

How and Why International Law Binds International Organizations

Kristina Daugirdas*

For decades, controversy has dogged claims about whether and to what extent international law binds international organizations (“IOs”) like the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. The question has important consequences for humanitarian law, economic rights, and environmental protection. In this Article, I aim to resolve the controversy by supplying a theory about when and how international law binds IOs. I conclude that international law binds IOs to the same degree that it binds states. That is, IOs are not more extensively or more readily bound; nor are they less extensively or less readily bound. This means that IOs, like states, are not bound by treaties without their consent, with some very narrow exceptions that apply to states and IOs alike. It means that IOs, like states, are bound by jus cogens rules, which are mandatory for states and IOs alike. And it means that IOs, like states, are bound by general international law—but only as a default matter. Like states, IOs may contract around such default rules, except to the extent that individual IOs lack the capacity to do so because of their limited authorities.

INTRODUCTION

Which international law rules bind international organizations?¹ Does the Security Council have a legal obligation to prevent genocide?² Does the International Monetary Fund have an obligation to ensure that its loan conditions do not impede borrowing states’ efforts to provide an education?³ Must the World Trade Organization recognize the precautionary principle in international environmental law? The charters of the United Nations, the

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1. This Article uses the definition of international organizations articulated by the International Law Commission: “an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality.” Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations with Commentaries art. 2(a), in *Report of the International Law Commission on Its Sixty-third Session*, ¶ 87, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011), to be reprinted in [2011] 2. Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (forthcoming) [hereinafter IO Responsibility Articles].

2. See José Alvarez, *Review of Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers*, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 674, 677–78 (2007) (describing this as a hard question).

3. Compare ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 148–51 (Gráinne de Búrca et al. eds., 1st ed. 2006) (arguing in the affirmative) with François Gianviti, *Economic, Social, and Cultural Human Rights and the International Monetary Fund* 113, 121–22 in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (arguing in the negative).

IMF, and the WTO do not clearly impose these obligations. Nor are these IOs party to treaties that impose such obligations. So if these obligations bind these IOs—and many commentators think they do—it must be for another reason.

This Article considers two possibilities. One is that these treaty provisions reflect customary international law or general principles (collectively, general international law),⁴ and that general international law binds IOs as well as states. Indeed, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has averred that “[i]nternational organizations are subjects of international law, and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law.”⁵ Many scholars echo this language and affirm that general international law binds IOs.⁶ But this one sentence hardly settles the matter.⁷ Closer inspection reveals that the ICJ’s statement lacks any support, and the ICJ’s precise legal conclusion is also unclear.⁸ Some scholars continue to think that whether customary international law binds IOs at all is a hard question, while others suggest that only a subset of general international law binds IOs.⁹

The second possibility is that treaties can bind IOs even when they are not parties and have not consented. But whether treaties can bind IOs under these circumstances is disputed. On the one hand, the view that IOs are automatically bound by their member states’ treaty obligations is in tension with IOs’ separate, independent legal personality. Additionally, the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of IO Treaties (“VCLT-IO”) says that treaties do not bind IOs without their consent.¹⁰ On the other hand, the VCLT-IO remains controversial and, nearly thirty years after its adoption, has failed to attract enough ratifications to enter into force.¹¹ In the meantime, several scholars—including the authors of a leading treatise on IOs—have insisted that IOs can be so bound.¹²

As it stands, significant disagreement and uncertainty persists about which international law rules bind IOs and which rules IOs can legally ig-

4. See *infra* notes 29–31.

5. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 73, 89–90 (Dec. 20) [hereinafter WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion].

6. See *infra* note 34 and accompanying text.

7. See discussion *infra* Part I.A.1; see also Jan Klabbbers, *The Paradox of International Institutional Law*, 5 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 151, 165 (2008) (“[T]he discipline may claim, following the ICJ in 1980, that international organizations are subjects of international law, and thus also subject to international law, but it remains unclear which international law and why: there is no plausible theory of obligation.”).

8. See *infra* notes 35–45 and accompanying text.

9. See *supra* note 2; *infra* notes 46–50 and accompanying text.

10. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations art. 34, *opened for signature* Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986) (not yet in force) [hereinafter VCLT-IO] (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State or a third organization without the consent of that State or that organization.”).

11. Thirty-five states must become parties before the VCLT-IO enters into force; so far, only thirty-one have done so. See *id.* art. 85.

12. See *infra* notes 61–68 and accompanying text.

nore. To resolve these competing claims, this Article offers a theory of how and why international law binds IOs. This Article's central claim is that international law binds IOs to the same degree that it binds states. That is, IOs are not more extensively or more readily bound; nor are they less extensively or less readily bound. This means that IOs, like states, are not bound by treaties without their consent, subject to some very narrow exceptions that apply to states and IOs alike. It means that IOs, like states, are bound by *jus cogens* rules. And it means that IOs, like states, are bound by general international law—but only as a default matter. Like states, IOs may contract around such default rules, except to the extent that individual IOs lack the capacity to do so because of their limited authorities.

At bottom, the debate about IOs' legal obligations boils down to this question: when and why should obligations that were created by states and for states also bind IOs?¹³ To begin to answer this question, it is helpful to consider IOs' relationship to states in the international legal system. A defining feature of IOs is that they are simultaneously in a vertical and a horizontal relationship with states. IOs are subordinate to states because states are the entities that create, sustain, and—potentially—dismantle IOs (the vertical relationship). States are the principals, IOs are the agents. At the same time, IOs are separate legal persons under international law with a significant degree of autonomy (the horizontal relationship). Among other things, IOs can call states to account for violations of international obligations using the same methods that states, as sovereign equals, use to resolve disputes among themselves. In addition, comprehensive immunity shields IOs from the regulatory authority of individual states. Both features distinguish IOs from other nonstate actors, including corporations and nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”).

The vertical relationship suggests that IOs are appropriately characterized as vehicles through which states operate. The horizontal relationship, by contrast, suggests that IOs are states' peers on the international plane. Of course, these two perspectives are not genuinely dichotomous. No IO is purely a vehicle, and no IO is wholly autonomous. The two conceptions are

13. Whether IOs can contribute to *making* customary international law is also contested. The International Law Commission has recently begun to tackle the question. See Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur on the Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law), *Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law*, ¶¶ 43–44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014); Int'l Law Comm'n, *Identification of Customary International Law: Text of the Draft Conclusions Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.869, at 2 (July 14, 2015) (“In certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law.”). Some scholars have suggested that IOs should be bound by customary international law only to the extent that they can contribute to making customary international law. See *infra* notes 49–50 and accompanying text. But this need not necessarily be the case. Armed opposition groups, for example, are bound by customary international humanitarian law, but on most accounts they do not have any role in shaping the content of customary international humanitarian law. See Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, *Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Law*, 37 *YALE J. INT'L L.* 107 (2012).

poles at the ends of a wide spectrum.¹⁴ Some IOs will be closer to the peer end, perhaps because of their resources or authorities. Others will be closer to the vehicle end, perhaps because of their decision-making structure or limited membership.¹⁵ Indeed, the same IO might look more like a peer or more like a vehicle depending on the angle from which it is scrutinized. Focus on the Secretary-General, and the United Nations looks more like a peer; focus on the Security Council or the General Assembly, and it looks more like a vehicle.

These two conceptions correspond to two distinct apprehensions that motivate the arguments about IOs' obligations. If IOs are conceived as vehicles through which states operate, the fear is that states might exploit IOs to evade their international obligations.¹⁶ If IOs are conceived as peers, however, the underlying concern is quite different: states have created entities with significant authorities and power that states do not or cannot fully control. This latter concern might be labeled the Frankenstein problem.¹⁷

Both conceptions of IOs lead to the same conclusion about their international obligations: general international law and treaties bind IOs to the same degree that they bind states. In other words, I argue that regardless of whether IOs are seen as peers or vehicles, the same international obligations bind them. By building the theoretical infrastructure for that conclusion from these two diverging perspectives, I hope to address the concerns raised by those who doubt that general international law binds IOs. In addition, the Article explains why the view that treaties can bind IOs without their consent is untenable in the vast majority of cases.

Drawing on these theoretical foundations, this Article turns to a practical and underappreciated question: what do IOs themselves think? A number of IOs have in fact communicated their views on the scope of their interna-

14. There may be IOs that do not fit neatly along this spectrum. For example, it may not capture the relationship between the EU and its member states because the EU has some features of supranational governance. But those very features have caused some scholars to suggest that the EU should not be understood as an IO. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy, *Neither an International Organization nor a Nation State: The EU as a Supranational Federation*, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Erik Jones et al. eds., 2012).

15. The vehicle perspective may seem especially appropriate for an IO like NATO, for example, in light of its limited membership and the rule that its twenty-eight member states must reach consensus before making important decisions. See Int'l Law Comm'n, *Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/637, at 11–12 (Feb. 14, 2011) [hereinafter *Responsibility of International Organizations*].

16. August Reinisch, *Securing the Accountability of International Organizations*, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 131, 134 (2001) ("Where states cooperate well and use an international organization as a vehicle to carry out activities that they themselves may be prevented from engaging in either under their domestic law or under international law, the lack of substantive and procedural restraint may pose a serious problem. This is where the lawyers' interest in protecting against worst-case scenarios begins.").

17. Others have made this comparison. The epigraph to Jan Klabbbers's casebook is a quotation from Mary Shelley: "You are my creator, but I am your master; obey!" JAN KLABBERS, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2009); see also JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 585 (2005); Andrew Guzman, *International Organizations and the Frankenstein Problem*, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 999 (2014).

tional obligations to the International Law Commission (“ILC”).¹⁸ In these comments, participating IOs have staked out a position that tracks this Article’s theoretical conclusions. They have emphatically rejected the possibility that treaties bind them without their consent. They have, at times, directly endorsed the conclusion that they are bound by *jus cogens* and customary international law. Finally, participating IOs have asserted that their charters constitute *lex specialis*—that is, that their charters reflect action by states to alter the application of customary international law or general principles by elaborating or carving out exceptions to it. The view that IO charters constitute *lex specialis* necessarily rests on the understanding that general international law binds IOs except to the extent that those IOs or their member states have contracted around it. In other words, there is some evidence that IOs themselves recognize that general international law binds them, but only as a default matter.

At the end of the day, then, states enjoy wide latitude to create *lex specialis* and to adjust the legal obligations that bind the IOs they establish. States can exercise that discretion to create IOs that are free to ignore certain international rules vis-à-vis their member states. States might choose to do so because they believe that such institutions will be more efficient or effective at achieving their policy goals.¹⁹ The result may be problematic along some dimensions: IOs that are licensed to ignore certain international norms might undermine those norms or work at cross-purposes to policy goals that states are advancing in other arenas.²⁰ But such conflicts are an inevitable feature of an international legal system that is based largely on state consent. Although IOs are creatures of international law, it does not follow that they are obliged to follow or reinforce all international norms.

That said, states’ discretion to fashion IOs is not unlimited. States cannot create IOs that are authorized to violate *jus cogens*. Nor can states establish or act through IOs to erase general international law obligations they owe to nonmember states. It is one thing for a group of states to establish an IO and authorize it to disregard certain general international law obligations in its

18. The ILC is a subsidiary body that the General Assembly created in 1947 to fulfill its responsibility under the Charter to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the codification and progressive development of international law. See U.N. Charter art. 13. The ILC is made up of thirty-four expert members with “recognized competence in international law” who serve in their personal capacities rather than as representatives of their States of nationality. Statute of the International Law Commission arts. 2(1), 3, Nov. 21, 1947. No two members of the Commission may be nationals of the same state, and, in electing the members, the General Assembly must ensure that the “main forms of civilization” and the “principal legal systems of the world” are represented. *Id.* arts. 2(2), 8.

19. See *infra* note 78 and accompanying text; cf. W. Michael Reisman, *Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated Responsibilities in Human Rights Programs*, 72 IOWA L. REV. 391, 395 (1986) (“[T]here is a limit to ‘institutional elasticity,’ i.e., the extent to which institutions created and still used for other purposes can be ‘stretched’ in order to get them to perform human rights functions, especially when those functions are accomplished at the expense of their manifest functions.”).

20. See, e.g., Siobhán McNerney-Lankford, *Human Rights and Development: Regime Interaction and the Fragmentation of International Law*, 4 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV. 123 (2013) (arguing that the absence of policy coherence across human rights and development regimes is problematic).

interactions with its member states. It is another thing altogether for states to use an IO to sidestep their international obligations to states that are not participating in the IO. In the end, this Article's account of IO obligations does not promise to eliminate all conflicts in the international legal system; sometimes IOs' obligations will diverge from those of their member states, and sometimes IOs will lack obligations to advance goals that states pursue through other treaties or IOs. But in concluding that certain obligations bind IOs with respect to both member and nonmember states this Article seeks to ensure that IOs do not become devices for undermining the international legal system.²¹

I. DISPUTES AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT IO OBLIGATIONS

A. *Disputes and Uncertainty*

A sampling of IO charters highlights their ambitious goals: "international peace and security,"²² "the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health,"²³ and "long-range balanced growth of international trade,"²⁴ to name just a few. Even as IOs contribute to achieving these goals, the possibility that they might either exacerbate the problems they were meant to alleviate or cause harm along the way has in recent decades gained more and more attention.²⁵ Demands for "IO accountability" have mounted. There are various ways to define accountability and to try to ensure IOs are accountable.²⁶ One way is to look to international law. The sources of states' international law obligations are well known: they include treaties, customary international law, and general principles.²⁷ But whether and when these sources bind IOs is mired in uncertainty. If we do not know what IOs' international obligations are, we do not know when IOs have violated them. As August Reinisch put it at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, when it comes to IOs, it is only a "little bit exaggerating" to say that "we don't know what the wrongful acts are."²⁸

21. Cf. *infra* note 183 and accompanying text.

22. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.

23. Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 1, July 22, 1946.

24. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development art. 1, Feb. 16, 1989.

25. See, e.g., Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, *United States Defends United Nations' Immunity in Haitian Cholera Case*, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 819 (2014) (describing lawsuit relating to U.N. peacekeepers as the most likely source of a cholera epidemic that has sickened more than 700,000 people and killed more than 8500).

26. See generally Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, *Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics*, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005); Richard B. Stewart, *Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness*, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 211 (2014).

27. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]; see also ALVAREZ, *supra* note 17, at 47–49.

28. August Reinisch, *Adapting to Change: The Role of International Organizations*, 2015 ASIL Annual Meeting (Apr. 20, 2015), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4fW-YR6HqW0>.

1. *General International Law*

General international law combines two sources of law found in article 38 of the ICJ statute: customary international law and general principles.²⁹ Customary international law emerges where there is a general and consistent state practice that states follow from a sense of legal obligation.³⁰ Exactly which rules fit into the general principles category is murkier. As traditionally conceived, general principles include those legal principles “derived from, and evidenced by, the consistent provisions of various municipal legal systems—principles *in foro domestico*—which can be validly transposed into international law.”³¹ Some scholars argue that obligations to protect fundamental human rights are binding as general principles.³² This Article’s argument does not turn on resolving the debate about which rules qualify as general principles or the debate about whether any particular norm is more appropriately characterized as customary international law or a general principle.

Scholars have taken a range of positions about whether and how general international law binds IOs. Some hesitate to stake out a position at all, considering it a hard question. Others argue that only a subset of general international law binds IOs. Still others suggest not only that the entire corpus of general international law binds IOs, but also that these rules constitute mandatory rather than default rules for IOs.

A single sentence in the ICJ’s 1980 *WHO-Egypt* advisory opinion supplies the foundation for many analyses of IO obligations under general international law. In full, it reads:

International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties.³³

29. To be a bit more precise, general international law excludes “special” customary international law norms that bind only small numbers of states, such as states in a particular region. JOOST PAUWELYN, *CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW* 148–49, 155–57 (2003).

30. See I.C.J. Statute, *supra* note 27, art. 38(1)(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(3) (1987) (“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”); Int’l Law Comm’n, *Identification of Customary International Law: Text of the Draft Conclusions Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.869, at 1 (July 14, 2015) (“To determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law (*opinio juris*).”). On whether IO practice and *opinio juris* count for purposes of ascertaining or making customary international law, see *supra* note 13.

31. PAUWELYN, *supra* note 29, at 125; see also JAMES C. HATHAWAY, *THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW* 26–28 (2005).

32. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, *The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles*, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 82–83 (1989).

33. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 5, ¶ 37.

Paraphrasing this key sentence, a number of scholars have affirmed that general international law binds IOs.³⁴ But others are less sure. One source of doubt that the *WHO-Egypt* opinion settles the question is the dearth of state and IO practice supporting its conclusion.³⁵

A closer look at the *WHO-Egypt* opinion reveals additional reasons why it cannot settle the question about IOs' obligations—or even shed much light on it. The case arose when Arab states sought to transfer a World Health Organization (“WHO”) regional office away from the city of Alexandria after Egypt agreed to the Camp David Accords with Israel.³⁶ (Arab states numerically dominated the WHO regional committee charged with overseeing the Alexandria office.³⁷) Egypt protested that such a transfer would violate a 1951 treaty it had signed with the WHO. Other states argued that the 1951 treaty did not apply to the transfer decision. The ICJ did not resolve this question; instead, it asserted that the “true legal question” was which legal principles and rules governed the relocation of regional offices.³⁸ The ICJ stated that IOs are bound by general rules of international law in the course of a paragraph that makes the obviously correct and rather trivial point that IOs lack an absolute right to select the location of their headquarters or a regional office:

States for their part possess a sovereign power of decision with respect to their acceptance of the headquarters or a regional office of an organization within their territories; and an organization's power of decision is no more absolute in this respect than is that of a State. As was pointed out by the Court in one of its early Advisory Opinions, there is nothing in the character of international organizations to justify their being considered as some form

34. See, e.g., Olivier De Schutter, *Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations*, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 51, 72–73 (Jan Wouters et al. eds., 2010) (“We may conclude that international organizations, as subjects of international law, must comply with general public international law in the exercise of their activities, and that this includes a requirement to comply with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as general principles of law.”); Eyal Benvenisti, *THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE* 99 (2014) (“[A]n international person, an [IO] is subject to general international law. Therefore [IOs] are subject to customary international law and general principles of law.”); Reinisch, *supra* note 16, at 136 (“[S]trong arguments in favor of an obligation to observe customary law may be derived from more general reflections concerning the status of the UN as an organization enjoying legal personality. It has been forcefully stressed that the Security Council is ‘subject to’ international law because the UN itself is a ‘subject of’ international law, and this reasoning may be applied more generally to other international organizations.”).

