Rochelle-Leigh (Shelley) Rosenberg<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n \u201cI don\u2019t think they will ever reinvent the wheel. And the difference between this moment until the moment of reaching an agreement will be how many names–Palestinians and Israelis–will be added to the lists of death and agony. At the end of the day, there will be peace.\u201d–Saeb Erekat<\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/em>\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n On July 24, 2000, after fourteen straight days of negotiations at the Camp David II presidential retreat, President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Yasir Arafat returned to their respective countries unable to reach a deal. Despite the summit\u2019s failure to produce a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in accordance with the 1993 Oslo Agreements, Arafat requested another meeting. Nearly five months later, the parties reconvened at the White House on December 19, 2000, and following separate meetings with both parties, Clinton offered his last proposal. Barak, who had wagered his political career on the potential deal, endorsed it. Arafat made no counteroffer and gave no explanation. Instead, he simply walked away.<\/p>\n Arafat\u2019s exit shocked the world: \u201cArafat\u2019s decision to walk away from these offers, effectively ending the Oslo peace process and inflaming the burgeoning second intifada . . . stunned the U.S. and Israeli leaders.\u201d[1]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> Shortly after, in his New York Times<\/em> column \u201cForeign Affairs; Yasir Arafat\u2019s Moment,\u201d Thomas Friedman explained to the American public that Arafat \u201cplayed rope-a-dope. He came with no compromise ideas of his own on Jerusalem. He simply absorbed Mr. Barak’s proposals and repeated Palestinian mantras about recovering all of East Jerusalem.\u201d[2]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> Even Arab leaders admitted that they were caught off guard when Arafat cut off negotiations.[3]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> In his autobiography, My Life, Clinton reflected on an exchange he had with Arafat upon his abrupt departure. \u201cYou are a great man,\u201d Arafat told Clinton after Camp David II. Clinton responded, \u201cI am not a great man. I am a failure, and you have made me one.\u201d[4]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n This paper examines the failure of Camp David II from a negotiation perspective. For the purposes of this paper, Barak and Arafat represent the nations of Israel and Palestine, theoretically unified entities. It should also be noted that due to the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this paper takes a simplistic view of the hypothetical unified parties\u2019 primary interests at a single point in time. It begins with a sketch of each party\u2019s primary interest. It then evaluates why the Clinton proposal did not offer a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA).[5]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> The paper concludes with suggestions for use in future negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians in the hope that one day a \u201cfinal settlement\u201d will be reached.<\/p>\n CONTINUE READING HERE<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n [1]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> Russell Korobkin & Jonathan Zasloff, Roadblocks to the Roadmap: A Negotiation Theory Perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict After Yasser Arafat<\/em>,30 Yale J. Int\u2019l L. 1, 24 (2005).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [2]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs; Yasir Arafat\u2019s moment, <\/em>N.Y. Times, July 28, 2000, www.nytimes. com\/2000\/07\/28\/opinion\/foreign-affairs-yasir-arafat-s-moment.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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