{"id":1767,"date":"2007-06-01T09:05:53","date_gmt":"2007-06-01T13:05:53","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/site\/?p=1767"},"modified":"2010-09-26T13:40:19","modified_gmt":"2010-09-26T17:40:19","slug":"issue_48-2_sebastian","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/2007\/06\/issue_48-2_sebastian\/","title":{"rendered":"World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Introduction<\/span><\/strong>*<\/p>\n<p>The  remedial regimes established by international treaties exhibit  considerable diversity. Some treaties merely provide review mechanisms  and do not permit further action against the violating state, while  others allow for the imposition of punitive fines. Some agreements  respond to non-compliance with individually tailored packages of  incentives and disincentives, while others provide for the award of  compensatory damages enforceable in domestic courts. This Article  examines the remedial regime established under what is arguably the most  complex multilateral treaty arrangement in the world today: the World  Trade Organization (\u201cWTO\u201d) Agreements.<\/p>\n<p>Within the WTO system, the  remedy for a continuing violation of WTO obligations is the right  granted to the affected WTO Member State to suspend \u201cconcessions or  other obligations\u201d owed to the violating WTO Member State. Thus, WTO  remedies take the form of a response \u201cin kind\u201d \u2014 the remedy for one  violation of the treaty is an offsetting violation of the treaty. In  domestic law, one rarely encounters situations where the remedy for a  violation of law is a right granted to the affected party to violate the  law as well. In contrast, remedies in international law frequently take  this form. In fact, given the absence of coercive and centralised  enforcement mechanisms at the international level, the ultimate remedy  for the breach of an international treaty will usually take the form of a  further violation, or \u201ccountermeasure.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>This Article examines a  basic issue that is confronted in every instance in which this remedy is  sought: How far can the retaliating state go in responding to the  breach of WTO obligations owed to it? It analyzes the limitations on  retaliation in the WTO Agreements and the manner in which WTO arbitral  panels have confronted and resolved this issue.<\/p>\n<p>The limitations  on the right to retaliate are important for a variety of reasons. First,  they determine the dimensions of any ensuing retaliation and,  therefore, are of considerable practical significance for WTO Members in  making decisions about whether to comply with their obligations and  whether to seek to enforce their rights. Second, these limitations are  important because they shed light on broad theoretical questions about  the nature of WTO rights and obligations. Finally, an understanding of  the WTO regime may carry lessons both for negotiators of remedial  regimes for other trade treaties and for those called upon to apply  similar remedial regimes installed in bilateral or regional trade  agreements.<\/p>\n<p>The Article is organized as follows. Parts I and II  outline the procedural and substantive context in which WTO arbitrators  make assessments about the permissible intensity of retaliation. Part  III explores the negotiating history of current WTO remedial regime.  Part IV scrutinizes the manner in which arbitral panels have assessed  the permissible intensity of retaliation to date. It organizes the  jurisprudence into two broad approaches and analyzes the issues that  arise when these approaches are applied in concrete cases. Part V then  considers the possible purposes that may be served by the WTO remedial  regime and examines whether this regime coherently promotes any or all  of these purposes. The Article argues that the remedial regime and the  jurisprudence are difficult to justify by reference to instrumental  purposes such as ensuring compliance, providing compensation,  rebalancing the bargain or facilitating efficient conduct. A retributive  rationale can justify the regime but this rationale is difficult to  defend. It concludes by arguing that the true value of arbitral review  lies in its escalation prevention function. Part VI explores certain  implications of the absence of a guiding rationale for the WTO remedial  regime. . . .<\/p>\n<p><em>* This excerpt does not include citations.  To read the entire article, including supporting notes, please download  the PDF.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The remedial regimes established by international treaties exhibit considerable diversity. Some treaties merely provide review mechanisms and do not permit further action against the violating state, while others allow for the imposition of punitive fines. Some agreements respond to non-compliance with individually tailored packages of incentives and disincentives, while others provide for the award of compensatory damages enforceable in domestic courts. This Article examines the remedial regime established under what is arguably the most complex multilateral treaty arrangement in the world today: the World Trade Organization (\u201cWTO\u201d) Agreements.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_FSMCFIC_featured_image_caption":"","_FSMCFIC_featured_image_nocaption":"","_FSMCFIC_featured_image_hide":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[123],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1767","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-print-archives"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/peZu3S-sv","jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1767","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1767"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1767\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1767"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1767"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1767"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}