35. Alvarez, *supra* note 2, at 677.

36. As explained in the Written Statement made to the ICJ by the Syrian Arab Republic, “[t]he cause of the increasingly tense and troubled situation obtaining in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, which has made it necessary to transfer the regional office, lies in the agreements signed at Camp David in the United States of America on 27 September 1978. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 5, ¶ 2 (dissenting opinion by Morozov, J.).

37. Constitution of the World Health Organization arts. 46–47, 50, July 22, 1946; WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 5, at 85, ¶¶ 28–29.

38. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 5, at 88, ¶ 5; see also *infra* notes 215–18 (describing the ICJ's conclusion about the principles and rules applicable to the possible transfer).

of “super-State.” International organizations are subjects of international law and as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties.³⁹

The ICJ’s opinion offers nothing to bolster its statement that IOs, as subjects of international law, are bound by general rules of international law. Equating being a subject with being bound by general international law is hardly obvious. As the universe of entities with rights or obligations (or both) under international law has expanded beyond states and IOs to include individuals and armed opposition groups, both the prerequisites and the consequences of being a subject of international law have grown increasingly contested.⁴⁰

Even accepting the ICJ’s conclusion, it is difficult to wring much content from it. After all, the ICJ wrote that IOs are bound by “any obligations *incumbent upon them* under general rules of international law.”⁴¹ Maybe all of general international law is “incumbent upon” IOs. But maybe only some (unspecified) subset is. The phrase “general rules of international law” compounds the confusion because the ICJ has not used this term (or its many variations) consistently.⁴² Sometimes the term refers to customary international law and general principles.⁴³ Other times the term refers to norms that are mandatory and binding without exception.⁴⁴ Still other times it is used as a synonym for customary international law.⁴⁵

Jan Klabbers has argued that *WHO-Egypt* is best read to indicate that only a subset of general international law binds IOs. In his view, that subset includes rules on the “making, application, and enforcement” of international law, such as rules about treaty law or responsibility, and excludes rules that require, permit, or prohibit particular conduct.⁴⁶ According to Klabbers, the ICJ probably did not intend to suggest that all of customary international law binds IOs. Had the ICJ meant to do so, he argues, the ICJ

39. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 5, at 89–90, ¶ 37 (citation omitted).

40. As a result, some scholars endorse discarding the “subject” concept altogether. *See, e.g.,* ROSALYN HIGGINS, *PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT* 49 (1994) (arguing that the notion of “subjects” and “objects” of international law has “no credible reality” and serves “no functional purpose”).

41. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 5, at 89–90, ¶ 37 (emphasis added).

42. *See* G.M. DANILENKO, *LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY* 9–10 (1993) (noting various ways that the term “general international law” and similar variations are used); *see also* Prosper Weil, *Towards Relative Normativity in International Law*, 77 *AM. J. INT’L L.* 413, 436–37 (1983) (same).

43. DANILENKO, *supra* note 42, at 9–10; *see also* Weil, *supra* note 42, at 436–37.

44. *Id.*

45. *Id.*

46. Jan Klabbers, *Book Review*, 11 *INT’L ORG. L. REV.* 235, 237 (2014) (reviewing GUGLIELMO VERDIRAME, *THE UN AND HUMAN RIGHTS: WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?* (2011)); *see also* Jan Klabbers, *The Sources of International Organizations Law*, in *THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW* (forthcoming).

would have done so explicitly.⁴⁷ After all, in 1980, when the ICJ issued its opinion, the prospect of wrongdoing by IOs was still seen as “a remote, largely hypothetical, possibility.”⁴⁸ Moreover, Klabbers argues, the view that customary international law rules created by and for states might bind other actors contravenes the very concept that customary international law results from “the aggregate of activities of the members of a political community.”⁴⁹ If all customary international law binds IOs, he argues, there is a troubling misalignment between IOs’ obligations and their limited ability to contribute to making customary international law.⁵⁰

WHO-Egypt thus fails to resolve which international law rules bind IOs, and the question remains unsettled. But even if there were agreement about which rules bind IOs, scholars have disagreed about whether those rules are mandatory or default rules.⁵¹ Some have affirmed that states can contract around general international law when establishing IOs,⁵² but others have suggested they cannot⁵³—or at least expressed some sympathy for the view that they cannot.⁵⁴

47. Klabbers, *Book Review*, *supra* note 46, at 237.

48. *Id.*

49. Klabbers, *The Sources of International Organizations Law*, *supra* note 46.

50. *Id.* (“Surely, if one is to become bound by a customary rule, it is only fair that one is also in a position to contribute to its formation—yet with international organizations this possibility is practically ruled out on topics other than those falling within the competences of the organization.”). *But see* CLAPHAM, *supra* note 3, at 28 (arguing that general international law can bind IOs without IOs having any role in making those rules); *see also supra* note 13.

51. The *WHO-Egypt* opinion does not speak to this question, nor do some of the scholars who have written about IO obligations. *See, e.g.*, CLAPHAM, *supra* note 3; De Schutter, *supra* note 34. These authors may not have addressed the question because they have focused on IOs’ human rights obligations, and states and IOs may not be able to contract around such norms even if they do not have *jus cogens* status. *See infra* note 131 and accompanying text.

52. *See* Daniel Halberstam & Eric Stein, *The United Nations, the EU, and the King of Sweden*, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 13, 21 (2009) (arguing that the United Nations is bound by customary international law as well as general principles of law, “at least to the extent that the UN Charter does not provide otherwise”); Dapo Akande, *The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?*, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 309, 320 (1997) (“Where the Charter gives the Council a right to derogate from international law it is clear that that right exists. Where no express permission is given the right does not exist.”).

53. Tomuschat starts with the proposition that IOs must be bound by *jus cogens* norms like the ban on the use of force in the U.N. Charter: “If states could evade this central rule of today’s legal order by founding an international organization, it would soon totally lose its practical impact.” Christian Tomuschat, *Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century*, 62 RECUEIL DES COURS 23, 135 (1999). He then argues that the “constraints” on IOs include “ordinary norms” as well as *jus cogens* norms. *Id.* at 135–36. States can contract around such ordinary customary international law norms if they so choose. Thus, for example, states may choose to vary by mutual agreement the rules relating to territorial seas or exclusive economic zones. By contrast, in his view, it appears that IOs cannot do so, for the “[l]egal clarity brought about by the UN Law of the Sea Convention and the customary rules which have emerged against its background should not be susceptible of being undermined by rather simplistic legal tricks” like the establishment of an IO. *Id.* at 136.

54. *See* August Reinisch, *Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions*, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 851, 858 (2001) (“[T]he assumption that the UN member states could have succeeded in collectively ‘opting out’ of customary international law and general principles of law by creating an international organization that would cease to be bound by those very obligations appears rather unconvincing.”).

In short, the answers that scholars have given to the question of whether general international law binds IOs include: maybe, sometimes, and always.

2. *Treaties*

There is also disagreement about whether treaties can bind IOs without their consent. Treaties do not bind states without their consent; the ability to pick and choose among treaties is one of the fundamental rights associated with statehood.⁵⁵ Indeed, if one state can bind another entity to international obligations without the latter's consent, it is good evidence that the entity lacks the independence that is a requisite feature of statehood.⁵⁶ The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") codified this principle in article 34: "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent."⁵⁷ It is known as the *pacta tertiis* rule.⁵⁸

According to the VCLT-IO, the *pacta tertiis* rule also applies to IOs. The VCLT-IO provides that "[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State or a third organization without the consent of that State or that organization."⁵⁹ But the VCLT-IO has not garnered enough ratifications to enter into force,⁶⁰ and a number of scholars disagree with the VCLT-IO. They take the position that treaties can, at least sometimes, bind IOs without their consent. One argument is that IOs are "transitively bound" by their member states' treaty obligations.⁶¹ That is, "an organization formed by states will be bound by the obligations to which the individual states were committed when they transferred powers to the organization."⁶² Alternatively, if states are bound by certain treaty obligations, they cannot create an organization that has the capacity to violate those obligations.⁶³ In both cases, the rationale is that "no subject of international law may transfer to another subject more powers than those which

55. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries art. 30, in *Report of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of Its Seventeenth Session and on Its Eighteenth Session*, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l Law Comm'n 169, 226, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966.

56. JAMES CRAWFORD, *THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW* 71 (2d ed. 2006).

57. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, *opened for signature* May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

58. See CHRISTINE CHINKIN, *THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW* 25 (1993) ("Treaties bind consenting parties only, and strangers to any treaty are legally unaffected by it. This is the classic rule of treaties and third parties: *pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt*.").

59. VCLT-IO art. 34, *supra* note 10.

60. See *supra* note 11.

61. Frédéric Mégret & Florian Hoffmann, *The UN as Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities*, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 314, 318 (2003) (describing the position that the United Nations is bound by international human rights standards "as a result and to the extent that its members are bound").

62. HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, *INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW* 995, § 1574 (4th rev. ed. 2003) ("According to principles of state succession, a new state is often bound by the obligations of its predecessor. By analogy, an organization formed by states will be bound by the obligations to which the individual states were committed when they transferred powers to the organization."); see also *infra* notes 243–44 and accompanying text (describing additional arguments framed in terms of functional succession).

63. De Schutter, *supra* note 34, at 62–63.

it possesses.”⁶⁴ Most scholars do not address whether this argument applies to treaty obligations entered into by all member states, by some fraction of member states, or by any member state.⁶⁵

Henry Schermers and Neils Blokker, the authors of a leading treatise on IOs, are the most prominent exponents of the view that treaties can bind IOs without their consent, although they do not define the universe of treaties that would automatically bind IOs.⁶⁶ Schermers and Blokker point out that IOs’ nonparty status to multilateral treaties does not necessarily indicate a desire not to be bound because multilateral treaties typically permit only states to become parties.⁶⁷ They also argue that IOs are more subordinate to international law than states are because IOs are creatures of international law.⁶⁸

B. *Illustrating the Stakes*

To illustrate the stakes of the debate over IOs’ obligations and the range of settings in which such debates have arisen or could arise, this section sets out three concrete examples regarding economic rights, humanitarian law, and environmental protection.

1. *Conflict Underway: The IMF and Economic Rights*

In the wake of World War II, forty-five states established the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the World Bank—institutions that were “dreamt up by economists on either side of the Atlantic.”⁶⁹ The IMF was charged with “promot[ing] international monetary cooperation,” “facilitat[ing] the expansion and balanced growth of international trade,” and “shorten[ing] the duration and lessen[ing] the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.”⁷⁰ To accomplish these goals, the IMF “exercise[s] firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members.”⁷¹ It also lends money to its members, subject to certain conditions.⁷²

64. *Id.* at 62 (noting also that this reflects the maxim *nemo plus juris transferre potest quam ipse habet*).

65. De Schutter argues that, “in principle, such obligations should correspond to any international obligation of *any* Member State of the organization, without it being necessary that *all* the Member States are bound by the said obligation.” *Id.* at 64.

66. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, *supra* note 62.

67. *Id.* at 995–96, § 1574.

68. *Id.* (“International organizations, although established by states, have never possessed a potent legal order of their own. They are established under international law. Their constitutional roots are in international law. No superiority over international law can be pleaded on their behalf.”).

69. NGAIRE WOODS, *THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THEIR BORROWERS* 45 (2006).

70. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. I, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.

71. *Id.* art. IV.

72. Gianviti, *supra* note 3, at 134–35.

For decades, international lawyers have debated what obligations, if any, the IMF might have to protect the economic rights of individuals. The U.N. General Assembly first enumerated economic rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. These rights were subsequently incorporated into the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), which was adopted in 1966. Such rights include the right to work; the right to enjoyment of “just and favourable conditions of work;” the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and housing; and the right to an education.⁷³ Not all states are in a position to implement these obligations immediately. Recognizing this, the ICESCR requires them to take incremental steps toward the “full realization” of the enumerated rights.⁷⁴

In the 1980s, human rights advocates and scholars began to criticize the IMF. In their view, the conditions that the IMF imposed on its loans were so draconian that they inevitably led borrowing states to violate their ICESCR obligations.⁷⁵ This concern has persisted. In 1999, for example, the Committee on Economic and Social Rights, a group of experts charged with monitoring states’ compliance with the Convention, asserted that the IMF and the World Bank “should pay greater attention to the protection of the right to food in their lending policies and credit arrangements and in international measures to deal with the debt crisis.”⁷⁶

Policy questions aside, there has been vigorous debate about whether the IMF is *legally* bound by international obligations to protect economic rights. According to François Gianviti, the IMF’s former general counsel, the IMF has no legal obligations to protect economic rights.⁷⁷ Indeed, Gianviti argues, an undue short-term focus on economic rights might compromise not only the IMF’s core mission, but also the realization of economic rights themselves, at least in the long run.⁷⁸

The IMF is not a party to the ICESCR. Indeed, the ICESCR’s final clauses permit accession only by states.⁷⁹ Some have nevertheless argued that the IMF has obligations with respect to economic rights because the IMF’s member states are parties to human rights treaties including the ICESCR.⁸⁰

73. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 6–7, 11, 13, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].

74. *Id.* art. 2.

75. See, e.g., Philip Alston, *The International Monetary Fund and the Right to Food*, 30 HOWARD L.J. 473, 476 (1987).

76. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999).

77. See Gianviti, *supra* note 3.

78. See *id.* at 130–32, 137.

79. ICESCR, *supra* note 73, art. 26.

80. Alston, *supra* note 75, at 479–80 (asserting that there is a “strong legal argument[] . . . that the IMF is obligated in accordance with international law, to take account of human rights considerations” because its member states “have all ratified various human rights conventions and in accordance with the relevant principles of international law the IMF ought not to encourage or facilitate a state’s violating those international legal obligations by encouraging it, or in effect forcing it to enter into an agreement

This argument is contested on a number of grounds, including that not all IMF member states are parties to the ICESCR.⁸¹

Alternatively, some scholars have argued that the IMF is bound by general international law and that economic rights constitute customary international law or general principles.⁸² Others disagree with this conclusion, either doubting that these rules bind the IMF⁸³ or contesting that economic rights have the status of customary international law or general principles.⁸⁴

2. *Conflict Deferred: The United Nations and International Humanitarian Law*

U.N. peacekeepers operate under the command and control of the United Nations. Does the United Nations have an international obligation to ensure that they comply with international humanitarian law? This question first arose more than a half-century ago, yet the answer remains unclear.

Over the years, the United Nations has taken various measures to ensure that U.N. peacekeepers do comply with international humanitarian law. A number of scholars have argued that these steps reflect not only sound policy, but also the United Nations' legal obligations: peacekeepers must comply with international humanitarian law because customary international law binds the United Nations.⁸⁵ Although there is little doubt that many international humanitarian law rules are part of customary international law (the U.N. Secretary-General has affirmed as much⁸⁶), the United Nations

which in fact violates the economic rights of the citizens of that country"); SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, *THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND* 83, 136 (2001) (describing Schermers and Blokker as making a "plausible" argument that treaties can bind IOs without their consent and concluding that while the IMF "do[es] not assume material or procedural legal obligations directly from the Economic and Social Rights Covenant, . . . the application of the Covenant brings more clarity to the substantive content of the human rights standards" that the IMF has "a negative and neutral obligation not to violate and to respect, according to [its] legal relationship to the [U.N.] Charter").

81. See Gianviti, *supra* note 3, at 113 nn.1 & 115 (explaining that some of the IMF's members are not parties to the ICESCR and arguing that "in the event that some or all members of an international organization adhere to a treaty containing such other objectives or values, this in itself does not result in these objectives or values becoming part of the organization's mandate unless and until agreement is reached to amend the organization's charter").

82. SKOGLY, *supra* note 80, at 76–79, 84–90, 120–25; CLAPHAM, *supra* note 3, at 148–51.

83. Klabbers, *supra* note 7, at 166 (describing the IO literature as "replete with eventually somewhat unsatisfactory statements holding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund bound by human rights because human rights are morally desirable").

84. Gianviti, *supra* note 3, at 121–22 ("[I]t is not generally accepted that the [ICESCR] (or the norms contained in it) form part of general or customary international law."); see also Reinisch, *supra* note 54, at 862 ("There is no consensus that the contents of [the ICESCR], as well as the economic rights contained in the Universal Declaration, can be considered to represent established customary law or general principles.").

85. See, e.g., R. SIMMONDS, *LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO* 178–80 (1968); MOSHE HIRSCH, *THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARD THIRD PARTIES* 36 (1995).

86. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, *Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808*, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc S/25704 (May 3, 1993); see also, e.g., Sandesh Sivakumaran, *BINDING ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS*, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 369, 372–73 (2006).

has conspicuously avoided taking a position about whether it is bound by those rules.⁸⁷

By nevertheless requiring peacekeepers to comply with international humanitarian law, the United Nations has kept debates about its legal obligations from coming to a head. This avoidance strategy is common among IOs; they often comply with international law norms without confirming that they have an obligation to do so.⁸⁸ This is one reason why uncertainty about IOs' legal obligations has endured for so long.

