{"id":4360,"date":"2025-06-01T23:33:17","date_gmt":"2025-06-02T03:33:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jol\/?p=4360"},"modified":"2025-08-29T15:08:40","modified_gmt":"2025-08-29T19:08:40","slug":"tobia-linguistics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/jol\/2025\/06\/01\/tobia-linguistics\/","title":{"rendered":"Reading Law with Linguistics: The Statutory Interpretation of Artifact Nouns"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Brandon Waldon[*]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\nCleo Condoravdi[**]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

James Pustejovsky[***]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Nathan Schneider[****]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Kevin Tobia[\u2020]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n

Abstract<\/span><\/p>\n

Is an airplane a \u201cvehicle\u201d? Is a floating home a \u201cvessel\u201d? Is an unassembled gun a \u201cfirearm\u201d? Such questions about \u201cartifact nouns\u201d\u2014nouns that describe human-created entities\u2014are fodder for legal philosophy. They are also common statutory interpretation issues, which today\u2019s textualist courts resolve with linguistic analysis. We propose that textualist courts complement familiar tools, like dictionaries, with insights <\/em>from linguistics.<\/em><\/p>\n

We examine as a case study Garland v. VanDerStok, which the Supreme Court will soon decide. It concerns \u201cgun parts kits,\u201d firearm parts that can become operable firearms through combination or part finishing. These kits have been used in several mass shootings, and the case concerns whether such a kit is a \u201cfirearm\u201d subject to regulation under the 1968 Gun Control Act. To analyze the statute\u2019s meaning, we apply insights from linguistic theory, new data from language usage, and a survey study of ordinary Americans. This evidence supports that the gun parts kits identified by the government fit within the statutory meaning of \u201cfirearm.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

The Article\u2019s case study in the legal interpretation of artifact nouns also carries broader implications. We develop lessons for the practice of legal interpretation, statutory interpretation theory, and broader debates in legal philosophy.<\/p>\n

I. Prefatory Note<\/span><\/p>\n

We wrote this Article and an associated amicus brief in Garland v. VanDerStok1<\/a><\/sup><\/em>Brief for Professors and Scholars of Linguistics and Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 1390 (2024) (No. 23-852) [hereinafter Linguistics Brief].<\/span><\/em> over the summer and fall of 2024. The Supreme Court heard the oral argument on October 8, 2024. The case remained undecided as this Article entered the final stages of publication with the Harvard Journal of Legislation<\/em> in early 2025. On March 26, 2025, the Supreme Court decided the case: Bondi v. VanDerStok<\/em>.2<\/a><\/sup>Bondi v. VanDerStok, 604 U.S. __ (2025) (In early 2025, Merrick Garland was replaced by Pamela Bondi as the United States Attorney General).<\/span> We were pleased that seven Justices applied a commendable linguistic analysis, and that the majority referenced our amicus brief,3<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> at *10 n.3.<\/span> upon which this Article expands.<\/p>\n

The publication timeline did not allow time to substantively update this Article to address the Court\u2019s analysis. As such, we ask readers to consider the pre-decision window as the reference context for our Article. In keeping with that context, we have made no changes to the Article in light of the decision (including even minor changes to reflect the final caption, \u201cBondi v. VanDerStok<\/em>\u201d). We are grateful to the Harvard Journal on Legislation <\/em>for allowing us this introductory note, the remainder of which briefly addresses the relationship between some of this Article\u2019s arguments and the Court\u2019s opinion.<\/p>\n

In what follows in this Prefatory Note, we assume that the reader is already acquainted with the relevant background of Bondi v. VanDerStok <\/em>and with our linguistic analysis as presented in this Article and in our amicus brief.<\/p>\n

The Court\u2019s opinion explicitly identifies weapon<\/em>, frame<\/em>, and receiver <\/em>with linguistic terminology: these nouns are \u201cartifact nouns\u201d denoting entities of human creation and\/or assimilation.4<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *10, *11, *13, *14, *17 n.4, *19, *21, *22, *23; see also<\/em> Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 6\u20139; infra<\/em> Part IV.<\/span> The Court characterizes its task as determining whether \u201cCongress\u2026 use[d] artifact nouns to reach incomplete objects\u201d in the statutory definition of firearm<\/em>, another artifact noun.5<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *17 n.4.<\/span> The Court recognizes a key aspect of artifact noun meaning: artifact nouns are distinguished by the potential to exhibit human-intended functions.6<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> at *10 (citing Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, 6\u20139; Scott Grimm & Beth Levin, Artifact Nouns: Reference and Countability<\/em>, 47 PROC. N. E. LING. SOC\u2019Y 55 (2017);<\/span> JAMES PUSTEJOVSKY, THE GENERATIVE LEXICON<\/span> 97 (1995); Jules Coleman & Ori Simchen, \u201cLaw\u201d<\/em>, 9 LEGAL THEORY<\/span> 1, 20 (2003); Terrence Parsons, The Progressive in English<\/em>, 12 LINGUISTICS & PHIL.<\/span> 213, 225\u201326 (1989).<\/span> Thus, \u201ceveryday speakers sometimes use artifact nouns to refer to unfinished objects\u2014at least when their intended function is clear.\u201d7<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *10. Moreover, speakers need not clarify their intention to refer to such objects through the use of explicit nominal modifiers such as unfinished<\/em> or incomplete<\/em>: \u201cordinary speakers sometimes use unadorned artifact nouns like \u2018weapon,\u2019 \u2018frame,\u2019 or \u2018receiver\u2019 to reach unfinished articles.\u201d Id.<\/em> at *22.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, just because artifact nouns can<\/em> be used in a way that emphasizes their function does not mean they should always be read in this way. The Court recognizes, rather, that context is crucial for determining the relevance of design considerations and functional potential in the Gun Control Act of 1968 (\u201cGCA\u201d) definition of firearm<\/em>.8<\/a><\/sup>In this respect, the Court\u2019s analysis relies on \u201cone of the most traditional tools for discerning statutory meaning\u2014contextual clues found in the pertinent statute itself.\u201d VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *17.<\/span> Some contexts may exclusively center entities\u2019 physical form or physical constitution. The GCA definition of firearm <\/em>does not provide such a context: rather, \u201cCongress explained that a \u2018weapon\u2019\u2026qualifies for regulation if it is either \u2018designed\u2019 to accomplish that function or \u2018capable of being \u2018readily\u2026converted\u2019 to do so.\u2019\u201d9<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> at *12; see also<\/em> Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 17\u201320; infra<\/em> Part IV.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Court acknowledges that the context supplied by the GCA definition is by no means unusual in this respect: ordinary speakers routinely deploy terms such as weapon <\/em>to refer to incomplete, unfinished, or disassembled objects. \u201cImagine a rifle disassembled for storage, transport, or cleaning\u2026as a matter of every day speech, that rifle is<\/em> a weapon, whether disassembled or combat ready.\u201d10<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *11.<\/span> More generally, the Court finds it relevant to consider how ordinary Americans and weapons manufacturers use language to refer to gun parts kits. The Court discusses one such kit, Polymer80\u2019s \u201cBuy Build Shoot\u201d kit, at length. For the Court, this kit\u2019s \u201cintended function as instrument of combat is obvious. Really, the kit\u2019s name says it all: \u2018Buy Build Shoot<\/em>.\u2019\u201d11<\/a><\/sup>Id. <\/em>We provide empirical evidence in support of the claim that manufacturers and customers use the terms weapon<\/em>, firearm<\/em> and rifle<\/em> to refer to gun parts kits. Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 12\u201317; see also<\/em> infra<\/em> Part V. We also present evidence in support of the claim that receiver<\/em> can refer to an incomplete receiver in ordinary usage. Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 23; see also<\/em> infra<\/em> Part V. <\/em>Moreover, people regularly use the terms firearm <\/em>and rifle <\/em>to refer to unassembled packages that include an unfinished receiver. Linguistics Brief, supra <\/em>note 1, at 23; see also<\/em> infra<\/em> Part V.<\/em> <\/span><\/p>\n

Moreover, the Court recognizes that artifact nouns encode an inherently vague and context-dependent notion of functional potential.12<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *13; see also<\/em> infra<\/em> Part IV. In advancing this claim, the Court likens the fuzzy boundary between functionally \u201ccapable\u201d and \u201cincapable\u201d artifact noun-denoted entities to the ancient philosophical sorites <\/em>paradox: \u201cThink of the problem of the heap: Start with a heap of sand and begin removing grains; at some point, a heap no longer exists. That problem attends many artifact nouns.\u201d VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *13. Indeed, it is recognized in linguistic theory that linguistic vagueness gives rise to sorites<\/em>-like puzzles of categorization. See, e.g.<\/em>, Christopher Kennedy, Vagueness and Grammar: The Semantics of Relative and Absolute Gradable Adjectives<\/em>, 30 LINGUISTICS & PHIL.<\/span> 1, 2\u20133 (2007). <\/span> \u201c[A]t some point a kit may be so incomplete or cumbersome to assemble that it can no longer fairly be described as a \u2018weapon\u2019 capable of \u2018read[y]… conver[sion]\u2019 into a working firearm.\u201d13<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *13; see also<\/em> infra<\/em> Part IV.<\/span> The language of the GCA definition makes clear that some gun parts kits meet the threshold of potential, on any plausible specification of that threshold. \u201cIf Congress had wanted to regulate only operable firearms, it could have simply addressed \u2018weapons\u2019 that can \u2018expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.\u2019 But Congress didn\u2019t stop there.\u201d14<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *11\u201312; see also<\/em> Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 19; infra<\/em> Part IV.<\/span> Thus, \u201cthe ATF\u2019s rule [at CFR \u00a7478.11] is not facially inconsistent with the GCA,\u201d15<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *2.<\/span> contra the Respondents\u2019 position.<\/p>\n

The Court also employs insights from linguistic theory in its analysis of frame <\/em>and receiver<\/em>. In addition to recognizing that these terms are artifact nouns,16<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *19\u201322; see also <\/em>Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 22\u201325; infra<\/em> Part VI.<\/em><\/span> the Court recognizes that subsection (B) of the statutory definition contains an anaphoric expression any such weapon <\/em>that \u201crefers us back to weapons encompassed by subsection (A).\u201d17<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *22; see also <\/em>Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 25\u201328; infra<\/em> Part VI.<\/em><\/span> Subsection (A) in turn \u201cencompasses some things that are not yet fit for effective use in combat, including\u2026certain weapon parts kits\u201d containing unfinished frames\/receivers.18<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *22. <\/span> For us and for the Court, this relationship between subsections (A) and (B) undermines the Respondents\u2019 \u201ccomplete-items-only reading of subsection (B).\u201d19<\/a><\/sup>Id. <\/em>at *20; see also<\/em> Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 25\u201326; infra<\/em> Part VI. <\/em>A similar line of argumentation is pursued in Brief of Amicus Curiae<\/em> Gun Violence Protection Groups in Support of Petitioners at 18, Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 1390 (2024) (No. 23-852).<\/span><\/p>\n

The Court\u2019s interpretation of frame <\/em>and receiver<\/em> is further supported by the following principle of linguistic interpretation: ordinarily, \u201cwe expect context to clarify language in a consistent manner.\u201d20<\/a><\/sup>Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 30; see also infra<\/em> Part VI.<\/em><\/span> Having established that weapon <\/em>in (B) refers back to weapons \u201cnot yet fit for effective use,\u201d21<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *22.<\/span> the Court contends that (B) should be read such that the artifact nouns frame<\/em> and receiver<\/em> similarly reach unfinished objects: \u201cthe fact that Congress used one artifact noun (\u2018weapon\u2019) in subsection (B) to reach some unfinished articles suggests it used two other artifact nouns (\u2018frame\u2019 and \u2018receiver\u2019) in the same way in the same provision.\u201d22<\/a><\/sup>Our analysis provides a formal account of how context serves to resolve the indeterminacies of weapon<\/em>, frame<\/em>, and receiver<\/em> in a consistent manner: \u201csubparagraphs (A) and (B)\u2026[are] expressly link[ed]\u2026together with the phrase \u2018any such weapon,\u2019 so that they are best read as sharing a single context in which both the Design and Potential facets of meaning are salient.\u201d Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 30; see also<\/em> infra<\/em> Part VI. <\/em>We claim that the Court\u2019s reading of frame <\/em>and receiver <\/em>also coheres with subparagraphs (C) and (D), which similarly \u201cforeground the Potential and Design facets of meaning ahead of considerations of physical shape or constitution.\u201d Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 27\u201328, 30; see also<\/em> infra<\/em> Part VI.<\/em> <\/span><\/p>\n

The Court\u2019s analysis stands in tension with an alternative, which proceeds from the observation that Congress explicitly contemplates weapons \u201creadily converted\u201d to exhibit particular functions in (A) but does not include similar language in (B). This alternative analysis takes this omission to be a meaningful variation: whereas (A) may reach unfinished or incomplete weapons, (B) extends only to complete frames and receivers.23<\/a><\/sup>Brief of Respondents VanDerStok, Andren, Tactical Machining, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., and Blackhawk Manufacturing Group, Inc. at 16, Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 1390 (2024) (No. 23-852).<\/span><\/p>\n

However, the Court\u2019s analysis provides a ready explanation for this omission. There are sufficient clues from the surrounding context of (B)\u2014including the anaphoric expression any such weapon <\/em>linking back to (A)\u2014to support the government\u2019s interpretation of frame <\/em>and receiver <\/em>in that subsection.24<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *22\u201323. We similarly contend that the absence of overt \u2018design\u2019 and \u2018functional potential\u2019 language in (B) can be explained by \u201c[t]he presence of an anaphoric construction in subparagraph (B) (\u2018any such weapon\u2019)\u2014coupled with the linguistic context of subparagraph (A).\u201d Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 28; see also<\/em> infra<\/em> Part VI. These textual features \u201care sufficient to determine the interpretation of \u2018frame or receiver\u2019 in context.\u201d Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 28; see also infra<\/em> Part VI. For this reason, the absence of \u201cdesign\u201d and \u201cfunctional potential\u201d language in (B) \u201cdoes not support a restrictive construction of \u2018frame or receiver\u2019\u201d in that subsection. Linguistics Brief, supra<\/em> note 1, at 28; see also infra<\/em> Part VI.<\/span> Indeed, \u201creading subsection (B) in light of subsection (A) does more to undermine than to advance the plaintiffs\u2019 cause.\u201d25<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok<\/em>, 604 U.S. at *22\u201323.<\/span><\/p>\n

In VanDerStok<\/em>, the Court leveraged analytical insights from linguistic theory to navigate a contested matter of statutory interpretation. In our Article, we argue that these insights have implications not only for VanDerStok<\/em>, but for future hard cases involving the interpretation of artifact nouns. We also claim that our analysis bears on theories of legal interpretation more generally.<\/p>\n

