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Although the issue has not yet gained the prominence of its Iranian analogue, it is essential to begin conducting a sober analysis of whether the benefits of negotiating with the Taliban outweigh the costs. <\/span>While there are many negotiations relevant to the Afghan War\u2014between the U.S. and its NATO allies, between the U.S. and the Afghan and Pakistani governments, and between the Pakistanis and the Taliban\u2014this paper will focus on whether the United States, together with its allies in Kabul or NATO, should negotiate with the Taliban. <\/span><\/p>\n To bring a coherent logic to the complexities of this cost-benefit analysis, I will apply the decision-making framework described by Professors Mnookin and Blum in their article \u201cWhen Not<\/em> to Negotiate\u201d and elaborated upon in Professor Mnookin\u2019s forthcoming book, Bargaining with the Devil<\/em>. <\/span>This framework focuses the inquiry on five key issues: 1) the parties\u2019 prioritized interests, 2) their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), 3) potential negotiated outcomes, 4) the probability of implementation, and 5) the direct and indirect costs of negotiation. <\/span>The framework then focuses on the related considerations of legitimacy and morality. <\/span>Mnookin and Blum argue that while we should not always \u201cbargain with the devil,\u201d our ingrained biases often lead us to reject negotiation prematurely, and we should therefore establish a rebuttable presumption in favor of negotiating.[1]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>With this in mind, I conclude that although it may indeed be too soon for direct talks between the U.S. and the Taliban, it is not too soon for indirect talks to probe the Taliban\u2019s interests and to seek a path to a zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) and a mutually beneficial outcome.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Current Context for Negotiations<\/em><\/p>\n As President Obama orders more troops to Afghanistan, the Taliban are making strategic gains in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.[2]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>In February, even while U.S. drones stepped up attacks on Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas in northwestern Pakistan, the Taliban effectively subdued the Pakistani military in the Swat Valley. <\/span>This demoralizing defeat prompted Islamabad to negotiate an agreement with the Taliban, effectively ceding a large swath of territory in central Pakistan, allowing the Taliban to impose Sharia law and institute measures that included closing girls\u2019 schools, banning music, and installing \u201ccomplaint boxes for reports of anti-Islamic behavior.\u201d[3]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n Even so, preliminary talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban have also taken place, albeit indirectly.[4]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>But the Taliban claim that they will refuse to negotiate until all foreign forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan.[5]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>Meanwhile, a State Department spokesman indicated that the Karzai government had set its own conditions that reportedly included \u201ca renunciation of violence, acceptance of Afghanistan\u2019s democratic Constitution and a repudiation of Al Qaeda\u2014all terms the Taliban leadership has rejected.\u201d[6]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>Another State Department official referred to preconditions including the exclusion from talks of any member of the Taliban linked to 9-11 and the exclusion from the agenda of proposals concerning power sharing or land swaps.[7]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n Into this morass of positional bargaining now steps Richard Holbrooke, a veteran diplomat and President Clinton\u2019s chief negotiator during the Bosnian War. <\/span> <\/span>In contrast to his mediation in Bosnia, his \u201cAfpak\u201d assignment promises a new breed of interlocutors: a loose coalition of Taliban and other militant groups, operating largely behind the Pakistani border, and perhaps unwilling or unable to implement any long-term agreement. <\/span>With so much uncertainty, how to decide whether to negotiate with the Taliban?<\/p>\n The Parties\u2019 Prioritized Interests<\/em><\/p>\n As opposed to the wide-ranging interests involved in the Iranian case (for example, nonproliferation, containing oil prices, and protecting Israel), in Afghanistan the U.S. is interested primarily in maintaining its own security at the lowest possible cost in blood and treasure. <\/span>Related interests include setting a strong precedent in the wider fight against terrorism, and providing for the development of Afghanistan in a manner that improves America\u2019s international standing and minimizes the risk that Afghanistan later backslides into a failed state.<\/p>\n The Taliban, too, have relatively simple interests. <\/span>First, they have a strong interest in survival\u2014as an organization and as individuals. <\/span>Second, the Taliban and its members have an interest in retaining influence and prosperity following the ultimate withdrawal of foreign forces. <\/span>This interest in power extends to a financial interest and an interest in good public relations.<\/p>\n The Parties\u2019 Alternatives<\/em><\/p>\n Since the parties already find themselves in the midst of war, the basic alternatives to a negotiated agreement are the continuation of war or an American withdrawal. <\/span>Theoretically, the Taliban could surrender or be destroyed, but these outcomes seem relatively unlikely; as General Petraeus has noted, \u201cYou don’t kill or capture your way out of an industrial strength insurgency.