{"id":207,"date":"2009-09-01T14:20:38","date_gmt":"2009-09-01T21:20:38","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/?p=207"},"modified":"2013-11-23T18:29:56","modified_gmt":"2013-11-24T01:29:56","slug":"power-and-trust-in-negotiation-and-decision-making-a-critical-evaluation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/2009\/09\/power-and-trust-in-negotiation-and-decision-making-a-critical-evaluation\/","title":{"rendered":"Power and Trust in Negotiation and Decision-Making: A Critical Evaluation"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"hands\"By <\/em>Yan Ki Bonnie Cheng<\/p>\n

I. <\/span><\/span><\/em>Introduction <\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

This <\/span>paper<\/span> critical<\/span>ly<\/span> <\/span>evaluates the impact of<\/span> <\/span>power<\/span> and <\/span>trust<\/span> <\/span>on<\/span> negotiation <\/span>and<\/span> decision-making.* \u201c<\/span>[A]<\/span> basic fact about negotiation, which could well be easily forgotten, is that [one is] dealing not with abstract representatives of the \u2018other side\u2019, but with human beings.\u201d<\/a> It is therefore unsurprising that human phenomena <\/span>like<\/span> power and trust should <\/span>have a<\/span> significant <\/span>influence in the process.<\/span> <\/span>These phenomena,<\/span> however<\/span>,<\/span> are<\/span> <\/span>broad<\/span>,<\/span> complex<\/span>, and often defined so abstractly that their importance may escape our attention. This paper therefore advocates <\/span>a more nuanced understanding of power and trust in negotiation and decision-making. Before <\/span>this<\/span> is attempted,<\/span> <\/span>two major concepts <\/span>\u2013 <\/span>negotiation and decision-making<\/span> \u2013 will be explained.<\/span><\/p>\n

Negotiation takes place in a <\/span>variety<\/span> of contexts. Thompson <\/span>defines it<\/span> as \u201can interpersonal decision-making process necessary whenever we cannot achieve our objectives single-heartedly.\u201d<\/a> Looking at <\/span>international<\/span> <\/span>negotiation specifically<\/span>, Kremenyuk proposes three paradigms to capture what he views as an evolving concept \u2013 negotiation as \u201cpart of a bigger strategy,\u201d \u201ca means of communication,\u201d and \u201ca decision-making process.\u201d<\/a> This <\/span>paper<\/span> will <\/span>evaluate<\/span> the <\/span>impact<\/span> of power and trust <\/span>in<\/span> <\/span>these <\/span>different <\/span>contexts but <\/span>will focus on negotiation as a decision-making mechanism. <\/span><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

II. <\/span>Power<\/span><\/em><\/em><\/p>\n

Power is said to pervade<\/span> all facets of negotiation.<\/a> Indeed, the very idea of negotiation intuitively conjure<\/span>s <\/span>images of power contests and tough bargaining. However, a more comprehensive understanding of power reveals how it<\/span> <\/span>actually influences negotiation and decision-making. Th<\/span>is section <\/span>will analyze power as a structure, strategy, <\/span>and<\/span> approach to negotiation, and examples of different sources and forms of power will<\/span> <\/span>shed light on this complex phenomenon.<\/span><\/p>\n