Shortly after the first U.N. peacekeeping force was established in 1956, the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") wrote to the United Nations, expressing concern that U.N. peacekeepers were "directly dependent on the United Nations, which was not, as an Organization, a party to the [Geneva] Conventions."⁸⁹ The ICRC thus proposed issuing instructions to the peacekeepers requiring compliance with the Geneva Conventions.⁹⁰ In response, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant agreed that those treaties were important; he affirmed that the "Geneva Conventions of 1949 constitute the most complete standards granting to the human person indispensable guarantees for his protection in time of war or in case of armed conflict whatever form it may take."⁹¹ Thant went on to say that he had issued regulations requiring peacekeepers "to respect the principles and the spirit of the general international Conventions relative to the conduct of military personnel."⁹² Notably, Thant did *not* say that the Geneva Conventions themselves bound the United Nations, either as a treaty obligation or as customary international law.⁹³

In 1972, the ICRC proposed amending the Geneva Conventions to allow the United Nations to accede.⁹⁴ The United Nations objected:

[Those conventions] contain many obligations that can only be discharged by the exercise of juridical and administrative powers which the Organization does not possess, such as the authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of the Forces, or ad-

87. See, e.g., HIRSCH, *supra* note 85, at 34; Steven R. Ratner, *Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of Convergence*, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 695, 705 (2005).

88. Kristina Daugirdas, *Reputation and the Responsibility of International Organizations*, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L. 991, 1012–14 (2014) (describing other examples of IOs complying with international law norms without making explicit their reason for doing so); see also ALVAREZ, *supra* note 17, at 179.

89. FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR 190 (1966).

90. *Id.*

91. Letter from U Thant, U.N. Secretary-General to Leopold Boissier, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (undated), reprinted in 2 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 29 (1962).

92. *Id.* The regulations for subsequent peacekeeping operations included similar language. See, e.g., SECRETARY-GENERAL, UNITED NATIONS, REGULATIONS FOR THE UN FORCE IN CYPRUS, reg. 40, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/UNFICYP/1 (Apr. 25, 1964).

93. At least one scholar writing in 1968 concluded that these regulations do "constitute a recognition of the applicability of the general (or customary) international law of war rather than of those detailed provisions of the relevant conventions which do not as yet constitute customary international law." SIMMONDS, *supra* note 85, at 192.

94. See U.N. Secretary-General, *Human Rights in Armed Conflict*, U.N. Doc. A/8781 (Sept. 20, 1972).

ministrative competence relating to territorial sovereignty. Thus the United Nations is unable to fulfill obligations which for their execution require the exercise of powers not granted to the Organization, and therefore cannot accede to the Conventions.⁹⁵

Ultimately, the ICRC's proposal was not adopted.

By the mid-1990s, it became clear that instructing peacekeepers to respect the "principles and spirit" of the Geneva Conventions was not enough. The trouble stemmed in part from new peacekeeping missions that blurred the line between *peacekeeping* and *peace enforcement*. For example, in Somalia, the U.N. peacekeepers' mandate included disarmament, which required the use of force when arms were not turned over voluntarily.⁹⁶ Furthermore, because the peacekeepers were operating in an urban environment, civilians were often in harm's way.

Working with the ICRC, the United Nations developed more detailed rules.⁹⁷ In 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued new regulations that set out in specific, concrete terms the international humanitarian law principles and rules with which peacekeepers had to comply.⁹⁸ The regulations also included provisions that are reflected in multilateral treaties but that probably do not (yet) reflect customary international law, such as prohibitions on methods of warfare intended to seriously damage the natural environment.⁹⁹ Thus, the new regulations both codified customary international law and went beyond it. By issuing them, the United Nations drained legal questions about the source and extent of the United Nations' obligations of their urgency.

3. *Conflict Anticipated: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and International Environmental Law*

On June 29, 2015, representatives of fifty-seven states signed an agreement to establish a new regional development bank—the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ("AIIB").¹⁰⁰ China led the effort, seeking to address a

95. Legal Opinion of the Secretariat of the United Nations, Question of the Possible Accession of Intergovernmental Organizations to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 1972 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 153, 154.

96. See S.C. Res. 814, ¶ 7 (Mar. 26, 1993).

97. Daphna Shrager, *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-related Damage*, 94 AM J. INT'L L. 406, 407–08 (2000).

98. U.N. Secretary-General, *Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law*, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999).

99. Shrager, *supra* note 97, at 408.

100. Simon Denyer, *China Launches Development Bank for Asia, Calls It First Step in 'Epic Journey'*, WASH. POST (June 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-launches-infrastructure-bank-first-step-in-an-epic-journey/2015/06/29/e7d8bd7a-ca11-46fa-9bad-15ba856f958c_story.html.

The AIIB's articles of agreement entered into force on December 25, 2015, and the AIIB opened for business on January 16, 2016. See *News*, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK, http://www.aiib.org/html/2016/NEWS_0202/92.html.

massive gap in infrastructure funding in Asia.¹⁰¹ China is supplying about 30% of the Bank's \$100 billion in authorized capital and will exercise just over 26% of the voting power.¹⁰²

At least for the time being, the United States does not intend to become an AIIB member.¹⁰³ In fact, the United States discouraged its allies from joining the AIIB, citing a concern that the AIIB would fail to incorporate the "high standards" of the World Bank and other regional development banks with respect to governance and environmental and social safeguards.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, on March 12, 2015, the United Kingdom became the first major Western state to apply for membership in the AIIB.¹⁰⁵ Others soon followed.¹⁰⁶

President Obama described the United States' concerns at a joint press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in April 2015:

As Prime Minister Abe said, the projects themselves may not be well-designed. They may be very good for the leaders of some countries and contractors, but may not be good for the actual people who live there. And the reason I can say that is because, in the past, some of the efforts of multilateral institutions that the United States set up didn't always do right by the actual people in those countries. And we learned some lessons from that, and we got better at making sure that we were listening to the community and thinking about how this would affect the environment, and whether it was sustainable.¹⁰⁷

Just before prospective founding members met to sign the AIIB's charter, Jin Liqun, who headed an AIIB working group and was subsequently named the AIIB's President-elect, said the Bank was committed to being "lean,

101. *Why China Is Creating a New "World Bank" for Asia*, *ECONOMIST* (Nov. 11, 2014).

102. See Press Release, The State Council, The People's Republic of China, Key Legal Framework Laid for China-initiated AIIB (June 29, 2015), http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/06/29/content_281475136908926.htm.

103. Matthew Yglesias, *How a Chinese Infrastructure Bank Turned into a Diplomatic Fiasco for America*, *VOX* (Apr. 1, 2015), <http://www.vox.com/2015/4/1/8311921/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank>.

104. *UK Support for China-backed Asia Bank Prompts US Concern*, BBC (Mar. 13, 2015), <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-31864877> (quoting U.S. National Security Council spokesperson Patrick Ventrell); Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Daily Briefing by the Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Mar. 17, 2015), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/17/daily-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-031715>.

105. *UK Announces Plans to Join Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank*, *GOV.UK* (Mar. 12, 2015), <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-plans-to-join-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank>.

106. Andrew Higgins & David E. Sanger, *Three European Powers Say They Will Join China-led Bank*, *N.Y. TIMES*, Mar. 18, 2015, at A4; Choe Sang-Hun, *South Korea Plans to Join Regional Development Bank Led by China*, *N.Y. TIMES*, Mar. 27, 2015, at A12.

107. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint Press Conference (Apr. 28, 2015), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press-confere>.

clean, and green.”¹⁰⁸ Jin explained that the working group had already drafted an environmental document for approval by member states.¹⁰⁹

Depending on which international law rules bind IOs—and whether those rules are mandatory or default rules—some environmental policies might be legally required. The ICJ has held, for example, that general international law requires environmental impact assessments where there is a risk that a proposed project will have a significant adverse transboundary impact.¹¹⁰ The World Bank and other regional development banks already require environmental impact assessments before they fund projects. If general international law binds IOs, then the AIIB risks violating international law unless it imposes a similar requirement.

* * *

As this Part has illustrated, many questions persist about which international obligations bind IOs. Moreover, these questions affect a wide range of IOs and IO activities.

II. IOS AS VEHICLES

To begin to sort through the competing claims and open questions about IOs’ obligations, this Part focuses on IOs’ vertical relationship with their member states—and the conception of IOs as vehicles through which states act. From the vehicle perspective, the underlying concern is that states will try to evade their international obligations by acting through IOs.¹¹¹ There are at least two ways to try to prevent such evasions. One is to make states responsible when they act through IOs to violate their obligations.¹¹² Indeed, several rules of state responsibility already seek to ensure that states cannot avoid the consequences of violating their international obligations by blaming other actors over which they exercise control.¹¹³ For example, a

108. Yangpeng Zheng, *AIIB to Be ‘Lean, Clean, and Green,’* CHINA DAILY (June 29, 2015), http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/06/29/content_281475136774500.htm; Mark Magnier, *China’s Jin Liqun Named President-elect of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank*, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2015), www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-jin-liqun-named-president-elect-of-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-1440421017.

109. Zheng, *supra* note 108.

110. *Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.)*, Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 204 (Apr. 20).

111. See, e.g., Halberstam & Stein, *supra* note 52, at 21 (“States cannot simply avoid international human rights by bringing to life an international organization and charging it with tasks that would violate human rights standards if undertaken by the members of that organization themselves.”); Reinisch, *supra* note 16, at 143 (“Stated less politely, one could say that states should not be allowed to escape their human rights obligations by forming an international organization to do the ‘dirty work.’”).

112. Halberstam and Stein argue that one consequence of the principle of noncircumvention is that “[s]tates may remain liable for the human rights abuses of an international organization that they direct and control or to which they transfer powers to act on their behalf.” Halberstam & Stein, *supra* note 52, at 22.

113. The International Law Commission adopted a set of draft articles on state responsibility in 2001. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries,

state is responsible for internationally wrongful acts that are undertaken (1) by private corporations empowered by the government or (2) by private actors under the direction or control of the government.¹¹⁴ A state is similarly responsible when it directs or aids another state in taking actions that would violate the first state's international obligations.¹¹⁵ The ILC has explained that “[t]he essential principle is that a State should not be able to do through another what it could not do itself.”¹¹⁶

The IO Responsibility Articles likewise include a provision that specifically addresses the risk that states might circumvent their international obligations by acting through an IO. Article 61 provides:

A State member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has competence in relation to the subject-matter of one of the State's international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the organization to commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the obligation.¹¹⁷

Article 61 applies in only a narrow set of circumstances: where a state acts through an IO with the *intent* of avoiding its international obligations and that same state *causes* the IO to take the action that violates the state's obligations.¹¹⁸ These limitations render article 61 inapplicable where states lack the requisite intent (for example, where states simply neglect to consider the full range of their international obligations when acting in connection with an IO), or where states lack the power to shape IO conduct unilaterally. Nor would article 61 apply where IO officials initiate the conduct that violates a state's international obligations. Thus, in many cases the link between state and IO conduct will be too attenuated to pin responsibility on member states under article 61. For these reasons, article 61 alone does not adequately address the risk of evasion.

U.N. Doc. A/56/10, *reprinted in* [2001] 2. Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1–208, 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [hereinafter State Responsibility Articles]. Even at the time that the State Responsibility Articles were adopted, they were viewed as largely codifying extant customary international law. See James Crawford (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), *Fourth Report on State Responsibility*, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/517 (Apr. 2–3, 2001); David Caron, *The Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and Authority*, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 857 (2002); see also *infra* notes 296–97 and accompanying text.

114. State Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 113, arts. 5, 8.

115. *Id.* arts. 16, 17.

116. *Id.* art. 17 cmt. 8; see also *id.* art. 16 cmt. 6 (“A State cannot do by another what it cannot do by itself.”).

117. IO Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 1, art. 61.

118. *Id.* art. 61 cmt. 2 (explaining that the “use of the term ‘circumvention’” implies “the existence of an intention to avoid compliance” and that “[i]nternational responsibility will not arise when the act of the international organization . . . has to be regarded as an unintended result of the member State's conduct”); see also *id.* art. 61 cmt. 7 (identifying conditions for responsibility under art. 61, including “a significant link between the conduct of the circumventing member State and that of the international organization” and stating that “[t]he act of the international organization has to be caused by the member State”).

A second solution to the evasion problem—which could complement provisions like article 61 of the IO Responsibility Articles—is to impose certain international obligations directly on IOs.¹¹⁹ Scholars and the ILC have both cited the risk of circumvention to explain why certain international obligations bind IOs. But they do not necessarily specify or agree about which obligations bind IOs in order to prevent such circumvention. Some have limited the argument to a narrow set of obligations.¹²⁰ Others have advanced variations of the argument that sweep more broadly.¹²¹

This Part argues that the IOs-as-vehicles view, coupled with the concern about member states evading their own obligations, supports some—but not all—of the claims that have been made about IO obligations. Some of these claims founder because they take too broad a view of what constitutes an evasion. The view that general international law necessarily binds IOs, for example, suggests that any attempt by states to deviate from these rules constitutes an evasion. But states actually have considerable latitude to contract around customary international law. Likewise, the view that member states' treaty obligations automatically bind IOs ignores the discretion that states have to modify their treaty obligations and even to enter into conflicting treaty obligations.

Properly understood, the IOs-as-vehicles view leads to the conclusion that *jus cogens* norms always bind IOs and that general international law binds IOs as a default matter. Member states' treaty obligations, in contrast, do not automatically bind IOs.

119. Still another possibility would be to attribute IO conduct to states in a broader set of circumstances. Cf. Monica Hakimi, *State Bystander Responsibility*, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 341, 347–49 (2010) (noting that options for expanding responsibility associated with human rights abuses include both assigning more actors obligations to respect and attributing to states a greater share of such abuses). Attributing *all* IO conduct to states could threaten IOs' independence and their separate legal personality, thereby compromising states' ability to cooperate to achieve shared goals. Cf. Rosalyn Higgins, *The Legal Consequences for Member States of the Non-fulfilment by International Organizations of Their Obligations Toward Third Parties*, 66 *Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International* (Session of Lisbonne, vol. 1, 1995, A. Pedone), at 419, ¶ 121 (“[I]f members know that they are potentially liable for contractual damages or tortious harm caused by the acts of an international organization, they will necessarily intervene in virtually all decision-making by international organizations. It is hard to see how the degree of monitoring and intervention required would be compatible with the continuing status of the organization as truly independent, not only from the host state, but from its membership. If members were liable for the defaults of the organization, its independent personality would be likely to become increasingly a sham.”).

120. Halberstam and Stein argue that one consequence of the principle of noncircumvention is that the obligations of member states will indirectly bind IOs in a limited set of cases: “when an international organization exercises the powers formerly belonging to a State or group of States in the context of a particular international legal regime, then such international organization succeeds that group of States not only in their rights but also in their obligations under that international regime.” Halberstam & Stein, *supra* note 52, at 22–23. They frame this argument in terms of functional succession, which is addressed in more detail in Part III.B.2.

121. See, e.g., FELICE MORGENSTERN, *LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS* 32 (1986) (“There is no reason why rules of international law which are generally recognized as applicable between States and which are not by their nature unsuitable for international organizations should not be automatically binding on the latter. Such a conclusion has been justified on the grounds that States bound by rules of international law should not be able to evade them collectively.”); see also *supra* note 52.

A. *Foundations of the IOs-as-vehicles View*

The IOs-as-vehicles view emphasizes the principal-agent nature of the relationship between states and IOs.¹²² IOs, like every agent, enjoy some discretion. But states remain in charge: they decide to establish IOs, define their purposes, and determine their authorities. States also play a critical role in IOs once they are up and running. Through bodies like the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council, states set IO policies and select key IO officials. States also determine the size of IOs' budgets and how to allocate them. To be sure, states will not always find it easy to correct course in the short run when IOs exercise discretion in a way that diverges from states' preferences.¹²³ In the long run, however, IOs must satisfy their principals or their principals will restrain or dismantle them.¹²⁴

At the same time that states play this "outsider" principal role, they simultaneously play an "insider" role in the IOs they establish. Every IO has at least one organ that is made up entirely of member states. (The United Nations has several: the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council.) Not only do states provide critical inputs to IO decisions, but they often also play a crucial role on the back end in implementing those decisions. To take an especially significant example, it is U.N. member states that implement Security Council authorizations to use force. Thus, while IOs have separate legal personalities as a formal legal matter, as a practical matter there is no sharp and fundamental distinction between IOs and their member states.

B. *Implications of the IOs-as-vehicles View*

If states cannot use IOs as vehicles to evade their own international obligations, what are the implications for IOs' international obligations? Before tackling that question, we must first answer another: what exactly counts as an evasion? I argue that treaty law as codified in the VCLT supplies the appropriate reference point.¹²⁵ The rule that follows is straightforward: what states can do directly by treaty, they can do indirectly through an IO. And what states cannot do directly by treaty, they cannot do indirectly through an IO.

122. See, e.g., Tomuschat, *supra* note 53, at 91.

123. See generally DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).

124. See Barbara Koremenos et al., *The Rational Design of International Institutions*, 55 INT'L ORG. 761, 768 (2001).

125. Even at the time it was being drafted, the VCLT was described as a constitution for the international legal system. See Julian Davis Mortenson, *The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History?*, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 780, 791, 808–09 (2013).

