{"id":5276,"date":"2025-02-15T20:30:29","date_gmt":"2025-02-16T01:30:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/?page_id=5276"},"modified":"2025-08-19T12:46:58","modified_gmt":"2025-08-19T16:46:58","slug":"environment-social-governance","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/environment-social-governance\/","title":{"rendered":"Environment, Social, & Governance"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

ACTIVISM ON HOLD: THE LEGAL BARRIERS TO SHAREHOLDER IMPACT LITIGATION<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Dennis Ronel1<\/a><\/sup>Dennis Ronel is a second-year student at Harvard Law School and serves as a Senior Editor and Columnist for the Harvard Business Law Review. He would like to thank Christopher Kies, Louis Noirault, and Professor Mariana Pargendler for their guidance and support in shap- ing the ideas for this paper.<\/span><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

In recent years, shareholder activism in the United States has surged, driven by the rise of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) policies and heightened corporate stewardship. This Column examines the challenges shareholder activists face when seeking to hold managers accountable through litigation, highlighting three key obstacles: the entrenched shareholder primacy doctrine, the protective nature of the business judgment rule, and the stringent evidentiary requirements under Delaware law. Despite the push for a broader stakeholder governance perspective, Delaware courts have historically favored management\u2019s authority, limiting the effectiveness of legal actions aimed at promoting progressive corporate change. I argue that, given these barriers, shareholder activists should reconsider their reliance on litigation and instead focus on reshaping corporate governance norms from within. There are indeed effective avenues for promoting corporate change, but this Column posits that litigation is not one of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 12 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

GOLDEN SHARES AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Naveen Thomas<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Social enterprises\u2014for-profit companies with public-interest missions\u2014 are now ubiquitous, yet few have emerged from the realm of small business. The main obstacle to their growth is a gap in trust between managers and investors, with each side lacking any legal assurance that the other will pursue both profits and purpose. Too often, these misgivings limit businesses\u2019 access to capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 12 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

BROWN ASSETS FOR THE PRUDENT INVESTOR<\/strong><\/a><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Alon Brav2<\/a><\/sup>Peterjohn-Richards Professor of Finance, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, ECGI, and National Bureau of Economic Research.<\/span> and J.B. Heaton3<\/a><\/sup>Managing Member, One Hat Research LLC.<\/span><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Most commentary on climate-themed investment treats climate change as a one-way risk to brown assets from a hoped-for transition to a low-carbon economy. But the converse holds as well. Brown assets could turn out to be highly valuable if the world fails to transition out of the high-carbon economy. This is true both because sentiment for green assets may cause brown assets to be underpriced (generating higher expected returns) and because brown assets may provide a valuable hedge against the costs of climate change in a world that failed to transition to a low-carbon economy. Given the lack of progress to date toward transition to a low-carbon economy, we argue that institutional investors subject to fiduciary duties of prudent investment (including the duty to diversify) cannot yet justify divestment from brown assets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 9 \u2022 ISSUE 2 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

WOKE CAPITAL: THE ROLE OF CAPITALISM IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Jennifer S. Fan<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Iconic companies such as Apple, BlackRock, Delta, Google (now Alphabet), Lyft, Salesforce, and Starbucks, have recently taken very public stances on various social issues. In the past, corporations were largely silent in the face of them. Now the opposite is true corporations play an increasingly visible role in social movements and there are times when corporations have led the discussion, particularly in areas where they have a self-interest or public opinion supports it. The enormous influence corporations wield on both the economic and social fabric of our society due to the legal framework and norms under which they operate make them uniquely positioned to affect the outcome of social movements \u2014 for better or worse. The contribution of this Article is threefold: it discusses how court cases and changing norms about the role of the corporation in society led to the rise of the modern business corporation, which in turn laid the groundwork for corporations\u2019 involvement in social movements; provides an original descriptive account of the role of corporations in social movements using three case studies and the ways in which corporations have helped or hindered such movements; and tackles the underlying normative question about the appropriateness of the involvement of corporations in social movements in light of the legal framework in which it resides. This Article concludes that despite the perils, corporate law holds the promise of being a force for social change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 6 \u2022 ISSUE 1 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