A. <\/span>As <\/span><\/em>structure and strategy<\/span><\/em><\/em><\/p>\n

The conception of power as underpinning the basic structure of negotiation originates from the structuralist tradition, <\/span>which proposes that <\/span>negotiation <\/span>begins<\/span> with a certain distribution of power among the parties.<\/a> This initial <\/span>distribution<\/span> is said to color the entire bargaining process and <\/span>determine<\/span> the eventual outcome.<\/a> For example, studies <\/span>have shown <\/span>that stronger <\/span>countries<\/span> (such as the United States) typically dominate exchanges with their less powerful counterparts.<\/a> Based on how much power each party possesses, the structure of a negotiation can be further classified as one of power symmetry or asymmetry.<\/a> <\/span>P<\/span>ower asymmetry is the most common structural setting for international negotiation.<\/a> Trade relations between the global North and South, for instance, are generally seen as asymmetrical given the North\u2019s superior economic power. Structuralists debate<\/span> <\/span>as to which power structure, symmetric or asymmetric, is more propitious to effective negotiation.<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Structuralist analysis<\/span> apparently<\/span> treats power as <\/span>a<\/span> fixed resource (<\/span>like<\/span> a country\u2019s military clout, <\/span>or <\/span>a company\u2019s financ<\/span>es<\/span>) <\/span>that<\/span> <\/span>parties bring<\/span> to the negotiating table. This, however, <\/span>is<\/span> recognized as too narrow an approach even within the structuralist school. For instance, studies<\/span> have shown<\/span> that smaller states, despite inferior structural power, do not necessarily submit to the will of stronger <\/span>ones<\/span>.<\/a> In order to understand this phenomenon, <\/span>one needs<\/span> to analy<\/span>z<\/span>e power as more of a relational and perceptional concept. The relational dimension <\/span>is<\/span> captured in Dahl\u2019s definition that <\/span>\u201c<\/span>A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do\u201d.<\/a> For example, most non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are less resourceful <\/span>than<\/span> the World Bank. Yet the Bank<\/span> can enhance the legitimacy of its programs by <\/span>including NGOs. Over time, <\/span>participating <\/span>NGOs <\/span>could<\/span> influence the Bank\u2019s agendas to some extent.<\/a> <\/span>Thus v<\/span>iewed, parties with asymmetric resources may <\/span>well<\/span> <\/span>share<\/span> <\/span>a<\/span> mutually dependent<\/span> relationship<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is also worthwhile to<\/span> <\/span>note<\/span> that power <\/span>sometimes <\/span>lies in the eye of the beholder<\/span>. A<\/span> party\u2019s <\/span>decisions<\/span> <\/span>may be<\/span> shaped as much by <\/span>its<\/span> perception of the situation as by objective reality.<\/a> Zartman and Rubin, in<\/span> studying<\/span> power in negotiation, define <\/span>it as<\/span> \u201cthe perceived<\/em> capacity of one side to produce an intended effect on another through a move that may involve the use of resources.\u201d<\/a> They explore how structurally weaker states can actively alter the perception of stronger opponents in order to \u201clevel the playing field\u201d through strategic maneuvering.<\/a> <\/span>To take an<\/span> example from the contemporary<\/span> business<\/span> world, firm<\/span>s<\/span> with low aggregate market power <\/span>often try to<\/span> shape the perception of business partners and customers to <\/span>their<\/span> advantage by highlighting <\/span>their<\/span> strengths in specific products and associating <\/span>themselves<\/span> with bigger firms.<\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n

From the above analysis, it appears that power encompasses more than the static, structural conditions for negotiation. It is <\/span>also <\/span>manipulable through \u201cwill and skill.\u201d<\/a> While structural power <\/span>could<\/span> <\/span>be<\/span> an important edge, <\/span>the<\/span> party yielding superior power <\/span>may<\/span> <\/span>not be<\/span> vigilant about the strategies of <\/span>the<\/span> weaker <\/span>party<\/span> <\/span>or motivated <\/span>to <\/span>obtain<\/span> accurate information <\/span>about<\/span> the negotiation.<\/a> In other words, power <\/span>could<\/span> well negatively affect the decision-making capacity of its holder. Furthermore, as Fisher and Ury have pointed out, the resources a party owns do not necessarily translate into effective negotiating power, which is much more context-specific. The authors cite the example of the <\/span>US<\/span>, which \u201cis rich and has lots of nuclear bombs, but neither has been of much help in deterring terrorist actions or freeing hostages when they have been held in places like Beirut.\u201d<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

B. <\/span>As a<\/span><\/em>n approach <\/span><\/em><\/em><\/p>\n

Having analy<\/span>z<\/span>ed <\/span>the structural and strategic dimensions of <\/span>power, <\/span>this<\/span> paper <\/span>now examines<\/span> <\/span>the \u201cpower-based\u201d<\/span> approach to negotiation<\/span>. According to Thompson, this <\/span>entails a competitive style of negotiating, with \u201cwinning\u201d the contest as <\/span>the<\/span> primary goal. <\/span>T<\/span>he common tactics under a power-based approach include coercion, intimidation, and <\/span>using <\/span>one\u2019s status<\/span> and <\/span>resources to overpower opponents. In the Cold War summitry between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna 1961, Khrushchev was obviously <\/span>employing <\/span>a power-based approach, <\/span>given<\/span> his aggressive attitude toward the <\/span>US<\/span> president. <\/span>Returning to <\/span>Kremenyuk\u2019s terminolog<\/span>y<\/span>, negotiation was<\/span> then<\/span> <\/span>treated as<\/span> part of a bigger strategy<\/span> <\/span>(combined <\/span>with <\/span>other strategies like military build-up<\/span>) <\/span>to assert the Soviet Union\u2019s supremacy<\/span>. It was much<\/span> less of<\/span> a<\/span> communication <\/span>or<\/span> decision-making <\/span>tool to <\/span>Khrushchev.<\/span><\/p>\n