II. Introduction<\/span><\/p>\n

In 2019, a sixteen-year-old shooter in California killed two students and injured several others.26<\/a><\/sup>Eric Leonard & Philip Drechsler, \u2018Kit Gun\u2019 Was Used in Deadly Saugus High School Shooting, Sheriff Says<\/em>, NBC LOS ANGELES<\/span> (Nov. 21, 2019), https:\/\/www.nbclosangeles.com\/news\/national-international\/ghost-kit-gun-saugus-high-school-shooting-weapon-santa-clarita\/2226421\/ [perma.cc\/6Y9J-755N]; see also<\/em> Tom Jackman & Emily Davies, Teens Buying \u2018Ghost Guns\u2019 Online, with Deadly Consequences<\/em>, WASH. POST (<\/span>June 12, 2023), <\/span>https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/dc-md-va\/2023\/07\/12\/teens-ghost-guns-deadly-shootings\/ [perma.cc\/VU9Q-2673] (explaining that an eighteen year-old purchased, assembled, and fired a \u201cgun parts kit\u201d to kill two schoolmates).<\/span> This shooter\u2019s gun had been assembled from a \u201cgun parts kit,\u201d an unassembled collection of firearm parts. A sixteen-year-old is not legally eligible to buy a firearm.27<\/a><\/sup>Federal law prohibits firearms dealers from selling to those known or reasonably believed to be under twenty-one years of age. Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(b)(1).<\/span> But the sale of \u201cgun parts kits\u201d has made it easier to avoid age and background requirements; since 2019, there have been at least 150 shootings involving these guns, many of which involve teen shooters.28<\/a><\/sup>Ghost Guns Recoveries and Shootings<\/em>, EVERYTOWN RESEARCH & POLICY<\/span> (July 31, 2023), https:\/\/everytownresearch.org\/report\/ghost-guns-recoveries-and-shootings\/#ghost-guns-shootings [perma.cc\/KTY6-JAF3].<\/span> \u201cGun parts kits\u201d are typically unserialized, making them difficult to trace, and they are sold from many online retailers. Internet tutorials demonstrate how to convert parts kits into an AR-15 assault rifle in as little as thirty minutes.29<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, How Hard is it to Build a Gun from a Parts Kit?,<\/em> REDDIT<\/span>, https:\/\/www.reddit.com\/r\/guns\/comments\/bdadoa\/how_hard_is_it_to_build_a_gun_from_a_parts_kit\/ [perma.cc\/AQ76-D7FC] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025); How Long to Build AR-15? Adam\u2019s Arms Piston Kit<\/em>, YOUTUBE<\/span>, https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=1yN3IFaG1o0 [perma.cc\/42JD-YMD4] (last visited Feb. 13, 2025).<\/span> Federal law imposes requirements concerning age minimums, licensing, and background checks for the purchase of \u201cfirearms.\u201d30<\/a><\/sup>18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921.<\/span> However, the Fifth Circuit recently held that \u201cgun parts kits\u201d are not<\/strong> firearms within the definition of these federal laws.31<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F.4th 179, 188 (5th. Cir. 2023), cert. granted<\/em>, 2024 WL 1706014 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2024) (No. 23-852).<\/span><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court will decide that decision\u2019s appeal in 2025. Garland v. VanDerStok32<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/span><\/em> asks whether the Gun Control Act of 1968 (\u201cGCA\u201d), allowing government regulation of \u201cfirearms,\u201d33<\/a><\/sup>18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 921\u2013934.<\/span> includes \u201cgun parts kits\u201d or \u201cghost guns.\u201d34<\/a><\/sup>Specifically, the case concerns \u201cgun parts kits\u201d or \u201cghost guns,\u201d and certain \u201cframes\u201d or \u201creceivers,\u201d which are readily able or designed to be assembled into complete frames or receivers, the structure for the primary energized component of a firearm.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Court\u2019s decision will turn on its application of textualism,35<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, Victoria Nourse, The Paradoxes of a Unified Judicial Philosophy: An Empirical Study of the New Supreme Court, 2020-2022<\/em>, 38 CONST. COMMENT<\/span>. 1 (2023). <\/span> an interpretive theory that gives statutory text the meaning it would communicate to an ordinary person, \u201creasonable person,\u201d36<\/a><\/sup>John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists<\/em>, 106 COLUM. L. REV.<\/span> 70, 70 (2006) (noting that textualists should consider how a \u201creasonable person\u201d uses words).<\/span> or \u201cordinary . . . speaker.\u201d37<\/a><\/sup>E.g.<\/em>, Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, <\/em>84 U. CHI. L. REV.<\/span> 2193, 2194 (2017) (explaining that \u201c[w]hat matters to the textualist is how the ordinary English speaker\u2014one unacquainted with the peculiarities of the legislative process\u2014would understand the words of a statute\u201d).<\/span> Although the Court\u2019s textualists have some theoretical disagreements,38<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g<\/em>., William Eskridge, Brian G. Slocum & Kevin Tobia, Textualism’s Defining Moment<\/em>, 123 COLUM. L. REV<\/span>. 1611 (2023); Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?<\/em>, 134 HARV. L. REV.<\/span> 265 (2020); see also<\/em> Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. __ (2024); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 590 U.S. 644 (2020); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U.S. 1 (2020); McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894 (2020); HollyFrontier Refining v. Renewable Fuels, 594 U.S. 382 (2021); Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374 (2021); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021); Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022).<\/span> the Justices are \u201call textualists\u201d39<\/a><\/sup>The 2015 Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes<\/em>, YOUTUBE<\/span> (Nov. 25, 2015), https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg&list=PL2q2U2nTrWq1bz6_l-PPEUf9Pw-blX6Pl&index=4 [https:\/\/perma.cc\/3YUN-A75E]; see generally <\/em>Kevin Tobia, We\u2019re Not All Textualists Now<\/em>, 78 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L<\/span>. 243 (2022).<\/span> in the sense that the debate will start with the linguistic meaning of the statutory definition, which implicates the meaning of terms like firearm<\/em> and weapon<\/em>.40<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> generally<\/em> ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS<\/span> (2012) (providing an overview of textualism); BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION<\/span> (2015) (providing an overview of ordinary meaning in textualism).<\/span> The textualist Court often relies on dictionary definitions and intuitive hypotheticals.41<\/a><\/sup>See infra<\/em> Section III.B.<\/span> This Article argues that textualist courts should also consider analytical insights from the field of linguistics. In making this recommendation, the Article builds on prior calls to \u201ctriangulate\u201d ordinary meaning,42<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record<\/em>, 2017 BYU L. REV<\/span>. 1621 (2017); Kevin Tobia, Jesse Egbert & Thomas R. Lee, Triangulating Ordinary Meaning<\/em>, GEO. L.J.<\/span> ONLINE<\/span> (2023).<\/span> which emphasize the use of interpretive tools like analysis of naturally occurring language and survey data about how ordinary Americans understand language.43<\/a><\/sup>E.g<\/em>., Kevin Tobia, Brian Slocum & Victoria Nourse, Statutory Interpretation from the Outside<\/em>, 122 COLUM. L. REV<\/span>. 213 (2022). <\/span><\/p>\n

The Article considers VanDerStok<\/em> and the regulation of \u201cgun parts kits\u201d as an important practical example. These firearms are sold without serial numbers and allow minors and other parties to obtain weapons that would normally be prohibited, with no paperwork or background check. Each year, law enforcement recovers thousands of these weapons.<\/p>\n

At the same time, our linguistic analysis applies more broadly. Firearm<\/em> is an artifact noun<\/em>, denoting entities of human-made creation. Legal interpretation often implicates the meaning of these nouns, asking questions like: Is an airplane a vehicle<\/em>, and is a floating home a vessel<\/em>?44<\/a><\/sup>McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931); Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115 (2013).<\/span> Our case study\u2019s analysis also illustrates lessons for other interpretive disputes, statutory textualism, and legal philosophy.<\/p>\n

Part III of the Article provides brief background on VanDerStok<\/em> and traditional textualist tools like dictionary definitions and intuitive examples.<\/em> Part IV introduces and applies relevant research from linguistics to VanDerStok<\/em>. First, linguistic theory suggests that the interpretation of artifact nouns (like weapon<\/em>, firearm<\/em>, frame<\/em>, receiver<\/em>, bicycle, <\/em>or table<\/em>) depends critically on context. We explain how context indicates the relevant facets of meaning of these artifact nouns, including facets related to the noun\u2019s potential function or manner of creation. Next, we argue that the statutory context of the GCA strongly emphasizes the functional and creational facets of firearm<\/em> and frame or receiver<\/em> over other facets.<\/p>\n

In Part V, we supplement our theoretical argument with two types of new empirical data. First, we report examples of naturally occurring language in which people describe firearm parts kits as \u201cweapons\u201d and \u201cfirearms.\u201d This indicates that, in many contexts, parts kits fit comfortably within the ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em> and weapon<\/em>. Next, we present an original experimental study of ordinary Americans. The survey has two primary implications. First, most (65%) of our sample understood parts kits as firearms, even with no further context. Second, when participants had context mirroring the statutory definition,45<\/a><\/sup>A firearm is \u201cany weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by means of an explosive.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(4)(B).<\/span> they agreed even more (73%) that parts kits are firearms. Part VI of the Article extends our linguistic analysis to the second question in VanDerStok<\/em>, concerning the interpretation of frame<\/em> and receiver<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Part VII elaborates the implications. First, the Article has implications for legal practice. This includes a recommendation for how the Supreme Court should analyze VanDerStok<\/em>. Insofar as the Court seeks to resolve the case through textualism, the Court should not rely solely on dictionary definitions and arbitrary hypotheticals about word meaning.46<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g<\/em>., Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406, 415 (2024) (relying on dictionary definitions to determine whether bump stocks fall within the National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 5845(b), which defines \u201cmachinegun\u201d as \u201cany weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger\u201d).<\/span> Instead, it should look to the rich context provided by the statutory definition, which emphasizes an object\u2019s potential functionality and design as a firearm. We additionally discuss recommendations for other cases involving the interpretation of artifact nouns. The Article\u2019s case study also carries broader implications for textualist theory, which we elaborate in Section VII.B, and for longstanding legal philosophical debates about text and purpose, which we discuss in Section VII.C.<\/p>\n

III. VanDerStok<\/em> and Traditional Textualist tools<\/span><\/p>\n

A. Background on <\/em>Garland v. VanDerStok<\/p>\n

The Gun Control Act of 1968 (\u201cGCA\u201d), codified at 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921, defines firearm<\/em> as:<\/p>\n

(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive;<\/p>\n

(B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon;<\/p>\n

(C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or<\/p>\n

(D) any destructive device.47<\/a><\/sup>18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(3).<\/span><\/p>\n

Congress delegated authority to administer the GCA to the Attorney General,48<\/a><\/sup>18 U.S.C. \u00a7 926(a).<\/span> who delegated that authority to the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (\u201cATF\u201d).49<\/a><\/sup>28 C.F.R. \u00a7 0.130(a).<\/span> In 2022, the ATF promulgated a rule clarifying its interpretation of the definition.50<\/a><\/sup>Definition of \u201cFrame or Receiver\u201d and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pts. 447, 478, 479).<\/span> The ATF interpreted firearm <\/em>to include \u201ca weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.\u201d51<\/a><\/sup>27 C.F.R. \u00a7 478.11.<\/span> The rule also explained that the agency interprets frame<\/em> or<\/em> receiver52<\/a><\/sup><\/em>27 C.F.R. \u00a7 478.12(a) provides the following definitions: \u201c(1) The term \u2018frame\u2019 means the part of a handgun, or variants thereof, that provides housing or a structure for the component (i.e., sear or equivalent) designed to hold back the hammer, striker, bolt, or similar primary energized component prior to initiation of the firing sequence, even if pins or other attachments are required to connect such component (i.e., sear or equivalent) to the housing or structure. (2) The term \u2018receiver\u2019 means the part of a rifle, shotgun, or projectile weapon other than a handgun, or variants thereof, that provides housing or a structure for the primary component designed to block or seal the breech prior to initiation of the firing sequence (i.e., bolt, breechblock, or equivalent), even if pins or other attachments are required to connect such component to the housing or structure.\u201d<\/span><\/em> to include certain partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frames and receivers, including a parts kit: \u201cThe terms \u2018frame\u2019 and \u2018receiver\u2019 shall include a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver, including a frame or receiver parts kit, that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver<\/strong>.\u201d53<\/a><\/sup>27 C.F.R \u00a7 478.12(c) (emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n

Jennifer VanDerStok and a set of individual, manufacturer, and organizational plaintiffs who sought to utilize, purchase, or sell gun parts kits (hereinafter \u201cVanDerStok\u201d) challenged the agency\u2019s interpretation in a Texas district court, which held that the ATF exceeded its statutory authority and vacated the final rule nationwide.54<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>VanDerStok v. Garland, 680 F.Supp.3d 741 (N.D. Tex. 2023).<\/span> The Fifth Circuit upheld the decision,55<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F.4th 179, 188 (5th Cir. 2023).<\/span> and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.56<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>144 S. Ct. 1390 (mem.).<\/span> In the October 2024 Term, the Supreme Court will decide two questions:<\/p>\n

1. Whether \u201ca weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,\u201d 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a \u201cfirearm\u201d regulated by the Act.<\/p>\n

2. Whether \u201ca partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver\u201d that is \u201cdesigned to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver,\u201d 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a \u201cframe or receiver\u201d regulated by the Act.57<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

VanDerStok<\/em> will have important consequences for the regulation of firearms. Although some states have passed laws regulating \u201cgun parts kits,\u201d58<\/a><\/sup>Laws regulating \u201cgun parts kits\u201d and\/or unserialized firearms have been passed in California, CAL. PENAL CODE<\/span> \u00a7 30400 (requiring serial numbers and background checks); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.<\/span> \u00a7 18-12-111.5 (requiring serial numbers and background checks, prohibiting 3D printing); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN.<\/span> tit. 11, \u00a7 1463 (requiring serial numbers and background checks, prohibiting 3D printing and distribution of 3D printing instructions, prohibiting plastic guns); the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. <\/span>\u00a7 7-2502.06 (requiring firearms be serialized within five business days of manufacture); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.<\/span> \u00a7 134-10.2 (requiring serial numbers and background checks, prohibiting 3D printing); Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.<\/span> 5\/24-5.1 (prohibiting knowingly selling, offering to sell, or transferring an unserialized firearm or unserialized unfinished frame or receiver to a federally unlicensed buyer, requiring serial numbers and background checks); Maryland, MD. CODE. ANN.<\/span>, PUB. SAFETY<\/span> \u00a7\u20025-702 (requiring serial numbers and background checks, prohibiting buying, transferring, or selling gun parts unless required by federal law or imprinted by a federally-licensed manufacturer); Massachusetts, 2024 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 135 (H.B. 4885) (requiring serial numbers and background checks for all firearms and parts); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.<\/span> \u00a7 202.3635 (requiring serial numbers and background checks for all firearms and parts, prohibiting the manufacture or assembly of an unserialized firearm unless regulated as firearms under state and federal law); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN.<\/span> \u00a7 2C:39-1 (requiring serial numbers and background checks for all firearms and parts, prohibiting 3D printing and distribution of 3D printing instructions), preempted in part by<\/em> Ass\u2019n. of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Platkin, No. CV 18-10507-PGS-JBD, 2024 WL 3585580 (D.N.J. July 30, 2024); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW<\/span> \u00a7\u00a7 265.55, 265.60, 265.61 (prohibiting selling, manufacturing, or possessing a ghost gun); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN.<\/span> \u00a7 166.265 (requiring serial numbers for all firearms, frames and receivers, prohibiting 3D printed guns, prohibiting possession or manufacture of undetectable firearms); Rhode Island, 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.<\/span> \u00a7 11-47-8 (requiring serial numbers and background checks for all firearms and parts, prohibiting 3D printing of firearms); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN.<\/span> 13 \u00a7 4084 (requiring serial numbers and background checks for all firearms and parts, prohibiting the possession or transfer of unserialized firearms and finished or unfinished frames and receivers); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.<\/span> \u00a7 9.41.326 (requiring serial numbers and background checks, prohibiting plastic undetectable guns, prohibiting the manufacture, assembly, sale, offered sale, knowing or reckless aid in the manufacture of unserialized firearms, prohibiting the possession and transportation of an untraceable firearm).<\/span> most have not. And although some significant \u201cgun parts kits\u201d manufacturers have recently shut down,59<\/a><\/sup>\u2018Ghost Gun\u2019 Maker Goes Dark<\/em>, NPR<\/span>, (Sept. 5, 2024), https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2024\/09\/04\/nx-s1-5099467\/ghost-gun-maker-goes-dark [https:\/\/perma.cc\/2HM4-YLGU].<\/span> many others are operating.60<\/a><\/sup>These include JSD Supply, Ghost Gunner, Blackhawk Manufacturing, Glockstore, and MDX Arms. See, e.g.<\/em>, GHOST GUNNER<\/span>, https:\/\/ghostgunner.net [https:\/\/perma.cc\/5A3Y-RT8B] (last visited Mar. 9, 2025).<\/span> Tens of thousands of \u201cgun parts kits\u201d are recovered by law enforcement each year, and VanDerStok <\/em>will determine the efficacy of existing federal regulation of these kits.<\/p>\n