THE CONFLICT MINERALS EXPERIMENT<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Jeff Schwartz<\/strong><\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

In Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress instructed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to draft rules that would require public companies to report annually on whether their products contain certain Congolese minerals. This unprecedented legislation and the SEC rulemaking that followed have inspired an impassioned and ongoing debate between those who view these efforts as a costly misstep and those who view them as a measured response to human rights abuses committed by the armed groups that control many mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 5 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

WHEN IS RENEWABLE NOT RENEWABLE? THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LAWS DENYING NEW LARGE CANADIAN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS TREATMENT AS RENEWABLE RESOURCES<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Harvey L. Reiter<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Over the past fifteen years, many states\u2014twenty-nine at last count\u2014have adopted renewable portfolio standards (RPS) as a means both to reduce their dependence on imported fossil fuels and to combat climate change. To comply with these standards, electric utilities must demonstrate that a significant minimum percentage of their supply portfolios will consist of renewable resources by the various target dates specified in state law. Most states affirmatively describe what counts as renewable resources\u2014wind, geothermal, and solar energy are commonly referenced in RPS legislation. But some state RPS laws also contain negative provisions, excluding from eligibility what otherwise would surely be considered renewable resources. Laws of this type amount to hidden barriers to power imports from Canada, the only source of electricity from new large-scale hydroelectric facilities. This article explains why the restrictions are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and bad for consumers and the environment, and why other states should follow the lead of Vermont and Wisconsin and modify their statutes to permit power from large hydroelectric projects to be treated as a renewable resource under their RPS laws.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 4 \u2022 ISSUE 2 \u2022 PRINT<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE INNOVATION: DELAWARE\u2019S PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
J. Haskell Murray<\/em><\/strong><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Delaware has innovated in the benefit corporation area by creating its own statutory framework to compete with the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (the \u201cModel\u201d), and when Delaware talks, other states listen.  This Article provides a comparative analysis of Delaware\u2019s Public Benefit Corporation (\u201cPBC\u201d) law and the Model, and suggests that Delaware\u2019s approach is superior in most areas. Despite Delaware\u2019s superiority, this Article also calls for policymakers to consider amendments to Delaware\u2019s PBC statute, including clarifying the priority of the specific public benefit purpose, requiring a partial-asset lock, imposing a charitable giving floor, providing more effective enforcement mechanisms, and reconfiguring the current re- porting requirements. Social enterprise legal forms are extraordinarily recent additions to the list of possible business entity types. While Delaware\u2019s PBC law is likely to have significant influence on social enterprise statutes, continued innovation in this field, from inside and outside of Delaware, is both likely and necessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 4 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
David B. Raskin<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Recent published reports point toward a growing conviction that the demand for utility service from the U.S. electric grid may soon decline, perhaps substantially, due to the expanding use of distributed generation. If distributed generation comes to play a significant role, the loss of demand for service from the grid may eventually make it difficult for the owners of grid assets to recover their costs, creating what the utility industry calls \u201cstranded costs.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 4 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

INVESTING IN U.S. PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE: COULD THE PROPOSED MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS PARITY ACT SPUR NEW INVESTMENT?<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Linda E. Carlisle, Daniel A. Hagan & Jane E. Rueger<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

This Article explores combining the traditional oil and gas pipeline structure with solar electric generation to: (1) increase the return on pipeline investments by making the income from a solar electric generation business available to pipeline operators; and (2) lower the cost of operating the pipeline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 3 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

WHY ARE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN DOMESTIC ENERGY PROJECTS NOW UNDER CFIUS SCRUTINY?<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Stephen Heifetz and Michael Gershberg<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