Many studies<\/span> <\/span>show that<\/span> a power-based approach<\/span> can be <\/span>costly and risky. It may <\/span>give rise to<\/span> short-term gains but undesirable consequences in the long run.<\/a> <\/span>This is because<\/span> <\/span>humans tend<\/span> to reciprocate power and engage in contests when confronted <\/span>by<\/span> a hostile opponent. <\/span>Such confrontation<\/span> can <\/span>cause<\/span> feelings of resentment and even acts of retaliation, which <\/span>can<\/span> hinder effective negotiation<\/span>,<\/span> damage the parties\u2019 relationship and forestall future opportunities <\/span>for<\/span> collaboration. In a labor dispute, for example, <\/span>the use of<\/span> a power-based approach by either side <\/span>can<\/span> <\/span>easily <\/span>result in escalation, stalemate and even labor strikes.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nevertheless<\/span>, a power-based approach is <\/span>not <\/span>detrimental under <\/span>all<\/span> circumstances. <\/span>For example, p<\/span>ower tactics may be necessary or <\/span>even<\/span> desirable <\/span>when there is<\/span> an impasse between the parties, or when <\/span>their <\/span>interests are fundamentally opposed. Using the analogy that \u201c[p]ower in negotiation is about getting a slice of the pie\u201d<\/a> (i.e. acquiring utilities from the negotiated outcome), Thompson advocates the use of \u201cenlightened power,\u201d whereby negotiator<\/span>s<\/span> \u201cget a bigger slice of the pie by creating a larger pie\u201d<\/a> (i.e. exploiting creative opportunities for joint gain). <\/span>She suggests<\/span> that parties <\/span>which<\/span> are high in power <\/span>are sometimes<\/span> oblivious to their weaker counterparts.<\/a> If <\/span>weaker parties <\/span>can strengthen their power <\/span>strategically<\/span>, they <\/span>can potentially<\/span> influence the stronger parties in ways that enhance mutual gains \u2013<\/span> <\/span>for example<\/span> \u2013 <\/span>by alerting the <\/span>latter<\/span> to areas of common interests that were previously unexplored.<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

C. <\/span><\/span><\/em>Sources and forms<\/span><\/em> of power<\/span><\/em>: examples<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

This <\/span>section<\/span> examine<\/span>s<\/span> three specific sources and forms of power. The first is the power of authority, which <\/span>is often a kind of <\/span>structural power. In negotiation on environmental treaties, for <\/span>example<\/span>, the scientific community commands a measure of influence <\/span>because of <\/span>its authority. <\/span>A<\/span>uthority usually resides with <\/span>people in<\/span> particular positions <\/span>(<\/span>\u201clegitimate power\u201d<\/span>) <\/span>or <\/span>with special <\/span>expertise<\/span> (<\/span>\u201cexpert power\u201d<\/span>)<\/span>.<\/a> Whatever it is called, the essence of authority is that it can be hugely influential, especially in inducing obedience.<\/a> Cialdini <\/span>observes <\/span>how average <\/span>people<\/span> <\/span>submit<\/span> <\/span>to <\/span>authority demands with little conscious deliberation.<\/a> <\/span>He finds<\/span> that even mere symbols (such as titles) could be sufficient to trigger compliance.<\/a> <\/span>Authority can thus make<\/span> <\/span>people <\/span>vulnerable to exploitation (when <\/span>it is used<\/span> <\/span>maliciously<\/span>) or deception (when <\/span>it<\/span> is <\/span>faked<\/span>).<\/span><\/p>\n

The second example <\/span>is concerned with<\/span> <\/span>the <\/span>\u201cbest alternative to a negotiated agreement\u201d (BATNA) <\/span>as<\/span> a source of power<\/span> in negotiation<\/span>.<\/a> <\/span>According to Goodwin, a<\/span> BATNA \u201csets the value threshold that any acceptable negotiated agreement must exceed.\u201d<\/a> <\/span>I<\/span>t is <\/span>a party\u2019s<\/span> \u201cPlan B\u201d option other than continuing to negotiate.<\/a> Fisher and Ury <\/span>assert<\/span> that the better one\u2019s BATNA, the more powerful one is.<\/a> The logic is easy to fathom: an employee <\/span>with<\/span> an attractive offer from another company <\/span>would<\/span> have greater bargaining strength vis-\u00e0-vis his\/her current boss, for example. A BATNA can <\/span>form<\/span> part of the given structure of negotiation, but it <\/span>can<\/span> <\/span>also<\/span> be subject to strategic manipulation. <\/span>In negotiation, n<\/span>ot only can a party improve its own BATNA, but it may also alter the objective<\/span>\/<\/span>perceived value of the other side\u2019s BATNA. China\u2019s strategy to reverse the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan\u2019s allies is an obvious attempt to weaken Taiwan\u2019s political alternatives<\/span>.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