B. Textualism\u2019s Traditional Tools<\/em><\/p>\n

The questions presented in VanDerStok <\/em>concern statutory interpretation: Do the weapons parts kits, frames, and receivers identified by the ATF fall within the statutory definitions of firearm<\/em>, frame<\/em>, and receiver<\/em>? For a textualist Supreme Court, the case turns on the statute\u2019s linguistic meaning, including what it would communicate to an ordinary reader.<\/p>\n

The textualist Court often relies on dictionary definitions and intuitive hypotheticals.61<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use<\/em>, 124 YALE L.<\/span>J. 497, 497 (2014).<\/span> These traditional tools infuse both the VanDerStok <\/em>lower court opinions62<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F.4th 179, 182 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. granted<\/em>, 144 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2024) (No. 23-852).<\/span> and Supreme Court briefs.63<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14\u201316, VanDerStok<\/em> (Feb. 7, 2024) (No. 23-852), 2024 WL 515619.<\/span> They appeal to dictionary definitions of firearm<\/em> and colorful hypotheticals about ordinary language: When IKEA sells a \u201ctable parts kit\u201d that must be assembled by the purchaser into a table, isn\u2019t this parts kit a table<\/em>?64<\/a><\/sup>For example, the petition argued the following: \u201cIf a State placed a tax on the sale of home goods, such as tables, chairs, couches, and bookshelves, IKEA surely could not avoid that tax by claiming that it does not sell any of those items and instead sells \u201cfurniture parts kits\u201d that must be assembled by the purchaser. So too with guns: An ordinary speaker of English would recognize that a company in the business of selling kits that can be assembled into firearms in minutes\u2014and that are designed, marketed, and used for that express purpose\u2014is in the business of selling firearms.\u201d Id.<\/em> at 16.<\/span><\/p>\n

Definitions and hypotheticals can assist in clarifying how an ordinary speaker of English understands language, but these tools must be carefully employed. Dictionary definitions can be cherry-picked.65<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court<\/em>, 30 ARIZ. ST.<\/span> L.J. 282, 282 (1988). <\/span> Intuitive hypotheticals can also be easily cherry-picked, and they may not accurately reflect ordinary language.66<\/a><\/sup>Intuitive hypotheticals play an important role in theoretical linguistics, and we will make extensive use of them to help advance our claims regarding the ordinary meaning of artifact nouns. Through the use of intuitional data, researchers can carefully control and adjust the properties of a sentence (or the surrounding context) that determine linguistic interpretation. Our point is that intuition-based methods are susceptible to misuse: a single hypothetical cannot account for all the ways in which interpretation depends on language and context.<\/span><\/span> Moreover, \u201c[w]hen Justices\u2014elite lawyers\u2014debate how \u2018ordinary people\u2019 talk, there is a serious risk that their renderings will speak with an upper-class, judicially-inflected accent.\u201d67<\/a><\/sup>William N. Eskridge Jr. & Victoria F. Nourse, Textual Gerrymandering: The Eclipse of Republican Government in an Era of Statutory Populism<\/em>, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV<\/span>. 1718, 1728 (2021).<\/span><\/p>\n

IV. Analytical Insights from Research in Linguistics<\/span><\/p>\n

This article augments the traditional textualist toolkit with formal linguistic theory and empirical linguistic methods. We show that out of context, artifact nouns such as firearm<\/em> are underdetermined as a matter of their ordinary linguistic meaning. Specifically, the interpretation of firearm <\/em>depends everywhere and always on the context in which that term appears. Though dictionary definitions may characterize the interpretation of firearm<\/em> in frequently encountered contexts, such definitions cannot possibly anticipate the rich variety of contexts in which the word is used or how those contexts shape interpretation. We review empirical evidence that supports our theoretical perspective, which is a mainstream one in linguistics.<\/p>\n

Linguistic theory also provides guidance on how an artifact noun\u2019s meaning is resolved as a function of context. This allows us to ascertain when a statutory definition, e.g., the definition of firearm <\/em>in the GCA, departs from ordinary meaning, as has been debated among the litigants in VanDerStok<\/em>. We complement this theoretical exercise with two empirical contributions: naturally occurring evidence of ordinary linguistic usage and experimental survey data on ordinary linguistic interpretation.<\/p>\n

A. The Ordinary Meaning of Artifact Nouns<\/em><\/p>\n

To ascertain the ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em>, we look to linguistic theory, which has extensively studied the linguistic category to which firearm <\/em>belongs: artifact nouns (e.g., firearm<\/em>, weapon<\/em>, table<\/em>, and bicycle<\/em>). Artifact nouns \u201cdenote[] entities of human invention and\/or entities that, through some assimilative procedure, come to serve some human-intended function.\u201d68<\/a><\/sup>Brandon Waldon, Cleo Condoravdi, Beth Levin & Judith Degen, On the Context Dependence of Artifact Noun Interpretation<\/em>, in <\/em>27 PROC. OF SINN UND BEDEUTUNG<\/span> 674, 675 (Maria Onoeva, Anna Sta\u0148kov\u00e1 & Radek \u0160im\u00edk eds., 2023).<\/span> These nouns differ in this respect from so-called natural kind-denoting nouns (e.g., egg<\/em>, dog<\/em>, and water<\/em>). Linguists have long recognized that as a matter of literal semantic meaning, an artifact noun can be characterized by basic attributes that pertain to members of the category denoted by the noun. A widely cited analytical framework was developed by Professor Pustejovsky, who associates words of the English lexicon with a semantic structure representing the essential facets (\u2018qualia roles\u2019) of artifact noun meaning:<\/p>\n

(1) The Constitutive<\/strong> facet: the relationship between an object and its constituents, or proper parts;<\/p>\n

(2) The Formal<\/strong> facet: that which distinguishes the object in the larger domain;<\/p>\n

(3) The Potential <\/strong>(\u2018telic\u2019) facet: the potential of an object to fulfill some function or purpose;<\/p>\n

(4) The Design<\/strong> (\u2018agentive\u2019) facet: factors involved in the origin or \u2018bringing about\u2019 of an object.69<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> James Pustejovsky, The Generative Lexicon<\/em>, 17 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS<\/span> 409, 426\u201327 (1991); see generally<\/em> PUSTEJOVSKY,<\/span> supra <\/em>note 6. We borrow the \u201cfacet\u201d terminology from D. A. Cruse, On Polylexy<\/em>, 14 DICTIONARIES: J. DICTIONARY SOC. N. AM. 88,<\/span> 92 (1992). These facets of meaning identified above serve to distinguish artifact nouns from other types of nouns. For example, though both artifact nouns and natural kind-denoting nouns are associated with a Design facet, \u201c[t]he manner in which something is created is a mode of explanation that will distinguish natural kinds from artifacts.\u201d PUSTEJOVSKY<\/span>, supra<\/em> note 6, at 97. Moreover, not all nouns are concretely associated with a Potential facet. \u201c[The Potential facet] defines what the purpose or function of a concept is, if there is such a constraint associated with it.\u201d Id. <\/em>at 99. <\/span><\/p>\n

In a given context, only select facets of nominal meaning may be relevant for the purposes of linguistic interpretation. For example, consider sentence (1) below. This sentence is underspecified as to the action that Noel undertakes. On one interpretation, (1) implies that Noel initiated the process of reading<\/strong> a novel; on another interpretation, (1) implies that Noel initiated the process of writing<\/strong> a novel:<\/p>\n

Noel began a novel.<\/p>\n

Linguistic theory illuminates the source of this underspecificity. On the \u2018begin-to-read\u2019 interpretation, the relevant facet of the noun novel <\/em>is its \u2018Potential\u2019 facet: here, the novel<\/em> realizes its potential to fulfill its intended function (i.e., to be read). On the \u2018begin-to-write\u2019 interpretation, the relevant facet is the \u2018Design\u2019 facet, i.e., the property of being brought into existence through writing. Context is crucial for identifying the relevant facet(s) and hence the intended meaning of the sentence. Out of context, (1) does not have a stable interpretation.70<\/a><\/sup>This is not a word sense <\/em>ambiguity. There are not two general meanings of \u201cbegan,\u201d one of which is \u2018started-to-write\u2019 and the other of which is \u2018started-to-read\u2019; nor does \u201cnovel\u201d have two distinct meanings, \u2018prose-literature-in-the-process-of-being-written\u2019 and \u2018prose-literature-in-the-process-of-being-read.\u2019 Rather, the indeterminacy lies in the meaning facet of the concept of \u201cnovel\u201d that is being elaborated in relation to the verb. See also infra<\/em> Section VII.B (explaining the \u201cword sense disambiguation paradigm\u201d).<\/span><\/p>\n

According to one na\u00efve hypothesis of linguistic meaning, contexts that center an artifact noun\u2019s Potential facet are ones in which members of the category realize their intended function. On this hypothesis, the set of vehicles <\/em>in such a context consists exclusively of objects that are (currently) engaged in the action of transporting people or things. Clearly, this hypothesis is untenable: it predicts that parked cars can never belong to the set of vehicles <\/em>(or even cars<\/em>). A more plausible hypothesis states that category membership in such contexts is determined by functional potential that may or may not be realized in context.71<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, Lynn Nichols, Lexical Semantic Constraints on Noun Roots and Noun Borrowability<\/em>, 32 STUD. LANG. 683,<\/span> 694 (2008); Grimm & Levin, supra<\/em> note 6.<\/span> The parked car is a vehicle <\/em>in part because it is ready to be used for transportation (once one turns the ignition key and starts driving). The Potential facet attends to potential<\/strong> capabilities, rather than exhibited behaviors.<\/p>\n

The line between \u2018capable\u2019 and \u2018incapable\u2019 vis-\u00e0-vis function is vague and heavily dependent on context and the artifact noun under consideration. The government\u2019s bicycle<\/em> hypothetical in VanDerStok <\/em>supports this point:<\/p>\n

A bicycle is still a bicycle even if it lacks pedals, a chain, or some other component needed to render it complete or allow it to function<\/strong>. So too if the bicycle is shipped with plastic guards attached to the gears or brakes that must be removed before operation<\/strong>, or with a seat tube that the user must cut to length before installing. No one would deny that a company selling and shipping products in any of those conditions was engaged in selling \u2018bicycles.\u201972<\/a><\/sup>Application for a Stay of the Judgment Entered by the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N.D. of Tex. at 22, Garland v. VanDerStok, No. 23A82 (filed Jul. 27, 2023) (emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n

This hypothetical considers objects that, with some manipulation, can fulfill the canonical intended purpose of bicycles. The relevant context is one in which \u201ca company [is] selling and shipping products\u201d to buyers who fully expect to put in some elbow grease before they can ride the thing they have purchased. Form and constitution\u2014including the physical shape of the object and the relative position of constituent parts in physical space\u2014are secondary considerations; what is important is that the buyer receives a product that is capable of being ridden, given an appropriate amount of effort. If the company ships a hunk of aluminum and other raw materials sufficient to produce a bicycle, the buyer can justifiably pursue a refund on the grounds that he did not receive a bicycle<\/em>. Of course, this is a clear case on a continuum of possibilities; there is no crisp line between \u2018appropriate\u2019 and \u2018inappropriate\u2019 effort.<\/p>\n

In sum, this theoretical perspective takes the ordinary meaning of artifact nouns like weapon<\/em>, firearm<\/em>, and table<\/em> to be inherently underspecified. There is no complete interpretation of these artifact nouns without context. In some contexts, a firearm<\/em> must be completed; in others, firearm<\/em> or gun<\/em> may have an interpretation that includes incomplete members. Moreover, context is crucial to determine both (1) whether, in context, an artifact noun refers to entities that share common functional properties and (2) how to characterize that common functional \u2018core.\u2019 Below, we apply this linguistic framework to analyze how statutory context resolves the interpretation of firearm <\/em>in the GCA.<\/p>\n

B. Context\u2019s Role in Interpreting \u201cFirearm\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

For the textualist Supreme Court, VanDerStok <\/em>turns on the meaning of firearm <\/em>in the GCA. This section addresses this linguistic question in light of the statutory context, which has been emphasized by textualists from Scalia73<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37<\/span> (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (noting that \u201c[i]n textual interpretation, context is everything\u201d).<\/span> to Barrett.74<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 511 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (\u201cTo strip a word from its context is to strip that word of its meaning.\u201d).<\/span> We restrict our attention to a contested subpart of the statutory definition, section 921(a)(3)(A) [hereinafter \u201c(A)\u201d], the part of the statutory definition from which the ATF derives its authority to regulate firearm parts kits. Below, we argue that (A) clearly extends beyond the narrowest category of completed, operable weapons. We then argue that (A) does so in a manner consistent with the ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em>.<\/p>\n

1. Analysis of the GCA Definition<\/em><\/p>\n

When a statute \u201cincludes an explicit definition,\u201d the Court \u201cmust follow that definition, even if it varies from a term\u2019s ordinary meaning.\u201d75<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok v. Garland, 680 F.Supp.3d 741, 764 (N.D. Tex. 2023) (quoting Digit. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. 149, 160 (2018)).<\/span> While the meaning of firearm<\/em> in the GCA may be informed by contemplating the ordinary meaning of that term, it is crucial to attend to the statutory context to discern the contextual meaning that firearm<\/em> has within the Act. We might not call a firearm silencer or a bomb kit a firearm<\/em> in ordinary language. But the statutory definition of firearm <\/em>explicitly includes a wide range of objects, from firearm frames and receivers,76<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(3)(B).<\/span> to any combination of parts designed and intended for use in assembling a firearm silencer,77<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 921(a)(3)(C), 921(a)(24).<\/span> to bombs and bomb-making kits.78<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 921(a)(4)(A), 921(a)(4)(B).<\/span><\/p>\n

In VanDerStok, <\/em>a locus of disagreement is part (A) of the GCA definition, which defines firearm <\/em>as \u201cany weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.\u201d79<\/a><\/sup>18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(3)(A).<\/span> The Respondents in the case sometimes suggest that the only \u201cactual\u201d firearms are completed ones, and that the statute covers only such firearms: \u201cIt covers only an actual<\/strong> firearm\u2026it does not cover mere parts or kits of parts that might be manufactured into one.\u201d80<\/a><\/sup>Brief of Respondents Defense Distributed, Polymer80, Inc., Not an L.L.C. (Doing Business as JSD Supply), and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 10, Garland v. VanDerStok, No. 23-852 (filed Mar. 8, 2024).<\/span><\/p>\n

The plain language of (A) undermines this analysis. (A) communicates three relevant categories of firearms<\/em>, comprising a list of items interpreted disjunctively:<\/p>\n