\u201d[8]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>It would seem that time is on the side of the Taliban regarding BATNAs, as no foreign power has ever successfully maintained control of Afghanistan or imposed central rule.[9]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n To improve its BATNA, the U.S. must fill the power and legitimacy vacuum in Afghanistan in which President Karzai is essentially reduced to the role of the corrupt \u201cmayor of Kabul.\u201d[10]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>Before the U.S. withdraws under any scenario, the power of the Kabul government must be increased, warlords must be supported, or regional powers must step in to fill the vacuum. <\/span>Clearly, the most acceptable alternative is to empower Kabul to legitimately govern the country as a whole, but it remains to be seen if this will be possible.<\/p>\n Potential Negotiated Outcomes<\/em><\/p>\n It appears that a ZOPA will emerge only when the Obama administration determines that the security and international standing of the U.S. would not be unduly threatened by allowing a critical mass of \u201creconcilable\u201d Taliban members to maintain some measure of power in Afghanistan. <\/span>Determining whether U.S. security and reputational interests would be unduly threatened by such a negotiated outcome entails a balancing test between those interests and the administrations\u2019 other interests, including financial and domestic political interests. <\/span><\/p>\n The extent of both the critical mass of Taliban reconcilables and the power that they maintain depends largely on the parties\u2019 evaluation of their BATNAs at the time of the negotiation. <\/span>If negotiations were to occur now, President Obama would be playing with a weak hand. <\/span>The Taliban\u2019s recent gains, the ubiquitous perception of the incompetence and corruption of the Karzai administration, and the worldwide financial crisis all signal that the Taliban\u2019s BATNA is superior to that of the U.S. and its allies. <\/span>If it were to set an early deadline for a negotiated agreement with the Taliban, the U.S. could expect to obtain little more than a \u201cdecent interval\u201d between a withdrawal and Taliban recidivism\u2014perhaps by providing sanctuary to Al-Qaeda or denying women education and medical care.[11]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>Significantly, the U.S. would probably have to offer the Taliban some degree of autonomy from Afghanistan\u2019s central government.<\/p>\n However, if negotiations were to occur (or continue) beyond a short-term time horizon, the U.S. could potentially change the game by improving its BATNA and reducing the attractiveness of the Taliban\u2019s BATNA. <\/span>Under such negotiating circumstances, the U.S. may succeed in splitting off a critical mass of \u201creconcilables\u201d\u2014i.e. dissident Pashtuns affiliated with the Taliban\u2014from the \u201cirreconcilables\u201d\u2014a core of extremist ideologues. <\/span>Theoretically, if this \u201cdivide and conquer\u201d strategy were to work, the U.S. may need only \u201cconquer\u201d the irreconcilables, while paying off the reconcilable Pashtuns as it did with the Sunnis in Iraq.<\/p>\n Implementation<\/em><\/p>\n Even if the Obama administration could negotiate a satisfactory agreement with the Taliban members it determined to be reconcilables, there is reason to doubt whether such an agreement could be implemented in Afghanistan. <\/span>For example, New York Times<\/em> correspondent Dexter Filkins explains that while Iraq is still a tribal society in which \u201ca big bag of money\u201d given to a tribal leader can effectively \u201cdeliver the tribe,\u201d Afghanistan is a country that \u201chas been at war for thirty years and has been decimated and atomized\u2014old tribal networks have been completely attenuated.\u201d[12]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>Similarly, Noah Feldman argues that, in contrast to the Iraqi tribal structure which was built by the British to deliver patronage, \u201cAfghanistan\u2019s tribes\u2014a term that covers everything from large confederations to cousin-networks and extended families\u2014are not natural vehicles for creating loyalty to a central government.\u201d[13]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n While many question whether the current split between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza rules out any prospect of implementing an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, Afghanistan\u2019s fissures appear more numerous than those between the Palestinian factions. <\/span>The fissures of most direct relevance to the issue of implementation are those within the Taliban reconcilables themselves. <\/span>Is there anyone who can speak for the reconcilables as a whole and deliver their compliance with a negotiated agreement? <\/span>At the very least, this hypothetical representative would have to be free of any direct link to the September 11 attacks.<\/p>\n The recent Pakistan-Taliban ceasefire agreement in Swat\u2014evidently unacceptable in substance\u2014also provides an example of the procedural challenges involved in attempting to peel reconcilables away from irreconcilables. <\/span>There, the Pakistani government brokered the cease-fire agreement \u201cwith an aging Islamic leader, Maulana Sufi Muhammad,\u201d viewing the negotiation \u201cas a way to separate what it considered to be more approachable militants, like Muhammad, from hard-line Taliban leaders like Maulana Fazlullah, his son-in-law.