CFIUS now actively reviews and sometimes alters transactions that result in foreign control of U.S. energy companies. There are three primary drivers behind this recent scrutiny.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 3 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

UNREASONABLE DELAYS: CFIUS REVIEWS OF ENERGY TRANSACTIONS<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Joshua C. Zive (April 18, 2013)<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Unfortunately, delays and burdens associated with CFIUS are playing an increasingly significant and frustrating role in energy transactions. These delays frustrate the intended role of CFIUS review and make it unnecessarily difficult for energy transactions to be designed and executed in an efficient manner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 3 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

THE PRIVATE ROLE IN PUBLIC FRACTURING DISCLOSURE AND REGULATION<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Hannah J. Wiseman<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Recent domestic growth in oil and gas natural gas production from shales and sandstones called \u201ctight\u201d formations\u2014largely enabled by a modified technology called slickwater hydraulic fracturing\u2014has driven both economic growth and environmental concerns. Public concerns have often focused on the chemicals used in the fracturing process, yet federal regulations requiring disclosure of chemicals are weak. In the midst of initial \u201cthreats\u201d of federal intervention, industry\u2014along with state regulators\u2014developed a website that enabled chemical disclosure. State regulations later mandated disclosure through this website, or allowed it as one option within a mandatory disclosure regime. Independently, gas companies also have begun to experiment with less toxic fracturing chemicals and to take other substantive efforts toward identifying and limiting the risks of tight oil and gas development. This example of a public-private effort to enhance informational access in fracturing, and to make limited substantive changes, may offer important lessons for other oil and gas regulation moving forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 3 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

SIXTH CIRCUIT PUSHES BACK ON EPA OIL AND GAS SOURCE AGGREGATION UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
William Bumpers and Paulina Williams<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

On August 7, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit) issued an opinion that has significant Clean Air Act (CAA) regulatory implications for oil and gas development projects. In Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, the court vacated an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determination that Summit Petroleum Corporation\u2019s natural gas sweetening plant and sour gas production wells spread over forty-three square miles constituted a single stationary source for CAA permitting purposes. The Summit Petroleum case is encouraging for oil and gas developers whose operations are often spread over substantial areas, though EPA indicates it does not intend to extend the decision\u2019s reach beyond the Sixth Circuit at this time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 3 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHALE GAS REVOLUTION FOR THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Mark R. Haskell and Levi McAllister<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Shale gas has the potential to create new producing regions, but it requires the creation of new infrastructure or the redesign and redeployment of existing infrastructure to access markets. Shale gas also carries with it the potential for the transformative disruption of existing supply and transportation networks. This article explores some of the implications of the \u201cshale gas revolution.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 3 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

AMERICA’S NATURAL GAS: FROM SHALE GAS TO LNG EXPORTS<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Susan Sakmar<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration\u2019s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook 2012, U.S. natural gas production is expected to increase almost twenty-nine percent from 21.6 trillion cubic feet in 2010 to 27.9 trillion cubic feet in 2035. Much has been written about shale gas being either an \u201cenergy game changer\u201d or an environmental hazard depending on whom you ask. In contrast, far less attention has been focused on whether the U.S. should export its newfound abundance of shale gas as liquefied natural gas (LNG) to foreign countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
VOLUME 2 \u2022 COLUMNS<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

