

## Book Notes

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*Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process.* By Susanne Jonas. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000. Pp. 299. \$25.00, paper.

The peace process in Guatemala is a necessary response to that nation's thirty-six-year civil war, a war that claimed the lives of an estimated 200,000 civilians and transformed Guatemala into a counterinsurgency state. The seeds of the conflict were sown in 1954, when democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown in a CIA-sponsored coup and succeeded by a series of military dictators. Peasants launched an armed insurgency in the 1960s in response to increasingly extreme inequalities in income and resource distribution, and a political regime that prohibited calls for reform; Latin America's longest and bloodiest civil war ensued. Not until 1990 did the first serious discussions about ending the conflict begin. Six years later a final peace accord officially ended Guatemala's civil war, but the peace process is by no means complete, and the extent to which its gains will be consolidated remains uncertain. For this reason, no tidy ending exists for *Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process*; to her credit, author Susanne Jonas does not attempt to write one. Jonas's book displays a deep engagement with the topic, serving as both a record of the peace process so far and as a case study for post-war societies undergoing democratic transitions. Her analysis is calculated and fair throughout and in the end asks as many interesting questions as it answers.

Guatemalans met the 1996 final peace accord with great ceremony and hope; it implemented agreements on issues such as democratization, human rights, the establishment of a truth commission, the identity and rights of indigenous peoples, socioeconomic and agrarian conditions, and the role of the armed forces. These accords, though certainly not perfect, represented more than a mere cease-fire; all sides made significant contributions and concessions in re-conceptualizing Guatemala as a civilian-ruled, multiethnic democracy. The consensus behind this vision (if one ever really existed) soon unraveled, however, and the movement for peace suffered two serious setbacks. First, the Guatemalan government failed to put into place the progressive tax system upon which the receipt of international aid (critical to implementation of the peace accords) was predicated. Second, in a 55%-45% vote on May 16, 1999, the proposed constitutional reforms that were the linchpin of the peace process were defeated in a national referendum. A voter turnout of just nineteen percent reflected widespread frustration, disorganization, and misinformation. The 1999 referendum condemned peace in Guatemala to a state of limbo. A return to armed conflict seems unlikely, but

speedy progress toward a de-militarized, multiethnic democracy appears equally improbable. The future is uncertain, but a minimalist peace looks most likely.

Jonas identifies demilitarization and the construction of citizenship as essential issues that must be addressed if Guatemala is to revitalize and realize the vision articulated in the peace accords. In addressing the latter, she argues that democratization in Guatemala must be defined broadly as active participation by all societal sectors, rather than simply as the absence of fraudulent elections. In a nation that has been as exclusionary toward Indians, women, and the poor as South Africa was toward non-whites, anything less would result in electoral democracy within the context of de facto apartheid. Namely, a comprehensive, multiethnic notion of citizenship is required, allowing true democracy to be consolidated *desde abajo*—from below. The success of such an effort depends in large part on social reconciliation between Mayans and Ladinos, as well as truth-telling about regarding wartime atrocities.

Regarding demilitarization, Jonas argues that the army high command never really accepted the peace project and the changes it implies—most significantly, civilian control and reduction of the army's autonomy. As in other Latin American countries, dismantling the traditional power and influence of the army in Guatemala appears an arduous but necessary task. Rather ominously, in response to a rise in common crime as well as U.S. requests for assistance in the drug war, some have already begun to argue that the army should re-assert itself as guarantor of Guatemala's internal security. Jonas contends that both the Guatemalan public and international actors must respond to such calls by insisting that the government create a strong and professional police force and give it exclusive domain over internal security matters.

While she stops short of declaring that peace in Guatemala cannot be achieved without an improvement in socioeconomic conditions, Jonas does raise serious questions about the sustainability of democratization amid widespread social inequity. Specifically, she asks whether the "structural causes" that gave rise to the revolutionary movements of the 1960s–1980s are being addressed by the peace settlements. If they are not, the disenfranchised may observe that "nothing has changed" and become frustrated with the peace process. There is evidence that this sense of frustration has already set in, and that it is partly to blame for the weakness of the peace movement and the failed constitutional reform referendum. Jonas asks whether accords on human rights, democratization, and multiethnicity are doomed to fail if unaccompanied by socioeconomic gains. Disappointingly, she fails to approach a conclusion on this point. Furthermore, while criticizing the neoliberal world order imposed by the international financial institutions (IFIs) as an obstacle to improving the lot of Guatemala's poor, the author does not suggest a meaningful alternative. Her sentimental musings about the unfortunate absence of a socialist bloc to provide moral support for land and tax reform à la Arbenz are interesting but unrealistic. In the end, the question Jonas asks—can the peace project survive neoliberalism?—remains unresolved; perhaps Guatemala will provide an answer.

Sir Marrack Goulding's foreword to *Of Centaurs and Doves* accurately describes Jonas as having written the first four acts of a five-act drama. Jonas must conclude, though the peace process has not. On one level this is highly unsatisfying. Nonetheless, the author succeeds in deconstructing what has happened so far and identifying the issues of import as the process approaches its denouement. The project in Guatemala—building a stable and inclusive democracy while grappling with the legacy of decades of war—is likely to provide a useful precedent if and when similar efforts take place in Afghanistan, Colombia, the Middle East, and beyond. Whether or not the peace process in Guatemala is ultimately successful, *Of Centaurs and Doves* will prove a valuable tool in assessing where the endeavor went right and where it went wrong.

—Michael J. Camilleri

*The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy*, Arturo Arias, ed. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 2001. Pp. 418. \$19.95, paper.

Arturo Arias begins the first essay in his anthology, *The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy*, by telling us basic facts about Guatemala's geography. It is hard to imagine that anyone reading this book doesn't know that Guatemala borders El Salvador. However, it is a wonderfully mundane way to start a book that describes, indeed contributes to, a dizzying academic and theoretical battle. It grounds us in the physical space that is Guatemala and reminds us of the very un-academic battle that took place on its soil.