\u201d[14]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>Thus far, it appears that the Taliban have not implemented the terms of this agreement.[15]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n Direct and Indirect Costs<\/em><\/p>\n In addition to the potential benefits of a negotiated agreement relative to the parties\u2019 BATNA, it is also necessary to calculate the costs \u201cincurred by the negotiation process itself, regardless of whether a deal is ultimately made.\u201d[16]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>Since the U.S.\u2019s BATNA is extremely unappealing, the costs of negotiating must reach a very high threshold to rule out negotiations, especially given Mnookin\u2019s rebuttable presumption in favor of negotiating.<\/p>\n The direct costs of negotiating with the Taliban reconcilables include the time, money, and manpower spent in seeking out\u2014perhaps even helping to consolidate\u2014and then negotiating with the reconcilables. <\/span>Even if Mr. Holbrooke is granted sufficient latitude to avoid conferring routinely with an overworked administration, presumably there are opportunity costs to pursuing a strategy of negotiation with the Taliban\u2014as opposed to having his team focus on working with Pakistan, NATO allies, or the Afghan government. <\/span>Direct costs would also include any information that may be disclosed to the Taliban during the negotiation. <\/span>For example, if there were an American presence at the negotiating table while the U.S.\u2019s BATNA remained unattractive, the Taliban may perceive that the U.S. has been weakened and ready to withdrawal.<\/p>\n The indirect costs of negotiating with the Taliban reconcilables include the signal it may send \u201cbehind the table\u201d to U.S. allies and domestic constituents. <\/span>If the Obama administration were to walk out on the negotiations, it may then face increased difficulty in convincing its allies and its constituents of the necessity to continue the war well into the future. <\/span>In negotiating with the Taliban, the U.S. may also have to incur the indirect cost of setting a precedent that the U.S. will now \u201cnegotiate with terrorists.\u201d <\/span>To minimize this cost, the Obama administration could initiate negotiations secretly and ultimately rebrand its negotiation partners as \u201creconcilables,\u201d \u201cPashtun rebels,\u201d or Taliban \u201caffiliates.\u201d <\/span>Also, as a toppled government, the Taliban may be distinguishable from, for example, hijackers, or purely non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda.<\/p>\n Questions of Legitimacy and Morality<\/em><\/p>\n Closely related to the indirect costs of the negotiation process are questions of legitimacy and morality. <\/span>Mnookin and Blum note that \u201c[p]roviding a counterpart with \u2018a place at the table\u2019 acknowledges their existence, and (to some degree) the validity of their interests and claims.\u201d[17]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>The U.S. may indeed find it necessary to acknowledge the validity of the interests of some Pashtuns who have seen their relatives killed and property destroyed during the war, but it should be able to distinguish these cases from the extremism of the Taliban ideology. <\/span>Alternatively, the U.S. could negotiate entirely through the Afghan government or try to keep its role secret.<\/p>\n A related concern is avoiding the perception that the U.S. is rewarding past bad behavior. <\/span>But, in the words of Yitzhak Rabin, \u201cYou don’t make peace with friends, you make peace with very unsavory enemies\u201d\u2014enemies that have necessarily engaged in bad behavior in waging war against you.[18]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>Presumably, few states will emulate the Taliban in providing safe haven to terrorists simply because the U.S. may be expected to negotiate after seven years of war.<\/p>\n Conclusion: Should the US Negotiate with the Taliban?<\/em><\/p>\n The U.S. must pursue numerous strategies if it is to fulfill its objectives in Afghanistan: <\/span>it must convince Pakistan to increase its pressure on the Taliban in the tribal areas, compel NATO allies to dedicate more troops to Afghanistan, and build the capacity of the Afghan government to provide much-needed services to its people in order to lure them back from the appeal of authoritarian stability. <\/span>These strategies are not alternatives to a negotiated agreement, but rather complements to negotiating with the reconcilables. <\/span>Barring total victory for the U.S. over a pervasive, locally-based force, the question is not whether<\/em> we will negotiate with the Taliban, but when<\/em>, under what circumstances<\/em>, and with which members<\/em>? <\/span>It may indeed be too soon to push for direct talks with the Taliban because the conditions are not yet ripe to negotiate an acceptable outcome for the U.S., and serious costs may result. <\/span>But it is probably never too soon for indirect talks, in order to feel out the Taliban\u2019s interests and seek a path to a ZOPA\u2014all while striving to increase bargaining power by improving the U.S.\u2019s BATNA and decreasing the attractiveness of the Taliban\u2019s BATNA.<\/p>\n Andrew Blandford is a joint degree student at Harvard Law School and the Harvard Kennedy School focusing on international law and international relations. He can be reached at ablandford@law.harvard.edu<\/a>.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n \n [1]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> Gabriella Blum & Robert H. Mnookin, When Not to Negotiate<\/em>, in The ABA Negotiator’s Fieldbook, 101<\/span> (Andrea K. Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
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