The final example<\/span> is <\/span>the threat move<\/span>, <\/span>a tactic associated with <\/span>the<\/span> power-based approach.<\/a> North Korea<\/span>\u2019s<\/span> leader Kim Jong I<\/span>l, for example,<\/span> has been notorious for <\/span>using<\/span> threats and provocations to achieve his objectives in the international arena. These are manifested in his tough rhetoric <\/span>and<\/span> <\/span>his<\/span> build-up and deployment of missiles. For a threat to be effective, it has t<\/span>o aim at the target<\/span>\u2019s underlying interests, such as a country\u2019s security concerns.<\/a> It also needs to be perceived as credible<\/span> \u2013<\/span> the target must believe the issuer has the ability to carry the threat out. While the target <\/span>may submit to<\/span> the issuer in face of a threat<\/span> \u2013 <\/span>like other tactics under a power-based approach<\/span> \u2013 <\/span>the use of threats can potentially backfire, risking escalation and relationship breakdown.<\/span><\/p>\n

III. <\/span>T<\/span><\/em>rust<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

T<\/span>here is widespread <\/span>agreement<\/span> among scholars that trust is important to effective negotiation. However, a more sophisticated understanding of trust is necessary to understand <\/span>how it<\/span> <\/span>influences<\/span> negotiation and decision-making<\/span> in different ways<\/span>. <\/span>T<\/span>his <\/span>paper will first analyze<\/span> whether trust is a precondition for negotiation. <\/span>It will then discuss <\/span>how trust may serve as a goal of and a strategy in negotiation and conclude with two examples.<\/span><\/p>\n

A. <\/span>As a <\/span><\/em>precondition<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Trust <\/span>can<\/span> be<\/span> <\/span>defined as \u201can expression of confidence in another person<\/span>\u2026<\/span>that you will not be put at risk, harmed or injured by <\/span>[his\/her]<\/span> actions.\u201d<\/a> Thompson sees trust as the \u201cbedrock\u201d of negotiation<\/span>.<\/span><\/a> This brings to mind the question of whether trust is therefore a precondition for negotiation. In certain situations, the presence of trust is indispensable for parties to negotiate at all. In traditional Chinese business circles<\/span>, <\/span>personal trust <\/span>is<\/span> <\/span>so important<\/span> that business<\/span>people<\/span> invest heavily <\/span>to cultivate it<\/span>. However, the significance of trust <\/span>is<\/span> culture<\/span>–<\/span> and context<\/span>-specific<\/span>. Claiming that trust is necessary for all<\/em> <\/span>kinds of <\/span>negotiation seems to be an overstatement. To take an extreme example, in<\/span> <\/span>negotiation with hostage-takers, there is unlikely to be<\/span> any<\/span> trust to start with. Yet<\/span> this is a situation where<\/span> negotiation is urgently needed, and one objective of<\/span> such negotiation<\/span> <\/span>is<\/span> to build at least<\/span> some mutual<\/span> trust<\/span>, so that the hostage-takers will be more willing to communicate their intentions. <\/span><\/p>\n

B. <\/span>As a<\/span><\/em>n objective <\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Of course<\/span>, trust<\/span>-building<\/span> <\/span>per se <\/span>can be <\/span>an<\/span> objective of negotiation. This may <\/span>stem from <\/span>the intrinsic value of trust in human relationships. Thompson suggests that a \u201cwin-win\u201d negotiated outcome allows negotiators to maximize what<\/span>ever<\/span> <\/span>utilities <\/span>they care about, and trust <\/span>can legitimately be one of them<\/span>.<\/a> <\/span>Trust also enables parties to develop and preserve their relationship.<\/span> For example, <\/span>a <\/span>primary goal<\/span> <\/span>of the <\/span>1985 <\/span>Geneva summit<\/span> <\/span>between Reagan <\/span>of US <\/span>and Gorbachev<\/span> of the Soviet Union<\/span> was to cultivate <\/span>certain<\/span> mutual trust <\/span>amidst the<\/span> Cold War climate of suspicion and hostility.<\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n

