{"id":3309,"date":"2025-08-04T09:00:31","date_gmt":"2025-08-04T13:00:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/?p=3309"},"modified":"2025-12-20T14:21:48","modified_gmt":"2025-12-20T18:21:48","slug":"common-use-is-not-a-plain-text-question-peter-patterson","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/common-use-is-not-a-plain-text-question-peter-patterson\/","title":{"rendered":"Common Use Is Not A Plain-Text Question – Peter Patterson"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Common Use Is Not A Plain-Text Question<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Peter A. Patterson*<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Supreme Court recently denied the petition for writ of certiorari in Snope v. Brown<\/em>.[1]<\/a> That case squarely presented the question of whether the Second Amendment allows the government to ban the AR-15, \u201cthe most popular rifle in the country.\u201d[2]<\/a>There were three votes to grant cert in Snope<\/em>. Justice Kavanaugh, who could have been the necessary fourth vote, did not vote to grant cert but indicated that the Court \u201cshould and presumably will address the AR-15 issue soon, in the next Term or two.\u201d[3]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass\u2019n v. Bruen<\/em>,[4]<\/a> the Second Amendment analysis proceeds in two steps: first, whether the conduct in question is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment; and if so, second, whether the government can demonstrate that the challenged law is consistent with this Nation\u2019s history of firearm regulation. And the distinction between steps one and two is important, because if the first step is satisfied, the challenged law is presumptively unconstitutional. Then, the burden of justification lies with the government to demonstrate that the challenged law is consistent with the Nation\u2019s history of firearm regulation. When the Court does take up the issue of AR-15 bans, a contested question almost certainly will be where in the analysis, either the initial plain text step or the subsequent historical step, to evaluate whether AR-15 rifles are in common use. Under District of Columbia v. Heller<\/em>,[5]<\/a> the answer should be straightforward. In that case, the Court began by assessing the plain-text meaning of \u201carms.\u201d Founding-era sources generally defined arms to include all weapons, and even the most restrictive definition identified by the Court \u201cstated that all firearms constituted \u2018arms.\u2019\u201d[6]<\/a> \u201cPutting all of th[e] textual elements together,\u201d the Court accordingly found \u201cthat they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons <\/em>in case of confrontation.\u201d[7]<\/a> The Court only discussed common use, on the other hand, when addressing historical limitations on the scope of the right: \u201cMiller <\/em>said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those \u2018in common use at the time.\u2019 We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition <\/em>of prohibiting the carrying of \u2018dangerous and unusual weapons.\u2019\u201d[8]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under Heller<\/em>, therefore, all firearms, including AR-15s, are covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and thus presumptively protected. This makes sense, as there is nothing in the plain text of \u201carms\u201d that would allow for exclusion of certain types of firearms. It is only in the historical part of the analysis that the question of common use is relevant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of course, Heller<\/em> is not the Court\u2019s last word on the Second Amendment. Some have contended that New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen<\/em>[9]<\/a> supports a contrary conclusion or at least introduces uncertainly about where the \u201ccommon use\u201d question fits into the analysis.[10]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The passage in Bruen <\/em>that courts and commenters have contended arguably puts common use in the plain-text part of the analysis reads, in relevant part, as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cHaving made the constitutional standard endorsed in Heller <\/em>more explicit, we now apply that standard to New York\u2019s proper-cause requirement. . . . It is undisputed that . . .  handguns are weapons \u2018in common use\u2019 today for self-defense. We therefore turn to whether the plain text of the Second Amendment protects Koch\u2019s and Nash\u2019s proposed course of conduct\u2014carrying handguns publicly for self-defense.\u201d[11]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

While this passage uses the phrases \u201ccommon use\u201d and \u201cplain text\u201d in the same paragraph, it does not in any way indicate that common use is a plain-text issue. In fact, it refutes<\/em> that very argument because the Court resolved entirely the question of whether the arms at issue in the case were protected by the Second Amendment, not just presumptively protected by the plain text, before moving on to evaluate the meaning of the word \u201cbear.\u201d The Court in this brief passage \u201cappl[ied]\u201d \u201cthe constitutional standard endorsed in Heller<\/em>\u201d and made \u201cmore explicit\u201d in Bruen<\/em> to the arms the plaintiffs in the case sought to carry.[12]<\/a> And because the parties agreed that the arms at issue, handguns, are in common use, the Court concluded that they are protected, period<\/em>\u2014i.e., not just presumptively<\/em>as a matter of plain text at step one, but conclusively<\/em> with respect to text and history, i.e.<\/em>, steps one and <\/em>two. Having concluded the constitutional analysis with respect to the arms at issue, the Court then \u201cturn[ed]\u201d to evaluate whether the Second Amendment covered the activity <\/em>the plaintiffs wanted to engage in with those arms\u2014\u201ccarrying [them] publicly for self-defense.