Two decades ago, Rigoberta Menchú, then an unknown Mayan *campesina*, awakened the international community to the fact that Guatemalan peasants were being slaughtered. Her testimony, published in book form, sparked an awareness that helped end the war between the army and the guerillas, a war that lasted thirty-five years and took more than 200,000 lives, almost all of them civilians.<sup>1</sup> Menchú has become an international symbol for resistance to oppression, and for empowering indigenous peoples throughout the world.

In December 1998, David Stoll, an American anthropologist, published *Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans*, which questioned the veracity of many of Menchú's claims.<sup>2</sup> He argued that Menchú's testimony was not "the story of all poor Guatemalans," as she claimed it was, but rather a highly political document whose author was closely affiliated with Guatemala's largest guerilla group, the Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP).

1. RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ, I, RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ: AN INDIAN WOMEN IN GUATEMALA (Elisabeth Burgos-Debray ed., Ann Wright trans., Verso 1984).

2. DAVID STOLL, RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ AND THE STORY OF ALL POOR GUATEMALANS (Westview Press 1999).

Defenses, responses, and recriminations came immediately, and a battle for the history of Guatemala began.

Artura Arias, the distinguished Guatemalan writer (best known as one of the screenwriters of *El Norte*), has assembled a collection to explore the controversy. He separates his book into three sections. The first, titled "Background," consists of two articles, one by Arias himself and the other by Mary Louise Pratt. The second section, "Documents: The Public Speaks," presents almost twenty newspaper articles, editorials, and interviews from *The New York Times*, Madrid's *El Pais*, Paris's *Le Monde*, and all of Guatemala's major newspapers. The third section, by far the lengthiest, "Responses and Implications," is a collection of scholarly responses to Stoll's book and comments on the controversy.

Arias uses the first section of the book to situate us in the two worlds of the controversy. His article is largely a political analysis of Guatemalan politics before and after the peace accords and a biographical introduction to Menchú. It is unremarkable as scholarship, but is a useful map for tying the scholars' largely theoretical explorations to the actual political situation in Guatemala.

Pratt's article, I Rigoberta Menchú *and the 'Culture Wars,'* the second in the "Background" section, presents a fascinating history of the role of testimonial literature in the Culture Wars of the 1980s and 1990s. She situates Menchú's book and Stoll's book in the context of American academia, the battlefield for much of the controversy. The juxtaposition of both theaters of controversy is elegant and pleasantly surprising. Pratt's article is unabashedly partisan. She leaves no doubt as to which side of the Culture Wars she supports—and is critical of Stoll, almost to the point of condescension.

The real background comes in the second part of the books, "Documents." These newspaper articles and editorials are polemical, often aggressively self-interested, and fun to read. Included are *Tarnished Laureate*, the front page *New York Times* article that ignited the controversy, and responses from many of the major players, including Stoll and Menchú. The articles range from *Lies by the Nobel Prize Winner*, by Jorge Palmieri, the most aggressive attack on Menchú in the book, to Eduardo Galeano's ironically titled and typically uncompromising *Let's Shoot Rigoberta*, in which he declares that "the world is upside down if it is discussing now whether Rigoberta deserves the [Nobel] prize, when it should be debating whether the prize deserves her."

It is hard to determine if these articles are commentary on the controversy or if they are the controversy itself. Newspaper articles which describe and comment on the controversy become the *subject* of commentary in the third section of the book, "Responses and Implications." Though many of the authors are scholars of anthropology their approaches to the controversy are diverse. Carol A. Smith's *Why Write an Exposé of Rigoberta Menchú?* directly takes on Stoll's argument, point by point. Rather than engage too deeply Stoll's criticisms of Menchú herself (as most of the other essays do), she addresses Stoll's larger points about the war and the relationship between peasants and guerrillas.

Many of the essays are concerned with the politically fraught issue of truth and truth-telling—eight out of fourteen articles have the words “truth” or “lies” in their titles. A common criticism of Stoll’s book is that he misunderstands what Menchú was doing when she narrated *I, Rigoberta Menchú*. He read it as autobiography, but it is really *testimonio*, and thus requires a radically different treatment. The highlight among these articles is *The Primacy of Larger Truths*, by W. George Lovell and Christopher H. Lutz, which traces the history of testimonial writing in Mayan traditions back to the years just after the conquest. It is the only article in the collection to search for antecedents to Rigoberta’s testimony in the literature of her ancestors.

Arias makes it clear that he put together this collection in part because he wanted a Guatemalan intellectual to control a book-length reckoning of the controversy. What we quickly learn, however, is that this is largely a gringo fight. Stoll’s book has yet to be translated into Spanish. Of the fourteen writers who contributed to the “Responses and Implications” section, only two are Guatemalan, and only one of those Mayan. The book gives us the sense that Guatemala has moved on and that the real battleground is in the literature and anthropology departments in United States universities.

While Arias has done a good job of assembling a collection of different views, the book is quite critical of Stoll. Only one of the fourteen articles unambiguously comes to Stoll’s defense (*Whose Truth? Iconicity and Accuracy in the World of Testimonial Literature*, by Daphne Patai), but even this piece is more of an attack on Menchú’s knee-jerk defenders than a vindication of Stoll’s positions. The section titled “Background,” a heading that seems to indicate objectivity, contains one of the most partial pieces in the collection.

Stoll gets a chance to answer these charges, but his response is disappointing. He reiterates and defends his claims about the role of the guerrillas in the war with conviction, but he does not address some of the more pointed criticisms of his book. Most notably he does not (or is unwilling to) engage *testimonio* on any terms other than those that he defines. Luckily, the controversy is no longer about Menchú and Stoll. It is about the future of Mayans in Guatemalan political life and about the future of multiculturalism in American universities. Arias’s collection tackles these two issues with creativity and vigor, and shows us that though Guatemala’s war is over, the battle over its history still rages.