C. <\/span>As a<\/span><\/em> strategy <\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

T<\/span>rust <\/span>can also serve <\/span>as strategic means to <\/span>ends other than relationship-building. Trust<\/span> <\/span>can offer \u201cintegrative potential\u201d and <\/span>\u201cexpand the pie\u201d in negotiation<\/span>, i.e. enable<\/span> parties to work collaboratively <\/span>for<\/span> joint benefits<\/span>.<\/span><\/a> In a commercial partnership founded upon trust, <\/span>parties<\/span> <\/span>are more likely to<\/span> share information, abstain from taking competitive advantage,<\/span> <\/span>and engage in longer-run exchange of favors. To take a counter example from the world stage, negotiation between Israel and Hamas in Palestine suffers <\/span>repeated<\/span> <\/span>setbacks<\/span> <\/span>partly<\/span> because of longstanding <\/span>mutual dis<\/span>trust. <\/span>T<\/span>he creation or rehabilitation of trust can be difficult, especially <\/span>against<\/span> a history of deep-seated mistrust<\/span>,<\/span> <\/span>and s<\/span>ubstantive conciliatory measures may be required.<\/a> For example, in 1963 <\/span>US President Kennedy announced <\/span>that he was stopping atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons, and this <\/span>turned out to be<\/span> a step on the road to d\u00e9tente.<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Just as the use of power tactics is not necessarily harmful, trust-based strategies are <\/span>not<\/span> universally <\/span>be<\/span>fitting. By committing to a trust-based relationship, the right to seek competitive advantage <\/span>may be lost <\/span>even when the benefits outweigh the costs.<\/a> Also, as one is likely to <\/span>act<\/span> in favor of a trusted counterpart, one\u2019s interests could be <\/span>jeopardized<\/span> if trust turns out to be misplaced. Furthermore, \u201c[o]nce we decide that someone is trustworthy, other qualities about that person are conceived as consistent with this favourable impression.\u201d<\/a> This means humans are prone to the so-called \u201chalo effect,\u201d which occurs when \u201cone positive characteristic of a person dominates the way that person is viewed by others.\u201d<\/a> The advantages and limitations of trust-based strategies will be further illustrated in the <\/span>examples below<\/span>. <\/span>They<\/span> will <\/span>show<\/span> that the concept of trust intertwines at some point with <\/span>that<\/span> of power<\/span>: <\/span>a person often holds power <\/span>vis-\u00e0-vis<\/span> those who places trust in him\/her.<\/span><\/p>\n

D. <\/span><\/span><\/em>Types of trust: examples<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Identification-based trust is grounded in empathy with another person\u2019s desires and intentions and leads one to \u201ctake on the other\u2019s value because of the emotional connection between them.\u201d<\/a> It often exists among friends. Fostering understanding and friendly ties may therefore be <\/span>a<\/span> step to engender identification-based trust. For example<\/span>,<\/span> Reagan and Gorbachev develop<\/span>ed<\/span> a cooperative relationship in the late 1980s partly because they had repeated face-to-face <\/span>talks over the years<\/span>.<\/a> Reagan also sought to cultivate a non-hostile atmosphere in <\/span>these<\/span> talks by appealing to common interests, actively diffusing tensions and <\/span>using<\/span> his sense of humor.<\/a> Because friendship and liking tend to generate trust and assent \u2013 sometimes in a subconscious fashion \u2013 Cialdini observes <\/span>that<\/span> salespersons often befriend <\/span>their <\/span>customers <\/span>before promoting <\/span>their <\/span>products<\/span>.<\/a> <\/span>Trusting<\/span> someone in certain situations may <\/span>thus come<\/span> with risks of <\/span>manipulation or exploitation<\/span>.<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Deterrence-based trust, on the other hand, is \u201cbased on consistency of behavior, meaning that people will follow through on what they promise they are going to do.\u201d<\/a> Such behavioral consistency is \u201csustained by threats or promises of consequences that will result if consistency and promises are not maintained.\u201d<\/a> Such a definition of \u201ctrust\u201d sounds somewhat paradoxical; and it certainly <\/span>has<\/span> strong connotations of a power relation. Yet it offers an interesting juxtaposition against <\/span>identification-based<\/span> trust. Thompson refers to people\u2019s attitudes towards legal contracts and forms of surveillance as examples of deterrence-based trust. Compared with identification-based trust<\/span>,<\/span> which operates at the level of intrinsic motivation, deterrence-based trust is <\/span>more<\/span> expensive to maintain because it requires external monitoring of people\u2019s compliance.<\/a> Moreover, backfiring <\/span>is<\/span> possible <\/span>because, psychologically, p<\/span>eople<\/span> <\/span>often <\/span>react negatively<\/span> when they perceive that someone is controlling their behavior or limiting their freedom.<\/a> Looking at their flipside, the distinction between deterrence-based and identification-based trust resembles somewhat that between hard<\/span> <\/span>and soft forms of power.<\/span><\/p>\n

