{"id":1697,"date":"2006-01-01T09:07:40","date_gmt":"2006-01-01T13:07:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/site\/?p=1697"},"modified":"2010-10-21T23:40:37","modified_gmt":"2010-10-22T03:40:37","slug":"issue_47-1_liebman","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/2006\/01\/issue_47-1_liebman\/","title":{"rendered":"Innovation Through Intimidation"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Introduction<\/span><\/strong>*<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\">Consider  two recent defamation cases in Chinese courts. In 2004, Zhang Xide, a  former county-level Communist Party boss, sued the authors of a best  selling book, <em>An Investigation into China\u2019s Peasants<\/em>. The book  exposed official malfeasance on Zhang\u2019s watch and the resultant peasant  hardships. Zhang demanded an apology from the book\u2019s authors and  publisher, excision of the offending chapter, 200,000 yuan  (approximately U.S.$25,000) for emotional damages, and a share of  profits from sales of the book. Zhang sued in a local court on which,  not coincidentally, his son sat as a judge.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\">In 2000, Song Dianwen, a peasant, sued the <em>Heilongjiang Daily<\/em>,  the official paper of the Communist Party, in his home province for  defamation after it published an article reporting that, during a  village disturbance, Song had lit a fire that killed two people. He won a  judgment from a local court, affirmed on appeal, for 3,500 yuan  (approximately U.S.$430) in emotional damages.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\">The  cases exemplify two different tracks of defamation litigation in  present-day China. Track-one cases, like Zhang\u2019s, are brought by local  public officials, government and Communist Party entities, or  corporations to punish and control the increasingly aggressive Chinese  media. In these cases, courts serve as state institutions at the local,  as opposed to central, level to restrict and retaliate against the media  and to block central oversight. On the second<br \/>\ntrack, persons without  power or Party-state ties sue the media, which, despite widespread  commercialization, virtually all continue to be linked to the Chinese  Party-state. Many such cases are brought by ordinary persons against  Communist Party mouthpiece newspapers. Track-two cases thus represent a  deployment of the courts by ordinary citizens against state entities.  Empirical evidence from 223 defamation cases studied in this Article  indicates that<br \/>\nthe media lose the overwhelming majority of cases on both tracks.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\">The  conventional wisdom, taking track-one powerful plaintiff suits as the  paradigm, perceives defamation litigation in local Chinese courts as yet  another lever of state control over the increasingly autonomous Chinese  media. Track-one developments in China correspond to experiences in  other contemporary single-party states, where libel laws often serve to  restrict individual rights, and to the use of defamation law to preserve  state authority in Western legal history. By neglecting track-two  cases, however, this popular view shortchanges the extent to which  defamation litigation in China also serves a countervailing function:  the use of courts by ordinary persons to challenge state authority. The  conventional wisdom also overlooks the degree to which defamation  litigation reflects growing use of the formal legal system by local  authorities to resist central Party-state control.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\">The  development of defamation litigation, on both tracks, illustrates the  complex and evolving roles of courts, media, and civil litigation in  China. Analysis of the claims and outcomes in 223 defamation cases  suggests that <span style=\"font-family: Arial;\">use of defamation litigation by  track-one plaintiffs for repressive purposes is encouraging both  ordinary persons to use such cases to protect their own interests and  courts to become increasingly important arbiters of individual rights.  Through these processes, instrumental use of the courts to protect local  interests is legitimizing the role of courts in Chinese society.  Defamation litigation serves<br \/>\nto intimidate and restrain the Chinese  media, but in a system in which the media are not free of state control,  such cases may also increase state accountability. This story is not as  simple as commonly believed, but, better understood, it adds signi\u00aacant  insight into the nature of legal innovation and institutional  development both in China and in other developing legal systems.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\">In  prior work I have shown how close Party-state ties give the media  extensive power both to in\u00bauence the courts and to resolve disputes,  power that has increased even as the media have become increasingly  commercialized and have begun to assert new autonomy. A high rate of  media defeats in defamation cases does not alter that conclusion. The  fundamental fact is that the media often have far more real authority  and power in the Chinese legal system than the courts. China\u2019s courts  remain institutionally weak and subject to extensive external in\u00bauence,  particularly from the local Party-state. The media continue to exert  in\u00bauence across a range of cases, and the total number of defamation  cases brought against the media is relatively small when compared to the  total volume of civil litigation in China.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\">Still,  defamation cases are worthy of independent study. These cases represent  an area in which the media frequently are a weak party, in particular  when sued by courts, judges, and other local officials and state  entities. Such cases suggest that courts are increasingly able to  challenge the media\u2019s broader authority and influence. Understanding the  media\u2019s strong position in the Chinese system helps explain why courts  and other local of\u00aacials and state<br \/>\nentities have turned to litigation  to combat media oversight: They possess few other tools to challenge  media verdicts. Yet defamation cases also show that courts are not  always swayed by the relative power of litigants before them. In cases  brought by ordinary persons, court verdicts in favor of plaintiffs often  re\u00baect judicial willingness to rule against powerful entities. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\">This  Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I sets out the methodology of the  study, the legal framework governing defamation law, and the early  development of plaintiff-favoring defamation cases in the 1980s and  1990s. Part II analyzes 223 defamation cases brought in China in the  past decade, with particular attention to who sues and is sued, the  nature of defamation claims, and plaintiffs\u2019 goals. Part III places the  empirical findings from Part II in a<br \/>\nlarger context, showing that  although defamation law has become a significant tool by which to  control the newly commercialized Chinese media, defamation litigation  cannot be understood solely in terms of restraints on the press. <span style=\"font-family: Arial;\">Cases  by ordinary and famous persons reflect the increased willingness of  those without Party-state ties to challenge the Party-state. The courts\u2019  growing role in resolving defamation disputes may have the effect of  encouraging both greater use of the courts and greater innovation by the  courts.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><em>* This excerpt does not include  citations. To read the entire article, including supporting notes,  please download the PDF.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The cases exemplify two different tracks of defamation litigation in present-day China. Track-one cases, like Zhang\u2019s, are brought by local public officials, government and Communist Party entities, or corporations to punish and control the increasingly aggressive Chinese media. In these cases, courts serve as state institutions at the local, as opposed to central, level to restrict and retaliate against the media and to block central oversight. On the second track, persons without power or Party-state ties sue the media, which, despite widespread commercialization, virtually all continue to be linked to the Chinese Party-state.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_FSMCFIC_featured_image_caption":"","_FSMCFIC_featured_image_nocaption":"","_FSMCFIC_featured_image_hide":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[123],"tags":[59],"class_list":["post-1697","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-print-archives","tag-asia-pacific"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/peZu3S-rn","jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1697","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1697"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1697\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1697"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1697"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1697"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}