—Adam Stofsky

*Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria*. By Rotimi N. Suberu. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace Press, 2001. Pp. 206. \$14.95, paper.

At times Rotimi N. Suberu’s *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria* gives the impression that Africa’s most populous nation is not unlike a clattering

jalopy. Held together by proverbial duct-tape and bubble gum, its occupants labor to steer while struggling to keep the doors on. Automotive metaphors aside, Suberu's clear and thorough work examines Nigeria's attempts to manage divisive ethno-regional struggles and argues that a strengthened federalist system is the best hope for peace and flourishing in the fledgling democracy. While evaluating the structure of a nation's political institutions may appear a rarified task, in Nigeria's case it is one of crucial practical import. Given the nation's size, resources and unresolved internal tensions, state failure in Nigeria could be disastrous for the country and the continent. Suberu's work reveals the importance of not only examining a government's discrete actions or a particular minority group's status, but also grappling with a nation's broader political structures and the significance of their impact on the promotion of human rights and dignity.

The work first reminds the reader that Nigeria's present federalist system is a useful despite its imperfections. The structure of thirty-six sub-federal states helps contain local ethnic disputes, diffuses the power of the three major Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups and prevents absolute domination of the nation's smaller minorities. Not only does it sometimes create a state-based identity to compete with ethnic affiliation; multi-state federalism provides a functional framework for economic distribution that avoids the unitary excesses of other African multiethnic states. Still, Suberu's work reveals how flawed governing structures can exacerbate ethno-regional (and, increasingly, religious) conflict and create a divisive "cake sharing" fixation where states and groups are more keen on grabbing a larger slice of federal disbursements than expanding the size of the nation's output.

The "federal character" principles in the Nigerian constitution also serve as a Rorschach test for the national family's dysfunction. The principles are interpreted as a mandate for the central government to represent and aid all groups. However laudable and necessary the principles are for a multi-ethnic nation, Suberu observes how efforts to implement them have cultivated resentment between winners and losers competing for slots in governmental institutions. Because national political parties must meet minimum membership requirements across the nation for certification, federal character policies may also create structures hostile to legitimate ethnic grievances and regional agendas. Consequently, a federal character interpreted as such, can close, rather than create opportunities for flexible and constructive approaches to minority or regional needs, leaving grievances simmering below a lid of constitutional language championing pluralism.

The thrust of Suberu's argument is that strengthening the federalist system of divided powers can provide healing solutions for a wounded Nigerian union. At the heart of his critique of the current system is distaste for an overweening central government. Whether by creating debilitating state dependence on federally distributed revenue or enhancing ethno-regional power struggles, over-centralization plays the part of principle villain in the narrative's drama of political and economic ills.

The author recommends that the federal center cede power to strengthened state and local governments on non-national matters, limiting itself primarily to defense, trade, external affairs, interstate commerce and assisting general macro-economic development. To combat the cake sharing mentality, he argues for creating incentives for states to produce revenue by having the federal government cede them greater taxation powers, reward increased economic production with larger shares of centrally distributed revenue and allow states to keep more of the revenue derived from their lands. While conceding the necessity of maintaining a system of central redistribution to states on basic equity grounds, Suberu argues needed adjustments would encourage regional self-reliance, improve governance, reduce oil dependence, and strengthen the economy. Moreover, reducing the power of the central government would lower the ethno-regional intensity at the national level, as groups would have to focus more on managing their region rather than competing with others for federal largesse or central control.

Suberu rejects proposed executive power-sharing reforms such as a presidency rotated on a regional basis or a federal collegiate council, arguing these proposals to manage internal tension ignore the complexity of a nation with 250 ethno-linguistic groups and would benefit elites within the largest ethnic groups. Beyond the fear that such regulations would place strictures on the democratic choice of leaders, Suberu argues the proposals distract from what he sees as the critical problem of a "massive, oppressive, divisive, and destructive hegemony" of the central government and an executive that unjustly controls other independent branches and functions of government at the state and federal level. Suberu asserts that limits on government power through a reasonable market economy and rule of law are just as crucial as power sharing. In that same vein, he calls for liberalization of laws restricting formation of national parties.

Finally, Suberu confronts the oft-discussed proposal to reconstruct Nigerian political organization by collapsing the states into six to ten ethnic regions united in a looser confederation. Letting loose a quiver of arrows at this proposal, he argues that because it has no support in the Northern half of the country, such a reformation would only excite regional tensions. Beyond reversing the benefits of better representation, conflict-containment and power diffusion that the large number of states bring, the boundaries confederation proponents offer do not bode well for stability and justice, as they are "culturally artificial and . . . politically controversial." In contrast, Suberu counsels for the more "ethnically flexible" approach of a federal union.

This last topic brings a nervous sidelong glance at the phantom lurking in the work's shadows: the nightmarish, although not inevitable, prospect of the collapse of the union. Given the fuzzy and overlapping lines of culture and ethnicity, shared history, economic interdependence and vast, heterogeneously located resources of the nation, it is hard to imagine dissolution without inter-group bloodshed. For this reason, Suberu's proposals for strengthening the viability of a united Nigeria deserve the attention of policy makers

and human rights advocates alike. The work is not flawless. Although strengthened federalism seems to provide the greatest promise for conflict management and local development, Suberu's accounts of the national ethnic and regional struggles recapitulating themselves at local levels dampens its immediate promise. And current accounts of the harsh application of the Shari'a laws in northern localities give the potential delegator pause. He also gives scant mention of the chances of bringing his recommendations from paper to practice or any accompanying strategy to do so. The book, however, gives a solid introduction to Nigeria's recent political history and present dilemmas and provides plausible solutions. And from a human rights perspective, when considered in light of what is at stake in the debates about Nigeria's stability and viability, it reminds the reader how constructive concern for the forest encourages the protection and flourishing of the trees.

—Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

*The Female Circumcision Controversy: An Anthropological Perspective*, By Ellen Gruenbaum. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. Pp. 221. \$24.95, paper.

Ellen Gruenbaum spent over five years in Sudan studying the country's widespread practice of female circumcision. In *The Female Circumcision Controversy*, Gruenbaum utilizes her perspective as a westerner immersed in the Sudanese culture to confront the reasons behind the failure of other western efforts to eradicate female circumcision and to explore the cultural, religious, and economic factors that perpetuate the practice in Sudan.

*The Female Circumcision Controversy* begins with a description of the varying degrees and types of female circumcision, the history of the practice, and the context of Gruenbaum's experience. This background information is helpful to set the stage for the remainder of the book, but any reader with knowledge of the debates surrounding female circumcision can skip the Introduction and plunge directly into her study of Sudanese society.

Gruenbaum methodically explores the aspects of Sudanese culture that she believes have the strongest impact on the perpetuation of female circumcision in Sudan. These cultural elements include the historical ritual and meaning of the female circumcision ceremony, the importance placed on female circumcision by men in choosing their wives, the cultural definition of sexuality, and the ethnic identity associated with the form of female circumcision practiced by one's group. In exploring each of these cultural elements, Gruenbaum utilizes her personal experiences to illustrate the strength of these cultural pressures on Sudanese women. For example, Gruenbaum tells the story of a mother who was thinking of not circumcising her daughter but was nervous about the daughter's ability to find a husband



who would accept her as uncircumcised. Without a husband to provide an income in a patriarchal society, both mother and daughter would likely face incredible economic pressures and social instability later in life. Few, if any, women would place their daughters and themselves in such a precarious position without strong cultural support and concrete knowledge of the harms that can arise from circumcision.

Gruenbaum also explores the effect of economic development in Sudan on the practice of female circumcision. Economic development leads, in general, to greater educational opportunities, which then lead to social change and empowerment for women. However, Gruenbaum also recognizes that economic development could lead to the perpetuation of the practice of female circumcision. For example, as men achieve greater economic status they gain greater control over their wives and daughters and gain greater potential to take multiple wives. The distribution of resources associated with polygamy is undesirable to many women who may take drastic measures to prevent polygamy amongst their husbands or the future husbands of their daughters. Circumcision is thought to increase the sexual pleasure of men and, if women believe increasing sexual pleasure will decrease the chance of their husband taking another wife, they may continue to practice circumcision.

Internal pressures and movements to end or modify the practice of female circumcision within Sudan are also explored. In this arena, Gruenbaum distinguishes Western efforts based solely on the goal of eradicating female circumcision from internal movements based on the education of men, women, and midwives, and the empowerment of women. For example, she describes the efforts of Islamic leaders to spread the word that female circumcision, at least the most extreme variation, is not religiously mandated. Gruenbaum closes the book with suggestions to Western readers on how to get involved in the effort to stop the practice of female circumcision without generating backlash. She provides contact information for numerous international organizations as well as organizations based in the United States.

While encouraging westerners to get involved in the movement, Gruenbaum also points out that for many Sudanese the eradication of female circumcision is simply not a priority. For women whose daily life is a struggle and who do not have access to clean water or reliable health care, there are greater priorities. In this context, western movements focused on female circumcision are unappreciated and, often, resented. Western aid to provide clean water, health care and educational opportunities are preferred because they speak to the daily needs of the Sudanese.

*The Female Circumcision Controversy* differs from the majority of books written by western authors on female circumcision. Gruenbaum avoids the aggressive tone of condemnation and the vehement call to arms commonly employed by western authors. She does not go into graphic detail when describing the circumcision procedure, nor does she focus on the serious medical side effects associated with female circumcision. Rather, Gruenbaum seeks to provide western readers with a better understanding of the complex cultural

context surrounding female circumcision and an explanation for the failure of most simplistic western efforts to eradicate the practice.

Some may criticize Gruenbaum's effort to promote understanding as an effort to promote acceptance. These critics may not be completely off the mark. Gruenbaum's goal is certainly not to encourage the acceptance of female circumcision as a practice. However, her goal does seem to be the acceptance of the cultural context in which female circumcision is practiced. With this acceptance and understanding she believes a stronger, more effective campaign for the eradication of female circumcision can be waged.

—Jeanne Cavanaugh

*For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator.* By Richard Goldstone. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. 152. \$18.50, cloth.

In *For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator*, Richard Goldstone offers the reader glimpses of his extraordinary career, from his days as a student activist against apartheid to his appointment as the world's first prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Delivered originally as a set of lectures at Yale University in 1998, this book gives readers valuable insight into some of the challenges that Goldstone confronted as chief prosecutor.

Goldstone traces his rise to a position of leadership in the international criminal justice movement to his days as a law student in South Africa. Active in student politics and the anti-apartheid struggle, he went onto play a crucial yet unanticipated role in helping to dismantle apartheid. Upon graduation, Goldstone entered commercial law, not politics. He stayed there for fifteen years, until he was appointed judge on the Transvaal Supreme Court in 1978. In 1982, Goldstone issued a watershed opinion in which he refused to eject a woman of color under the Groups Areas Act, a statute enforcing racial residential segregation. Noting that the statute made such enforcement discretionary, Goldstone's ruling halted all prosecutions under the Act. In 1990, as political violence escalated, former President F. W. de Klerk asked Goldstone to head a judicial investigation into the Sebokeng Massacre, a demonstration in which the police killed eleven people and injured four hundred. Goldstone made the hearings accessible to the public, locating them near the site of the demonstration. His ruling that the police should be prosecuted for murder both affirmed his reputation as impartial and led to his first experience with threats and hate mail. Soon thereafter, with unanimous support of all parties to the National Peace Accord, Goldstone was offered to chair what came to be known as the Goldstone Commission. His work exposed how the South African security forces, relying on violence and murder, sought to undermine the transition to democracy. He

organized raids against security forces and collected evidence documenting the involvement of senior police officers and government ministers. Neither threats to his safety nor hostility from the conservative media and some politicians deterred Goldstone.