1. *Jus Cogens*

On the vehicles view, the explanation for why *jus cogens* norms bind IOs is straightforward. As the ILC explained, *jus cogens* norms must bind IOs as well as states to prevent states from circumventing their obligations:

[D]espite a personality which is in some respects different from that of the States Parties to such treaties [that is, treaties that establish IOs], [IOs] are nonetheless the creations of those States. And it can hardly be maintained that States can avoid compliance with peremptory norms by creating an organization.¹²⁶

While many aspects of *jus cogens* are contested, it is perfectly clear that states cannot enter into treaties that violate *jus cogens* norms.¹²⁷ *Jus cogens* norms bind IOs because states cannot, by treaty, establish IOs that are authorized to violate *jus cogens* norms.¹²⁸

2. *General International Law*

When it comes to customary international law and general principles, the analysis is more complicated. States are not categorically prohibited from entering into treaties that derogate from general international law. To the contrary, it is well established that states can enter into treaties to either elaborate or modify the general international law rules that would otherwise govern. Reflecting this capacity, the *lex specialis* principle provides that when both a general standard and a more specific rule govern the same subject matter, the specific rule should take precedence over the general rule.¹²⁹ Of course, states' capacity to create *lex specialis* is not unlimited. States need to find willing treaty partners. Even then, states cannot contract around *jus cogens* norms.¹³⁰ And some scholars have argued that certain non-*jus cogens*

126. Commentary on the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations and Between International Organizations, reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 56, art. 53, cmt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1.

127. VCLT, *supra* note 57, art. 53 ("A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law."); *id.* art. 64 ("If a new peremptory norm of international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.").

128. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, *Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law*, ¶ 346, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) ("If United Nations Member States are unable to draw up valid agreements in dissonance with *jus cogens*, they must also be unable to vest an international organization with the power to go against peremptory norms.").

129. See *North Sea Continental Shelf* (Ger. v. Den. & Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 43, ¶ 72 (noting that "it is well understood" that "rules of international law can, by agreement, be derogated from in particular cases, or as between particular parties"); *Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran*, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 ("As a *lex specialis* between the two countries, the Treaty supersedes the *lex generalis*, namely customary international law."); Koskenniemi, *supra* note 128, ¶ 79 ("That treaty rules enjoy priority over custom is merely an incident of the fact that most of general international law is *jus dispositivum* so that parties are entitled to derogate from it by establishing specific rights or obligations to govern their behavior."); PAUWELYN, *supra* note 29, at 212–36.

130. VCLT, *supra* note 57, arts. 53, 64.

norms are likewise nonderogable.¹³¹ Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that creating *lex specialis* is not considered a devious and troubling technique for states to evade obligations under general international law. To the contrary, *lex specialis* offers states a way to achieve more tailored—and more effective—regulation.¹³² Thus customary international law and general principles need not categorically bind IOs the way that *jus cogens* norms do.¹³³ Few scholars acknowledge this point explicitly¹³⁴—although, as Part IV explains, it is central to the way IOs view their own charters.

While states have significant flexibility to contract around general international law when they establish IOs, that flexibility is not infinite. One especially important limitation involves nonmember states. A handful of states cannot, by entering into a treaty among themselves, alter the application of customary international law vis-à-vis third states. This result would contravene the *pacta tertiis* rule that treaties cannot alter the obligations or rights of third states without their consent.¹³⁵ In other words, unless IOs are bound by customary international law vis-à-vis nonmember states, the IOs' member states could evade settled limits on their capacity to contract around customary international law.

Consider the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and the AIIB. Even if they wished to, NATO’s member states simply could not establish an organization unbound by general international law in its inter-

131. See, e.g., Koskeniemi, *supra* note 128, ¶ 108 (“[A]side from *jus cogens*, there may be other types of general law that may not permit derogation. In regard to conflicts between human rights norms, for instance, the one that is more favorable to the protected interests is usually held overriding. At least derogation to the detriment of the beneficiaries would seem precluded.”); see also *id.* ¶ 109 (“Whether derogation by way of *lex specialis* is permitted will remain a matter of interpreting the general law. Concerns that may seem pertinent include at least the following: the normative status of the general law (is it *jus cogens*?), who the beneficiaries of the obligation are (prohibition to deviate from the law benefiting third parties, including individuals or non-state entities); whether nonderogation may be otherwise inferred from the terms of the general rule (for instance its ‘integral’ or ‘interdependent’ nature, its *erga omnes* character, or subsequent practice creating an expectation of non-derogation.”); Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, *Withdrawing from International Custom*, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 211–12 (2010) (“It is accepted that a CIL [customary international law] rule can be overridden by a later-in-time treaty, but only as between the parties to the treaty. In that case, the CIL rule continues to bind nonparty states as well as parties in their relations with nonparty states. As a practical matter, therefore, the treaty-override option not only requires obtaining the agreement of other nations, but also that the CIL obligation be such that a nation can differentiate in its conduct between parties to the treaty and nonparties. This will not be possible for some CIL obligations, such as those that concern the human rights obligations of a nation to its citizens or the resource or environmental obligations of a nation with respect to something regarded as a global commons (such as the air, the seabed, or outer space.”).

132. Koskeniemi, *supra* note 128, ¶ 60 (“A special rule is more to the point . . . than a general one and it regulates the matter more effectively . . . than general rules. This could also be expressed by saying that special rules are better able to take account of particular circumstances. The need to comply with them is felt more acutely than is the case with general rules. They have greater clarity and definiteness and thus often felt ‘harder’ or more ‘binding’ than general rules which may stay in the background and be applied only rarely. Moreover, *lex specialis* may also seem useful as it may provide better access to what the parties may have willed.”).

133. *Contra* Tomuschat, *supra* note 53, at 135 (arguing that IOs should be bound by “ordinary” customary international law norms to preclude states from evading their international obligations).

134. See *supra* notes 52–54 and accompanying text.

135. See VCLT, *supra* note 57, art. 34.

actions with nonmember states. At the same time, nothing prevents NATO's member states from authorizing NATO to enter into treaties with nonmember states to take actions that would otherwise be prohibited by customary international law governing use of force. NATO has done so through status-of-forces agreements with nonmember states like Afghanistan.¹³⁶

With respect to the AIIB, recall that general international law requires states to complete environmental impact assessments before undertaking industrial projects with significant adverse transboundary effects.¹³⁷ The AIIB's member states cannot eliminate or modify this obligation to nonmember states by entering into a treaty among themselves. Nor can they do so by establishing the AIIB. For this reason, if the AIIB funds projects that would significantly and adversely affect *nonmember states*, the AIIB will have to undertake environmental impact assessments—whether its member states would prefer to avoid that obligation or not. At the same time, the AIIB's member states have considerable discretion to elaborate or modify the application of general international law when it comes to the AIIB's interactions *with its member states*. Relieving the bank of obligations to undertake environmental impact statements for projects that exclusively affect member states may well be misguided. But international law does not prohibit the AIIB's member states from doing just that.

When it comes to an IO's interactions with its member states, general international law binds the organization except to the extent that the member states have made clear their desire to diverge from it. This conclusion accords with the ordinary rule in treaty interpretation that treaties are presumed not to contract around general international law unless they do so expressly.¹³⁸

This view also finds some support in case law. In 2002, the United States led an initiative to oust José Bustani, the director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ("OPCW"), arguing that Bustani had engaged in polarizing and confrontational conduct and had mismanaged the organization.¹³⁹ On April 22 of that year, the Conference of the

136. See, e.g., Agreement Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Status of NATO Forces and NATO Personnel Conducting Mutually Agreed NATO-led Activities in Afghanistan, Sept. 30, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_116072.htm.

137. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, *supra* note 110, ¶ 204.

138. See, e.g., PAUWELYN, *supra* note 29, at 205–07, 240–42; Koskenniemi, *supra* note 128, ¶ 37 (citing Jennings and Watts for the presence of a “presumption that the parties intend something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of international law”); *Electronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy)*, Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 31, ¶ 50 (July 20) (“The Chamber has no doubt that the parties to a treaty can therein either agree that the local remedies rule shall not apply to claims based on alleged breaches of the treaty; or confirm that it shall apply. Yet the Chamber finds itself unable to accept that an important principle of customary international law should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so.”).

139. See Sean D. Murphy, *U.S. Initiative to Oust OPCW Director-general*, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 711 (2002).

States Parties—the principal organ of the OPCW¹⁴⁰—voted to terminate Bustani’s appointment, effective immediately.¹⁴¹ Bustani then filed suit at the International Labor Organization’s Administrative Tribunal, which had jurisdiction over employment disputes with the OPCW.¹⁴² Bustani argued that the Conference of the States Parties lacked the authority to dismiss him before the end of his term absent a criminal or quasi-criminal offense and without providing due process.¹⁴³ The Administrative Tribunal agreed: in its view, allowing the Conference of the States Parties to fire the OPCW’s director-general for any reason and without due process would “contra-vene[] the general principles of the law of the international civil service.”¹⁴⁴ In the absence of explicit provisions authorizing the Conference of the States Parties to dismiss the director-general at will, the Administrative Tribunal found that the Conference of the States Parties was required to act consistently with default rules supplied by general international law.¹⁴⁵

3. *Treaties*

As explained earlier, some scholars have advanced the view that member states’ treaty obligations “transitively bind” the IOs of which those states are members, or that IOs necessarily lack the authority to violate their member states’ treaty obligations because states cannot transfer to IOs the authority to violate their treaty obligations.¹⁴⁶ The argument that states lack the capacity to establish IOs that are unbound by their treaty obligations harkens back to an argument made by early international law scholars, including Emmerich de Vattel, that states lack the capacity to enter into conflicting treaty obligations.¹⁴⁷ Having entered into a treaty with one state to do one thing, a state could not subsequently enter into another treaty with a different state to do the opposite: the later treaty would be void.¹⁴⁸ Consistent with this view, Hersch Lauterpacht, the ILC’s second special rapporteur on treaties, proposed a general rule (with some exceptions) providing that a

140. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 8.B.19, *opened for signature* Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.

141. Murphy, *supra* note 139, at 712. Bustani later argued that the real motivation the United States sought to fire him was “the Bush administration’s fear that chemical weapons inspections in Iraq would conflict with Washington’s rationale for invading it.” Marlise Simons, *To Ousted Boss, Arms Watchdog Was Seen as an Obstacle in Iraq*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2013, at A4.

142. *Bustani v. Org. for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons*, Judgment No. 2232 (ILO Admin. Trib. July 16, 2003).

143. *Id.*

144. *Id.* ¶ 16.

145. This argument assumes that the “general principles of the law of the civil service” constitute a subset of general principles of international law. As noted earlier, exactly what counts as a general principle is contested. See *supra* notes 27 & 31–32 and sources cited therein.

146. See *supra* notes 61–64 and accompanying text.

147. Wolfram Karl, *Conflicts Between Treaties*, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 935, 937 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).

148. *Id.* (“[Vattel] and many other writers conceived the question as one of incapacity to conclude the later treaty, and thus as a question of essential validity.”).

treaty would automatically be void “if its performance involves a breach of a treaty obligation previously undertaken by one or more of the contracting parties.”¹⁴⁹

At bottom, the view that member states’ treaty obligations automatically limit IOs is an argument about how to avoid—or resolve—conflicts between treaties that establish substantive obligations and treaties that establish IOs. If, for example, the IMF is bound by the ICESCR because the IMF’s member states are so bound, the IMF will have legal obligations to avoid working at cross-purposes with its member states’ obligations under the ICESCR. At first glance, this might seem like an attractive way to avoid the risk that states will evade their treaty obligations.

This section ultimately concludes that this view is wrong—and that IOs are *not* automatically limited or bound by their member states’ treaty obligations. Before explaining why, however, it is necessary to distinguish several possible variations of the argument that member states’ treaty obligations do limit or bind IOs; these variations lead to different conclusions about which obligations bind IOs. First, what fraction of an IO’s member states must be bound before the IO is bound? Is an IO bound by the treaty obligations of any IO member state? Only those treaty obligations common to all of its member states? Or only some of those obligations? Second, there is a question of timing. Are IOs bound only by those treaty obligations that (all, some, or one of) their member states took on before establishing the IO? Or are IOs also bound by the treaty obligations that (all, some, or one of) their member states take on after creating the IO?

Recognizing these complications, Olivier De Schutter argues that if the rationale for binding IOs is that states cannot transfer to IOs more powers than they have, then IOs should be limited by the treaty obligations of *any* member state.¹⁵⁰ On this view, what matters are states’ treaty obligations at the moment they become members of an IO. Even so, De Schutter points out, an IO’s obligations might change over time as its membership changes. Specifically, an IO’s authority would shrink if it accepted new member states bound by more extensive treaty obligations than the IO’s earlier member states.¹⁵¹ Indeed, De Schutter concludes that this account of IOs’ obligations is defensible in theory but unworkable in practice because IOs would become straitjacketed by their member states’ manifold treaty obligations.¹⁵²

149. Hersch Lauterpacht (Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties), *Second Report on the Law of Treaties*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 90, 156–59, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1953/Add.1; see also Hersch Lauterpacht, *Second Report on the Law of Treaties*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/87 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 123, 133–39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1954/Add.1.

150. De Schutter, *supra* note 34, at 64.

151. *Id.*

152. *Id.*

At the end of the day, the view that IOs are automatically bound by the treaty obligations of their member states, or that states lack the authority to empower IOs to take actions that would contravene their international obligations, cannot be correct. The problem with this view goes beyond the adverse practical consequences De Schutter identified. The problem is far more fundamental. This view, in all its permutations, contravenes the VCLT rules that govern treaty conflicts. It is also in serious tension with the normative principles that animate those rules. As explained in more detail below, the VCLT rejects Vattel and Lauterpacht's views on treaty conflicts, and for good reason.¹⁵³

To see the problem, start with what might initially appear to be the strongest case for the view that member states' treaty obligations transitively bind IOs in order to prevent states from circumventing those obligations. Suppose three states—A, B, and C—enter into a treaty, and those same three states subsequently establish an IO with authorities that relate to the same subject matter as the earlier treaty. Because all of the IO's member states are parties to the treaty at the time they establish the IO, it might be superficially appealing to say that the IO they create ought to be bound by the prior treaty too.

Nothing in the VCLT, however, supports that conclusion. When the same group of states enters into two successive treaties relating to the same subject matter, the VCLT sets out some default rules but ultimately leaves it to the participating states to determine how to structure the relationship between the two treaties to the extent they conflict.¹⁵⁴

153. The ILC's third special rapporteur, Gerald Fitzmaurice, worried that holding treaties invalid on account of conflicting obligations would unfairly penalize parties to the later treaty, who may not be aware that their treaty partners had previously entered into treaties with conflicting obligations. See G.G. Fitzmaurice (Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties), *Third Report on the Law of Treaties*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 (1958), reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 20, 41–42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1958/Add.1. Fitzmaurice also worried that a rule prescribing invalidity on account of conflicting obligations would introduce undesirable rigidity into international law; many international regulatory efforts evolved through the development of new treaties that did not necessarily bind all of the parties to the prior treaty. *Id.* at 43–44. Given the manifold purposes that treaties serve, Fitzmaurice urged caution before prescribing invalidity as the solution to treaty conflicts, and he suggested that invalidity was appropriate only in a handful of exceptional cases. See Humphrey Waldock (Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties), *Second Report on the Law of Treaties*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 36, 56 ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1963/Add.1. The fourth special rapporteur, Humphrey Waldock, went even further and eliminated altogether any role for invalidity in dealing with treaty conflicts (except those involving *jus cogens*). Waldock and Fitzmaurice agreed that the solution to conflicting treaty obligations was state responsibility, not invalidity. See Humphrey Waldock (Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties), *Third Report on the Law of Treaties*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167 (1964), reprinted in [1964] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 5, 44 ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1964/Add.1. That is, the conflicting treaties would both remain valid, but the state that entered into the conflicting obligations would face the consequences of breaching one treaty or the other. The existence of a conflicting treaty obligation would not excuse the breach. The VCLT ultimately codified Waldock's position; only treaties that violate *jus cogens* are void. VCLT, *supra* note 57, art. 53.

154. VCLT, *supra* note 57, arts. 30(2)–(3), 59. As the International Law Commission put it when the provision that became article 30 was being formulated, “the parties to the earlier treaty are always competent to abrogate it, whether in whole or in part, by concluding another treaty with that object.” Humphrey Waldock (Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties), *Third Report on the Law of Treaties*, U.N.

Accepting the argument that the common treaty obligations of an IO's member states automatically bind the IO at the moment of its establishment would diminish the very wide discretion that states have under the VCLT to shape and revise their treaty obligations. When the same group of states first enters into a treaty and subsequently creates an IO that is unbound by the obligations in the earlier treaty, those states are not evading anything. They are modifying their obligations, in the same way that states might modify otherwise applicable customary international law by creating *lex specialis*. Because such modifications are wholly compatible with international law, there is nothing impermissible or even especially troubling about states choosing to establish an IO that is unbound by treaty obligations to which those same states previously agreed.

Now consider the more complicated case, in which the parties to an IO charter (states A, B, and C, and no other states) overlap only partially with the parties to a separate treaty imposing substantive obligations (states A, B, and D, and no other states). Again assuming that the IO's activities relate to the same subject matter as the treaty between A, B, and D, do the obligations in the treaty between states A, B, and D affect the IO established by states A, B, and C? The answer might depend on which treaty came first in time.

Suppose first that A, B, and C, establish the IO *before* A, B, and D enter into the separate treaty. This hypothetical tracks the participation and sequencing of the IMF and the ICESCR: the IMF opened its doors in 1945, some three decades before the ICESCR entered into force,¹⁵⁵ and the IMF's membership partially overlaps with state parties to the ICESCR.¹⁵⁶ Considering the IMF transitively bound by the ICESCR would have significant consequences. First, it would violate the *pacta tertiis* rule, pursuant to which the ICESCR should not have any legal consequences for nonparties. Second, it would bypass the carefully designed amendment procedures in the IMF's charter, pursuant to which proposed amendments go into effect only after the Board of Governors approves them and at least "three-fifths of the members, having eighty-five percent of the total voting power" formally accept them.¹⁵⁷ Finally, it would arguably nullify a provision in the ICESCR that explicitly addresses the relationship between the ICESCR and the IMF charter. Article 24 of the ICESCR states:

Doc. A/CN.4/167 (1964), *reprinted in* [1964] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 5, 38 ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1964/Add.1.

