{"id":1790,"date":"2008-06-01T09:03:03","date_gmt":"2008-06-01T13:03:03","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/site\/?p=1790"},"modified":"2010-09-25T19:55:49","modified_gmt":"2010-09-25T23:55:49","slug":"issue_49-2_gadinis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/ilj\/2008\/06\/issue_49-2_gadinis\/","title":{"rendered":"The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Abstract<\/span><\/p>\n<p><em>Policy  coordination between diverse regulatory regimes in financial services  ranks highly on the international political agenda because regulatory  differences create impediments to growing financial activity.  Efficiency-oriented theories fail to explain why coordination was  achieved in some domains but not in others, while arguments linking  coordination to similarities or differences in states\u2019 substantive  policy goals cannot account for coordination progress in spite of vast  differences in prior domestic regimes. This Article posits that  coordination success or failure depends on the interaction of two  variables: whether strong competitors to U.S. firms and markets  challenge U.S. dominance and whether activity is centralized at a main  facility in a single jurisdiction, such as a stock exchange, or diffused  around many separate jurisdictions. Strong U.S. dominance attracts more  foreigners to U.S. centralized markets who voluntarily adopt U.S. laws  and lobby their governments for policy coordination; yet in dispersed  markets, policy coordination offers limited benefits to either the  United States or to foreign countries when U.S. dominance is strong.  When a competitor challenges U.S. dominance in a centralized market,  U.S. policymakers will maintain regulatory barriers to prevent U.S.  investors from migrating to competitors. In dispersed markets, on the  other hand, the United States will promote policy coordination because  it can eliminate its competitors\u2019 advantages across all national  markets. This Article provides four case studies in areas with varying  degrees of U.S. dominance and market centralization to support this  theoretical framework. Overall, the Article makes two contributions: it  generalizes across cases to draw broad conclusions about the field of  finance as a whole, and it highlights the role of politics in financial  regulation, refining the concept of power, clarifying mechanisms, and  providing a theory of how increased competition might shape diverse  fields for regulation.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This Article posits that coordination success or failure depends on the interaction of two variables: whether strong competitors to U.S. firms and markets challenge U.S. dominance and whether activity is centralized at a main facility in a single jurisdiction, such as a stock exchange, or diffused around many separate jurisdictions.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center 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