In July 1994, the Security Council elected Goldstone chief prosecutor for the international criminal tribunal for Yugoslavia. Goldstone had no prosecution experience and minimal knowledge of humanitarian law. Yet the Security Council voted for him unanimously. Goldstone's greatest challenge was to help legitimize the court by demonstrating that an international system of accountability was both feasible and desirable. In fact, former British Prime Minister Edward Heath asked him at the time, "Why did you accept such a ridiculous job?" From the beginning, and at every turn, Goldstone had to deal with a dismissive and skeptical media, a deficiency in funds, and state-created obstacles. Even governments that professed support for the tribunal posed logistical challenges. The United States, for instance, responded extremely slowly to Goldstone's requests for critical intelligence information. France initially insisted that the investigators consult its citizens only through formal court proceedings—a costly and time-consuming requirement that it later withdrew.

Goldstone's responsibilities increased when the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, appointing him as chief prosecutor for that tribunal as well. His task of setting up office in Kigali was not easy. Although they had initially requested the establishment of the tribunal, representatives of Rwanda were the only ones to ultimately vote against it. While Rwandan officials were extremely cooperative in helping establish the prosecutor's office, they nevertheless maintained their criticism of the tribunal, including the decision to locate the hearings in Tanzania, and Goldstone's insistence that some of the accused stand trial in the tribunal rather than in national courts. Goldstone acknowledges such criticism, but only in passing.

In both his discussion of the tribunals and of South Africa, Goldstone rather surprisingly eschews the opportunity to provide extensive analytical lessons. He does, however, provide lively anecdotes, emphasizing the need for the prosecution to be completely independent of any political interference. Goldstone relates one incident, for instance, in which former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali hinted at dismay that he had not been consulted about a decision to indict Radovan Karadzic. Although Boutros-Ghali resisted interfering with Goldstone's indictment, it is clear that he favored a delay in the indictment until after peace negotiations had succeeded. Goldstone not only argues that such political considerations should not constrain the prosecutor, but also that they can be misplaced. He states, perhaps too strongly, that the failure to indict Karadzic would actually have prevented the Dayton Accord negotiations, since Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia, would not have attended them in Karadzic's presence.

Even as Goldstone calls for absolute independence of the prosecutor's office, an important theme that emerges from his narrative involves the political intricacies of his appointment as the first prosecutor. Early on, Goldstone recognized that he would have to cultivate personal relationships with world leaders to lend credibility to the court. In discussing one trip to Yugoslavia, for example, Goldstone writes that "without personal contact with relevant players such cooperation [from Bosnia and Croatian authorities] would not have been possible." Furthermore, the book shows how inextricably linked his office is to state cooperation. Goldstone expresses serious disappointment and frustration with the United States and Europe for their failure to take any action to arrest those indicted, such as Karadzic.

In his final chapter, Goldstone urges the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). He addresses some of the practical difficulties that the ICC would pose, arguing that an ICC prosecutor should not defer to national amnesties. At the same time, however, he recognizes that some balance must be struck between national and international processes seeking justice. Goldstone criticizes the US deference to its military, both in its opposition to the ICC and in failing to arrest indicted war criminals.

Goldstone's book is inspirational. Yet, the interested reader would do well to consult some other books to attain a more comprehensive understanding of the debate and criticism surrounding both the tribunals and South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The tribunals have been criticized for selective and delayed prosecution, for an inadequate defense, and for aggravating, not healing, the emotional scars of survivor-witnesses. *For Humanity* is a valuable history of obstacles overcome in the establishment of the two tribunals and invites a more critical analysis of their effectiveness and potential to be replicated on a truly global scale.

—Suzanne Katzenstein

*In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong*, By Amin Maalouf. Translated by Barbara Bray. New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000. Pp. 164. \$22.95, cloth.

How are murderous identities made? If ever there was a time that this question pressed, and pressed hard, on our collective consciousness it is now, in the wake of the devastating events of September 11. The question is the focus of Amin Maalouf's short and engaging book, first published in France in 1996, and recently issued in its first North American edition.

Maalouf's self-described task in this book is "to try to understand why so many people commit crimes nowadays in the name of religious, ethnic, national or some other kind of identity," how what he calls "identities that kill" are made and sustained. His answer is simple and straightforward:

murderous identities are born of humiliation. Thus, if we want to address the problem of ethnically or religiously motivated violence, we must work to counter the conditions under which people are humiliated or denigrated for being part of some ethnic or religious or national group.

For Maalouf, the key condition that makes it possible for some to humiliate others is a failure to understand the true nature of identity. Identity, he reminds us, is neither monolithic nor static, "it is built up and changes throughout a person's lifetime." As such, it is a shifting composite of a great number of different, often conflicting, allegiances and attachments, including one's allegiances to one's family, neighborhood, village, and country, to one's religious, ethnic, linguistic, and racial group, to one's profession, favorite soccer team, or political movement.

Maalouf refers to these constitutive allegiances as "genes of the soul" though he cautions that they are in no way understood to be innate. Indeed, time and again, he returns to the point that we are not born but rather made—and make and remake ourselves—in relation to the world in which we live and the choices that it presents to us. It is a point that bears repeating, he says, because a failure to recognize the fluidity, multiplicity and malleability of identity is not only misguided but also dangerous. The danger is twofold. First, a failure to recognize the complexity, the multidimensionality, of the Other makes their dehumanization easier. Second, imposing on the Other a rigid, singular (and usually inferior) identity will provoke them, in anger and defiance, to pick up arms to 'assert their identity.' This, he says, is how ordinary men are "transformed into butchers."