IV. <\/span><\/span><\/em>Conclusion<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

In conclusion, power and trust are both complex <\/span>phenomena<\/span> that can derive from different sources and take <\/span>multiple<\/span> forms in negotiation. When deployed as strategies, their strengths and limitations are <\/span>highly<\/span> contingent on the negotiation<\/span>\u2019s context and<\/span> the <\/span>parties\u2019 <\/span>dynamics. As demonstrated above, the two <\/span>concepts<\/span> do overlap under certain situations. Given the importance of power and trust in negotiation and decision-making, it is hoped that th<\/span>is paper<\/span> has offered a more nuanced comprehension of their meanings and implications.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

\n
Yan Ki Bonnie Cheng is a Master of Laws (LL.M.) student at Harvard Law School. She can be reached at <\/em>ycheng@llm10.law.harvard.edu<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

*This paper was written in conjunction with the \u201cInternational Diplomacy\u201d course under the MSc in Global Governance and Diplomacy 2008-09 program at the University of Oxford. I would like to thank Dr. Deborah Goodwin for her comments on the paper.<\/p>\n

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<\/a> F<\/span>RANCESCO<\/span> A<\/span>QUILAR<\/span> &<\/span> M<\/span>AURO<\/span> G<\/span>ALLUCCIO<\/span>, <\/span>P<\/span>SYCHOLOGICAL<\/span> P<\/span>ROCESSES<\/span> <\/span>IN<\/span> I<\/span>NTERNATIONAL <\/span>N<\/span>EGOTIATIONS<\/span> <\/span><\/em>45 (<\/span> 2008<\/span>).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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<\/a> L<\/span>EIGH<\/span> T<\/span>HOMPSON<\/span>, <\/span>T<\/span>HE<\/span> M<\/span>IND AND<\/span> H<\/span>EART<\/span> <\/span>OF THE<\/span> N<\/span>EGOTIATOR<\/span> <\/span>2 ( <\/span>2005<\/span>)<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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<\/a> <\/span>Victor <\/span>Kremenyuk, Negotiation Paradigm: Three in One<\/em>, <\/span>12, <\/span>Paper presented at the First International. Biennale on Negotiation, Paris, 11-12 December<\/span>. Negotiation as a \u201cpart of a bigger strategy\u201d means treating negotiation as a tool to achieve another goal. It forms part of some strategy, such as military or economic strategies.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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<\/a> C<\/span>HRISTOPHE<\/span> D<\/span>UPONT<\/span> &<\/span> G<\/span>UY<\/span> O<\/span>LIVIER<\/span> F<\/span>AURE<\/span>, I<\/span>NTERNATIONAL<\/span> N<\/span>EGOTIATION<\/span>: A<\/span>NALYSIS<\/span>, A<\/span>PPROCHES<\/span>, I<\/span>SSUES<\/span> 40-41<\/span> <\/span>(Victor <\/span>Kremenyuk<\/span> <\/span>ed<\/span>., <\/span>2002<\/span>)<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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<\/a> Id<\/em>. See also <\/span>W<\/span>ILLIAM<\/span> <\/span>Z<\/span>ARTMAN<\/span> <\/span>&<\/span> <\/span>J<\/span>EFFREY<\/span> <\/span>R<\/span>UBIN<\/span>, <\/span>P<\/span>OWER AND <\/span>N<\/span>EGOTIATION <\/span>(William <\/span>Zartman <\/span>&<\/span> <\/span>Jeffrey <\/span>Rubin <\/span>eds., <\/span>2000<\/span>)<\/span> for a comprehensive analysis on the role of power structures in negotiation.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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<\/a> <\/span>W<\/span>ILLIAM<\/span> <\/span>Z<\/span>ARTMAN<\/span>, <\/span>P<\/span>OWER AND<\/span> N<\/span>EGOTIATION<\/span> 71 (William <\/span>Zartman <\/span>&<\/span> <\/span>Jeffrey <\/span>Rubin <\/span>eds., <\/span>2000<\/span>).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> <\/span>W<\/span>ILLIAM<\/span> <\/span>Z<\/span>ARTMAN<\/span> <\/span>&<\/span> <\/span>J<\/span>EFFREY<\/span> <\/span>R<\/span>UBIN<\/span>, <\/span>P<\/span>OWER AND<\/span> N<\/span>EGOTIATION<\/span> 275-276 (William <\/span>Zartman <\/span>&<\/span> <\/span>Jeffrey <\/span>Rubin <\/span>eds., <\/span><\/span>2000<\/span>).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/span>at 271-294<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/em><\/span>at <\/span>284.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Z<\/span>ARTMAN<\/span>, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 6. See also<\/em> <\/span>Z<\/span>ARTMAN<\/span> <\/span>&<\/span> R<\/span>UBIN, <\/span>supra<\/span><\/em> <\/span>note 8.