{"id":5558,"date":"2026-09-03T23:05:29","date_gmt":"2026-09-04T03:05:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/?page_id=5558"},"modified":"2026-09-03T23:15:00","modified_gmt":"2026-09-04T03:15:00","slug":"volume-16-2025-2026","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-16-2025-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Volume 16 (2025-2026)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

BEYOND A MERE TECHNICALITY: IMPACT OF NEW SEC GUIDANCE REGARDING SCHEDULE 13G ELIGIBILITY<\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Mihaela Esanu<\/h6>\n\n\n\n

Regulation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (\u201cSEC\u201d) shapes interactions between shareholders and companies\u2019 management. One of the most influential tools at the SEC\u2019s disposal is its oversight of reports regarding ownership interests on Schedule 13D and 13G. Although institutional investors have traditionally relied on the streamlined Schedule 13G, the new guidance issued by the SEC makes it harder for investors to remain eligible for 13G filing. Expanding the scope of 13G-disqualifying actions, the new guidance has a tangible impact on all actors in the corporate sphere, including shareholders, Board directors and officers, proxy advisory firms, and activists. Advocates of the new guidance portray it as a common-sense interpretation of longstanding rules, while critics point to its inadvertent consequences such as the chilling of engagement and the rise in influence of proxy advisors. After conducting a multi-stakeholder-centric analysis of the new guidance, this piece will consider how the new guidance may result in underinvestments in engagement activities. The piece also puts the new guidance in the context of other SEC policy changes and takes a forward-looking approach, considering the adaptive mechanisms employed by capital markets participants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

THE RISE OF THE PRACQUISITION: WHY BIG TECH IS AVOIDING M&A<\/a><\/strong><\/em><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Annabelle Diana Hutchinson<\/h6>\n\n\n\n

In a pracquisition, an acquiror hires a target\u2019s key talent and licenses its intellectual property, effectively gaining the target\u2019s core value without formally acquiring it. Since it is \u201cpractically an acquisition,\u201d a pracquisition serves as a structural alternative to traditional M&A structures and promotes deal efficiency while also providing a workaround to antitrust scrutiny. Companies engaging in the practice achieve similar goals as traditional M&A without the regulatory roadblocks and costs typically associated with a normal acquisition, representing a shift in dealmaking strategy with market-wide ramifications for companies, investors, and regulators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Faculty Features Column<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

PROFESSOR ROBERTO TALLARITA<\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Alexander Siegenthaler<\/h6>\n\n\n\n

What follows is the result of an hour-long conversation with Roberto Tallarita, Assistant Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. We discussed his work, from current trends in corporate governance to an application of legal philosophy to contemporary debates. We further discussed recent events in Delaware and Texas, as well as Professor Tallarita\u2019s work in the classroom. This conversation has been added for clarity and length, with citations added to assist the reader.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

BEYOND A MERE TECHNICALITY: IMPACT OF NEW SEC GUIDANCE REGARDING SCHEDULE 13G ELIGIBILITY Mihaela Esanu Regulation by the U.S. Securities […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":230,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"footnotes":"","_members_access_role":[],"_members_access_error":""},"class_list":["post-5558","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/PgKEUK-1rE","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":4129,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-6-issue-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":5558,"position":0},"title":"Volume 6, Issue 1 (2016)","author":"ehansen","date":"June 5, 2016","format":false,"excerpt":"INVESTING & ASSET MANAGEMENT \u2022 CORPORATE LAW & GOVERNANCE DISENTANGLING MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE FROM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Eric D. 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George S. Georgiev This Article suggests that the ubiquitous \u201cpublic company\u201d regulatory category, as currently constructed, has outlived its effectiveness in fulfilling core goals of the modern administrative state. An ever-expanding array of federal economic regulation hinges on public\u2026","rel":"","context":"Similar post","block_context":{"text":"Similar post","link":""},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4778,"url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hblr\/volume-10-issue-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":5558,"position":3},"title":"Volume 10, Issue 1","author":"wgu","date":"March 27, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"LEGAL & REGULATORY COMPLIANCE THE UNTENABLE CASE FOR KEEPING INVESTORS IN THE DARK Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson Jr., James D. Nelson & Roberto Tallarita This Article seeks to contribute to the heated debate on the disclosure of political spending by public companies. 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