Maalouf places great theoretical emphasis on the cognitive dimension of the failure to understand the true nature of identity. At times, the text reads as though Maalouf viewed the contemporary problem of identity-based violence primarily as a cognitive distortion that might be solved if we only could find a way of reforming long-standing but unexamined habits of thought that imprison us in outdated and dangerous ways of seeing the world. But at other times, the text suggests that the view he wants to put forth is a little more complex. He discusses at some length the cognitively distorting effects of asymmetrical power relationships—how these cause people on both sides of the relationship to reify the Other, for example.

He also discusses the causal importance of what many perceive to be an American-led push toward globalization to generating a sense of humiliation, marginalization and alienation in members of non-western, non-hegemonic ethnic, religious and national groups. In what becomes, after September 11th, a rather chilling passage, he asks: "How can they [non-westerners] not feel their identities are threatened? That they are living in a world which belongs to others and obeys rules made by others, a world where they are orphans, strangers, intruders or pariahs? What can be done to prevent some of them feeling they have been bereft of everything and have nothing more to lose, so that they come, like Samson, to pray to God for the temple to collapse on top of them and their enemies alike?"

In response, he proposes what he calls a “moral contract”—a reciprocal agreement of mutual recognition between presently dominant and subordinate groups in the world, such that all people everywhere may legitimately feel that they are equal participants in the emergence of a “common civilization,” that they are reflected in it and reflect it in turn. Within a given society, the moral contract would take the form of an agreement between members of the majority culture and those of minority cultures to treat each other as equals, and to take seriously the constitutive nature of the other’s culture. To this end, each must be prepared to give up his claim to cultural purity. Majority members must not predicate full-fledged membership on a complete abandonment by minority members of their cultural heritage; rather, they must be prepared to accept them as full members in light of—indeed, in celebration of—their cultural (or ethnic or religious) difference. For their part, members of minority cultures must be prepared to adapt, at least minimally, to the basic rules and values of the majority culture, even if this means abandoning some of their cultural practices.

It is difficult to try to define the concrete principles according to which a moral contract to be applied within a given society might be structured. What constitutes a “minimal” adaptation by members of cultural minorities to the basic rules and values of the majority culture, for example? How much can legitimately be required of them? And how much can be required of members of the majority culture vis-à-vis minorities? Even more difficult is conceptualizing the structure of Maalouf’s proposed moral contract between the West and the Rest. What would it look like? And, sadly, what hope is there for such a contract given current geo-political realities?

Maalouf makes no pretense to even know how to begin to address these important questions. But this is, ultimately, of little consequence, for the book’s principal merit lies in that it raises these questions—and many others—in the first place, and does so in a way that invites his readers to continue to think hard about the seemingly intractable problem of identity-based violence in the world today. His book is certainly not the place to end one’s inquiry, but it is a useful place to start.

—Sandra J. Badin

*A History of Bombing.* By Sven Lindqvist. Translated by Linda Haverty Rugg. New York: The New Press, 2001. Pp. 186. \$24.95, cloth.

*A History of Bombing* is both a straightforward exegesis on the development and growth of aerial bombardment and a well-argued indictment of its means and mechanisms. Lindqvist’s history begins with the invention of the hot air balloon and the airplane at the turn of the century, and the nearly immediate recognition by the creators of these machines that they could be

used as weapons. However, early aerial bombardments were neither terribly accurate nor tremendously destructive. They could only be utilized effectively against large accumulations of people or structures, and functioned primarily as a means of spreading panic and terror. The European nations with the capacity to bomb thus first deployed this weapon in the context that best exploited its capacity to terrorize: beginning with the first bombs dropped by Italian fighters near Tripoli on October 26, 1911, European nations bombed their colonies.

The principle thrust of Lindqvist's argument is that the European decision to bomb the indigenous peoples they were attempting to colonize is not an accident of history. Rather, he situates the advancement of bombing as a military technique squarely within the greater social context of racial stratification and ethnic fears that characterized European colonial movements. Native peoples were seen as sub-human and uncivilized—the Italians originally justified their bombing of civilians by claiming that their mission of bringing “civilization” to the colonies superceded all other human rights laws. Throughout his history, Lindqvist weaves in descriptions of contemporary works of literature that invoke such racially violent fantasies: he cites numerous examples of novels, even before the advent of heavier-than-air flight, that foretold of a menacing “Yellow peril” and of a world overrun by hostile Chinese and rescued only by airships that dealt indiscriminate death across Asia. Lindqvist's narration drips with irony when describing the decision by the World War I belligerents to forbid aerial bombing of each others' forces during the War, at the same time as they continued to bomb civilians in Africa and the Middle East.

Within this context, the turning point in Lindqvist's history is not the infamous decimation of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War, when Europeans first witnessed the terrible destructive power of bombing on their own continent, but rather a similar raid against Chechaouen in Morocco by the Spanish more than a decade earlier. It was then that the “taboo” against annihilating a defenseless civilian city from the air was broken and European war-planners came to fully understand what bombing might do to a civilian population's capacity to wage war. Lindqvist thus understands the famous bombings of World War II as the exemplification of an imported tactic; an outgrowth of the imperialist racial killings that were bombing's spawning grounds. He points to the American refusal to engage in broad area bombing with the intent of killing or displacing civilians only in Germany. In Japan, of course, the Air Force perpetrated many of the most terrible civilian massacres known in the history of warfare, in particular the firebombing of Tokyo. He locates the causal motive in Americans' deep racial animus toward Japanese and the “Asian other.”