(1) \u201cany weapon\u2026which will\u2026expel a projectile by the action of an explosive\u201d;<\/p>\n

(2) \u201cany weapon\u2026which\u2026is designed to\u2026expel a projectile by the action of an explosive\u201d; or<\/p>\n

(3) \u201cany weapon\u2026which\u2026may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.\u201d81<\/a><\/sup>18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(3)(A).<\/span><\/p>\n

To read (A) to include completed, assembled, currently functional firearms gives effect to the first disjunct (1). But to read (A) to include only<\/em> such entities renders (2) and (3) superfluous, and \u201ccourts should avoid treating any statutory language as surplusage.\u201d82<\/a><\/sup>Whole Woman\u2019s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 47 n.4 (2021) (citing Kallinen v. City of Houston, 462 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tex. 2015)).<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, the statutory context of (A) emphasizes that firearm<\/em> extends to weapons beyond fully completed, functional firearms. The text clearly communicates that firearm<\/em> includes some weapons beyond those that \u201cwill . . . expel\u201d a projectile by the action of an explosive; it also includes (2) weapons designed to<\/strong> or that (3) may readily be converted<\/strong> to do so.83<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(3)(A).<\/span><\/p>\n

Though we expect the statutory definition of firearm <\/em>to take precedence over its ordinary meaning in VanDerStok<\/em> (if the two diverge), the latter notion nevertheless features prominently in that case: does (A) embellish the ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em>, or does it explicate an interpretation consistent with that term\u2019s ordinary meaning? We turn to that question below.<\/p>\n

2. A Linguistic Perspective on the Statutory Definition<\/em><\/p>\n

The litigants in VanDerStok <\/em>no doubt recognize the primacy of the statutory definition of firearm<\/em> for the purposes of the GCA (and that Act\u2019s implementation by the ATF). However, VanDerStok claims that (A) is \u201can expansion of the ordinary usage\u201d of firearm <\/em>because it covers weapons \u201cthat could readily be converted\u201d to expel projectiles.84<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> Respondents VanDerStok, Andren, Tactical Machining, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., and Polymer80, Inc.\u2019s Response in Opposition to Stay at 13, Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 1390 (2023) (No. 23A82), 2023 WL 5046734.<\/span> The Government disagrees, claiming that (A) explicates the term\u2019s ordinary meaning rather than embellishing it (it is an \u201c\u2018explicit\u2019\u201d definition of the ordinary meaning).85<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> Brief for the Petitioners at 9, 19, Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 1390 (2024) (No. 23-852), 2024 WL 3344939.<\/span><\/p>\n

This dispute over ordinary meaning is consequential. First, as discussed in Part IV, the Government\u2019s \u2018ordinary meaning\u2019 analysis of firearm <\/em>is important for its analysis of the phrase frame or receiver <\/em>as it appears in section 921(a)(3)(A) [hereinafter \u201c(B)\u201d]. Our analysis of firearm<\/em>\u2019s ordinary meaning will similarly inform our own analysis of frame or receiver<\/em>. Another reason to consider this question is that while statutory definitions take priority by default, \u201c[s]ometimes a definition itself contains a term that is not clear.\u201d86<\/a><\/sup>SCALIA & GARNER<\/span>, supra <\/em>note 40, at 228.<\/span> In such cases, \u201cthe usual criteria of interpretation . . . are brought to bear,\u201d87<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em><\/span> and \u201c[f]ar and away the most important of those is the contextual factor of the word actually being defined.\u201d88<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em><\/span> In other words, judges should look to a term\u2019s ordinary meaning and surrounding context when specialized statutory definitions are unclear. More broadly, \u201cthe meaning of the definition is almost always closely related to the ordinary meaning of the word being defined.\u201d89<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

As far as (A) is concerned, there is no conflict between the ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em> and its statutory definition. Rather, (A) contains ample linguistic context to specify the noun\u2019s ordinary meaning. (A) identifies the relevant facets of meaning for the purposes of interpretation: there is a clear and specific elaboration that firearm<\/em>\u2019s Design facet (\u201cdesigned to\u201d) and Potential facet (\u201cmay readily be converted to\u201d) are essential.90<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(3)(A).<\/span><\/p>\n

The Potential facet encodes a notion of potential capability that is inherently vague and context dependent. (A) faithfully reflects this inherently vague dimension of artifact noun meaning: the definition explicitly identifies objects that \u201cmay readily be converted<\/strong> to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.\u201d91<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> (emphasis added).<\/span> With \u201cconverted,\u201d we see Congress contemplating scenarios in which the user must perform a non-trivial action to get the object to perform its intended function, \u201cto expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.\u201d92<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em><\/span> Nevertheless, the line between readily converted<\/strong> and its negation is inherently fuzzy. In this regard, the definition takes pains not to narrow the reach of the term firearm<\/em> relative to its ordinary meaning. That is, the definition explicates a property of artifact noun interpretation that constitutes part of the implicit linguistic knowledge of competent ordinary speakers, who recognize that an object can be called a firearm even when it does not presently realize its intended function.<\/p>\n

Finally, (A) covers \u201cany weapon\u201d that exhibits the design and potential characteristics.93<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> (emphasis added).<\/span> Thus, to determine whether (A) is faithful to the ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em>, we must understand the contribution of mentioning \u201cweapon\u201d in the definition.94<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em><\/span> Because weapon<\/em>, an artifact noun, is not defined elsewhere in the statute, we consider its ordinary meaning.<\/p>\n

The relationship between firearm<\/em> and weapon<\/em> is well-characterized in both linguistic and psychological research, which draws a distinction between \u2018basic-level\u2019 categories, the most typical names we assign to everyday things (e.g., those categories denoted by tree<\/em>, book<\/em>, table<\/em>), and superordinate-level categories, which reside at a higher level of abstraction (e.g., organism <\/em>and furniture<\/em>). Superordinate terms group together categories denoted by basic-level terms: for example, the superordinate category mammal <\/em>groups together the categories denoted by dog <\/em>and cat<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Firearm<\/em> and weapon<\/em> stand in exactly this basic-superordinate relationship. (A) grounds the definition of firearm <\/em>in its superordinate category, just as the category denoted by firearm<\/em> constitutes part of the category denoted by weapon<\/em> as a matter of ordinary linguistic meaning.<\/p>\n

Like basic-level artifact nouns, superordinates tend to identify entities that have common potential-related properties; however, there may be few (if any) common perceptual attributes that characterize a superordinate category.95<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g<\/em>., Eleanor Rosch, Carolyn B Mervis, Wayne D Gray, David M Johnson & Penny Boyes-Braem, Basic Objects in Natural Categories<\/em>, 8 COG. PSYCH.<\/span> 382 (1976); Barbara Tversky & Kathleen Hemenway, Objects, Parts, and Categories<\/em>, 113 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN.<\/span> 169 (1984).<\/span> For example, the superordinate noun vehicle<\/em> identifies entities of many shapes, sizes, and descriptions; what makes something a vehicle<\/em> is the potential to transport people or things.<\/p>\n

As a matter of ordinary meaning, weapon<\/em> contemplates entities with common functional potential. Moreover, like firearm<\/em>, weapon<\/em> may denote entities that are far from operable. Thus, weapon<\/em> harmonizes with the rest of (A), which explicitly emphasizes the role of potential while downplaying the relevance of physical characteristics.<\/p>\n

In sum, there are multiple sources of linguistic context within (A) that point to the relevance of the Design and Potential facets of firearm <\/em>while de-emphasizing considerations of physical form and\/or constitution. This interpretation is routinely available for artifact nouns, and the Government offers compelling evidence that supports this generalization regarding entities that require further assembly to become functional: for example, \u201c[e]very speaker of English would recognize that a tax on sales of \u2018bookshelves\u2019 applies to IKEA when it sells boxes of parts and the tools and instructions for assembling them into bookshelves.\u201d96<\/a><\/sup>Application for a Stay of the Judgment Entered by the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N.D. of Tex. at 4, Garland v. VanDerStok, No. 23A82 (filed Jul. 27, 2023).<\/span> The same is true of entities that require finishing, with additional tools sold separately, to become functional. For example, Ticonderoga\u2019s \u201cClassic Yellow Wood-Cased Pencils\u201d are sold unsharpened.97<\/a><\/sup>Classic Yellow Wood-Cased Pencils<\/em>, DIXON TICONDEROGA<\/span>, https:\/\/weareticonderoga.com\/shop\/products\/pencils\/yellow-wood-cased-pencils\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/PWY3-GFUS] (last visited Mar. 2, 2025).<\/span> They can only actually function (write) after the purchase of a sharpener and an additional finishing step: sharpening the pencil. Nevertheless, buyers and sellers recognize that these are clearly pencils. Similarly, customizable belts and watches are sold without holes. Users must hole punch the belts and watches with additional tools to complete them. Nevertheless, the objects as sold are belts and watches.<\/p>\n

Thus, from a linguistic perspective, Congress\u2019s definition of firearm<\/em> in (A) is best understood not as an instruction to disregard or embellish the noun\u2019s ordinary meaning but as an attempt to provide sufficient context to resolve an indeterminacy that is inherent to its ordinary meaning. Because the resolution depends on context, we expect that some contexts may suggest a different resolution. For example, when we call a child\u2019s toy gun his gun<\/em>, the relevant facets are the Formal and Constitutive facets: the object has certain physical properties that make it a suitable object for make-believe play. (A) is not such a context; the language of the definition points to an interpretation that centers the object\u2019s functional capabilities and the circumstances of its creation.<\/p>\n

Notably, the Government and Respondents in VanDerStok<\/em> appear to dispute whether the ATF\u2019s interpretation of the GCA departs from the ordinary meaning of \u2018firearm\u2019:<\/p>\n

[A] covered firearm parts kit qualifies as a firearm as a matter of ordinary usage <\/strong>. . . An ordinary speaker of English<\/strong> would recognize that a company in the business of selling kits that can be assembled into firearms in minutes\u2014and that are designed, marketed, and used for that express purpose\u2014is in the business of selling firearms.98<\/a><\/sup>Application for a Stay of the Judgment Entered by the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N.D. of Tex. at 17\u201318, Garland v. VanDerStok, No. 23A82 (filed Jul. 27, 2023) (emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n

The district court correctly held that [the ATF] . . . extend[s] the definitions of \u201cfirearm\u201d and \u201cframe or receiver\u201d in federal law beyond any reasonable understanding of those terms<\/strong>.99<\/a><\/sup>Response in Opposition to Stay for VanDerStok et al. at 13, Garland v. VanDerStok, No. 23A82 (filed Aug. 2, 2023) (emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n

As mentioned above, we expect the statutory definition of firearm <\/em>to be privileged over considerations of \u2018ordinary usage\u2019 or \u2018reasonable,\u2019 \u2018commonsense\u2019 understanding\u2014insofar as the statutory definition diverges from ordinary meaning. Nevertheless, the above passages suggest that some parties believe that the Court\u2019s interpretation of the statutory definition should also cohere with ordinary meaning and \u2018commonsense\u2019 linguistic intuition. The analysis presented in this section helps clarify this issue: to the extent that the ATF\u2019s regulatory authority over firearm parts kits is grounded in (A), its authority is also grounded in the ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em>, since (A)\u2019s definition is fundamentally underscoring the ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em> in context. In the next section, we present empirical linguistic data that speaks in favor of the ATF\u2019s interpretation of (A) and provides further evidence that this interpretation coheres with ordinary meaning considerations.<\/p>\n

V. Empirical Data on the Meaning of \u201cFirearm\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

In this Part, we supplement Part IV\u2019s theoretical linguistic analysis with two sources of empirical evidence: naturally occurring linguistic data, which demonstrates that ordinary speakers can felicitously refer to a parts kit as a firearm<\/em>, weapon<\/em>, gun<\/em>, rifle<\/em>, and\/or assault rifle (AR)<\/em>, and experimental survey data, which demonstrates that ordinary speakers interpret firearm <\/em>to include parts kits in the context of definitions akin to (A).<\/p>\n

A. New Data on Ordinary Language Use<\/em><\/p>\n

In assessing whether firearm parts kits fall within the ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em> and weapon<\/em>, actual linguistic usage is instructive. The Court regularly considers hypothetical linguistic examples to assess the ordinary meaning of statutes, particularly in criminal contexts.100<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 138\u201341 (2024); Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 357 (2016).<\/span> Members of the Court have also recommended considering patterns of actual language use through corpus linguistics.101<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, <\/em>592 U.S. 395, 411\u201312 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring). <\/span><\/p>\n

Ordinary usage shows that firearm parts kits fall within the ordinary meaning of both firearm<\/em> and weapon<\/em> in many contexts\u2014especially contexts similar to \u00a7 921. Below, we present several examples from online product advertisements and reviews, with the relevant term bolded for emphasis. The Appendix has an extensive set of examples.<\/p>\n

First, grammatical evidence links the label \u201cfirearm\u201d to a parts kit:<\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cIntroducing the AR-40 4.5″ MOD1 Billet Upper Receiver Pistol Build Kit, a powerful and compact firearm<\/strong> designed to deliver outstanding performance in the dynamic world of pistol builds.\u201d102<\/a><\/sup> AR-40 4.5\u201d Billet MOD1 Upper Receiver Pistol Build Kit<\/em>, A1ARMORY<\/span>, https:\/\/a1armory.com\/ar-40-4-5-billet-mod1-upper-receiver-pistol-build-kit\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/5KXL-4426] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025) (emphasis added). <\/span><\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cTiger Rock AR-15 Enhanced Flat Dark Earth Rifle Kit with a 10\u201d Handguard, a precision-engineered firearm<\/strong> designed for optimal performance and durability.\u201d103<\/a><\/sup> Tiger Rock AR-15 Flat Dark Earth Enhanced Rifle Kit w 10\u201d Handguard,<\/em> A1ARMORY<\/span>, https:\/\/a1armory.com\/tiger-rock-ar-15-flat-dark-earth-enhanced-rifle-kit-w-10-handguard\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/6TNY-6AZG] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025) (emphasis added). <\/span><\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cTiger Rock AR-15 Enhanced Robins Egg Blue Pistol Kit – a compact and powerful firearm<\/strong> designed for performance and style.\u201d104<\/a><\/sup>Tiger Rock AR-15 Robins Egg Blue 7\u201d Pistol Build Kit<\/em>, A1ARMORY<\/span>, https:\/\/a1armory.com\/tiger-rock-ar-15-robins-egg-blue-7-pistol-build-kit\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/9GD9-Q8C5] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025) (emphasis added). <\/span><\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cDiscover the iconic 16\u201d Burnt Bronze Rifle Kit 5.56 from House Keymod, a stylish and versatile firearm<\/strong> made in the USA.\u201d105<\/a><\/sup>16\u201d Burnt Bronze Rifle Kit 5.56 with 12\u201d House Keymod<\/em>, DAYTONA TACTICAL<\/span>, https:\/\/daytonatactical.com\/products\/16-burnt-bronze-rifle-kit-5-56-with-12-house-keymod\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/Q2Z5-SW3U] (last visited Mar. 2, 2025) (emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cInvest in excellence with the Tiger Rock AR-15 Burnt Bronze 5\u201d Complete Pistol Kit \u2013 a versatile, reliable, and aesthetically pleasing firearm<\/strong> that stands out in both performance and style.\u201d106<\/a><\/sup>Tiger Rock AR-15 Burnt Bronze 5\u201d Complete Pistol Kit<\/em>, A1ARMORY<\/span>, https:\/\/a1armory.com\/tiger-rock-ar-15-burnt-bronze-5-complete-pistol-kit\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/ETL8-JHYZ] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025) (emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n

