragments of personal information into detailed personal dossiers. On the other hand, there is a concern that lack of information about sources of information in social media fosters propagation of false information that can influence elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    VOLUME 10 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    CYBERSECURITY PROVISIONS IN TRADE AGREEMENTS: THE STATE OF THE ART<\/a><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    Chim\u00e8ne I. Keitner & Harry L. Clark<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    Virtually without exception, conducting business across borders today means being connected to the Internet. The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), which is awaiting implementation by Congress, would become the first operative United States free trade agreement to include a chapter devoted to \u201cdigital trade.\u201d3<\/a><\/sup>Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, Nov. 30, 2018; see Roy Blunt, USMCA: Where Things Stand, Senate Republican Pol\u2019y Comm. (Mar. 26, 2019), https:\/\/www.rpc.senate.gov\/policy-papers\/usmca-where-things-stand.<\/span> The USMCA provisions on digital trade build on the electronic commerce chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP, now CPTPP)\u2014a multilateral trade agreement that the Obama Administration negotiated, but the Trump Administration rejected.4<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The Coming North American Digital Trade Zone, Council on Foreign Rel. (Oct. 8, 2018), https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/blog\/coming-north-american-digital-trade-zone (observing that \u201cthe TPP is dead, long live the TPP\u201d).<\/span> As the United States continues to negotiate the conditions for its bilateral trade relationships, cybersecurity concerns are likely to feature in the discussions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    VOLUME 6 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    KING HENRY II AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    James W. Giddens<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    A significant portion of the failure that fueled the 2008 financial crisis has been attributed to a systemic lapse in senior executive oversight at the major financial institutions. Notwithstanding this failure, these executives have not been held personal liable for their \u201cKing Henry moments,\u201d instances where senior executives have allegedly been aware of, or turned a blind eye to, questionable acts that occurred on their watch\u2014often for the executives\u2019 own personal benefit. This Article outlines the current state of the law governing senior executive liability, summarizes recent headline events in the financial industry, and provides a series of recommendations for proportionate reforms to correct current incentive imbalances in the financial industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    VOLUME 3 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BUBBLE<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    Adam J. Levitin and Susan M. Wachter<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    Two parallel real estate bubbles emerged in the United States between 2004 and 2008, one in residential real estate, the other in commercial real estate. The residential real estate bubble has received a great deal of popular, scholarly, and policy attention. The commercial real estate bubble, in contrast, has largely been ignored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    VOLUME 3 \u2022 ISSUE 2 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    THE NON-EXPERT AGENCY: USING THE SEC TO REGULATE PARTISAN POLITICS<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    Bradley A. Smith and Allen Dickerson<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    Over the past 15 years advocates of campaign finance reform, frustrated by the structure and design of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), have at- tempted to offload the duties of campaign finance regulation to other federal agencies, most notably the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) but also the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Recently, these efforts have expanded to include the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    VOLUME 2 \u2022 ISSUE 2 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    QUIXOTIC REGULATION: SECTION 23A OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT AND CONTAINMENT OF THE FEDERAL SAFETY NET SUBSIDY<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    Randy Benjenk<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act imposes quantitative and qualitative limits on certain transactions between depository institutions and their non-depository affiliates. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve states that a purpose of Section 23A, along with Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, which mandates that depositories conduct affiliate transactions on arm\u2019s length terms, is to prevent any subsidy given to depositories by the federal safety net from leaking to their non-depository affiliates. Yet Section 23A does not stop subsidy from leaking to non-depository affiliates through mispriced transactions; Section 23B does this by mandating that depositories receive adequate compensation in affiliate transactions. Most importantly, neither Section 23A nor Section 23B can prevent subsidy from leaking through dividend transactions to non-depository affiliates or to shareholders. Thus, in this Note, I question the usefulness of restrictions on affiliate transactions and of restrictions on affiliations generally, concluding that the goal of containing subsidy should take a backseat to the goal of preventing subsidy from accruing to depository institutions in the first place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    VOLUME 2 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    OLD SINS AND LONG SHADOWS<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    Lee C. Buchheit<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    Old sins cast long shadows. In the world of sovereign debt, so apparently do new ones. It used to be that the period of time that elapsed between a serious policy mistake and the punishment for that transgression was generous\u2014at least long enough to allow the erring politicians to exit with a valedictory speech along the lines of \u201cjust remember that everything was okay when I left.