Lindqvist's historical explanation begins to break down, however, in his analysis of the British firebombing of Germany. Prior to World War I, Britain and Germany were economically intertwined, and Chamberlain and the British saw Hitler and the Germans as equal partners in negotiations. Nev-

ertheless, it was with little compunction that British bombers set fire to Hamburg and Dresden, massacring 150,000 people with no objective other than to kill and derail the German industrial machine. The idea that the dehumanization of victims, a necessary predicate to civilian bombing, can arise not from *ex ante* racial antipathy but simply because they have become the enemy is nowhere broached. Whereas Lindqvist saw racism as the catalyst for the desire to bomb, in Britain it was the need for bombing that expediently triggered racial dehumanization.

Lindqvist does not see aerial bombing as simply another mechanism for waging war. Rather, he states as his thesis that bombing is by nature a fundamentally different activity than other types of warfare. Bombing is distinguished by its area-wide effect and usefulness against targets that cannot be separated from the civilians that surround them; to be used in ways that violate international human rights norms and slaughter noncombatants is the bomb's birthright. In the age of destructive bombing and "total war," warfare no longer concerns only the leaders or armies that have chosen to wage it—its ravages are more demonstrably visited upon the women, the children, the elderly, the unengaged civilians.

The potential use of nuclear weapons marks the apotheosis of this threat. Nations have constructed enough bombing power to end life on earth hundreds of times over, and so great is the destructive force of these weapons that even their foremost advocates hardly dare use them. In the last section of the book, Lindqvist describes the International Court of Justice's decision not to impose a legal ban on nuclear weapons and argues persuasively for a worldwide moratorium on the possession or use of all such weapons.

Though Lindqvist's imagery and the bleak picture he paints of a nuclear future are compelling, he fails to acknowledge even the small potential that bombing and nuclear deterrence might hold as a means of ameliorating the human rights situation worldwide. During his discussion of World War II, Lindqvist berates the Allied Powers for not having used bombing to end German concentration camps and suggests even that Britain might have been able to bargain a cessation of civilian bombing for an end to Nazi genocide. No such utilitarian possibility is raised in his later discussion of nuclear weapons. Additionally, despite causing the world to hover over the edge of a "nuclear abyss" for over fifty years, nuclear weapons are credited by many historians for having prevented a devastating war between the NATO and Warsaw powers. Though he does not address the question specifically, it may be that Lindqvist has already balanced these concerns and decided that nuclear abolition holds the only possibility for salvation. Having read his history of the human rights calamities already wrought by bombing, it is difficult to disagree.

—Jonathan Masur



*Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to Mining and Oil Corporations*, By Al Gedicks. Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 2001. Pp. 241. \$18.00, paper.

Our planet is on the brink of ecological disaster. Fossil fuel emissions and rainforest destruction have combined to release enough carbon dioxide into the atmosphere to significantly warm the climate. Toxic chemicals pollute the air, ground and water that sustain us. Delicate ecosystems that nurture the diversity of life are being eradicated. In the existential struggle between human progress and the natural world, native peoples are on the front lines. In this struggle, as Al Gedicks tells it, the native peoples are the "miner's canaries" warning the rest of us that the destruction of our environment will ultimately lead to the destruction of ourselves.

Much of this struggle is being fought over resources, as mining and oil corporations encroach upon native lands in an endless search of profit. In *Resource Rebels*, Gedicks describes the burgeoning indigenous movement against these companies. It is a movement that has brought together concerns about human rights and the environment and used an array of tactics against its more powerful adversaries. It has been rural-based, grassroots, multiracial and international. The book illuminates the origins of this movement by providing examples of native resistance from around the world. It discusses the connections between trade, militarization and resource extraction as well as the tactics used by corporations to counter popular opposition. It concludes by recommending a series of sustainable strategies to avert the current ecological and cultural crisis.

Underlying the threat to indigenous lands and the environment is the insatiable appetite for consumption in the industrialized states. Gedicks points out that while the industrial countries account for 20% of the world's population; they consume 84% of all paper and 87% of all cars each year. Having exhausted the richest and most easily accessible resources, oil and mining companies have set their sights on indigenous lands to keep up with demand. From Ecuador to Nigeria to Indonesia to the United States, native peoples are subject to a "discourse of dominance" by corporations and governments, which leaves them out of decisions affecting their lands. This process has been exacerbated by a shift in project financing away from shareholders and states and toward multilateral development agencies and regional banks. The World Bank, Gedicks writes, has radically increased its lending for extractive projects and engages in "narrow, economic thinking [that] ignores any concern for people and the environment."

An important part of the struggle has been the recognition and elucidation of the connections between environmental destruction and human rights abuses. Gedicks argues that native peoples' close connection to the land makes them particularly vulnerable to ecological damage. Extractive activities can threaten patterns of subsistence, living conditions, and cultural practices. In addition, corporations often conspire with governments to deny native peoples' civil and political rights in order to prevent them from re-

sisting the incursions. Gedicks points to Nigeria, where Shell Oil's operations have devastated the Ogoni people, subjecting their homeland to gas flares, oil spills, pipeline explosions and other abuses. In the early 1990s, the Ogoni began to engage in nonviolent resistance to protect their lands, for which they became the targets of a campaign of political repression and violence by the Nigerian military. This campaign, Gedicks charges, was carried out with Shell's knowledge, approval, and material support. The case gained widespread attention in 1995 when, despite international protests, Nigeria tried and executed Ogoni author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders. The struggle continues to this day.

*Resource Rebels* tells similar stories from around the world. From the U'wa in Colombia to the Amungme and Komoro in West Papua, indigenous peoples are building movements to protect their lands. The book is at its best when it tells these stories and uses them to draw broad conclusions about the evolution of native movements. Gedicks astutely points out that states that depend on outside investment are necessarily more vulnerable to pressure for human rights reform. Indigenous groups have begun to find and exploit these pressure points with varying degrees of success. The groups are pursuing multilateral strategies that include litigation, mass mobilizations, shareholder resolutions, and public education. They are refining their rhetoric by linking environmental concerns with traditional human rights issues. Perhaps the most important innovation has been the increased communication of information through transnational networks and electronic media. Native peoples are now often able to wage their local struggles on a global front and can alter the balance of power by working closely with allies.