\u201d[13]<\/a> And it began that analysis with the first part of the Bruen <\/em>analysis for the relevant constitutional term, the plain text of \u201cbear.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This reading of Bruen <\/em>is confirmed by the rest of the opinion. For example, the Court quotes Heller <\/em>for the proposition that \u201cthe Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all <\/em>instruments that constitute bearable arms,\u201d[14]<\/a> a proposition that is inconsistent with presumptive textual protection only for arms in common use. And the Court makes clear that the \u201ccommon use\u201d standard is the product of Heller<\/em>\u2019s evaluation of \u201chistorical tradition\u201d and therefore is part of \u201cthe historical understanding\u201d that \u201cdemark[s] the limits on the exercise of\u201d the \u201cindividual right to armed self-defense.\u201d[15]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In sum, read properly, Heller <\/em>and Bruen <\/em>establish that all <\/em>firearms are covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment. The common-use test thus derives not from plain text but rather from Heller<\/em>\u2019s evaluation of the historical limitations on the scope of the right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

*<\/a> Partner at Cooper & Kirk PLLC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> 145 S. Ct. 1534 (2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 145 S. Ct. 1556, 1569 (2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> Snope<\/em>, 145 S. Ct. at 1534 (2025) (statement of Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> 597 U.S. 1 (2022)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> 554 U.S. 570 (2008).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 581.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> Id. <\/em>at 592 (emphasis added).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 627 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a> 597 U.S. 1 (2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a> See, e.g.<\/em>, Duncan v. Bonta<\/em>, 133 F.4th 852, 900 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (In Bruen<\/em>, \u201ccommon use\u201d is \u201cmentioned in both the historical and textual steps of the analysis.\u201d); Antonyuk v. James<\/em>, 120 F.4th 941, 981 (2nd Cir. 2024) (The \u201cthreshold [plain-text] inquiry requires courts to consider \u2026 whether the weapon concerned is \u2018in common use\u2019 \u201d because Bruen <\/em>\u201cresolv[ed]\u201d that question \u201cbefore proceeding to historical analysis.\u201d); Hanson v. District of Columbia<\/em>, 120 F.4th 223, 232 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (\u201cWe assume, without deciding, this [common-use] issue falls under Bruen <\/em>step one because the Bruen <\/em>Court determined that handguns are in common use before conducting its historical analysis.\u201d); Bianchi v. Brown<\/em>, 111 F.4th 438, 501 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (Richardson, J., dissenting) (\u201cBruen <\/em>is somewhat ambiguous on this point.\u201d); United States v. Price<\/em>, 111 F.4th 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2024) (\u201c[T]o resolve this [plain-text] inquiry[,]\u201d Bruen <\/em>\u201casked \u2026 whether the weapons regulated by the challenged regulation were \u2018in common use.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Alaniz<\/em>, 69 F.4th 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2023) (\u201cBruen <\/em>step one involves a threshold inquiry\u201d that includes \u201cwhether the weapon at issue is \u2018in common use today for self-defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Bruen<\/em>, 597 U.S. at 32)); Jamie G. McWilliam, The Relevance of \u2018Common Use\u2019 after <\/em>Bruen, 37 J. Harv. L. & Pub. Pol\u2019y Per Curiam 1, 6 (Fall 2023) (\u201c[T]he Court in Bruen <\/em>raised the common use standard at the beginning of its plain text analysis. . . .\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a> Bruen<\/em>, 597 U.S. at 31\u201332.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/a> Id. <\/em>at 31.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/a> Id. <\/em>at 32.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 28 (quoting Heller<\/em>, 554 U.S. at 582) (emphasis added).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 21, 46.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Common Use Is Not A Plain-Text Question Peter A. Patterson* The Supreme Court recently denied the petition for writ of certiorari in Snope v. Brown.[1] That case squarely presented the question of whether the Second Amendment allows the government to ban the AR-15, \u201cthe most popular rifle in the country.\u201d[2]There were three votes to grant cert in Snope. Justice Kavanaugh, who could have been the necessary fourth vote, did not vote to grant cert but […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":202,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[72],"tags":[13,77],"class_list":["post-3309","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-per-curiam","tag-constitutional-law","tag-second-amendment"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/peZSiL-Rn","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3309","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/202"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3309"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3309\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3309"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3309"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3309"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}