\u201d Moralists must surely be pleased that one of the byproducts of modern financial integration is the speed with which fiscal policy mistakes are punished by the terrible, swift sword of market sentiment. Take the first deadly sin of fiscal policy: the decision to cover chronic budget deficits through borrowing, as opposed to the politically less popular measures of taxation or curtailment of public services. Once upon a time politicians could peddle deficits-don\u2019t-matter fairy tales for decades before the day of reckoning arrived in the form of sovereign downgrades, higher borrowing costs, and constrained market access. That period is now measured in years, occasionally (and embarrassingly) overtaking the very politicians who had spun the cotton candy in the first place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    VOLUME 2 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, POLITICS, AND THE SEC<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    Edward F. Greene<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    Publicly held corporations typically solicit votes or consents by proxy from their shareholders with respect to any proposed action requiring shareholder approval. This solicitation process involves the SEC because of its statutory role in overseeing disclosure in a company\u2019s proxy statement.1 During this process, the SEC acts as a gatekeeper that decides under its rules whether shareholders\u2019 proposals must be included in a company\u2019s proxy statement at the company\u2019s expense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    VOLUME 2 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    BRAZIL AND RUSSIA DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A TALE OF TWO COMMODITY EXPORTERS<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    Gaurav Toshniwal<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    Brazil and Russia were similarly placed on the eve of the recent financial crisis. Both countries were large middle-income commodity exporters with a shared history of vulnerability to financial contagion. Aided by the long commodities boom, both countries were thriving. They had accumulated large foreign exchange reserves, paid down their external public debt, and experienced rapid economic growth; it was the best of times. The collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing global financial panic changed this rosy picture. The crisis quickly spread to Brazil and Russia. Financial markets in both countries dropped precipitously, their respective currencies came under speculative attack, and their strong public sector financial positions deteriorated quickly; it was soon the worst of times. Nevertheless, Brazil\u2019s economic performance proved far more robust than Russia\u2019s during the crisis because of the country\u2019s relatively superior financial and macroeconomic regulation, as well as its deft crisis management. Compared to Russia, Brazil came out of the crisis with relatively stronger economic growth, more robust stock market performance, and greater policy flexibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    VOLUME 2 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    ECONOMIC CRISES AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN EUROPE<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    Ragnhildur Helgad\u00f3ttir<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    This article discusses the state reactions to financial crises from the point of view of domestic constitutional law and the main international obligations of European countries. State reactions in such circumstances have been very different, and so have the legal questions they raise. This article will describe the legal framework that applies to state action in such circumstances. Part 3 will briefly describe how Iceland reacted to its crisis in October 2008 and how courts and international organizations have dealt with its reactions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    VOLUME 1 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

    UNDERSTANDING THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE DEBT CRISIS<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
    Tanya D. Marsh<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

    The popular, if simplistic, understanding of the most recent economic crisis is that it was triggered by the bursting of an unprecedented residential real estate bubble. In this narrative, the bubble was caused by interrelated factors\u2014the irrational beliefs of homeowners that property values would continue to rise and the aggressive lending practices, which focused on maximizing the size and volume of loan originations at the expense of prudent underwriting. Although we see signs of a slow recovery, the bubble\u2019s collapse continues to have a destabilizing effect on every corner of our economy and society, from financial institutions struggling with \u201ctoxic assets\u201d on their balance sheets, to community disruption caused by residential foreclosures.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS THICKER THAN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Olivia Schwartz Saudi Arabia and the United States have a strong history […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":109,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-5255","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/PgKEUK-1mL","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":5257,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/technology-innovation\/","url_meta":{"origin":5255,"position":0},"title":"Technology & Innovation","author":"wgu","date":"February 15, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS THICKER THAN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Olivia Schwartz Saudi Arabia and the United States have a strong history together. 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Heaton Most commentary on climate-themed investment treats climate change as a one-way risk to brown assets from a hoped-for transition to a low-carbon economy. But the converse holds as well. Brown\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4672,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-9\/","url_meta":{"origin":5255,"position":5},"title":"Volume 9 (2018\u20132019)","author":"wgu","date":"May 9, 2019","format":false,"excerpt":"HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR SAVING LIVES THROUGH SHAMING Sharon Yadin The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) routinely employs shaming tactics toward employers, using public denunciations disseminated through social media, press releases, and online databases. These tactics, termed by the agency \u201cregulation by shaming,\u201d aim to name and shame companies\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/5255","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/109"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5255"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/5255\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5255"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}