155. The ICESCR entered into force on January 3, 1976. *See* ICESCR, *supra* note 73.

156. The IMF has 189 member states, of which 164 are parties to the ICESCR. *See List of Members*, IMF, <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm> (last updated May 10, 2016) (last visited June 23, 2016); *ICESCR Member List*, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=iv-3&src=treaty (last updated June 23, 2016) (last visited June 23, 2016). Twenty-five states are members of the IMF but not parties to the ICESCR; Liechtenstein, North Korea, and Palestine are parties to the ICESCR but not members of the IMF. *Id.*

157. IMF Articles of Agreement, *supra* note 70, art. XXVIII(a).

Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the specialized agencies [including the IMF] which define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.¹⁵⁸

Under the VCLT, this provision is surely relevant to the relationship between the ICESCR and the IMF charter. Indeed, the IMF's former general counsel argued that this provision confirms that the ICESCR "does not affect" the IMF's charter, "including its mission and governing structure."¹⁵⁹ Ignoring this provision and concluding that the ICESCR automatically binds the IMF would effectively elevate the ICESCR's provisions to *jus cogens* status, contrary to the VCLT's accord of equal status to treaties. For all these reasons, IOs should not be bound by treaties to which a subset of their member states later become parties.

Now suppose that states A, B, and D entered into the substantive treaty *before* states A, B, and C established the IO. Does the treaty between A, B, and D affect the kind of IO that states A, B, and C can establish? If states can only transfer to an IO the lowest common denominator of powers among them (as De Schutter suggests ought to be the case if we take seriously the principle that states cannot transfer to an IO more power than they have¹⁶⁰), then the answer is yes. But that is not the VCLT's answer.

The VCLT sets out a two-part rule for dealing with conflicting treaties where the parties to the later treaty do not include all of the parties to the earlier treaty.¹⁶¹ For states that are parties to both treaties, the later-in-time rule applies: the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty. When it comes to the relationship between a state that is a party to both treaties and a state that is a party to only one of the treaties, a different rule applies: the treaty to which both states are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.

To illustrate, suppose that states A, B, and C are parties to the first treaty and states A, B, and D are parties to a second treaty. As between A and C, the earlier treaty governs. As between A and D, the later treaty governs. If the later treaty includes provisions that conflict with the earlier treaty, A could have an international obligation to do one thing with respect to C while simultaneously having an international obligation to do a different thing with respect to D. Complying with both international obligations might be literally impossible. In these circumstances, the VCLT does not privilege one obligation over the other; both obligations are equally valid.¹⁶²

158. ICESCR, *supra* note 73, art. 24.

159. Gianviti, *supra* note 3, at 119.

160. See *supra* notes 150–52 and accompanying text.

161. VCLT, *supra* note 57, art. 30(4)–(5).

162. *Pacta sunt servanda*, the principle that treaties must be obeyed, applies to both obligations.

Instead, the VCLT leaves it to A to choose the obligation with which it will comply and the obligation that it will breach.¹⁶³ But, importantly, the VCLT makes clear that if A chooses to comply with its obligation to C, it will incur international responsibility for the breach to D, and vice versa.¹⁶⁴ Under these rules, it is wrong to say that A can “evade” its obligation to C by entering into an incompatible obligation with D. A will still incur international responsibility for any breach of its treaty with C.

In short, there is no rule of treaty law that prohibits states from entering into treaties and becoming members of IOs that work at cross-purposes. Except for treaties that violate *jus cogens*, the VCLT *never* prescribes invalidity of a treaty as the consequence of a treaty conflict. Under the VCLT, then, states are perfectly free to create IOs that do not share their member states’ pre-existing treaty obligations—although states that do so could face responsibility for violating those obligations.

In some cases, states will be able to avoid a breach of their treaty obligations by ensuring that IOs adopt particular policies. Consider, for example, the *Waite and Kennedy v. Germany* case before the European Court of Human Rights.¹⁶⁵ The case involved a potential conflict between Germany’s obligations as a member of the European Space Agency (“ESA”) and its obligations as a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). Waite and Kennedy argued that by according immunity to the ESA and precluding German courts from hearing their employment dispute with the ESA, Germany had violated its obligation under article 6 of the ECHR to guarantee a right of access to courts. The European Court of Human Rights rejected Waite and Kennedy’s claim, but emphasized that a “material factor” in its decision was the availability of a “reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention.”¹⁶⁶ In particular, Waite and Kennedy had recourse to an independent body set up specifically for resolving employment disputes with the ESA.¹⁶⁷ In the absence of this mechanism for reconciling Germany’s obligations under the ECHR with its obligations to provide immunity for the ESA, Germany would have faced consequences for failing to comply with its obligations under the ECHR, including the payment of “just satisfaction” to Waite and Kennedy.

163. PAUWELYN, *supra* note 29, at 427 (“With the law stepping back, a principle of political decision takes its place whereby it is left to the party to the conflicting obligations to decide which treaty it prefers to fulfill.”) (quoting Wolfram Karl).

164. VCLT, *supra* note 57, art. 30(5) (specifying that VCLT article 30(4) is “without prejudice . . . to any question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another treaty”); see also MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 242 (2011) (“Just as I can conclude two equally valid contracts whereby I commit to sell the same thing to two different people, and then have to face a choice as to which obligation to fulfill and which to breach and hence suffer the consequences, so a state can enter into two mutually contradictory, yet equally valid treaties, from which the only escape is a political one.”).

165. *Waite & Kennedy v. Germany*, App. No. 26083/94, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 261 (1999).

166. *Id.* ¶ 68.

167. *Id.* ¶ 69.

But there is a wrinkle here that needs to be addressed. Specifically, the circumvention problem threatens to resurface because of an important difference between states entering into ordinary treaties containing conflicting obligations and states establishing an IO that is authorized or required to take action that violates a member state's treaty obligation. This discontinuity results from IOs' separate legal personality—and the possibility that the conduct that causes the breach of the treaty obligation will be attributed exclusively to the IO, thereby putting the breaching state into a position to say: “I did not undertake the wrongful act; the IO did. Therefore, the IO should bear international responsibility, not me.”¹⁶⁸ If this argument is accepted, then the breaching state *will* be able to avoid consequences for breaching its treaty obligations. And if the breaching state can avoid the consequences of the breach, there *is* a circumvention problem.

This concern is not merely hypothetical. In the wake of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia, the then-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia brought ten individual cases against NATO members, seeking provisional measures requiring each of those states to “cease immediately its use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”¹⁶⁹ Because the ICJ's jurisdiction over contentious cases is limited to states, Yugoslavia could not file a case against NATO directly. In response, France argued, among other things, that the conduct forming the basis for Yugoslavia's case was attributable exclusively to NATO—not to France.¹⁷⁰ Because it dismissed all ten cases on jurisdictional grounds, the ICJ never ruled on this argument.¹⁷¹

At first glance, France's argument sounds plausible—and therefore the risk of circumvention is significant. Under the IO Responsibility Articles, the conduct of IO organs, IO officials, and IO agents is generally attributed to the IO itself.¹⁷² But these attribution rules do not allow IOs' member

168. For a state (or IO) to be responsible for a violation of international law, the act or omission constituting the wrongful conduct must be attributable to that state (or IO). State Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 113, art. 2; IO Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 1, art. 4.

169. Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Can.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Fr.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Ger.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Italy), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Neth.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Port.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Spain), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.K.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29).

170. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Fr.), Preliminary Objection, 1999 I.C.J. 26–29 (July 5), <http://www.icjci.org/docket/files/107/10873.pdf>.

171. The ICJ dismissed the cases against Spain and the United States in 1999. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 916 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Spain), Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 761 (June 2). The eight remaining cases were dismissed five years later. See John Crook, *Court Finds No Jurisdiction in NATO Bombing Cases*, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 450 (2005).

172. IO Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 1, arts. 6, 7.

states to dodge the consequences of breaching their treaty obligations because the analysis does not end there. The ILC's commentary makes clear that attributing conduct to IOs does not preclude also attributing conduct (and responsibility) to states in the same set of circumstances.¹⁷³

In some cases, states will not be able to avoid the consequences of a breach because their treaty obligations will encompass their interactions with an IO.¹⁷⁴ Returning to the IMF and the ICESCR, the ICESCR supervisory body—the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—has trained its attention not only on the domestic policies that states adopt, but also on their interactions with the IMF. Thus, the Committee has directed wealthier states like Belgium that are in a position to influence the IMF's policy decisions to do “all [they] can to ensure that the policies and decisions” of the IMF “are in conformity with the obligations of States parties to the Covenant.”¹⁷⁵ To states like Morocco that borrow from the IMF, the Committee strongly recommended that their “obligations under the Covenant be taken into account in all aspects of [their] negotiations” with the IMF “to ensure that economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly of the most vulnerable groups of society, are not undermined.”¹⁷⁶ Even if the ultimate decisions that the IMF takes are attributed to the IMF, Belgium's interactions with the IMF are attributable to Belgium, while Morocco's interactions with the IMF are attributable to Morocco.

In other cases, the conduct attributable to member states is the implementation of an IO decision or obligation of IO membership. Consider *Waite and Kennedy* again. In state responsibility terms, the conduct that was attributable to Germany—and that potentially put Germany in breach of

173. See IO Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 1, art. 3 cmt. 6 (“The fact that an international organization is responsible for an internationally wrongful act does not exclude the existence of parallel responsibility of other subjects of international law in the same set of circumstances.”); see also *id.* pt. 5 cmt. 2 (“Not all questions that may affect the responsibility of a State in connection with the act of an international organization are examined in the present draft articles. For instance, questions relating to attribution of conduct to a State are covered only in the articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. Thus, if an issue arises as to whether certain conduct is to be attributed to a State or to an international organization or to both, the present articles will provide criteria for ascertaining whether conduct is to be attributed to the international organization, while the articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts will regulate attribution of conduct to the State.”). The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in *Behrami and Saramati* has been rightly excoriated for ignoring the possibility of attributing conduct to both IOs and states. See Marko Milanovic & Tatjana Papic, *As Bad as It Gets: The European Court of Human Rights's Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law*, 58 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 267 (2009).

174. See IO Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 1, art. 58 cmt. 5 (States may have primary obligations that “encompass the conduct of a State when it acts within an international organization. Should a breach of an international obligation be committed by a State in this capacity, the State would . . . [incur responsibility] under the articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.”).

175. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Belgium), ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/21/Add.54 (Dec. 1, 2000); see also, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Italy), ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/A/Add.43 (May 23, 2000).

176. VCLT, *supra* note 57, art. 59.

the ECHR—was adopting the legislation and regulations that provided for the ESA’s immunity.¹⁷⁷

Returning to France’s argument in the NATO bombing case, it should be similarly straightforward to identify conduct that is attributable to France. One could point to the decision by French government officials to vote in favor of authorizing the bombing campaign. Or one could point to France’s participation in carrying out that authorization. The general point is that it should usually be possible to identify actions attributable to a state in connection with its participation in an IO.¹⁷⁸ And so long as this is the case, states will not be able to avoid the consequences of breaching their treaty obligations when they participate in an IO that engages in conduct that is inconsistent with those treaty obligations.

In the end, the argument that states should not be able to evade their international obligations by joining with other states to establish an IO does successfully explain why certain international rules bind IOs. It explains why *jus cogens* binds IOs and why general international law binds IOs as a default matter. But it fails to establish that member states’ treaty obligations automatically bind IOs.

III. IOS AS PEERS OF STATES

While the IOs-as-vehicles view focuses on the vertical relationship between states and IOs, the IOs-as-peers view emphasizes their horizontal relationship. Not merely the servants of states, IOs are powerful and autonomous actors on the world stage. They can enter into treaties and call states to account for violations of international law. IOs might extend or withhold loans to economies on the brink of collapse (as the IMF has done) or govern territory (as the United Nations did in Kosovo and East Timor).¹⁷⁹ Indeed, it is this combination of independence and power that generates anxiety about how international law binds IOs.

177. See also *Nada v. Switzerland*, App. No. 10593/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 121 (2012) (finding measures imposed and other acts taken to implement Security Council resolutions imposing targeted sanctions attributable to Switzerland).

178. A potentially difficult case could arise where a state unsuccessfully *opposed* the decision by the IO that violated its treaty obligations *and* that state did not take any steps to implement the IO decision. In this situation, it may be trickier to identify conduct that is attributable to the state. That said, the concern that the state is acting through an IO to evade its treaty obligations is more attenuated in this kind of situation because the state is taking affirmative steps to align the organization’s actions with its treaty obligations.

179. Ralph Wilde, *Enhancing Accountability at the International Level: The Tension Between International Organization and Member State Responsibility and the Underlying Issues at Stake*, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 395, 396 (2006) (“For those states that become the target for concerted international intervention, the power wielded by international organizations can be acute, especially in circumstances where international organizations assert administrative prerogatives over territory.”). For a discussion of the United Nations’ role in Kosovo, see *infra* notes 256–58. For a discussion of conditionality in IMF lending, see WOODS, *supra* note 69, at 25–26, 40–43 (2006).

In thinking through the implications of this view, the relationship between new states and international law supplies a strikingly on-point analogy. In fact, IOs and new states have a lot in common: they are independent actors on the international stage with the potential to undermine the international legal order if they are free to ignore international law. And from the moment that they emerge, new states are bound by *jus cogens*, and, as a default matter, by customary international law and general principles. This is so even though new states had no opportunity to participate in forming those rules—and therefore no opportunity to protest or opt out of any they might have found objectionable.¹⁸⁰

The best account of these obligations grounds them in new states' status as members of the international community.¹⁸¹ The members of this community exist side by side in a horizontal relationship with one another. They also share and act on a conviction that certain reciprocal rules bind them.¹⁸² All states—including new states—share certain rights and obligations by virtue of their status as members of the international community and regardless of their individual consent. After all, international law could not function “if there were white spots on the map with States not bound by any legal rule and therefore not legally prevented from acting in the most irresponsible and irrational manner.”¹⁸³

Or consider entities that *de facto* meet the criteria for statehood even though they are not recognized as states. Such entities are in a horizontal relationship with established states: no other power has authority over them.¹⁸⁴ And established states treat such entities as having both rights and obligations under international law.¹⁸⁵ Thus, for example, in 1968 the United States protested when North Korea seized a U.S. naval vessel sailing

180. See, e.g., DANILENKO, *supra* note 42, at 113–16; Weil, *supra* note 42, at 434 (“It is this opportunity for each individual state to opt out of a customary rule [during its period of formation pursuant to the persistent objector rule] that constitutes the acid test of custom’s voluntarist nature.”).

181. Christian Tomuschat, *Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will*, 241 RECUEIL DES COURS 195, 218–19, 227, 305–06 (1993); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 190–92 (1990); HERMANN MOSLER, THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY (1980); DANILENKO, *supra* note 42, at 13–14 (“[W]hile the existing divisions indeed prevent far-reaching integration and community actions in many areas, there has always been at least one element that served as a sufficient ground for basic legal integration of the community of states. States have always recognized that there are some fundamental principles of international law of both procedural and substantive character which unite them into a legal community governed by law.”). Some scholars have expressed doubts about this account of international obligations. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, *Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders*, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 301 & n.27 (describing doubts as to whether the requisite shared sense of group solidarity exists).

182. MOSLER, *supra* note 181, at 1–2; FRANCK, *supra* note 181, at 197 (“The difference between a rabble or even a primitive association and a developed community is the latter members accept reciprocal obligations as a concomitant of membership in that community, which is a structured, continuing association of interacting parties.”).

183. Tomuschat, *supra* note 53, at 306.

184. MOSLER, *supra* note 181, at 46 (“It follows from the very fact that no other power has authority over them, that they must have a certain status in international relations.”).

185. *Id.* at 43 (“The State of Israel was, from the very beginning of its existence in 1948, at war with its Arab neighbours. They never recognized it as a State, but the laws and customs of warfare binding

on the high seas as a violation of international law—even though the United States did not recognize North Korea as a state at the time.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, if North Korea were not bound by these rules it would be in a position not only to cause genuine harm but also to undermine established international law governing navigation on the high seas.

Just so with IOs. Like new and *de facto* states, IOs are in a horizontal relationship with established states; indeed, this horizontal relationship is a defining feature of IOs. Furthermore, as increasingly significant and autonomous actors in the international legal system, IOs would constitute “white spots on the map” if unregulated by international law. Thus, under the IOs-as-peers view, IOs—like other members of the international community—must be bound by certain rules for the international legal system to function.

A. *Foundations of the IOs-as-peers View*

The view that IOs are peers—and, like states, members of the international community—finds support in IOs’ exemption from the regulatory control of any single member state, in ICJ opinions that have bolstered IOs’ status under international law, and in the on-the-ground autonomy that IOs enjoy.¹⁸⁷ And, of course, IOs’ legal status encourages states to view IOs as their peers, making it easier for IOs to act independently.

1. *Insulation from Individual States’ Authority*

Like states (and unlike natural persons, corporations, and NGOs), IOs are regulated exclusively by international law and by their internal legal orders, although they may consent to abide by particular national (or subnational) regulations. The primary mechanism for ensuring that IOs remain outside individual states’ regulatory authority is immunity. States take on international obligations to recognize IOs’ immunities in the international agreements that establish IOs or in subsequently negotiated headquarters agreements.¹⁸⁸ These international agreements typically render IOs immune from all judicial process and render IO employees and officials immune for

belligerent states under international law were applicable to the struggle between them and the several cease-fire, armistice and disengagement of forces agreements were valid under international law.”).

186. See *U.N. Security Council Begins Debate on Korea*, 58 STATE DEP’T BULL. 194, 194-97 (1968).

187. Scholars writing about the international community as a source of (some) international obligations have suggested that IOs are members of the international community without delving into the implications of this status. See, e.g., FRANCK, *supra* note 181, at 184; MOSLER, *supra* note 181, at xv; DANILENKO, *supra* note 42, at 12-13.