Of course, multinational corporations are not sitting idly by while native peoples organize. Gedicks outlines a number of methods by which they seek to undermine the opposition, including mass media campaigns, attacks on tribal sovereignty and challenges to local zoning authority. Armed with money and political clout, oil and mining companies sometimes manage to pay off impoverished communities or get states to preempt local control. Yet the indigenous opposition remains vibrant and, Gedicks believes, effective.

The book's primary shortcoming is its lack of depth. Numerous case studies are presented to illuminate the author's basic point about the evolving movement, but they are generally sketched in broad strokes that may not offer much insight for the experienced practitioner. As an introduction to the issue, however, *Resource Rebels* performs ably. Gedicks clearly is passionate about his subject and makes no pretension of neutrality. His tone is guardedly optimistic and practical. Though native peoples continue to build their movement, Gedicks realizes that their cause—and that of humanity—depends on a revolutionary shift in patterns of consumption worldwide. In this vein he recommends a number of sustainable strategies such as banning exploration in pristine ecosystems, investing in renewable energy, improved product design and recycling. He exhorts us to remember that while native

peoples may be the "miner's canaries," we all stand to lose from unfettered consumption. In that respect at least, their struggle should be ours.

—Edward Grauman

*Speak Truth to Power: Human Rights Defenders Who Are Changing Our World.* By Kerry Kennedy Cuomo. New York: Crown Publishers, 2000. Pp. 256. \$50.00, cloth.

Human rights lawyer and nun Digna Ochoa slipped by police guards at a military hospital in Mexico to acquire proof that a prisoner was being held incommunicado. Entering the prisoner's room, she shouted at judicial police to force them to leave, buying herself two minutes in which to acquire proof that the prisoner was being held. When police tried to grab her on her way out, she assumed a karate position she had seen in movies, and the baffled police called for reinforcements to protect themselves from the dangerous nun. As they arrived, she recorded their statements about the "guy who was incommunicado" on tape recorder, then smuggled the cassette out of the hospital after security officers confiscated her tape recorder.

A coffee-table reference with portraits by Pulitzer Prize-winning photojournalist Eddie Adams and interviews conducted by Kerry Kennedy Cuomo, *Speak Truth to Power* is a collection of fifty short profiles of courageous activists like Sister Ochoa from thirty-five countries who deal with a variety of human rights causes. Although several of the individuals profiled, like the Dalai Lama, Desmond Tutu, and Vaclav Havel, have achieved global stature, the majority are grass-roots activists. Among others, the book profiles Abubacar Sultan, an activist who worked to repatriate child soldiers in Mozambique, Ka Hsaw Wa, who documented atrocities conducted by Burmese military agents on behalf of a U.S. corporation, and Gabor Gambos an advocate for the mentally ill in Hungary. One of the profiles features "Anonymous," a Sudanese activist teaching women's rights whose identity was withheld for his or her safety. Anonymous is depicted on the cover with a hood and a hangman's noose around his or her neck, underscoring the risk that many of the activists confront.

More than a collection of "war stories," Kennedy Cuomo's interviews delve into the psychological experience of the activists to understand why they undertake their work and how they persevere in the face of grave risk. Several activists said their initial experience of torture, rape, and imprisonment led them to their career. Others describe responding to an unmet need for protection of a specific class, such as Bruce Harris who works on behalf of street children in Guatemala. Still other practitioners viewed their work as arising from social responsibilities, such as Bishop Wissa of Egypt who in-

vestigated brutal interrogations of his parishioners and pushed to have the police officers involved prosecuted.

While the selection of activists reflects their exceptional achievements, the thesis of *Speak Truth to Power* is that each individual relies on common human beliefs and emotions to carry out his or her work. Kennedy Cuomo identifies three such common elements: religious or spiritual beliefs, righteous indignation, and a sense of humor. Although six of the activists are members of a structured religion, many of the remainder point to faith in a calling as a motivating factor for persevering. Many, like Ochoa, also describe righteous indignation at injustices they witnessed or experienced firsthand, as both a motivation to persevere and as a resource to be exploited. Kennedy Cuomo illustrates the role of humor in maintaining perspective with an anecdote from Harris, who joked about receiving a bulletproof vest "complete with a money-back guarantee."

Along with a separate PBS video, an extensive Web site, and a traveling photographic exhibit, *Speak Truth to Power* is intended to serve as a pedagogical tool as well as a reference. As such, the three- to six-page interviews provide a concise presentation of the personalities of the activists, but only a peripheral treatment of the issues that they serve. For human rights practitioners, the value of the work is in promoting a broad culture that embraces several regions, diverse experiences, and alternate approaches to human rights. The inclusion of practitioners from several non-Western countries is a response to critical claims that human rights activists reflect Judeo-Christian or Western biases.

On October 19, 2001, Digna Ochoa was found murdered in her office in Mexico City along with a note threatening those working on human rights violations against Zapatista supporters. In the introduction, Kennedy Cuomo describes calling for an investigation into threats against Ochoa that arose shortly after her interview for the book in 1999 and demanding that Ochoa be protected by the Mexican legal system. Kennedy Cuomo notes the impossibility of measuring the success of such calls; in a sense, measuring their failure is all too easy, as governments and individuals continue in their attempts to silence those holding them accountable. By profiling Ochoa and the other fifty individuals, *Speak Truth to Power* succeeds as a testimony to the courage of activists around the world who refused to be silenced and as a tool to encourage others to take up their causes.

—Donovan Rinker-Morris