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Z<\/span>ARTMAN<\/span> <\/span>&<\/span> R<\/span>UBIN, <\/span>supra<\/span><\/em> <\/span>note 7<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Dahl is quoted in The Use of Power in Negotiations (Part I of III), available at <\/em>http:\/\/www.calumcoburn.co.uk\/articles\/articles-powerone\/, <\/span>(last visited<\/span> 1 June<\/span> 2009<\/span>)<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> For this argument, see <\/span>Kim <\/span>Reiman, A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs<\/em>, 50<\/span> <\/span>International Studies Quarterly 45-67 (2006).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Z<\/span>ARTMAN<\/span> <\/span>&<\/span> R<\/span>UBIN, <\/span>supra<\/span><\/em> <\/span>note 7 at 13.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/span>at <\/span>14 (emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/span> at<\/span> 278-284.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> <\/span>J<\/span>ESWALD<\/span> S<\/span>ALACUSE<\/span>, <\/span>P<\/span>OWER AND<\/span> N<\/span>EGOTIATION<\/span> 261 (William <\/span>Zartman <\/span>&<\/span> <\/span>Jeffrey <\/span>Rubin <\/span>eds., <\/span>2000<\/span>)<\/span>. It is suggested that aggregate power may not be as important as issue-specific power in a given negotiation.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Z<\/span>ARTMAN<\/span> <\/span>&<\/span> R<\/span>UBIN, <\/span>supra<\/span><\/em> <\/span>note 7, at<\/span> 275. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> T<\/span>HOMPSON<\/span>, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 2<\/span>, <\/span>at <\/span>158.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> <\/span>R<\/span>OGER<\/span> <\/span>F<\/span>ISHER<\/span>, W<\/span>ILLIAM<\/span> <\/span>U<\/span>RY<\/span> & Bruce Patton<\/span> <\/span>G<\/span>ETTING<\/span> <\/span>TO<\/span> Y<\/span>ES<\/span>: N<\/span>EGOTIATING <\/span>A<\/span>GREEMENT<\/span> W<\/span>ITHOUT<\/span> G<\/span>IVING<\/span> I<\/span>N<\/span> 188<\/span> <\/span>(<\/span>Arrow Business Books 1997<\/span>)<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> T<\/span>HOMPSON<\/span>, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 2<\/span>, <\/span>at<\/span> 106. See also<\/em> The Use of Power in Negotiations (Part II of III), available at<\/em> http:\/\/www.calumcoburn.co.uk\/articles\/articles-powertwo\/, <\/span>(last visited<\/span> 1 June<\/span> 2009<\/span>)<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> T<\/span>HOMPSON<\/span>, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 2<\/span>, <\/span>at<\/span> 151.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> <\/span>I<\/span>d<\/span><\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/span>at <\/span>158.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Z<\/span>ARTMAN<\/span> <\/span>&<\/span> R<\/span>UBIN, <\/span>supra<\/span><\/em> <\/span>note 7, at<\/span> 278.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> See The Use of Power in Negotiations (Part I of III), available at <\/em>http:\/\/www.calumcoburn.co.uk\/articles\/articles-powerone\/ <\/span>(last visited<\/span> 1 June<\/span> 2009<\/span>) <\/span>and The Use of Power in Negotiations (Part I of III)<\/em>, available at <\/em>http:\/\/www.calumcoburn.co.uk\/articles\/articles-powerthree\/, <\/span>(last visited<\/span> 1 June<\/span> 2009<\/span>)<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> <\/span>R<\/span>OBERT <\/span>C<\/span>IALDINI<\/span>, <\/span>I<\/span>NFLUENCE<\/span>: T<\/span>HE<\/span> P<\/span>SYCHOLOGY OF<\/span> P<\/span>ERSUASION<\/span> <\/span>Ch.6 <\/span>(<\/span>2007<\/span>).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/em><\/span>at <\/span>185.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/em><\/span>at <\/span>188.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> This term was proposed in F<\/span>ISHER <\/span>& <\/span>U<\/span>RY, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 20, at Ch.6<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> See<\/em> <\/span>D<\/span>EBORAH<\/span> G<\/span>OODWIN<\/span>,<\/span> The Negotiation precipice: the attraction of the aggressive BATNA in modern conflict<\/em><\/span>, N<\/span>EOCIATION ET TRANSFORMATIONS DU MONDE<\/span> <\/span>137-146 (<\/span>par <\/span><\/span>Sous la direction de Christophe Dupont<\/span>, <\/span>Deuxi\u00e8me Biennale Internationale de la N\u00e9gociation<\/span><\/span> <\/span>2005<\/span>). <\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> F<\/span>ISHER <\/span>& <\/span>U<\/span>RY, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 20, at<\/span> 194.