188. See, e.g., Michael Wood, *Do International Organizations Enjoy Immunity Under Customary International Law?*, 10 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 287 (2013).

all acts taken in their official capacities.¹⁸⁹ These agreements usually also shield IO premises, archives, and communications.¹⁹⁰

For example, New York City cannot—and does not—enforce its fire code in the U.N. Headquarters. On paper, the city's fire code applies: according to the U.N. Headquarters agreement, federal, state, and local laws apply to U.N. Headquarters unless the United Nations has adopted inconsistent regulations, and the United Nations does not appear to have done so.¹⁹¹ But the New York Fire Department can inspect U.N. Headquarters for compliance only with the United Nations' consent.¹⁹² In fact, the fire department has inspected the U.N. Headquarters just once since it was built in the 1940s.¹⁹³ It took the city nine months to secure permission for that 2007 inspection, which identified 866 violations.¹⁹⁴ But New York City had almost no leverage to insist that the United Nations address those violations. The mayor's office was reduced to threatening that "the city [would] be forced to direct the cessation of all public school visits to the United Nations" if the headquarters were not brought up to code.¹⁹⁵

Likewise, IOs need not comply with federal employment discrimination laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. That is why, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit dismissed a suit against the World Bank by a former employee alleging that she was the victim of sexual harassment and discrimination.¹⁹⁶ In affirming the World Bank's immunity, the court explained:

Like the other immunities accorded international organizations, the purpose of immunity from employee actions is rooted in the need to protect international organizations from unilateral control by a member nation over the activities of the international organization within its territory. The sheer difficulty of administering multiple employment practices in each area in which an organization operates suggests that the purposes of an organization could be greatly hampered if it could be subjected to suit by its employees worldwide. But beyond economies of administration, the very

189. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15; United Nations Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261; The International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1945).

190. See, e.g., Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, U.S.-U.N., June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 3416, 11 U.N.T.S. 11 (subsequently supplemented and amended).

191. See *id.* art. III §§ 7–8.

192. See *id.* art. III § 9(a) ("The headquarters district shall be inviolable. Federal, state or local officers or officials of the United States, whether administrative, judicial, military, or police, shall not enter the headquarters district to perform any official duties therein except with the consent of and under conditions approved by the Secretary-General.")

193. Anthony Ramirez, *Bringing the U.N. Up to Code*, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2007), <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/nyregion/23lives.html>.

194. *Id.*

195. *Id.*

196. *Mendaro v. World Bank*, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

structure of an international organization, which ordinarily consists of an administrative body created by the joint action of several participating nations, requires that the organization remain independent from the international policies of its individual members.¹⁹⁷

IOs' immunity from national courts thus plays an important practical role in safeguarding IOs' independence.

IOs' immunity from national courts also suggests IOs' status as peers of states. After all, states' immunity from suit in each other's courts reflects, in part, the principle that "legal persons of equal standing cannot have their disputes settled in the courts of one of them."¹⁹⁸

2. *Status and Capacities on the International Plane*

Two influential ICJ opinions have contributed to IOs' capacity to act as peers of states. The first, the 1949 *Reparation for Injuries* opinion, held that the United Nations has separate legal personality from its member states and therefore has the independent capacity to pursue claims for violations of international law.¹⁹⁹ The second—the previously discussed *WHO-Egypt* opinion—held that the WHO and the states that host its offices have mutual obligations to consult in good faith in the event that either party wishes to relocate WHO offices.²⁰⁰ Both opinions reflect the view that, while IOs are different from states, IOs and states interact on the same plane in the international legal system. Like states, IOs can make international law,²⁰¹ break international law, be victims of violations of international law, and call other actors to account for such violations.

In *Reparation for Injuries*, the ICJ considered whether the United Nations could bring an international claim on its own behalf against a state that had failed to protect a U.N. agent. At the time that the General Assembly requested the opinion, an extremist faction in Israel had just assassinated Count Bernadotte, the U.N. Mediator in Palestine.²⁰² Israel was not then a U.N. member.

197. *Id.* at 615–16.

198. IAN BROWNLIE, *PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW* 321 (6th ed. 2003) (translating the maxim *par in parem non habet jurisdictionem*).

199. *Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations*, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter *Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion*].

200. *WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion*, *supra* note 5, ¶¶ 48–49; see also *supra* notes 36–39 and accompanying text.

201. While the question of whether IOs can directly contribute to the formation of customary international law is contested, IOs have entered into thousands of treaties. Three decades ago, IOs were already parties to more than 2000 treaties. CATHERINE BRÖLMANN, *THE INSTITUTIONAL VEIL IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW OF TREATIES* 125–28 (2007).

202. David J. Bederman, *The Reparation for Injuries Case: The Law of Nations Is Transformed into International Law*, in *INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES* 307–16 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007).

The first notable feature of the *Reparation for Injuries* opinion is that the ICJ did not hesitate to assume that nonmember states could have international law obligations to the United Nations. The ICJ simply accepted that the reparations claim arose “from a failure by the State to perform obligations of which the purpose is to protect the agents of the Organization in the performance of their duties.”²⁰³ Just as states have a duty under international law to protect other states’ nationals within their territories, the Court seemed to reason, so too could a state (even a nonmember state) have comparable obligations with respect to U.N. agents.²⁰⁴ In making this assumption without further comment, the ICJ telegraphed its willingness to equate the status of states and IOs.

Second, the ICJ framed its analysis around the question of whether a level playing field existed between states and the United Nations. Traditionally, when one state violated its international obligations and failed to protect another state’s nationals, the injured individuals could not themselves call the violating state to account. Instead, the individuals’ state of nationality could espouse the claim and seek reparation from the offending state. As the ICJ explained, an international claim “takes the form of a claim between two political entities, equal in law, similar in form, and both direct subjects of international law.”²⁰⁵ The methods for presenting international claims are thus designed for peers. They include protest, request for an inquiry, and negotiation; international claims cannot be submitted to an international tribunal “except with the consent of the States concerned.”²⁰⁶

The question for the ICJ was, in essence, whether the United Nations could use those methods for resolving disputes among peers—or whether the United Nations’ member states needed to espouse the claim first, as they would if their nationals had been injured. The Court equated asking whether the United Nations has legal personality with asking “whether the Charter has given the Organization such a position that it possesses, in regard to its Members, rights *which it is entitled to ask them to respect.*”²⁰⁷

The ICJ held that the United Nations does have legal personality separate from its member states and thus could itself pursue international claims. To support this conclusion, the ICJ cited the purposes for which the United Nations was established, the intentions of its founding states, and the United Nations’ practice of entering into treaties. This practice, the ICJ averred, “confirmed” the character of the organization, “which occupies a

203. *Reparation for Injuries* Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 199, at 177.

204. See DAMROSCH ET AL., *INTERNATIONAL LAW* 1062 (5th ed. 2009) (citing, *inter alia*, the William E. Chapman Claim (U.S. v. Mexico) 4 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 632 (1930) (holding Mexico liable for failure of its authorities to take appropriate steps to protect a U.S. Consul who was shot and seriously wounded after threats to U.S. diplomatic and consular representatives had been communicated to Mexican authorities)).

205. *Reparation for Injuries* Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 199, at 177–78.

206. *Id.*

207. *Id.* at 178 (emphasis added).

position in certain respects in detachment from its Members, and which is under a duty to remind them, if need be, of certain obligations.”²⁰⁸ As a separate legal person under international law, the United Nations enjoys rights under international law as well as the capacity to “maintain [those] rights.”²⁰⁹ In other words, the ICJ’s conclusion emphasized the co-equal status of states and the United Nations. The ICJ nonetheless took pains to emphasize that the United Nations was not “‘a super-State,’ whatever that expression may mean.”²¹⁰

Finally, the ICJ’s separate conclusion that *all* states must recognize the United Nations’ legal personality—not just its member states—likewise reflects the status of the United Nations as a peer of states. The ICJ’s analysis on this point is rather thin; it consists of a single sentence affirming that

fifty States, representing the vast majority of members of the international community, ha[ve] the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with capacity to bring international claims.²¹¹

The ICJ held that once the United Nations emerged on the international scene, all states had to respect its rights under international law—not just the United Nations’ member states.²¹² The parallel is clear: states have obligations toward all other entities that *de facto* meet the criteria for statehood, not just those they formally recognize.²¹³

Three decades later, the World Health Assembly asked the ICJ to resolve the dispute between the WHO and Egypt over the legal requirements for relocating the WHO’s regional office.²¹⁴ Once again, the ICJ issued an opinion that characterized the relationship between the IO and one of its mem-

208. *Id.* at 179.

209. *Id.*

210. *Id.* The written statement submitted by the United Kingdom suggests that the states negotiating the U.N. Charter did not expressly provide for the United Nations’ international personality because there “was apparently some apprehension—for which there is no basis in fact—” that doing so might “be interpreted as creating a super-State.” Written Statement Presented by the Government of the United Kingdom Under Article 66 of the Statute of the Court and the Order of the Court Dated 11th December, 1948, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/4/11707.pdf>.

211. Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 199, at 185.

212. MOSLER, *supra* note 181, at 36 (“[T]hird parties who are not members of the Organisation and who have not otherwise recognised it cannot ignore its existence as a subject of international law. In the event of any contact between them and the Organisation the latter must be treated as a member of the international community, and relations so established are governed by international law.”).

213. States have obligations to unrecognized states; these include respecting an unrecognized state’s territorial sovereignty and accepting its right to grant nationality to persons and vessels. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 202 cmt. c (2006); Nkambo Mugerwa, *Subjects of International Law*, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 247, 269 (Max Sorenson ed., 1968); see also CRAWFORD, *supra* note 56, at 26–27 (noting that denial of recognition to an entity otherwise qualifying as a state does not entitle the nonrecognizing State to act as if the latter is not a State, such as by ignoring its nationality or intervening in its affairs).

214. See *supra* notes 36–39 and accompanying text.

ber states as a relationship between peers. That relationship was the product of “common action based on mutual consent”; its “very essence” is “a body of mutual obligations of cooperation and good faith.”²¹⁵ Before delineating the specific obligations of the WHO and Egypt, the ICJ surveyed a number of host agreements, the provisions of the VCLT, and the draft articles that would later become the VCLT-IO. It then observed that these provisions “are based on an obligation to act in good faith and have reasonable regard to the interests of the other party to the treaty.”²¹⁶ The ICJ thus concluded that “on the basis of the legal relations between the Organization and Egypt under general international law, under the Constitution of the Organization and under the agreements in force between Egypt and the Organization,” a possible transfer of the regional office entailed a duty on both the WHO and Egypt to “consult together in good faith,” to ensure any transfer of the regional office occurred “in an orderly manner and with a minimum of prejudice to the work of the Organization and the interests of Egypt,” and following a “reasonable period of notice.”²¹⁷ In other words, the WHO and Egypt needed to approach and resolve their disputes as peers operating within the international legal system.

3. *On-the-ground Autonomy*

As a practical matter, IOs—and especially their secretariats—operate with significant autonomy. This autonomy is not unbounded, of course. But IO officials, especially those in leadership positions, share the “first-mover” capacities that executives in national governments enjoy.²¹⁸ They can set agendas, define problems, and delimit the range of acceptable solutions, using their prestige and visibility both to influence representatives of member states and to go “over the heads” of those representatives by directly addressing the public.²¹⁹ IO bureaucracies enjoy legitimacy and power that stems from their apparently neutral and impersonal technocratic decision-making style.²²⁰ IOs’ expertise and their control over information that is not readily available to other actors—including their member states—reinforce

215. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 5, ¶ 43.

216. *Id.* ¶ 47.

217. *Id.* ¶ 49.

218. Cf. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, *The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action*, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999) (describing the first-mover advantages that presidents enjoy because of the discretion, opportunities, and resources that are available to them).

219. THOMAS M. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U.N. DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S. CAN DO ABOUT IT 94–133 (1985); Ian Johnstone, *The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur*, in SECRETARY OR GENERAL? (Simon Chesterman ed., 2007).

220. Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, *The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations*, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 707–10 (1999).

their authority.²²¹ This combination of discretion, resources, and authority gives international civil servants a significant role in making policy.

IOs' international legal status and legal authorities reinforce this autonomy. For example, IOs' independent legal personality not only imbues the actions or omissions of IOs with legal consequences, but also signals that IOs are to be taken seriously, thus making it easier for IOs to shield themselves from outside interference.²²²

B. *Implications of the IOs-as-peers View*

When new states emerge on the international scene, *jus cogens* norms bind them; so too does general international law. Treaties do not bind new states without their consent, with some possible exceptions as a result of state succession. If the analogy of IOs to new states holds, then the same conclusions would seem to follow for IOs.

But does the analogy hold? Even if they are members of the international community, IOs are not identical to new states. Indeed, in the *Reparation for Injuries* opinion, the ICJ specifically said that concluding that the United Nations is a legal person is “not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State.”²²³ Most significantly, states have general competence to act on the international plane. IOs do not. As the ICJ put it, IOs are “governed by the ‘principle of speciality,’ that is to say, they are invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those states entrust to them.”²²⁴ The remainder of this Part explores the implications of this distinction.

1. *Jus Cogens and General International Law*

One might think that because IOs enjoy only a subset of the authorities that states do, IOs ought to be bound by only a subset of the obligations that bind states. For example, should human rights law or the law of the sea really bind the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)? The purposes for which states established WIPO have nothing to do with either. WIPO’s objectives are “to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States” and to facilitate implementation of certain international agreements related to the protection

221. *Id.* at 707–15 (describing how IOs structure knowledge by (1) classifying the world and creating categories of actors and action; (2) fixing meanings in the social world; and (3) articulating and diffusing new norms, principles, and actors around the globe).

222. Jan Klabbbers, *The Concept of Legal Personality*, 11 *IUS GENTIUM* 35, 61–65 (2005); David J. Bederman, *Souls of International Organizations*, 36 *VA J. INT’L L.* 275, 374.

223. *Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion*, *supra* note 199, at 179.

224. *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion*, 1996 *I.C.J. Rep.* 226, ¶ 25 (July 8).

of intellectual property.²²⁵ To achieve these objectives, WIPO is authorized to “encourage the conclusion of international agreements designed to promote the protection of intellectual property” and to “assemble and disseminate information concerning the protection of intellectual property.”²²⁶

Perhaps only those international law norms that relate to the content of the WIPO Convention should bind WIPO. To put it more generally, perhaps IOs’ international law obligations should parallel their limited authorities. Thus, a small slice of general international law would bind WIPO; a different (but also small) slice of international law would bind the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. Given its broader purposes and the broader range of its authorities, a larger slice would bind the United Nations.

But reviewing the explicit authorities enumerated in an IO’s charter is not an especially good way to understand the scope of the IO’s activities.²²⁷ Two common approaches to interpreting IO charters both validate and perpetuate expansive charter interpretations. The first is the implied powers doctrine. IOs have not only the powers their charters confer explicitly, but also “those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon [them] by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of [their] duties.”²²⁸ Separately, IO practice informs the interpretation of IO charters,²²⁹ and consideration of practice tends to expand the range of permissible IO activity.²³⁰ The possibility that IO activities might expand—including in ways that their member states do not necessarily foresee—suggests that IOs’ international law obligations must extend at least somewhat beyond those that touch on the powers their charters formally confer.

Consider WIPO again. As the “principal purveyor of technical assistance on [intellectual property] issues,” WIPO can both facilitate and undermine individuals’ access to medicine.²³¹ For that reason, WIPO’s actions or omissions may affect the extent to which individuals enjoy a (human) right to health.²³² The point is not that WIPO clearly has obligations in connection with the right to health, but that human rights law is not categorically

225. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 3, July 14, 1967.

226. *Id.* art. 4.

227. ALVAREZ, *supra* note 17.

228. Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 199, at 182.

229. IO charters are usually treaties, and the VCLT, which sets out the method for interpreting treaties, including IO charters, indicates that the subsequent practice of the parties is relevant to interpreting them. See VCLT, *supra* note 57, art. 31(3)(b).

230. See, e.g., ALVAREZ, *supra* note 17, at 124 (describing how subsequent practice led to an interpretation of the Charter that expanded the General Assembly’s authority to assess U.N. members for certain kinds of organizational expenses); see also Julian Arato, *Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Informal Change in International Organizations*, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 289 (2013).

231. Ruth L. Okediji, *The Role of WIPO in Access to Medicines*, in BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2014).

232. ICESCR, *supra* note 73, art. 12(a) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”).

irrelevant to WIPO's work. Indeed, since IOs' activities can grow in unanticipated ways, it is difficult to assert with confidence that any particular subset of general international law is wholly irrelevant to any given IO. To put it another way, it is difficult to see why powers *explicitly* conferred should be subject to international legal constraints while powers *implicitly* conferred are not.

Even so, some rules of international law might seem completely irrelevant to some IOs. Is there really reason to consider WIPO bound by, say, the law of the sea? I argue that there is, in part because there is always a possibility that IOs will engage in *ultra vires* conduct. Imagine that overzealous WIPO officials started patrolling the territorial seas of coastal states that, in their view, were too lax in enforcing laws protecting intellectual property. If another state undertook such action without the consent of the coastal state, that state would have violated the law of the sea.²³³ Should WIPO really be able to evade international responsibility on the ground that its action was lawless even under its own charter?

When it comes to states, the probability that a state will (or will not) violate a particular norm does not affect whether that norm binds that state. The law of the sea binds landlocked states as well as those with long coastlines. Limits on the use of force bind states with small or nonexistent militaries. The principle of speciality does mean that particular IOs might be especially unlikely to contravene some general international law rules. But the principle of speciality does not render violations impossible. For that reason, it does not justify limiting IOs' international obligations to match their limited authorities.