The construction used above (\u201cthe\u2026Kit, a powerful and compact firearm\u201d),107<\/a><\/sup>A1ARMORY<\/span>, supra<\/em> note 102.<\/span> with a comma or hyphen separating the full product name and a descriptive phrase, conveys that the speaker believes that the kit is<\/strong> a firearm. Specifically, this is an illustration of an \u201cascriptive [noun phrase] supplement[].\u201d108<\/a><\/sup> See<\/em> RODNEY HUDDLESTON & GEOFFREY K. PULLUM, THE CAMBRIDGE GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE<\/span> 1356\u201357 (2002).<\/span> For example, the first part of the sentence \u201cKim Jones, a quite outstanding student, won a scholarship to MIT,\u201d is equivalent in meaning to \u201cKim Jones is a quite outstanding student.\u201d109<\/a><\/sup> See id.<\/em> at 1357.<\/span><\/p>\n

Second, many advertisements name the kit and then immediately refer to a \u201cweapon\u201d or \u201crifle.\u201d For example:<\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cLooking for a little more firepower in your life? Say hello to the 16\u201d Flat Dark Earth Rifle Kit 5.56 with 12\u201d Keymod. This powerful rifle<\/strong> comes equipped with an M4 Feed Ramp, a 1\u00d77 barrel twist, and a 1\/2\u00d728 thread, making it perfect for taking down even the most tough targets.\u201d110<\/a><\/sup>16\u201d Flat Dark Earth Rifle Kit 5.56 with 12\u2019 Keymod with Lower<\/em>, DAYTONA TACTICAL<\/span>, https:\/\/daytonatactical.com\/products\/flat-dark-earth-fde-rifle-kit-magpul-lower-furniture-upper-assembled-with-fde-80-lower\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/94J4-RXTZ] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025) (emphasis added). <\/span><\/p>\n

Others refer to parts kits themselves as weapons:<\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cWhen you need the best AR-15 rifle available, look no further than this Blue Titanium 16\u201d Rifle Kit 5.56 12\u201d House M-LOK. Designed and manufactured with an obsessive attention to detail, this rugged and dependable weapon<\/strong> is perfect for the professional gun owner or enthusiast.\u201d111<\/a><\/sup>Brief for Professors and Scholars of Linguistics and Law as Amici Curae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 1390 (2024) (No. 23-852) (emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cOutstanding! A great value and a great weapon<\/strong>! Assembles pretty easy, I would recommend it for anyone who is interested in making their first build.\u201d112<\/a><\/sup>PSA AR-15 RIFLE KIT 5.56 16\u201d NITRIDE 1:7 MID-LGTH 13.5\u201d LTWT M-LOK MOE W\/ MBUS SIGHTS<\/em>, PALMETTO STATE ARMORY<\/span>, https:\/\/palmettostatearmory.com\/psa-16-5-56-nato-1-7-mid-length-nitride-13-5-lightweight-m-lok-moe-ept-rifle-kit-516446780.html [https:\/\/perma.cc\/7BJU-CFV3] (last visited Mar. 9, 2025) (emphasis added). <\/span><\/p>\n

Customer reviews also tightly tether references to the unassembled firearm parts kits and a \u201cgun\u201d or \u201crifle.\u201d113<\/a><\/sup> If speakers made a sharp categorization distinction between kits and assembled firearms, they might have been expected to signal the difference more explicitly: instead of \u201cGreat inexpensive rifle,\u201d perhaps, \u201cThis inexpensive kit builds a great rifle\u201d\u2014but of course, this sounds unnecessarily explicit when one understands what the kit is.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cSince I bought this kit I have bought several more AR\u2019s. This one by far is still my go to range rifle<\/strong> as it nails at 200 yards.\u201d114<\/a><\/sup> PSA AR-15 Rifle Kit 5.56 16\u201d Nitride 1:7 MID-LGTH 13.5\u201d LTWT M-LOK MOE W\/ MBUS Sights<\/em>, PALMETTO STATE ARMORY<\/span>, https:\/\/palmettostatearmory.com\/psa-16-5-56-nato-1-7-mid-length-nitride-13-5-lightweight-m-lok-moe-ept-rifle-kit-516446780.html [https:\/\/perma.cc\/GP35-M7AS] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025) (emphasis added). <\/span><\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cThe kit came in as advertised. Great inexpensive rifle<\/strong>.\u201d115<\/a><\/sup> AR-15 Rifle Kit 15\u201d M-Lok Barreled Upper with NIB BCG<\/em>, DAYTONA TACTICAL<\/span>, https:\/\/daytonatactical.com\/products\/ar-15-rifle-kit-15-m-lok-barreled-upper-with-nib-bcg\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/G6A7-MFNM] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025) (emphasis added). <\/span><\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cPurchased this rifle<\/strong>. The assembly was a learning experience since this was my first build.\u201d116<\/a><\/sup> AR-15 5.56\/.223 16\u201d M4 Tactical Rifle Kit with 15\u201d MLOK Super Slim Handguard \u2013 MIL-SPEC, USA Made<\/em>, MORIARTI ARMAMENTS<\/span>, https:\/\/moriartiarmaments.com\/ar-15-6.5-grendel\/5.56-nato-.223-rem\/ar-15-5.56.223-16-m4-tactical-rifle-kit-with-15-mlok-super-slim-handguard-rk15-fk15-nl?sort=rating&order=DESC [https:\/\/perma.cc\/7HAH-UQPS] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025) (emphasis added). <\/span><\/p>\n

The purchased entity is an uncompleted firearm kit, not a completed firearm\u2014so it cannot be the case that \u201crifle\u201d in these sentences refers only<\/strong> to completed firearms. Rather, the writers\u2019 use of the demonstrative word \u201cthis\u201d to modify \u201crifle,\u201d near references to the kit, shows that the customers refer to both the kit and the firearm assembled from the kit as one holistic product.117<\/a><\/sup>Brief for Professors and Scholars of Linguistics and Law as Amici Curae in Support of Petitioners at 16 n.19, Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 1390 (2024) (No. 23-852) (\u201cRespondent VanDerStok (Opp. 24) attempts to analogize a weapon parts kit to a \u201cpinewood derby car kit that comes with wheels, nails to affix them, and a block of wood that must be carved and sanded before it becomes a car.\u201d VanDerStok notes, \u201cNo one would call such a kit a car.\u201d Id.<\/em> Yet, some do. See, e.g.<\/em>, AMAZON<\/span>, https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Woodland-Scenics-Pine-Derby-Basic\/product-reviews\/B000BR4VBG\/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_viewopt_kywd (stating \u201c[t]his car is easy to work with and great for Scouts. The kids can help when putting the car together\u201d). This usage is not surprising, as these pinewood derby kits are designed to be complete cars. If the block of wood were sold separately (not as part of a kit designed to become a car), one would not expect customers to describe that wood block as a car. But the Court does not need to decide the status of pinewood derby cars. With respect to weapon parts kits, the linguistic usage data is clear: Americans regularly treat the weapon parts kit and the completed firearm as the same thing, and the Court should assume Congress did as well. See<\/em> Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders<\/em>, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.<\/span> 2193, 2209 (2017) (arguing that \u201c[i]f, moreover, a legislative command is directed to the citizenry, it is both sensible and fair for the courts to interpret the command as its recipients would\u201d) (internal citations cleaned up)).<\/span><\/p>\n

The preceding examples offer ample evidence that sellers and consumers readily deploy firearm<\/em> and similar nouns to refer to a product over its lifespan, or to the product that is purchased (as a kit). These examples demonstrate that ordinary speakers do not confine firearm<\/em> to just completed weapons or those extremely close to operability as a matter of ordinary meaning.<\/p>\n

B. New Data from a Survey Experiment<\/em><\/p>\n

Supreme Court justices have also recognized the usefulness of survey data to textualist analysis.118<\/a><\/sup>Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 163 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (referring to a survey of ordinary Americans in support of an interpretation). This is the first, and to our knowledge only, reference to a survey in statutory interpretation, although other Justices have indicated interest. For example, in the oral argument of Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, Chief Justice Roberts asked whether a survey of ordinary Americans might prove instructive for judges seeking the statute\u2019s ordinary meaning. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, 592 U.S. 395 (2021) (No. 19-511). <\/span> Survey data are a useful complement to traditional textualist sources of linguistic evidence, especially insofar as the Court seeks to understand how \u201cthe ordinary English speaker . . . would understand the words of the statute\u201d or how the \u201creasonable person\u201d uses words. In an experiment, we observe that ordinary speakers readily construe firearm<\/em> to include parts kits. This observed decision by consensus among ordinary speakers is particularly strong in contexts akin to (A), which clearly centers firearm<\/em>\u2019s design and potential facets.<\/p>\n

1. Methods <\/em><\/p>\n

Participants: We recruited 1250 participants from Prolific, a widely used online crowdsourcing platform. We recruited a U.S.-based sample, with a minimum 99% approval rating, 50% men and 50% women, and 50% Republican\u2013identified, 50% Democrat\u2013identified, <1% Independent, Other or No Preference. We preregistered three comprehension check questions and one CAPTCHA (to screen out bots). There were 988 participants who completed all checks correctly and were included in the analysis (50% male, 49% female, 1% non-binary; 49% Republican, 47% Democrat, 3% Independent, <1% Other or No Preference). Participants were paid $1.00, and median completion time was 3 minutes and 53 seconds, for a median compensation rate of $15.44\/hour.119<\/a><\/sup>Methods, exclusions, and analyses for this study were pre-registered through the Open Science Foundation. Artifact Nouns<\/em>, OPEN SCIENCE FOUNDATION<\/span>, https:\/\/osf.io\/8m5vh\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/VRH4-XY6W] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025). Data and code are available at the same link.<\/span><\/p>\n

Materials:<\/em> Experiment trials are schematized in Figure 1. Participants were asked to read a short passage which described a disagreement between two parties. The locus of the disagreement was the interpretation of some artifact noun, which was defined within the context of a law (in \u201clegal\u201d-domain trials) or a company rule (in \u201cordinary\u201d-domain trials).<\/p>\n

In all trials, the definition specified that members of the relevant nominal category are also members of a corresponding superordinate category. (E.g., for X to meet the definition of firearm<\/em>, X must also be a weapon<\/em>). However, these definitions were further elaborated in ways that varied across experimental conditions. In trials featuring a \u201crestricted\u201d definition, the law\/rule explicitly contemplated entities with the immediate potential to exhibit a canonical function. In trials featuring a \u201cfull\u201d definition, the law\/rule additionally contemplated the Design and Potential of such entities. These definitions were designed to closely track the statutory definition of firearm <\/em>in (A), modulo relevant manipulations. There were 12 trial types total: 3 Noun conditions [firearm, table, or bicycle] \u00d7 2 Domain conditions [legal or ordinary] \u00d7 2 Definition conditions [restricted or full].<\/p>\n

Participants were then asked to provide their judgment as to the permissibility of an [AN] parts kit, where [AN] was the artifact noun defined in the law\/rule. Participants were told that these kits can be purchased online, that creating a functional [AN] requires combining the parts, and that most people could combine the parts in one or two hours with the right tools.120<\/a><\/sup>The time to convert a weapon varies from kit to kit\u2014as with furniture or bicycles\u2014but the process generally does not take very long. Companies market the ease and speed with which a functional firearm can be assembled, many people report less than an hour of work, and even \u201cun-handy\u201d first-time gun purchasers can assemble them in the equivalent of a day\u2019s work. For most gun kits, the indexes and tabs have been made, the kit can be assembled with common hand tools (or tools that are included in the kit), and instructions are either included or easy to find online. See<\/em> Brief for the Petitioners at 6, VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F. 4th. 179, 188 (5th. Cir. 2023 (No. 23-852). For comparison, courts have found that a gun restoration process that can be completed in six hours or less falls within the definition of \u201creadily restored.\u201d United States v. TRW Rifle 7.62\u00d751mm Caliber, One Model 14 Serial 593006, 447 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. One TRW, Model M14, 7.62 Caliber Rifle, 441 F.3d 416, 422\u201324 (6th Cir. 2006).<\/span> Participants provided a binary \u201cYes\u201d\/ \u201cNo\u201d judgment to the following question: \u201cIn your view, does the rule\u2019s definition of \u201c[AN]\u201d include [AN] parts kits?\u201d<\/p>\n

Procedure:<\/em> Each participant completed one trial of a randomly assigned type. Before the trial, participants completed two tasks which served as exclusion criteria: an attention task, designed to ensure that participants were reading experiment instructions in full, and a simple reasoning problem task. After the trial, participants completed a comprehension task, in which they were asked to recall how the artifact noun of interest was defined in the experimental trial. The two selection options corresponded to the artifact noun\u2019s two associated Definition conditions. This task served as a third exclusion criterion. Data from participants who met at least one criterion were excluded from analysis.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
Figure 1a<\/strong>. Experimental materials, legal condition<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
Figure 1b<\/strong>. Experimental materials, ordinary condition<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
Figure 2<\/strong>. Proportions of \u2018yes\u2019 response in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% binomial confidence intervals (as computed with the Hmisc function in R).<\/p>\n

2. Results <\/em><\/p>\n

In total, 262 participants (\u224821%) met at least one exclusion criterion or exited the study early, leaving data from 988 participants for analysis.121<\/a><\/sup>Our data includes responses from nine participants who, in a debrief survey, indicated \u201cI am not fluent in English but am fluent in another language or languages.\u201d Excluding such participants from analysis does not qualitatively change any of the findings reported below.<\/span> Figure 2 visualizes participant responses as a function of Definition, faceted by Noun. A majority of participants (69%; 95% CI = [63%, 74%]) considered firearm parts kits to be firearms. This trend held in both the legal context (64%; 95% CI = [56%, 71%]) and the ordinary context (74%; 95% CI = [67%, 80%]), regardless of whether firearm<\/em> received a restricted definition (65%; 95% CI = [58%, 72%]) or full definition (73%; 95% CI = [65%, 79%]).<\/p>\n

To investigate whether and how participant responses varied as a function of Noun (reference level firearm<\/em>), Domain (reference level \u201clegal\u201d), and Definition (reference level \u201crestricted\u201d), we conducted a binary logistic regression predicting log odds of \u201cYes\u201d response from fixed effects of these three variables and all possible interactions. None of the interaction terms were significant predictors of the outcome variable, so we dropped these terms from the model and conducted a second regression with only the additive fixed effects of the three variables. Relative to firearm <\/em>trials, the likelihood of \u201cYes\u201d response was significantly lower on bicycle <\/em>trials (\u03b2 = -0.7073, SE = 0.1637, z = -4.319, p<\/em> = 1.56e-05) but not on table <\/em>trials (\u03b2 = -0.1626, SE = 0.1671, z = -0.973, p<\/em> = 0.330611). Moreover, we found no evidence of an effect of Domain (\u03b2 = 0.1096, SE = 0.1338, z = 0.819, p<\/em> = 0.412656); i.e., there was no evidence that the likelihood of \u201cYes\u201d response was either higher or lower in the \u201clegal\u201d condition as compared to the \u201cordinary\u201d condition. However, there was evidence of significant positive effect of Definition (\u03b2 = 0.5136, SE 0.1359, z = 3.780, p <\/em>= 0.000157); i.e., there was evidence that the likelihood of \u201cYes\u201d response was higher when participants were provided with a \u2018full\u2019 definition of the relevant noun.<\/p>\n