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> <\/span>D<\/span>EBORAH<\/span> G<\/span>OODWIN<\/span>, <\/em><\/span>T<\/span>HE<\/span> M<\/span>ILITARY AND<\/span> N<\/span>EGOTIATION<\/span>: T<\/span>HE <\/span>R<\/span>OLE OF THE <\/span>S<\/span>OLDIER<\/span>-D<\/span>IPLOMAT<\/span> 47 (2<\/span>005<\/span>)<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> T<\/span>HOMPSON<\/span>, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 2<\/span>, <\/span>at<\/span> 113.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/span><\/em><\/span>at<\/span> <\/span><\/em>125.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/span>at<\/span> 123-125.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> See <\/em><\/span>D<\/span>AVID<\/span> <\/span>R<\/span>EYNOLDS<\/span>, <\/span>S<\/span>UMMITS<\/span>: S<\/span>IX<\/span> M<\/span>EETINGS THAT<\/span> S<\/span>HAPED THE <\/span>T<\/span>WENTIETH<\/span> C<\/span>ENTRY<\/span> <\/span>324-325 <\/span>(<\/span>2008<\/span>)<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> T<\/span>HOMPSON<\/span>, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 2<\/span>, <\/span>at<\/span> 77.<\/span> D<\/span>EAN <\/span>P<\/span>RUITT,<\/span> I<\/span>NTERNATIONAL<\/span> N<\/span>EGOTIATION<\/span>: A<\/span>NALYSIS<\/span>, A<\/span>PPROCHES<\/span>, I<\/span>SSUES<\/span> 93<\/span> <\/span>(Victor <\/span>Kremenyuk<\/span> <\/span>ed<\/span>.,<\/span> 2002<\/span>)<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/em><\/span>at<\/span> <\/span><\/em>95. <\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/span><\/em><\/span>at<\/span> <\/span><\/em>94.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> T<\/span>HOMPSON<\/span>, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 2<\/span>, <\/span>at<\/span> 140.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> <\/span>C<\/span>IALDINI<\/span>,<\/span> supra<\/em> note 27, at<\/span> 148.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> T<\/span>HOMPSON<\/span>, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 2<\/span>, <\/span>at<\/span> 128.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> <\/span>See id.<\/em>, at<\/span> 137, where the author stresses the importance of face-to-face meetings to build trust.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> See, for example, R<\/span>EYNOLDS<\/span>, <\/span>supra<\/span><\/em> note 39<\/span>, <\/span>at <\/span>344-345. See also<\/em> T<\/span>HOMPSON<\/span>, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 2<\/span>, <\/span>at<\/span> 116.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> <\/span>C<\/span>IALDINI<\/span>,<\/span> supra<\/em> note 27, at<\/span> 146-147.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> T<\/span>HOMPSON<\/span>, <\/span>supra <\/span><\/em>note 2<\/span>, <\/span>at<\/span> 125.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/em><\/span>at <\/span>125-126.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/span><\/em> <\/em><\/span>at <\/span>126.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Yan Ki Bonnie Cheng I. Introduction This paper critically evaluates the impact of power and trust on negotiation and decision-making.* \u201c[A] basic fact about negotiation, which could well be easily forgotten, is that [one is] dealing not with abstract representatives of the \u2018other side\u2019, but with human beings.\u201d It is therefore unsurprising that human phenomena like power and trust should have a significant influence in the process. These phenomena, however, are broad, complex, and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":16,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,38],"tags":[39],"class_list":["post-207","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-online-only","category-hnlr-online-article","tag-hnlr-online-articles"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/peZSkE-3l","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/207","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/16"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=207"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/207\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=207"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=207"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/hnlr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=207"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}