As members of the international community, then, when IOs emerge they are bound by *jus cogens* and by general international law as a default matter, just as new states are. The states establishing the IO might, by means of the IO's charter, alter the general international law rules that would otherwise apply between themselves and the IO. But the states establishing the IO cannot alter the general international law rules that govern their own and the IO's relationship to nonmember states. In other words, the states creating the IO cannot create a new "white spot" on the map when they establish an IO.²³⁴ Over time, IOs, like states, will be bound by new general interna-

233. Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states exercise sovereignty over their territorial seas, subject to the right of ships of all states to enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial seas. Patrolling in this way would not qualify as innocent passage. United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea art. 2, 17–19, Dec. 10, 1982. Virtually all states view these provisions as reflecting customary international law. See Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, *Is It Time for the United States to Join the Law of the Sea Convention?*, 41 J. MAR. L. & COM. 151, 156 (2010); Marian Nash Leich, *Limits of the Territorial Sea*, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 349 (1989).

234. Likewise, states that voluntarily participate in establishing a new state by means of secession, dissolution, or merger cannot create a new state that is unbound by general international law vis-à-vis other states.

tional law rules as they coalesce, except to the extent that individual IOs have and exercise the authorities to contract around those default norms.²³⁵

2. *Treaties*

To the extent that IOs are states' peers and in a horizontal relationship with them on the international plane, the *pacta tertiis* rule would seem to apply to IOs as well.²³⁶ The VCLT-IO accords with this view.²³⁷ In its commentary to the draft article that extended the *pacta tertiis* rule to IOs, the ILC explained: "The principle which the Vienna Convention lays down is only the expression of one of the fundamental consequences of consensuality. It has been adapted without difficulty to treaties to which one or more international organizations are parties" ²³⁸

If anything, binding IOs to treaty obligations without their consent would undermine the principle of speciality, which emphasizes that states create IOs to pursue specific goals by investing them with specific authorities. It is not entirely clear exactly which treaties would bind IOs—or how—if the *pacta tertiis* rule did not apply to IOs. But any new treaty obligations would either expand or contract IOs' authorities through methods not contemplated in their charters.²³⁹ Moreover, the actors who could bind IOs to treaties without their consent would be empowered at the expense of others, again in ways that would bypass decision-making procedures set out in IO charters. Suppose, for example, that the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights could pronounce the IMF bound by the ICESCR—or that a handful of the IMF's member states could do so. Whether good or bad, the consequences would be significant. And they

235. Provided they have the relevant authorities, it seems that IOs would also be able to avoid being bound by new customary international law norms by persistently objecting to those norms to the same extent that states can.

236. Of course, IOs are bound by their own charters; the relationship between an IO and its charter falls outside the scope of the *pacta tertiis* rule because IOs are not third parties to their charters. Paul Reuter, the ILC's Special Rapporteur for the draft articles that became the VCLT-IO, described as "absurd" the question of whether the United Nations was a third party in relation to its Charter. See [1982] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982. By way of comparison, he explained that "[i]n all systems of internal law, it was acknowledged that a corporation was not a third party in relation to the contract establishing it." *Id.*

237. See VCLT-IO, *supra* note 10, art. 34 ("A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State or a third organization without the consent of that State or that organization.")

238. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations with Commentaries art. 34 cmt., in *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-fourth Session*, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.343, reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part 2).

239. It is uncontested that an IO's member states can expand or contract an IO's authorities, or impose new international obligations on the IO by following the amendment procedures laid out in the IO charter. Binding IOs by such amendments does not violate the *pacta tertiis* rule because, as explained above in *supra* note 236, IOs are not third parties or strangers to their charters. Just as states can constitute IOs by agreeing on their charters, states can also change and reconstitute IOs by amending those same charters.

would not be the product of decisions made pursuant to the IMF's Articles of Agreement.

All that said, there is one exception to the general rule that treaties do not bind states without their consent and it would seem to apply to IOs as well. New states may succeed to the treaty obligations of their predecessors in some circumstances. As new members of the international community, successor states “inherit” certain rights and duties from their “parent states,” “not by virtue of consent but as a concomitant of status.”²⁴⁰ IOs, too, can inherit rights and obligations from other IOs.²⁴¹ A number of commentators have argued that IOs might, by virtue of functional succession, become bound by the obligations of their member states. Some scholars have suggested that functional succession will bind IOs in a limited set of cases.²⁴² Others have made or endorsed the argument in a more general way, without specifying when it would or would not apply.²⁴³

I agree that IOs can functionally succeed to the international obligations of another state or states.²⁴⁴ But succession represents only a tiny exception to the general rule that IOs cannot be bound by conventional treaty obligations without their consent. This is because the concept of succession depends on the complete replacement or displacement of one entity by another. Questions of succession arise when new states arise from previously existing states—for example, when a state becomes independent of another state of which it had formed a part, a single state disaggregates into two or more new states, or formerly separate states unify into a single state. Each of these situations involves the “*definitive replacement* of one state by another in respect of sovereignty over a given territory.”²⁴⁵

240. FRANCK, *supra* note 181, at 191.

241. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 128, 136 (July 11) (concluding that the United Nations is “legally qualified” to exercise supervisory functions related to the administration of nonindependent territories assigned to the League of Nations even though those supervisory functions were “neither expressly transferred to the United Nations nor expressly assumed by that organization”).

242. Halberstam and Stein explain that an IO “may, at times, find itself indirectly bound by the legal obligations of its Members. The principal idea here is one of functional legal succession . . . , [which] roughly holds that when an international organization exercises the powers formerly belonging to a State or group of States in the context of a particular international legal regime, then such international organization succeeds that group of States not only in their rights but also in their obligations under that international legal regime.” Halberstam & Stein, *supra* note 52, at 22–23. They specify that they find functional succession arguments unconvincing with respect to positive international obligations that require taking action where the IO’s member states retain some powers to implement those international obligations. *Id.* at 48 & n.140.

243. SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, *supra* note 12, at 995 § 1574; Reinisch, *supra* note 6, at 137 (“One promising road—particularly in light of the transfer of ‘governance’ tasks to international organizations—appears to be a discussion of something like a ‘functional’ treaty succession by international organizations to the position of their member states.”); Mégret & Hoffmann, *supra* note 61, at 318.

244. IOs could also potentially succeed to the obligation of another IO under comparable circumstances. See International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, *supra* note 241, and accompanying text.

245. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 621 (6th ed. 2003) (emphasis added); Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 2(b), Aug. 22, 1978,

In other words, functional succession requires more than IOs being peers in the international legal system that exist alongside states. It requires an IO to replace or displace a state.²⁴⁶ Such replacement or displacement is quite rare, implying that functional succession will be quite rare, too. But it can happen. Take, for example, the European Union (“EU”) and its predecessor, the European Community (“EC”). The European Court of Justice’s (“ECJ”) 1972 opinion in *International Fruit Company NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit* held that the EC had succeeded to its member states’ obligations pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).²⁴⁷ Before reaching this conclusion, however, the ECJ found evidence of a complete transfer of authority from the member states to the EC with respect to trade policy. The ECJ observed that the Community had become wholly responsible for setting trade policy for its member states, that the GATT’s other contracting parties “recognized” this “transfer of powers” to the Community, and that the Community has participated in negotiations and has entered into related trade agreements in its own name.²⁴⁸ Under these circumstances, the ECJ concluded that the relevant GATT provisions bound the Community, not just its member states.²⁴⁹ The completeness of the transfer in *International Fruit* made the analogy to state succession appropriate.

Still, examples of this kind are very unusual. An IO can properly succeed to a state’s obligations only if the IO makes final decisions about the policy that will govern regarding particular matters (like trade) or in a particular territory. But IOs almost never exercise that degree of control. Most IOs are in the business of making recommendations. When an IO generates new international obligations, the IO’s member states almost always retain the discretion to accept or reject them. The authorities of the EU and its predecessors and certain decisions of the U.N. Security Council are significant exceptions.²⁵⁰ Even in these cases in which IOs can bind their member states to new international obligations, individual states usually retain authority

1946 U.N.T.S. 3 (“[S]uccession of States’ means the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory . . .”).

246. This view is in accord with Halberstam and Stein with respect to positive obligations. See Halberstam & Stein, *supra* note 52, at 48 n.140 (“We are less convinced by the application of functional succession in the absence of exclusive [European] Community powers when the question surrounds a positive international command to take action—as opposed to a negative prohibition against certain forms of action. As long as the EC has not by treaty or secondary legislation displaced Member States’ ability to comply with the international obligation, the EC has not substituted itself for the Member States in that arena.”).

247. Joined Cases 21-24/72, *Int’l Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit*, 1972 E.C.R. 1219.

248. *Id.* ¶¶ 14–17.

249. *Id.* ¶ 18.

250. Other examples are few and far between, and usually involve narrow and technocratic issues. For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization can adopt rules of air navigation that apply over the high seas that bind all parties to the Chicago Convention; states do not have the option to opt out of these rules. Convention Establishing the International Civil Aviation Organization art. 12, Dec. 7, 1944; see also Guzman, *supra* note 17, at 1013–17 (discussing other similar examples).

over whether and how they will implement those new obligations. Unless the IO has the final authority to set policy, functional succession arguments are inapposite.

Even in those rare circumstances in which an IO does replace or displace a state, the state's treaty obligations will not *necessarily* bind the IO. Successor states are not always, or even almost always, bound by their predecessors' treaty obligations.²⁵¹ Indeed, the law of state succession is unsettled and fraught with tension. On the one hand, reliance values favor the new state succeeding to the former state's treaty obligations. On the other hand, concerns about sovereignty and consent favor a clean slate.²⁵² The 1978 Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties sets out rules that vary by context.²⁵³ However, fewer than two dozen states are parties, and many of its provisions remain controversial.²⁵⁴

Consider, for example, the legal disputes about succession that have arisen in connection with the United Nations' recent experience in territorial administration. From 1999 to 2008, the United Nations partially displaced Serbia and Montenegro and exercised all governmental authority—legislative, executive, and judicial—in Kosovo.²⁵⁵ The United Nations thus temporarily functioned as a surrogate state, and “assume[d] the classical functions of a state in the place of domestic authorities.”²⁵⁶ It was never clear whether the human rights treaty obligations of Serbia and Montenegro bound the U.N. administration in Kosovo, which was known as UNMIK.²⁵⁷ The U.N. Human Rights Committee, the supervisory body for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), thought that UNMIK was so bound.²⁵⁸ UNMIK itself, however, rejected this view.²⁵⁹ So

251. Gerhard Hafner & Gregor Novak, *State Succession in Respect of Treaties*, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 396 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012) (“The law and practice of State succession is highly contextual, with the outcome of each case strongly influenced by the relevant political situation. As a result, there is no single rule for all cases of treaty succession.”).

252. See generally Detlev F. Vagts, *State Succession: The Codifiers' View*, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 280–84 (1993).

253. For example, article 11 provides that succession does not affect boundaries established by treaty. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, *supra* note 245. Part III of the treaty addresses newly independent states—that is, former colonies—while Part IV addresses “uniting and separation of states.” *Id.*

254. See BROWNLIE, *supra* note 198, at 633; Hafner & Novak, *supra* note 251, at 400 (“[T]he applicable international law has remained rather vague, primarily because State practice itself has been and remains largely inconsistent.”).

255. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 10 (June 10, 1999); U.N. Mission in Kosovo Reg. No. 1, ¶ 1 (July 25, 1999).

256. CARSTEN STAHN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION 494 (2008).

257. *Id.* at 492–96.

258. Drawing on previous work concluding that the ICCPR categorically binds successor states, the Human Rights Committee took the position that the U.N. Mission in Kosovo was “bound to respect and to ensure to all individuals within the territory of Kosovo and subject to their jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant.” Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Kosovo (Serbia), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1 (Aug. 14, 2006); see also Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 26: General Comment on Issues Relating to the Continuity of Obligations to the

too did the Venice Commission.²⁶⁰ In other words, treaty norms might sometimes bind IOs by functional succession. But examples of an IO succeeding a state are few and far between, and even where it occurs there are unsettled questions about which treaty norms would bind the succeeding IO.

In the final analysis, then, the IOs-as-peers view—properly understood—leads to the conclusion that IOs are bound by *jus cogens* and by general international law as a default matter. And, with possible rare exceptions when IOs succeed or displace states in the performance of governmental functions, treaties do not bind IOs without their consent.

IV. IOs' OWN VIEWS

Most scholars writing about IO obligations have not addressed IOs' own views on the question of which rules of international law bind them. Up to this point, this Article has not addressed them either. Whether IOs' views are relevant may depend on the theoretical perspective one takes. If IOs are treated simply as vehicles through which states act, IOs' views may not matter much. But IOs' own views would seem to count if they are peers of states and full-status members of the international community. The very existence of such a community depends in part on its members sharing the conviction that they are part of a community that is governed by certain rules.²⁶¹

In addition to their theoretical significance, IOs' own views about their legal obligations matter for practical reasons. Formal mechanisms for adjudicating and enforcing IOs' international obligations are few and far between.²⁶² IOs are simply more likely to comply with obligations that they themselves accept as binding.²⁶³

A number of IOs revealed their views about which international law rules bind them as the ILC sought to codify and develop the international law rules that apply specifically to IOs. The first ILC effort culminated in the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev. 1 (Dec. 8, 1997).

259. Human Rights Comm., Report Submitted by the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo to the Human Rights Committee on the Human Rights Situation in Kosovo Since June 1999, ¶¶ 123–24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UNK/1 (Mar. 13, 2006).

260. Eur. Comm'n for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo, ¶ 78, Opinion No. 280 (Oct. 11, 2004), <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282004%29033-e>. The Venice Commission is an advisory body to the Council of Europe composed of independent experts. The Commission provides legal advice on a range of issues including fundamental rights.

261. See *supra* note 181 and accompanying text.

262. Daugirdas, *supra* note 88.

263. Cf. Tomuschat, *supra* note 53, at 362 (making this point with respect to states); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, *Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation*, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 762 (2001) (same).

VCLT-IO, which was adopted in 1986.²⁶⁴ The second resulted in the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, which the ILC adopted in 2011.²⁶⁵ Not every IO participated in these debates and even those that did participate never offered fully developed theories about the scope of their obligations. Strikingly, as described below, the participating IOs' comments reflect broad areas of consensus. The IOs that weighed in indicated that *jus cogens* rules bind them, as does general international law except to the extent that their charters, as *lex specialis*, contract around it. At the same time, IOs consistently took the position that they are *not* bound by treaties without their consent. In other words, IOs' own views closely track the theoretical conclusions sketched above—and hence offer further support for those conclusions.

A. *IOs and the Law of Treaties*

The ILC formally took up the topic of treaties to which IOs are parties shortly after the VCLT was adopted in 1969.²⁶⁶ The ILC's work provided IOs with an opportunity to describe both their practice and their understanding of which international law norms bind them. Three points are especially important. First, a number of IOs expressed the view that they were already bound by those parts of treaty law that constituted customary international law or general principles. Second, these IOs indicated that customary international law norms that developed in the future would also bind them. Third, IOs categorically rejected the possibility that treaties could bind them without their consent.

In drafting articles on IO treaties, the ILC did not seek to reinvent the wheel. Instead, the ILC started with the VCLT and considered, on an article-by-article basis, whether differences between states and IOs required any changes.²⁶⁷ After provisionally adopting draft articles, the ILC transmitted them to IOs for their comments.²⁶⁸ When they responded, participating IOs emphasized the degree to which the VCLT both shaped their practice with respect to treaties and described the law applicable to IOs. But these IOs maintained that not all the rules developed for states could carry over auto-

264. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Vienna, Austria, Feb. 21–Mar. 21, 1986, *Final Act of United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations*, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/14 (1986).

265. IO Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 1, at 53 ¶ 82.

266. See G.A. Res. 2501 (XXIV), ¶ 5 (Nov. 12, 1969).

267. Paul Reuter (Special Rapporteur), *Second Report on the Question of Treaties Concluded Between States and International Organizations or Between Two or More International Organizations*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/271, reprinted in [1973] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 75, 77 ¶¶ 9–12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1973/Add.1.

268. *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-first Session*, U.N. Doc. A/34/10, reprinted in [1979] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 79, 138 ¶ 84, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.1 (Part 2).

matically to IOs.²⁶⁹ Where those rules did not directly translate, IOs invoked their own practice for ascertaining and developing the relevant rules.²⁷⁰

Consider, for example, the comments that the International Labor Organization submitted in 1980:

A preliminary question concerns the extent to which the articles innovate, or are merely declaratory of existing custom or practice. There would seem to be little doubt that—since conventional arrangements falling outside the internal law of organizations have had to draw on existing principles of international law—major rules of treaty law, such as the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* [treaties are to be obeyed] or the rules concerning the interpretation of treaties, have long been applied by those concerned.²⁷¹

Not only did the ILO report that its own practice conformed to the major rules in the VCLT, but the ILO also suggested that these rules already bound IOs.²⁷²

Other IOs likewise indicated that they applied the VCLT in practice and considered themselves bound by at least some aspects of it. For example, the United Nations explained that “the method following in the United Nations practice has been to apply in principle the established international legal rules concerning treaties between States, and to modify these rules only so far as necessary in view of the special requirements of the United Nations.”²⁷³

269. For example, article 7 of the VCLT, captioned “full powers,” identifies those persons who can represent states for the purpose of adopting, authenticating, and consenting to treaties. Because those persons hold titles that IO officials do not share (e.g., head of state, head of government, minister of foreign affairs), these rules needed to be adapted to apply to IOs. VCLT, *supra* note 57, art. 7.