3. Discussion<\/em><\/p>\n

Across multiple tested contexts, a majority of ordinary Americans evaluated firearm parts kits as members of the category denoted by firearm<\/em>. Note that this occurred without<\/strong> any further language emphasizing the relevance of design or potential function, such as the language of (A) (\u201cdesigned to\u201d and \u201cmay readily be converted to\u201d). We found that when such language was provided, an even greater proportion of participants considered firearm parts kits to be firearms. That is, ordinary readers recognize that a clear statement including weapons that are \u201cdesigned to\u201d or \u201cmay readily be converted to\u201d function as a firearm indicates that parts kits are included.<\/p>\n

This result is fully compatible with the theoretical framework presented in Part IV. Without definitional language that explicitly identifies the relevant facets of artifact noun meaning, ordinary speakers attempt to infer those relevant facets under considerable uncertainty. We predict this uncertainty to be reflected as population-level variation in interpretive judgments, which is what we observe in the \u201crestricted\u201d condition of the experiment. When the context includes language which explicitly identifies the Design and Potential facets of firearm<\/em>, the uncertainty is resolved.122<\/a><\/sup>In a second study, we investigated the relative contribution of Design language and Potential language when it comes to the availability of this more inclusive interpretation. The results of that study are available in the OSF repository. Artifact Nouns<\/em>, OPEN SCIENCE FOUNDATION<\/span>, https:\/\/osf.io\/8m5vh\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/5YBC-25V8] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025). <\/span> As predicted, we see greater levels of population-level agreement in the expected direction, with a greater proportion of speakers construing firearm <\/em>to include parts kits.<\/p>\n

These results also carry methodological implications. Not all artifact nouns (or artifact noun parts kits) were treated equally: most participants reported that the term firearm <\/em>includes firearm parts kits, but a significantly smaller proportion of participants judged bicycle<\/em> to include bicycle parts kits. In VanDerStok, <\/em>the Government, Respondents, and lower courts have all attempted to elucidate the meaning of firearm <\/em>and firearm parts kit <\/em>by considering \u2018analogous\u2019 linguistic expressions. (Recall, e.g., the Government\u2019s \u201cIKEA bookshelf\u201d hypothetical.)123<\/a><\/sup>Brief for the Petitioners at 18, VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F.4th 179, 188 (5th. Cir. 2023) (No. 23-852).<\/span> Our results suggest that there are limits to this approach: it may obscure substantial divergences in how ordinary Americans would interpret the words or phrases under comparison. This cautionary note applies even when making analogies between highly related linguistic expressions. (For example, bicycle <\/em>and firearm <\/em>are both alike in that they are both basic-level artifact terms.)<\/p>\n

VI. The Meaning of \u201cFrame\u201d and \u201cReceiver\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Beyond the interpretation of firearm<\/em>, VanDerStok <\/em>implicates the interpretation of frame or receiver<\/em> as that phrase appears in (B), the second disjunct of the GCA\u2019s statutory definition of firearm<\/em>. The Government contends that (B) includes frame or receiver<\/em> parts kits that are designed to or may readily be converted to function as a frame or receiver<\/em>. The respondents claim that \u201c[i]f an item potentially could be made into a frame or receiver but is not a[n assembled] frame or receiver that is insufficient under the Act\u2019s plain text.\u201d124<\/a><\/sup>Respondents VanDerStok et al.\u2019s Response in Opposition to Stay at 11, Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 44 (2023) (No. 23A82).<\/span> That is, the respondents contend that (B) extends only to fully-assembled, fully-functional frames and receivers.<\/p>\n

A. Linguistic Theory<\/em><\/p>\n

As a reminder, recall the language of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(3):<\/p>\n

The term \u201cfirearm\u201d means<\/p>\n

(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive;<\/p>\n

(B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon;<\/p>\n

Like firearm<\/em>, both frame <\/em>and receiver <\/em>are artifact nouns whose linguistic meanings are made more precise by context. We argued that (A) underscores that the contextual meaning of firearm <\/em>includes the ATF-identified gun parts kits, by foregrounding the Potential (\u201cexpel projectiles . . .\u201d) and Design (\u201cdesigned\u201d) facets of the noun\u2019s ordinary linguistic meaning and backgrounding the Formal and Constitutive facets (no mention of size, shape, trigger, etc.). Notably, however, Congress does not similarly underscore the meaning of frame or receiver <\/em>in (B) with similar language (e.g., \u201cany object which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to function as a firearm frame or receiver\u201d).<\/p>\n

The Government argues that the inclusion of (A)\u2019s \u201cdesigned\u201d and \u201creadily be converted\u201d language merely serves to ground the statutory definition of firearm <\/em>in a familiar, ordinary sense of that term;125<\/a><\/sup>\u201cLike the district court, respondents emphasize . . . that Congress used the phrase \u2018designed to or may readily be converted to\u2019 in Section 921(a)(3)(A) but did not include a similar phrase in Section 921(a)(3)(B) . . . [T]here is an obvious explanation for that difference: If Congress had limited the express definition of \u2018firearm\u2019 in Section 921(a)(3)(A) to weapons that \u2018will expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,\u2019 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added), it would have departed from ordinary meaning by including only functional firearms.\u201d Reply in Support of Application for a Stay at 7\u20138, Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 44 (2023) (No. 23A82).<\/span> and in (B), frame or receiver<\/em> is similarly interpreted according to its ordinary meaning, which for the Government \u201cinclude[s] a partially completed frame or receiver that can readily be made functional.\u201d126<\/a><\/sup>Application for a Stay of the Judgment Entered by the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N.D. of Tex. at 17\u201318, Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 44 (2023) (No. 23A82).<\/span><\/p>\n

In contrast, the lower courts and respondents take the omission of such language in (B) to be deliberate and meaningful, and they conclude on that basis that frame or receiver <\/em>extends only to fully assembled and functional frames and receivers. However, proper understanding of artifact nouns reveals that this conclusion does not follow. (B) not only omits the \u201cdesigned\u201d and \u201creadily be converted\u201d language found in (A) but also omits language analogous to (A)\u2019s \u201cwill <\/em>. . . expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.\u201d (B) could have been written to explicitly identify (only) fully assembled, fully functional frames or receivers, e.g., \u2018a frame that will<\/em> hold the essential mechanism\u2019 (\u201cwill\u201d to express purpose-readiness) of \u2018any such weapon\u2019 defined in (A). But (B)\u2019s language varies from (A)\u2019s in this respect. As we argue below, we do not think these strong inferences should be drawn from the \u201cvariation\u201d between (A) and (B). But even for those who propose that this variation is meaningful, it does not follow that the variation cuts in one direction. (B) has neither the explicit mirroring language that would favor the government (\u201cany object which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to function as a firearm frame or receiver\u201d) nor the explicit mirroring language that would favor the respondents (\u201cany object which will function as a firearm frame or receiver\u201d).<\/p>\n

1. The Context of Section 921(a)(3)(B) <\/em><\/p>\n

How, then, does context contribute to the meaning of frame or receiver<\/em>? To answer this question, we first note that language users routinely leverage contextual information to inform a word\u2019s contextual meaning. Recall from Section IV.A that verb + artifact noun combinations may leave unspecified the nature of the activity. (2) shows that when multiple under-specifications are present, there is pressure to specify them similarly:<\/p>\n

(2) Last week, Noel started a novel, and Liz finished a nonfiction book.<\/p>\n

In (2), the nouns novel <\/em>and nonfiction book<\/em> have a possible \u2018Potential\u2019\u2013oriented interpretation: Noel and Liz are reading (realizing the object\u2019s intended function). Both nouns also have a possible \u2018Design\u2019 interpretation: Noel and Liz are writing (creating) the object. Where available, interpreters tend to apply contextual information broadly to specify nouns consistently. This is demonstrated by (3) and (4), in which the first sentence provides a context clue for how to resolve the indeterminacy in (start a) novel. <\/em>Because of the strong default expectation of similar specification, this context clue may also serve to determine an interpretation of (finished a) nonfiction book<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Noel is a prolific writer. Last week, he started a new novel. A few days later, his friend Liz finished a nonfiction book.<\/p>\n

Noel is an avid reader. Last week, he started a new novel. A few days later, his friend Liz finished a nonfiction book.<\/p>\n

The context of (3) clarifies that Liz is writing, and the context of (4) clarifies that Liz is reading. The same kind of contextual inferences clarify section 921(a)(3). In (A), Congress furnishes the reader with the context sufficient to identify the relevant facet of firearm<\/em>\u2019s ordinary meaning for the purposes of the definition. Frame or receiver <\/em>does not receive a similar elaboration in (B), but because frame or receiver<\/em> is underspecified in the same way that firearm <\/em>is, we can readily account for this omission by appealing to the same principle of interpretive consistency exemplified in (2), (3), and (4). Section 921(a)(3)(A) contemplates gun parts kits, including those with 80% frames or receivers, as we have argued above in Part IV; in context, section 921(a)(3)(B)\u2019s \u201cframes or receivers\u201d are just those same frames or receivers. Even though 80% frames or receivers are not immediately ready to function, they are regularly included as part of a kit that may readily be converted into a firearm, and therefore the frame or receiver<\/em> of any such weapon contemplated in (A).<\/p>\n

The remainder of section 921(a)(3) bolsters this conclusion. Part (C) defines \u201cany firearm muffler or firearm silencer\u201d as a firearm<\/em>; (D) further extends this definition to include \u201cany destructive device.\u201d Both (C) and (D) \u2018bottom out\u2019 in statutory definitions which, like (A), foreground the Potential and Design facets over and above Formal or Constitutive facets:<\/p>\n

The terms \u201cfirearm silencer\u201d and \u201cfirearm muffler\u201d . . . includ[e] any combination of parts<\/strong>, designed or redesigned<\/strong>, and intended for use in assembling or fabricating<\/strong> a firearm silencer or firearm muffler.\u201d127<\/a><\/sup>18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(25). <\/span><\/p>\n

The term \u201cdestructive device\u201d means . . . (B) any type of weapon . . . which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile <\/strong>by the action of an explosive or other propellant . . . and (C) any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any destructive device <\/strong>. . . and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled<\/strong>.128<\/a><\/sup>18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(4).<\/span><\/p>\n

(C) and (D) thus provide further contextual information which helps to resolve the indeterminacy of frame or receiver <\/em>in (B). In sum, neither context nor considerations of ordinary linguistic meaning suggest that frame or receiver<\/em> extends exclusively to fully assembled frames and receivers in (B).<\/p>\n

This analysis contrasts starkly with one presented in the lower court opinions, which apply a familiar heuristic of legal interpretation and achieve the opposite interpretive result. The lower courts\u2019 preferred heuristic\u2014sometimes called the Presumption of Consistent Usage <\/em>canon of statutory construction\u2014states that \u201c[a] word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.\u201d129<\/a><\/sup>SCALIA & GARNER,<\/span> supra <\/em>note 40, at 170 (emphasis added).<\/span> From the Meaningful Variation <\/em>corollary to this canon, we can derive an \u2018omitted terms, negative implication\u2019 principle of the kind invoked by the lower courts.130<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, id.<\/em> (explaining that \u201cwhere [a] document has used one term in one place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the different term denotes a different idea\u201d).<\/span><\/p>\n

By contrast, the argument developed in this section is evocative of another heuristic, the Associated Words <\/em>canon (noscitur a sociis<\/em>), which states that \u201c[a]ssociated words bear on one another\u2019s meaning.\u201d131<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> at 195.<\/span> Scalia and Garner elaborate: \u201cWhen several nouns or verbs or adjectives or adverbs . . . are associated in a context suggesting that the words have something in common, they should be assigned a permissible meaning that makes them similar.\u201d132<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> <\/span> The Associated Words <\/em>and Consistent Usage <\/em>(Meaningful Variation<\/em>) canons appear to offer contradictory guidance when it comes to the meaning of frame or receiver <\/em>in (B). How can we be confident that Associated Words <\/em>takes \u201cprecedence\u201d over Meaningful Variation<\/em> in this case?<\/p>\n

According to Scalia and Garner, \u201c[t]he [Associated Words<\/em>] canon has tremendous value in a broad array of cases\u201d;133<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> at 196.<\/span> by contrast, \u201c[b]ecause it is so often disregarded, [the Consistent Usage<\/em>] canon is particularly defeasible by context . . . [it] can hardly be said to apply across the whole corpus juris.<\/em>\u201d134<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> at 171\u201372.<\/span> The Consistent Usage<\/em> canon \u201cmore than most other canons . . . is not often achieved.\u201d135<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> at 170. <\/span> Thus, say Scalia and Garner, as a general matter the Associated Words <\/em>canon is more broadly applicable than Consistent Usage <\/em>reasoning.136<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> at 170, 195\u201396.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. The Role of Anaphora in Section 921(a)(3) <\/em><\/p>\n

The specific language and context of section 921 further confirm the conclusion recommended by the Associated Words<\/em> canon. There are clear linguistic indications that count against inferring any \u201cmeaningful\u201d variation from differences between (A) and (B). Recall that section 921 defines firearm<\/em> to include:<\/p>\n

(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive;<\/p>\n

(B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon.137<\/a><\/sup>18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921.<\/span><\/p>\n

The phrase \u201cany such weapon\u201d in (B) refers back to \u201cweapon\u201d as defined in (A). Linguists call this relationship \u201canaphora.\u201d This is \u201ca relation between two linguistic elements, wherein the interpretation of one (called an anaphor) is in some way determined by the interpretation of the other (called an antecedent).\u201d138<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> YAN HUANG, ANAPHORA: A CROSS-LINGUISTIC APPROACH 1 <\/span>(2000).<\/span><\/p>\n

This clear reference from Congress, using \u201cany such weapon\u201d in (B) to refer back to \u201cweapon\u201d in (A), is essential elaboration of the contextual meaning of \u201cframe\u201d and \u201creceiver.\u201d It indicates a close connection between (A) and (B). As Parts I and II of this Article explain, (A) describes weapons that will, are designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by means of an explosive. Section (B), then, describes frames and receivers of \u201csuch weapons\u201d that will, are designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by means of an explosive.<\/p>\n

Anaphora\u2019s contribution to this contextual meaning clarifies why \u201creceiver\u201d in (B) would not include, for example, the completed<\/strong> metal receiver of a toy gun.139<\/a><\/sup>E.g.<\/em>, Shopping Filter for Military Rifles<\/em>, MAGNUM ENTERPRISES<\/span>, https:\/\/www.rubberbandguns.com\/rifles\/rifiles-military [https:\/\/perma.cc\/DG66-6MB2] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025); MOC 14022 Military Thompson Sub Machine Gun Bricks Toys<\/em>, USA BLOCKS<\/span>, https:\/\/www.usablocks.com\/products\/moc-14022-military-thompson-sub-machine-gun-bricks-toys-usablocks [https:\/\/perma.cc\/A8MH-98PX] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025).<\/span> Literally, such a receiver is a completed<\/strong> receiver, but there is no statutory context to indicate that \u201ccompletion\u201d in the constitutive sense is the relevant facet of meaning. Overreliance on abstract dictionary definitions could imply the same bizarre conclusion.140<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F.4th 179, 188 (5th Cir. 2023) (relying on dictionary definitions of \u201cframe\u201d and \u201creceiver\u201d).<\/span> But the completed receiver of a toy gun\u2014or the completed receiver of a metal model gun\u2014is not a receiver in this context<\/strong>: Those are not receivers of \u201cany such weapon,\u201d as defined in (A). The text says nothing about whether the relevant receivers should be restricted to only completed<\/em> ones; to the contrary, it emphasizes that the relevant receivers are ones compatible with the \u201cweapons\u201d described in (A).<\/p>\n