CONFLICT MINERALS AND SEC DISCLOSURE REGULATION<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Celia R. Taylor<\/em><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Mention the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (\u201cDodd-Frank\u201d or the \u201cAct\u201d), and most people think of legislation aimed at \u201cfundamental reform of the financial system\u201d focused on regulation of Wall Street practices and complex financial products.  But tucked within the voluminous text of the Act (which consists of 2,300 pages and stipulates the passage of 387 rules by 20 different agencies) is a provision having nothing to do with these issues or anything remotely related to them.  Instead the \u201cconflict minerals\u201d provision of the Act requires companies that are subject to the reporting requirement of the federal securities laws to disclose whether they manufacture products using so-called \u201cconflict minerals\u201d sourced from the Democratic Republic of Congo (\u201cDRC\u201d) or contiguous countries.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS ACTIVISM ON HOLD: THE LEGAL BARRIERS TO SHAREHOLDER IMPACT LITIGATION Dennis Ronel In recent years, shareholder […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":109,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-5276","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/PgKEUK-1n6","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":4916,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-12\/","url_meta":{"origin":5276,"position":0},"title":"Volume 12 (2021-2022)","author":"wgu","date":"February 26, 2022","format":false,"excerpt":"ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, & GOVERNANCE \u2022 INVESTING & ASSET MANAGEMENT BROWN ASSETS FOR THE PRUDENT INVESTOR Alon Brav and J.B. Heaton Most commentary on climate-themed investment treats climate change as a one-way risk to brown assets from a hoped-for transition to a low-carbon economy. But the converse holds as well. Brown\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":5258,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/corporate-law-governance\/","url_meta":{"origin":5276,"position":1},"title":"Corporate Law & Governance","author":"wgu","date":"February 15, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"VOLUME 15 \u2022 COLUMNS THE DUAL CLASS DILEMMA AND THE SUNSET-CLAUSE SOLUTION\u00a0 Adrian Brown The desirability of dual-class stock has been a source of substantial controversy. Some scholars, commentators, and industry participants are wholly in favor of such arrangements. Others are wholly opposed. While neither of these diametrically opposed views\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":5315,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/","url_meta":{"origin":5276,"position":2},"title":"HOME","author":"wgu","date":"February 16, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"FEATURED ESSAY \u2022 SECURITIES & FINANCIAL REGULATION CAN SECTION 11 BE SAVED?: \u201cTRACING\u201d A PATH TO ITS SURVIVAL John C. Coffee, Jr. & Joshua Mitts Last term, a unanimous Supreme Court held in Slack Techs. v Pirani that purchasers of securities must \u201ctrace\u201d their shares to the registration statement that\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4672,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/hblr-online-volume-9\/","url_meta":{"origin":5276,"position":3},"title":"Volume 9 (2018\u20132019)","author":"wgu","date":"May 9, 2019","format":false,"excerpt":"HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR SAVING LIVES THROUGH SHAMING Sharon Yadin The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) routinely employs shaming tactics toward employers, using public denunciations disseminated through social media, press releases, and online databases. These tactics, termed by the agency \u201cregulation by shaming,\u201d aim to name and shame companies\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":5167,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-15-masthead\/","url_meta":{"origin":5276,"position":4},"title":"Volume 15 Masthead (2025)","author":"wgu","date":"November 15, 2024","format":false,"excerpt":"Volume XV, Issues I\u2013III Presidents & Editors-in-ChiefJoseph Ravenna IVSavannah Grace Huitema Managing Submissions EditorJuan Carlos Infante Managing ColumnistSneha Durairaj Executive Submissions EditorsNoah SpicerDerek WuWilliam MarksGabriella Mestre Submissions EditorsFiona DoyleNoah WintmanAlex GeyelinEden VanceRobert PedersenLouis NoiraultErica ChenChristine ScottMahima MenghaniLev Lascu Sponsorship DirectorsOlivia SchwartzMatthew Hirschfeld Sponsorship Committee MembersColin RobinsonRohit NairLindsey PerlmanAlex GeyelinNoah WintmanMaria\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":5399,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-11-editors-in-chief\/","url_meta":{"origin":5276,"position":5},"title":"Volume 11 Editors-in-Chief","author":"wgu","date":"September 6, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text] Saba Sadri & Autumn Simpson [\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]Saba Sadri and Autumn Simpson served as the editors-in-chief of the Harvard Business Law Review from 2020 to 2021. Saba Sadri received his J.D. from Harvard Law School; his M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School at Tufts University; and his B.A. from the University of\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/5276","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/109"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5276"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/5276\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5276"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}