270. See, e.g., *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-third Session*, U.N. Doc. A/36/10, reprinted in [1981] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 197, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.1 (Part 2) (“The United Nations treaty practice may be said to find its legal basis principally in the intentment of the Charter as interpreted and accepted through practice. It follows that in the case of the United Nations the practice of the Organization is an essential source of the rules of international law governing the subject of treaties between the United Nations and States and/or international organizations.”); see also *id.* at 198 (“The draft articles in section 2, in so far as they are not essentially particular applications of the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* and of the will of the parties, appear to be codification *de lege ferenda* as far as the United Nations is concerned. This observation is based on the fact that the United Nations has not developed any general, let alone established, practices with respect to reservations, objections to reservations, and acceptance, opposition, or withdrawal of reservations and opposition to reservations.”).

271. *Id.* at 199.

272. *Id.* (“[T]he main rules of treaty law are binding on the organizations irrespective of the terms of the convention” on IO treaties that might ultimately be negotiated.)

273. *Id.*; see also *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-fourth Session*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.343, reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 137, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part 2) (“In the day-to-day legal practice of the IAEA, resort is frequently had to the [VCLT], which is treated as a ‘handy manual’ of the law affecting the Agency’s treaties with states and other organizations and other treaties of interest to it to which only States are parties.”) (statement of the International Atomic Energy Agency); *id.* at 145 (“[T]he spirit, if not the letter, of most of the rules established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies fully to both types of treaties; in

After formally adopting the draft articles on IO treaties on July 1, 1982, the ILC recommended that the General Assembly start the process of embedding them into a treaty.²⁷⁴ But some IOs were nervous. Like the draft articles that formed the basis for the VCLT, the draft articles on IO treaties blended codification and progressive development. IOs voiced serious concerns about how the ILC's draft articles—especially those that reflected progressive development rather than existing customary international law—might come to bind them.²⁷⁵

The United Nations and the specialized agencies²⁷⁶ developed and presented their views through the Administrative Committee on Coordination (“ACC”).²⁷⁷ In November 1982, the ACC submitted to the General Assembly a statement identifying several “legally sound” ways that a treaty based on the ILC's draft articles might bind IOs.²⁷⁸ First, IOs and states could become parties to the treaty on the same footing. Second, IOs might formally adopt, accept, or consent to a treaty to which only states would be parties.²⁷⁹ Notably, both of these methods made some form of express IO consent a prerequisite for binding IOs. The final option, the ACC said, was “quite different.” The General Assembly could adopt the articles “not as an international convention destined to create legal obligations for the parties thereto, but as a standard of reference for action destined to harden into customary international law.”²⁸⁰ The ACC reported that a number of IOs expressed a preference for this last approach.²⁸¹

The next month, the General Assembly concluded that it would proceed with a convention without reaching a decision about the method by which

other words, treaties concluded between States and treaties to which one or more international organizations are contracting parties.”) (statement of the European Economic Community).

274. *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-fourth Session*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.343, reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 16, ¶¶ 57–58 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part 2).

275. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/38/145, at 23 (Sept. 15, 1983) (“[T]he draft articles contain many elements of progressive development of law and as such need to be expressly accepted by international organizations.”) (comments of the International Atomic Energy Association).

276. The term “specialized agency” is somewhat misleading. The specialized agencies are not subordinate units of the United Nations; rather, they are independent IOs with their own charters, members, and budgets—although they do coordinate their work with the United Nations pursuant to articles 57 and 63 of the U.N. Charter. The specialized agencies include the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the World Bank.

277. The ACC was composed of the U.N. Secretary-General and the heads of the specialized agencies. ECOSOC Res. 13 (III), Sept. 21, 1946. In 2001, ECOSOC renamed the ACC the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination.

278. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/37/L.12 (Nov. 18, 1982) (attaching the text of a decision adopted by the Administrative Committee on Coordination when it met on November 1–3, 1982). The routes identified by the ACC tracked those identified by the ILO in its submissions to the ILC in 1980. See *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-third Session*, U.N. Doc. A/36/10, reprinted in [1981] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 199, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.1 (Part 2).

279. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/37/L.12, at 2–3 (Nov. 18, 1982).

280. *Id.* at 3.

281. *Id.*

the convention would bind IOs.²⁸² In the same resolution, the General Assembly invited comments from a number of IOs, including the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”), the GATT, and a number of regional organizations including the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Islamic Conference.²⁸³

Over the next year, some of these IOs submitted comments reflecting their commitment to the view that they could not be bound by treaty obligations without their consent.²⁸⁴ The United Nations, for example, said that “[i]t is, of course, clear that . . . an inter-organizational conference could not bind its participants without their consent, that is, that no agreement could be imposed on any organization merely by reason of its participation in the conference.”²⁸⁵ The International Telecommunications Union said that the creation of obligations and rights for IOs through a convention “simply and beyond any doubt necessitates such express consent to that convention.”²⁸⁶

When the ACC met in 1983, it adopted a new statement reflecting the input of the legal advisers of the participating organizations. Like the ACC’s first statement, it emphasized the indispensable role of IO consent: “The Legal Advisers considered it essential, and ACC concurs, that no international organization be bound without its explicit consent by a convention incorporating the draft articles.”²⁸⁷

As ultimately negotiated, the VCLT-IO permits IOs to become parties to the convention. To date, seventeen IOs have done so, including the United Nations.²⁸⁸ But the VCLT-IO will not enter into force unless and until thirty-five states become parties to the treaty²⁸⁹—and only thirty-one have done so to date.²⁹⁰

Although holding to the view that treaty obligations cannot bind them without their consent, some IOs that declined to sign the VCLT-IO believe that key provisions of the VCLT and VCLT-IO nonetheless bind them as customary international law. For example, none of the international financial institutions have signed the VCLT-IO.²⁹¹ The World Bank, for example, worried that the treaty’s provisions on invalidity, termination, and suspension of treaties were ill-suited for the kinds of long-term financial agree-

282. G.A. Res. 37/112, ¶ 5 (Dec. 16, 1982).

283. *Id.* ¶ 3.

284. U.N. Doc. A/38/145, at 18-27 (Sept. 15, 1983); U.N. Doc. A/38/45.Add.1, at 16-45 (Oct. 20, 1983).

285. U.N. Doc. A/38/145/Add.1, at 17-18 ¶ 7 (Sept. 1983).

286. *Id.* at 37.

287. U.N. Secretariat, Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/4, at 4 ¶ 11 (Oct. 27, 1983).

288. VCLT-IO, *supra* note 10.

289. *Id.* arts. 82-85.

290. *Id.* art. 85.

291. See U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/4, ¶ 17 (Oct. 27, 1983) (describing some of the problems perceived by the IFIs).

ments the Bank regularly concluded.²⁹² But, as a former general counsel of the World Bank pointed out, these concerns “have not precluded . . . the application, in the Bank’s practice, of some of [the VCLT-IO’s] provisions reflecting customary international law.”²⁹³ Indeed, one of his predecessors emphasized that the legal opinions presented to the World Bank’s executive directors by the Bank’s general counsel provide a “*legal* interpretation” of the Bank’s charter, and “[s]uch interpretation is subject to general rules of international law developed through centuries of state practice, judicial precedents, and scholarly works,” including in particular the provisions of the VCLT that govern treaty interpretation.²⁹⁴

B. *IO Charters as Lex Specialis*

In 2000, the ILC undertook another project to adapt rules formulated for states to IOs. After adopting a set of Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC turned to the task of producing a counterpart set of articles on IO responsibility. Both sets of articles address the “secondary rules” associated with violations of international law.²⁹⁵ That is, they address issues like when conduct can be attributed to states or IOs, defenses that render otherwise unlawful conduct permissible, and the consequences of violations of international law. Neither set of articles seeks to define the content of the “primary rules” that bind states or IOs, the breach of which may give rise to responsibility.²⁹⁶ Even so, the topic came up as the ILC developed the IO responsibility articles—especially in relation to the article addressing the role of *lex specialis*.

In their comments, participating IOs generally agreed that *jus cogens* norms bind them. IOs also embraced the view that their charters constitute *lex specialis*—and, as explained below, this view only makes sense against a background presumption that general international law governs, *except to the extent that states have contracted around it*. Their views, in other words, are predicated on a belief that general international law norms bind IOs as a default matter.

The subject of IOs’ obligations under *jus cogens* and customary international law usually arose indirectly as the ILC developed the draft articles. Some IOs, for example, considered whether an IO could ever incur international responsibility for conduct that was consistent with its charter. The

292. See *id.*

293. Roberto Dañino, Secretary-General of ICSID and Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank, *Why Treaties Matter*, Opening Remarks, First Annual Conference “Interpretation Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—25 Years On,” at 9 (Jan. 17, 2006), <http://sitere.sources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/214576-1139604306966/20817203/WhyTreatiesMatterLondon011706.pdf>.

294. IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, *THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD* 68 (1991).

295. IO Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 1, at 2 ¶ 3.

296. State Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 113, at 31 cmt. 1; IO Responsibility Articles, *supra* note 1, at 2 cmt. 3.

IMF addressed this issue on more occasions, and in greater depth, than other IOs. Indeed, when other IOs eventually weighed in, they seemed to be following the IMF's lead. In 2005, the IMF wrote:

To suggest that acts authorized by and consistent with an organization's charter are wrongful suggests that the organization's charter is itself contrary to some higher international obligations. We can accept this only in cases involving breaches of peremptory norms of international law, but we find no support for such a proposition with regard to ordinary norms of international law.²⁹⁷

In other comments, the IMF explicitly framed the argument in terms of *lex specialis*:

[W]hen an organization acts in accordance with the terms of its constituent charter, such acts can only be wrongful in relation to another norm of international law if the other norm in question is either a 'peremptory norm' (*jus cogens*) or arises from a specific obligation that has been incurred by the organization in the course of its activities (e.g., by entering into a separate treaty with another subject of international law). However, vis-à-vis all other norms of international law, both the charter and the internal rules of the organization would be *lex specialis* as far as the organization's responsibility is concerned and, accordingly, cannot be overridden by *lex generalis*, which would include the provisions of the draft articles.²⁹⁸

In 2011, several other IOs submitted comments that echoed the IMF's position. They include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which said:

The responsibility of an IO can only be challenged when an act is clearly in breach of its constituent instruments, internal rules and procedures, or if in accordance with them, is in breach of peremptory norms.²⁹⁹

297. Int'l L. Comm'n, *Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from Governments and International Organizations*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/556, at 40 (May 12, 2005) (statement of IMF); see also *id.* at 47–48 ("It should also be recognized that the rules of an organization are *lex specialis* as between the organization and its members and agents and among its members. It is therefore not possible to suggest . . . that in some cases (other than involving obligations of a peremptory nature) general international obligations might prevail over the rules of an organization. Such a suggestion ignores the international agreements between the organization's members regarding the exclusive application of the laws governing their relations and it suggests that *lex generalis* prevails over *lex specialis*." (statement of IMF).

298. Int'l Law Comm'n, *Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/582, at 5 (May 1, 2007) (statement of IMF).

299. *Responsibility of International Organizations*, *supra* note 15, at 40 (statement of OECD).

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe weighed in along similar lines:

With the exception of the presence of a peremptory norm of general international law, the *lex specialis* rule is key to resolving potentially conflicting characterization of any act of an international organization as ‘wrongful or not’ under general international law vis-à-vis the internal law of the said IO.³⁰⁰

So too did the International Labor Organization and the World Bank.³⁰¹

Taken together, these comments suggest that charter obligations exhaust all of an IO’s international obligations vis-à-vis their member states, with the exception of *jus cogens* norms. Does this imply that IOs believe they are unbound by customary international law or general principles?

I argue no. When states create *lex specialis*, they are not necessarily rejecting general international law. Sometimes *lex specialis* and general international law point in the same direction: the *lex specialis* is “an elaboration, updating, or a technical specification” of the general international law norm.³⁰² Even when states do intend for *lex specialis* to diverge from otherwise applicable general international law, general international law norms persist in the background. Those norms fill gaps and influence the interpretation of the treaty’s terms.³⁰³ Indeed, treaties that create *lex specialis* are presumed to be consistent with general international law except to the extent that they contract around it.³⁰⁴

Because of this presumption, states need not explicitly incorporate general international law into IO charters. Those norms are already implicit in IO charters, and general international law binds IOs except to the extent that their charters provide to the contrary. In other words, when it comes to IOs’

300. *Id.* at 40–41.

301. *Id.* at 38–39 (“[T]he relationship between member states and the organization . . . should be analysed in the light of the internal legal system of each organization, as created by the constituent instrument and developed further by the organization’s internal rules and practice. These rules represent *lex specialis* and the relationship between the member State and the international organization should not be subject to general rules of international law for the issues regulated by the internal rules.”) (statement of ILO); *id.* at 41 (“Again, as the internal law of the organization is, as a rule, the most significant component (when not the whole) of *lex specialis*, will not a special rule prevail over all international obligations other than those deriving from *jus cogens*? We cannot think of any dispositive (as opposed to peremptory) norm that would constitute an exception, precisely because, on any matter that is not governed by a peremptory norm, a general obligation is qualified and superceded by special law, this being the very purpose of special law.”) (statement of the World Bank).

302. Koskeniemi, *supra* note 128, ¶ 56.

303. See, e.g., *Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v. Iran*, *supra* note 129, ¶ 112 (“As a *lex specialis* in the relations between the two countries, the Treaty supersedes the *lex generalis*, namely customary international law. This does not mean, however, that the latter is irrelevant in the instant Case. On the contrary, the rules of customary law may be useful in order to fill in possible *lacunae* of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of undefined terms in its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and implementation of its provisions.”); *Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.)* 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶¶ 39–78 (Nov. 6) (applying general law concerning the use of force to give meaning to the term “necessity” in the relevant treaty).

304. See *supra* note 138 and accompanying text.

interactions with their member states, general international law binds IOs as a default matter.

The view that IO charters constitute *lex specialis* also supports the conclusion that general international law binds IOs in their interactions with non-member states. Indeed, the IMF and the ILO both specify that their charters constitute *lex specialis* that governs *between themselves and their member states*.³⁰⁵ Those statements are consistent with the view, explored above, that IO charters cannot displace or replace customary international law or general principles with respect to nonmember states.

CONCLUSION

IOs are not exactly new on the international scene. The first IOs date back to the mid-nineteenth century; they became far more numerous in the wake of World War II.³⁰⁶ IOs play an increasingly important role in making, elaborating, implementing, and promoting compliance with international law. Indeed, few if any areas of international law or policy remain free of their influence. Yet fundamental questions about how IOs fit into the international legal system remain unanswered. This Article tackles the question of IO obligations. In short, I argue that IOs are not categorically more or less bound by international law than states are. *Jus cogens* norms bind IOs. Customary international law and general principles do, too—but only as a default matter. Treaties do not bind IOs without their consent.

These conclusions raise some new questions for future projects. An important set of questions concerns the need to adapt some general international law norms, in at least some cases, to account for differences between states and IOs, or for differences among IOs. In particular, some adaptation will be necessary for those general international law norms that turn on features of states that IOs lack. For example, important rules of diplomatic protection turn on nationality; because IOs do not have their own nationals, these rules must be modified to sensibly apply to IOs.³⁰⁷ Other general international law rules turn on features like territorial control that IOs share with states

305. See U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/556, at 38 (May 12, 2005) (“[T]he rules of an organization are *lex specialis* as between the organization and its members and agents and among its members.”) (emphasis added); see also *Responsibility of International Organizations*, *supra* note 15, at 38–39 (“[T]he relationship between member states and the organization . . . should be analyzed in the light of the internal legal system of each organization, as created by the constituent instrument and developed further by the organization’s internal rules and practice. These rules represent *lex specialis* and the relationship between the member State and the international organization should not be subject to rules of general international law for the issues regulated by the internal rules.”) (emphasis added).

306. See generally Bederman, *supra* note 222; see also Jan Klabbers, *The Transformation of International Organizations Law*, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2015).

307. See *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-eighth Session*, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, at 13, 23–24 (2006) (explaining that there are similarities and differences between diplomatic protection and protection of an agent by an international organization).

only exceptionally.³⁰⁸ In these cases, adaptation to account for this lack of territorial control will be necessary in many but not all cases. Sometimes no adaptation at all will be necessary; for example, it is difficult to see why international humanitarian law norms regarding targeting would need to be adapted for IOs. The question of when and how to adapt general international law norms merits further attention.

There is a straightforward way to clarify some difficult questions about IOs' obligations: allowing IOs to become parties to the multilateral treaties that bear on their work. Thus, for example, the IMF might become a party to ICESCR. This alternative is appealing for several reasons. It would serve to clarify IOs' obligations with respect to the subject matter governed by the treaty (and obviate disputes about whether, for example, a particular norm is part of customary international law and if so, whether and how that norm must be adapted for a given IO). Should the treaty include provisions that need to be modified to apply sensibly to a particular IO, such modifications could be addressed expressly through reservations. Finally, joining treaties would subject IOs to any monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that are built into the underlying treaty. To be sure, this route may not be immediately available. Most multilateral treaties allow only states to become parties;³⁰⁹ these treaties would have to be amended to allow IOs to become parties. Separately, IOs would have to establish that they have the authority to become parties and to fulfill the obligations they take on.³¹⁰ The considerable advantages of this approach suggest that the effort necessary to surmount these obstacles would be worthwhile.

Debates about IOs' international obligations also raise important questions about how to choose among—or how to reconcile—competing priorities. These debates too implicate the allocation of resources to the various goals that states and IOs pursue. Not every step that might be desirable for IOs to take can credibly be characterized as a legal obligation. This Article provides a framework for distinguishing the credible claims about IOs' obligations from those that are untenable, while acknowledging that some of the untenable legal claims may nevertheless reflect sound policy proposals.

308. See *supra* notes 255–56 (describing the United Nations' governmental role in Kosovo).

309. See, e.g., ICESCR, *supra* note 30, art. 26(1) (“The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the present Covenant.”).

310. The EU's efforts to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights offer a vivid demonstration of the complications that can arise on this front. See Daniel Halberstam, “It's the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward, 16 GERMAN L.J. 105 (2015).