Recognizing the contextual meaning of (B) underscores that it includes an \u201cincomplete\u201d 80% receiver that is designed to or could be converted in one hour into the essential firing mechanism of an AR-15. Such receivers are frequently sold as parts of weapons that are firearms<\/em> under (A), as we argued in Parts I\u2013III.141<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, 16\u201d AR-15 Rifle Kit with 15\u201d Slim Keymod with 80% Lower Receiver – Titanium Blue<\/em>, DAYTONA TACTICAL<\/span>, https:\/\/daytonatactical.com\/products\/titanium-blue-16-ar15-kit-with-15-slim-keymod-with-lower\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/C7MB-CHE3] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025).<\/span> Those (unfinished) receivers are receivers of any such weapon<\/em> as defined in (A).<\/p>\n

The presence of the anaphoric construction in (B) (\u201cany such weapon\u201d)\u2014coupled with the linguistic context provided by (A) (elaborating firearm as \u201cany weapon\u201d that is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile), which contains the antecedent\u2014clarifies why the absence of similar language in (B) does not point to such a restrictive construal of frame<\/em> or<\/em> receiver<\/em>. These two linguistic phenomena are sufficient to determine the interpretation of frame<\/em> or<\/em> receiver<\/em> in context. For this reason, it would have been superfluous for Congress to add overt \u2018designed to or may readily be converted to\u2019 language directly into (B). The absence of such language in (B) is further evidence that the interpretation of frame<\/em> or<\/em> receiver<\/em> is resolved by considering the context of (A), which in turn suggests that frame<\/em> or<\/em> receiver<\/em> extends beyond fully completed frames and receivers in context. The textual indications from section 921 strongly support applying the Associated Words<\/em> canon.<\/p>\n

In contrast, there are none of the indications one would expect to support the Meaningful Variation<\/em> canon. That canon carries the most weight when there is clear linguistic evidence that text was added in one place and not the other in order to draw a contrast.142<\/a><\/sup>SCALIA & GARNER<\/span>, supra<\/em> note 40, at 170; see also <\/em>Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 162\u201363 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that statutory use of both \u201cand\u201d and \u201cor\u201d implies Congress having contemplated difference between two words). <\/span> That is not the case here. Consider a hypothetical alternative where instead of (B), there was (B\u2032), coupled with (A) as follows:<\/p>\n

(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive;<\/p>\n

(B\u2032) any frame or receiver of a weapon which will expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.<\/p>\n

In this hypothetical, the parallel language (\u201cwhich will expel\u201d) and absence of any connection between the two clauses (i.e., no anaphoric \u201csuch\u201d) provide a stronger basis for reading the absence of \u201cis designed to or may readily be converted to\u201d from (B\u2032) as deliberate and meaningful.<\/p>\n

The actual statutory text, however, is not a good candidate for such a Meaningful Variation<\/em> inference. It does not use two different terms (e.g., land vs. real estate, completed frame vs. frame), nor does it include any language that indicates a contrast between (A) and (B). It does the opposite: It explicitly binds the two clauses together (with \u201cany such weapon\u201d) such that they are best read as sharing a context in which both Design and Potential facets of meaning are salient.<\/p>\n

B. New Data on Ordinary Language Usage<\/em><\/p>\n

The preceding linguistic analysis may seem complex, and the contribution of context here is easily overlooked. But the preceding analysis is confirmed by ordinary examples and common sense.<\/p>\n

1. Unfinished frames as frames and unfinished receivers as <\/em>receivers<\/p>\n

Our analysis of frame or receiver <\/em>in (B) extends to usages of frame <\/em>and receiver <\/em>in ordinary contexts. As the government\u2019s reply brief in VanDerStok <\/em>notes, sellers (including Respondents in VanDerStok<\/em>) refer to 80% frames as simply frames<\/em>.143<\/a><\/sup>Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 8 n.4, VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F.4th 179, 188 (5th. Cir. 2023) (No. 23-852) (noting that \u201cRespondent Polymer80, for example, sold the relevant products on a section of its website entitled \u2018Pistol Frame[s] and Jigs.\u2019 Polymer80, 80% Frames and Jigs<\/em>, https:\/\/perma.cc\/DLG5-GRGX. Similarly, respondent BlackHawk marketed \u2018the GST-9\u2019 \u2018[f]rame.\u2019 80% Arms, GST-9<\/em>, https:\/\/perma.cc\/4N5Y-YQHM\u201d).<\/span> Ordinary people also refer to incomplete receivers as receivers<\/em>:<\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cWhat additional parts do I need to assemble a complete rifle or pistol using this receiver<\/strong>?\u201d144<\/a><\/sup>Pike Arms Elite22 80% Receiver with Extended Picatinny Rail Matte Black, <\/em>TACTICAL INC<\/span>., https:\/\/www.tacticalinc.com\/catalog\/product\/id-8186 [https:\/\/perma.cc\/73SP-MQZN] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025) (emphasis added) (characterizing a Frequently Asked Question).<\/span><\/p>\n

People also regularly refer to unassembled packages that include an unfinished 80% receiver as a firearm <\/em>and rifle.<\/em><\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cGet ready to rock and roll with the brand new 16\u201d AR-15 Rifle Kit with 15\u201d Slim Keymod and 80% Lower Receiver \u2013 Burnt Bronze! Not only does it look great, thanks to its stylish burnt bronze color, but it\u2019s also the perfect firearm<\/strong> for any shooter.\u201d145<\/a><\/sup>16\u201d AR-15 Rifle Kit with 15\u201d Slim Keymod with 80% Lower Receiver \u2013 Burnt Bronze, <\/em>DAYTONA TACTICAL<\/span>, https:\/\/daytonatactical.com\/products\/burnt-bronze-16-ar15-kit-with-15-slim-keymod-with-lower\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/4TEG-YK9K] (last visited Feb. 16, 2025) (emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n

\u25cf \u201cIntroducing the 16\u201d AR-15 Rifle Kit with 15\u201d Slim Keymod with 80% Lower Receiver \u2013 Titanium Blue; the perfect addition to your collection! This rifle<\/strong> has many of the features you\u2019d expect from a higher-end model, like a .223\/5.56 M4 Feed Ramp and 1:7-barrel twist.\u201d146<\/a><\/sup>16\u201d AR-15 Rifle Kit with 15\u201d Slim Keymod with 80% Lower Receiver \u2013 Titanium Blue, <\/em>DAYTONA TACTICAL<\/span>, https:\/\/daytonatactical.com\/products\/titanium-blue-16-ar15-kit-with-15-slim-keymod-with-lower\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/S2EG-64EP] (last visited Feb. 18, 2025) (emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n

An unfinished 80% frame or receiver falls within the ordinary meanings of frame<\/em> and receiver<\/em>, respectively. As such, it is sensible for a statute to simply employ these terms with this meaning (inclusive of, e.g., 80% receivers), with no additional language to underscore this meaning.<\/p>\n

2. Analogous ordinary examples do not support an inference from \u201cmeaningful variation\u201d or \u201clack of similar language.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

Section VI.A\u2019s linguistic analysis of artifact nouns extends beyond firearm frames and receivers. Here we present five ordinary examples that mirror the structure of section 921(a)(3). Imagine, as a simple example, that a high school prohibits students from bringing cigarettes to school. The rule defines cigarettes as follows.<\/p>\n

Example 1: Cigarettes<\/strong><\/p>\n

The term \u201ccigarette\u201d means<\/p>\n

(A) any object which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to smoke tobacco;<\/p>\n

(B) the tobacco tube of any such object.<\/p>\n

(A)\u2019s express definition prohibits finished cigarettes as well as an unassembled and unfinished \u201ccigarette kit,\u201d complete with tobacco, rolling papers that must be unboxed and torn out of their holder, and a filter. (B) does not explicitly define \u201ctobacco tube\u201d of \u201cany such object.\u201d Now imagine that a student entered the school with (only) unopened\/unboxed rolling papers and claimed that these do not fall under (B) because they are only an \u201cunfinished\u201d and \u201cunassembled\u201d tobacco tube and (B) does not have language mirroring (A), like \u201cany object which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to be used as a tobacco tube.\u201d The school principal would rightly reject this argument as an unsuccessful effort to evade the rule\u2019s meaning. The absence of an explicit definition in (B) is not meaningful in the sense that it implies that (B) is artificially limited to only 100% completed tobacco tubes. The language \u201cany such object\u201d in (B) underscores that the contextual meaning of \u201ctobacco tube\u201d is not artificially restricted in this way: (B) explicitly includes those tobacco tubes that are part of a kit falling under (A).<\/p>\n

Before turning to the next example, note that the anaphora (\u201cany such object\u201d) also underscores the contextual meaning of tobacco tube<\/em> by emphasizing the exclusion<\/strong> of entities that might fall under the meaning. A candy cigarette tube (that is solid and cannot hold tobacco) does not fall under (B). This reasoning also answers the Fifth Circuit\u2019s suggestion that the government\u2019s reading of section 921(a)(3)(B) might extend to objects that \u201clook like frames or receivers.\u201d147<\/a><\/sup>VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F.4th 179 (5th. Cir. 2023), cert. granted<\/em>, 2024 WL 1706014 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2024) (No. 23-852).<\/span> The court worries that:<\/p>\n

One could make a cake that looks like a hamburger, just as one could make a cake that looks like a gun frame or receiver. One is \u2018clearly identifiable\u2019 as a hamburger, just as the other is \u2018clearly identifiable\u2019 as a gun part. But that does not make the former taste like a Big Mac, just as it does not make the latter covered by the GCA.148<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

The court is correct that section 921(a)(3)(B) does not include a cake that looks like a firearm receiver, and that this would be an absurd conclusion. But the court is incorrect that such an absurd conclusion must follow from an interpretation that extends section 921(a)(3)(B) beyond fully completed receivers. In Example 1 above, tobacco tube<\/em> extends to unfinished and unassembled tubes but not toy tubes or cake tubes. This is underscored by the statutory context, indicating the relevant class of tubes with \u201cany such tube.\u201d<\/p>\n

As a second example, suppose that a middle school prohibits children from bringing board games to school. The rule defines board games as follows.<\/p>\n

Example 2: Board games<\/strong><\/p>\n

The term \u201cboard game\u201d means<\/p>\n

(A) any object which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to be played as a game by placing or moving pieces on a board;<\/p>\n

(B) the board of any such object.<\/p>\n

Suppose a student enters the school with a brand-new cardboard sheet of tiled board pieces from the board of the game Settlers of Catan. To convert these tiles into a functional board, the pieces must be \u201cpunched out\u201d of the cardboard sheet that holds them and assembled, but the student has clearly brought to school a board<\/em> within the meaning of (B). The same would be true of a student who brought unfinished and unassembled boards of Guess Who? or Mousetrap. There is no Meaningful<\/em> Variation <\/em>inference to draw from the explicit definition in (A) to an artificial restriction of the ordinary meaning of (B)\u2019s terms. The best reading in context, underscored by the anaphora (\u201cany such object\u201d) connecting (A) and (B), is that (B) includes such an unfinished and unassembled board.<\/p>\n

We are cautious about drawing too much from ordinary examples for legal interpretation. But these examples show that there is nothing unusual about the contextual argument from Section VI.A. There is no Meaningful Variation<\/em> inference that must be drawn from a construction like section 921(a)(3)\u2019s.149<\/a><\/sup>The definition has two parts. Part A elaborates the facets of meaning of an entity. Part B omits those facets for a subpart, but instead connects A and B through anaphora.<\/span><\/p>\n

The real examples from \u201cgun parts kits\u201d advertisements and customer reviewers also illustrate that the Design and Potential function of artifact nouns, like unfinished frames and receivers, are often contextually relevant. Moreover, these examples illustrate that it is a mistake to assume that the \u201cvariation\u201d in descriptions of artifact nouns in sections 921(a)(3)(A) and 921(a)(3)(B) is a sound basis of contextual restriction of those nouns\u2019 meaning. The opposite inference is often contextually warranted: artifact nouns described in slightly different terms should be construed consistently, not artificially inconsistently. Finally, the construction in section 921(a)(3) underscores this opposite contextual inference: The anaphoric \u201cany such weapon\u201d explicitly unifies the context of sections 921(a)(3)(A) and 921(a)(3)(B).<\/p>\n

VII. Implications<\/span><\/p>\n

This Article\u2019s analyses have implications for legal interpretive practice. These include (1) a recommendation for deciding VanDerStok<\/em>, and (2) lessons for other interpretive disputes involving artifact nouns.<\/p>\n

The case study has broader implications for statutory interpretation theory. Today\u2019s textualists rely heavily on what we call a \u201cword sense disambiguation\u201d (\u201cWSD\u201d) paradigm. The analysis here illustrates the limits of that approach. This also has implications for the increasingly important determination of textual clarity versus ambiguity.<\/p>\n

Most broadly, this study advances longstanding discussions in legal philosophy. First, vehicle<\/em> is an artifact noun, and we turn to the classic Hart-Fuller debate about the hypothetical \u201cno vehicles in the park\u201d rule. That debate has been explored thoroughly,150<\/a><\/sup>See generally<\/em> Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park,<\/em> 83 N.Y.U. L. REV<\/span>. 1109 (2008).<\/span> but the Article\u2019s linguistic analysis provides new support for Fuller\u2019s (sometimes disparaged) view of language and the relationship between text and purpose. Second, the Article\u2019s case study illustrates the benefits to legal interpretation of employing intensional<\/em> rather than extensional<\/em> definition.151<\/a><\/sup>For recent legal discussions of this distinction, see generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Brian G. Slocum & Stefan Th. Gries, The Meaning of Sex: Dynamic Words, Novel Applications, and Original Public Meaning,<\/em> 119 MICH. L. REV.<\/span> 1503 (2021); Stefan Th. Gries, Brian G. Slocum & Kevin Tobia, Corpus-Linguistic Approaches to Lexical Statutory Meaning: Extensionalist vs. Intensionalist Approaches<\/em>, 4 APPLIED CORPUS LINGUISTICS<\/span> 1 (2024).<\/span><\/p>\n

A. Legal Interpretive Practice<\/em><\/p>\n

1. Implications for Garland v. VanDerStok<\/p>\n

The linguistic theories and data presented in this Article bear directly on how to interpret the terms firearm, frame, <\/em>and receiver <\/em>in the GCA. These interpretive questions are at the heart of VanDerStok<\/em>. Our arguments support the claim that the GCA grants the ATF regulatory authority over the firearm parts kits and unfinished frames and receivers identified by the government.<\/p>\n

Begin with ordinary meaning. The linguistic theory explained here clarifies that artifact nouns (like firearm<\/em>, weapon<\/em>, frame<\/em>, receiver<\/em>, table<\/em>, and bicycle<\/em>) have context-sensitive meanings, which are heavily influenced by the entity\u2019s design and potential function. In many contexts, artifact nouns include members missing parts (a book missing a page is a book<\/em>), members that are unassembled (an IKEA table is a table<\/em>), and members with unfinished parts that can only be completed by applying additional tools (an unsharpened pencil is a pencil<\/em>).<\/p>\n

This linguistic theory is supported by a survey experiment of a sample of ordinary Americans. The majority of participants evaluated a firearm parts kit as a firearm<\/em> without any further context. Ordinary linguistic usage further supports this finding. Moreover, in online consumer reviews of weapon parts kits, people regularly refer to such a product as a firearm, weapon, gun, rifle, and AR (\u201cassault rifle\u201d).<\/p>\n

The statutory context further underscores this ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em> and weapon<\/em>. Section 921(a)(3)(A) explicitly defines firearm<\/em> with reference to design (\u201cdesigned to\u201d) and potential function (\u201cmay readily be converted to\u201d) as key facets of meaning of the firearm-weapons contemplated by the statute. Our empirical results demonstrate that ordinary readers are sensitive to these contextual cues. When survey participants were presented with this statutory language (a firearm is \u201cany weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to\u2026\u201d), their categorization of weapon parts kits as firearms increased to 73%.<\/p>\n

Frame <\/em>and receiver <\/em>are also artifact nouns, and thus they are also context-sensitive and heavily influenced by design and functional potential. In many contexts, an \u201c80% receiver,\u201d which can be converted into a fully functional receiver in a few hours, fits comfortably within the ordinary meaning of receiver<\/em>. Ordinary language confirms this: Firearms manufacturers and consumers refer to such unfinished frames and receivers as simply a \u201cframe\u201d and \u201creceiver.\u201d<\/p>\n

Moreover, the statutory context underscores this meaning. Section 921(a)(3)(A) contains an explicit disjunctive definition of the ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em>, while section 921(a)(3)(B) does not include such a definition. However, it is a mistake to assume that this construction implies an artificial restriction of the ordinary meaning of frame<\/em> and receiver<\/em> in 921(a)(3)(B). Moreover, section 921(a)(3)(B) contemplates the \u201cframe\u201d and \u201creceiver\u201d of \u201cany such weapon,\u201d as defined in Section 921(a)(3)(A). In linguistics terminology, this language establishes an anaphoric relation, clarifying that the relevant class of frames and receivers are the ones for the weapons contemplated by section 921(a)(3)(A).<\/p>\n

2. Implications for Artifact Noun Disputes<\/em><\/p>\n

This Article has focused on the artifact nouns firearm,<\/em> weapon, frame<\/em> and receiver<\/em>. But litigation implicates many other artifact nouns. Since 2010, the Supreme Court has examined the meaning of artifact nouns including administration, certified mail, document, employee, jail, money, prison, <\/em>and public accommodation<\/em>.152<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum & Victoria Nourse, Ordinary Meaning and Ordinary People, <\/em>171 U. PA. L. REV. 365, 444\u201345 (2023)<\/span> (documenting terms defined by a dictionary in Supreme Court opinions between 2010 and the present).<\/span> Artifact nouns also arise regularly in contract litigation,153<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, Stephen C. Mouritsen, Contract Interpretation with Corpus Linguistics, <\/em>94 WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1365\u201379 (2019) <\/span>(discussing debate about \u201csport\u201d and \u201csnorkeling\u201d).<\/span> as the next sub-section\u2019s example illustrates. And there is dispute about artifact nouns in common law adjudication.154<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, Adams v. N.J. Steamboat Co., 45 N.E. 369, 369 (N.Y. 1896) (asking whether sleeping cabin on steamboat is a \u201croom\u201d or \u201cinn,\u201d both being artifact nouns).<\/span> The analysis here provides a template for linguistic analysis of these terms.<\/p>\n

Consider, for example, the meaning of vessel<\/em>. The meaning of this term was the central issue in both Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.<\/em>, which the Supreme Court decided in 2005,155<\/a><\/sup>543 U.S. 481, 484 (2005).<\/span> and Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach<\/em>, which the Supreme Court decided in 2013.156<\/a><\/sup>568 U.S. 115, 118 (2013).<\/span> The Rules of Construction Act, codified at 1 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1\u20138, defines vessel<\/em>:<\/p>\n

The word \u201cvessel\u201d includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.157<\/a><\/sup>1 U.S.C. \u00a7 3.<\/span><\/p>\n

Begin with Stewart.<\/em> As part of the City of Boston\u2019s \u201cBig Dig\u201d construction project, it employed Dutra Construction Company. Dutra owned and used the \u201cSuper Scoop,\u201d a massive floating platform with a clamshell bucket that removes silt from the ocean floor. Dutra hired Willard Stewart to monitor the Super Scoop\u2019s mechanical systems, and Stewart was injured in an accident on the Super Scoop. Stewart sued under the Jones Act, alleging Dutra\u2019s negligence, and under the Longshore and Harbor Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (LHWCA), which allows employees to sue a \u201cvessel\u201d owner for an injury caused by that owner\u2019s negligence. Ultimately, one question reached the Supreme Court: Is the Super Scoop a vessel<\/em> for the purposes of the LHWCA?<\/p>\n

At the time of the accident, the Super Scoop was not moving in the water. So, an interpreter might be inclined to think that it is not a vessel\u2014vessels are only watercrafts that are actively transporting. But Justice Thomas\u2019s majority came to the opposite conclusion, that the stationary Super Scoop is a vessel<\/em>:<\/p>\n

A ship long lodged in a drydock or shipyard can again be put to sea, no less than one permanently moored to shore or the ocean floor can be cut loose and made to sail. The question remains in all cases whether the watercraft\u2019s use \u201cas a means of transportation on water\u201d is a practical possibility or merely theoretical one.158<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Here, Thomas\u2019s majority reads 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 3\u2019s \u201ccapable of being used as a means of transportation on water\u201d not to mean literally<\/em> being used or extremely close to being used, but rather practically<\/em> capable of being used. There is, of course, inevitable fuzziness around the category boundaries of \u201cpractically capable.\u201d But Justice Thomas, rightly, did not take that fuzziness to imply that any object could be a vessel<\/em> within the meaning of 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 3.<\/p>\n

This Article\u2019s discussion of the linguistics of artifact nouns clarifies both why Justice Thomas\u2019s interpretation is consistent with the meaning of vessel <\/em>and a sensible reading in context. The meaning of artifact nouns is not necessarily limited to currently operable members. Firearm<\/em> often includes firearms without bullets or magazines; table<\/em> often includes unassembled IKEA tables; and so on. Similarly, vessel <\/em>need not be restricted to vessels that are currently transporting entities on water, or even vessels that are extremely close to doing so. Vessels that have a \u201cpractical possibility\u201d of transporting on water are also vessels.<\/p>\n

The statutory definition of vessel<\/em> underscores this ordinary meaning. Like the explicit definition of firearm in the GCA, the definition of vessel<\/em> includes a disjunction: \u201cThe word \u2018vessel\u2019 includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used,<\/em> as a means of transportation on water.\u201d159<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em><\/span> This context underscores that vessel<\/em> extends beyond only watercrafts \u201cused.\u201d<\/p>\n

As a second vessel<\/em> example, consider Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach<\/em>.160<\/a><\/sup>Lozman<\/em>, 568 U.S. at 118. <\/span> In 2002, Fane Lozman bought a floating, two-story structure that was about fifty-seven feet long. Lozman lived there for three years, until a hurricane struck, when Lozman moved the structure to the Riviera Beach marina and lived there for a year. About two years later, the Riviera Beach city brought an in rem action against the structure. The City argued that Lozman\u2019s structure was a vessel<\/em>, and thus that maritime liens attach to the vessel; Lozman argued that his structure was not a vessel.<\/p>\n

The district court held that Lozman\u2019s floating home was a vessel<\/em> under the Rules of Construction Act, which defines a vessel<\/em> as including \u201cevery description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.\u201d161<\/a><\/sup>1 U.S.C. \u00a7 3.<\/span> This is a broad definition, which would seemingly include a floating mobile home, capable of moving on water (and thus transporting on water). The Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding that Lozman\u2019s structure was a vessel.162<\/a><\/sup>City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1269 (11th Cir. 2011), rev\u2019d<\/em>, 568 U.S. 115 (2013).<\/span><\/p>\n

However, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Breyer rejected the proposal that a vessel is \u201canything that floats.\u201d Instead, Justice Breyer\u2019s majority held that a vessel is something that a reasonable observer would consider designed for transportation on water; as such, Lozman\u2019s floating home was not a vessel. Justice Breyer\u2019s opinion highlighted the importance of design to artifact nouns:<\/p>\n

Not every<\/em> floating structure is a \u201cvessel.\u201d To state the obvious, a wooden washtub, a plastic dishpan, a swimming platform on pontoons, a large fishing net, a door taken off its hinges, or Pinocchio (when inside the whale) are not \u201cvessels,\u201d even if they are \u201cartificial contrivance[s]\u201d capable of floating, moving under tow, and incidentally carrying even a fair-sized item or two when they do so . . . . Consequently, in our view a structure does not fall within the scope of this statutory phrase unless a reasonable observer, looking to the home\u2019s physical characteristics and activities, would consider it designed to<\/em> a practical degree for carrying people or things over water . . . .<\/p>\n

The home has no other feature that might suggest a design to transport over water anything other than its own furnishings and related personal effects. In a word, we can find nothing about the home that could lead a reasonable observer to consider it designed to a practical degree for \u201ctransportation on water.\u201d163<\/a><\/sup>Lozman<\/em>, 568 U.S. at 121\u201322 (second emphasis added).<\/span><\/p>\n

Justice Breyer\u2019s opinion also emphasized that actual use would be relevant. Lozman\u2019s home was towed<\/em> from location to location, and was rarely (if ever) used for transportation. Justice Breyer writes that \u201c[t]his is far too little actual<\/em> \u2018use\u2019 to bring the floating home within the terms of the statute,\u201d164<\/a><\/sup>Id.<\/em> at 130.<\/span> implicitly acknowledging that more robust actual use could bring the home within the meaning of the statute.<\/p>\n

This Article\u2019s analysis of artifact nouns illuminates the analysis and discussion in these two cases. In Stewart<\/em>, the Court held that the Super Scoop was<\/em> a vessel: The term also included vessels that have a practical possibility of transporting on water.165<\/a><\/sup>Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co., 543 U.S. 481, 484 (2005).<\/span> In linguistic terms, this is to emphasize the Potential (telic) facet. In Lozman<\/em>, the Court held that Lozman\u2019s floating home was not<\/em> a vessel: The term did not apply to all floating structures, though it did apply to those that are designed to transport.166<\/a><\/sup>Lozman<\/em>, 568 U.S. at 118, 121.<\/span> This emphasizes the Design (agentive) facet.<\/p>\n

This linguistic analysis also clarifies the source of seeming contradiction between Stewart <\/em>and Lozman<\/em>. If the Super Scoop was a vessel, surely a floating mobile home was also one? Both can transport people and goods on water, though neither\u2019s primary purpose is to do so. Part of what explains the difference between the opinions is that Justice Thomas emphasizes the Potential (telic) facet (what can practically operate as a vessel) while Justice Breyer emphasizes the Design (agentive) facet (what is designed to be a vessel).<\/p>\n

In these cases, and others concerning artifact nouns,167<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g.<\/em>, Tobia, Slocum & Nourse, supra <\/em>note 152, at 444\u201350 (collecting terms, including artifact nouns, defined by the Supreme Court using dictionaries).<\/span> a proper understanding of artifact nouns illuminates legal decision making.<\/p>\n

B. Statutory Interpretation Theory<\/em><\/p>\n

The case study presented here also has broader implications for statutory interpretation. First, the Article\u2019s analysis illustrates the limitations of \u201cword sense disambiguation\u201d (\u201cWSD\u201d). WSD is a common approach in current textualist discourse and the foundation of contemporary legal corpus linguistics; but, we argue, this approach has important limitations. Second, the case study illuminates current interpretive debate about textual clarity and ambiguity.<\/p>\n

1. Beyond Word Sense Disambiguation<\/em><\/p>\n

Contemporary textualist theory emphasizes word sense, often asking: Does the statutory term express sense A or sense B? Important distinctions, like ordinary versus technical meaning, are framed as ones about competing word senses.168<\/a><\/sup>See e.g<\/em>., Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Language?<\/em>, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV<\/span>. 501 (2015).<\/span> Traditional tools, like dictionaries, are often employed to distinguish between competing word senses.169<\/a><\/sup>See e.g<\/em>., United States v. Hansen, 143 S. Ct. 1932, 1936, 1942 (2023) (distinguishing between an ordinary \u201csense\u201d of a term found in Webster\u2019s Dictionary and a \u201cspecialized, criminal law sense\u201d of a term).<\/span> New tools, like corpus linguistics, are also framed in relation to sense differentiation.170<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning<\/em>, 127 YALE<\/span> L.J. 788, 799 (2018) (asking \u201c[h]ow is the court to decide which sense is the ordinary one?\u201d).<\/span><\/p>\n

A broader lesson of this Article\u2019s analysis is that textualist interpreters should think beyond what we call the WSD paradigm. This paradigm views interpretation through the lens of selecting the right \u201csense\u201d of a contested word, among various competing senses.<\/p>\n

Some textualists might be tempted to analyze VanDerStok<\/em> as a WSD problem. This analysis would begin by positing two separate senses of firearm<\/em>: a narrower \u201ccompleted sense\u201d and a broader \u201ccompleted-or-uncompleted sense.\u201d Next it would analyze which of those senses is the ordinary meaning. This might involve quantifying which sense is more frequent in ordinary language.171<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g<\/em>., id. <\/em>at 859.<\/span><\/p>\n

Such a frequency approach is problematic for many reasons,172<\/a><\/sup>See generally<\/em> Kevin Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning<\/em>, 134 HARV. L. REV. 726 <\/span>(2020). Ordinary understanding often exceeds attested examples of printed language. In print, we tend to refer to airplanes as \u201cairplanes\u201d rather than \u201cvehicles,\u201d but this does not imply that ordinary readers understand vehicles to exclude airplanes or that an airplane is not a \u201cvehicle\u201d in a statutory context. Id.<\/em> at 735.<\/span> and it would be unhelpful to conduct a corpus linguistic analysis reporting that most ordinary uses of firearm<\/em> or weapon<\/em> refer to completed or uncompleted entities. The question in VanDerStok<\/em> is about the contextual meaning of a statutory definition, not the meanings that firearm<\/em> or weapon<\/em> most often take in literature or on the internet. Just because most (or even all) uses of table<\/em> in a corpus refer to completed tables does not imply that an unassembled IKEA table is outside of the ordinary meaning of that term in all contexts. And even if most uses of pencil<\/em> in a corpus refer to finished (i.e., sharpened) pencils, this does not imply that an unfinished (i.e., unsharpened) pencil must fall outside of the term\u2019s ordinary meaning.<\/p>\n

This Article\u2019s analysis also challenges textualism\u2019s familiar WSD paradigm in a more fundamental way. A term like bank<\/em> has separate senses: (1) land beside a body of water; (2) a financial institution.173<\/a><\/sup>Linguists use the term polysemy <\/em>to refer to this kind of correspondence of a single linguistic form to multiple possible senses. Even when the relevant \u201csense\u201d has been identified, a linguistic form is not interpretable (that is, it does not have a \u201ccomplete meaning\u201d) out of context. It has long been recognized in linguistic theory that polysemy is distinct from these latter varieties of indeterminacy. Understanding the interpretive \u201cdivision of labor\u201d between lexical meaning (which describes sense-level generalizations) and context is an active and long-standing area of linguistic research. See, e.g.<\/em>, WILLIAM CROFT & D. ALAN CRUSE, COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS<\/span> (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (surveying the field of cognitive linguistics, including an exploration of cognitive approaches to lexical semantics). <\/span> But there is no basis to assert that an artifact noun like firearm<\/em> has a \u201ccompleted sense\u201d and an \u201cuncompleted sense.\u201d This distinction applies to many artifact nouns: firearm<\/em>, weapon<\/em>, table<\/em>, chair<\/em>, house<\/em>, hammer<\/em>, etc. A parsimonious explanation of this phenomenon (and the one arrived at by dictionary-makers174<\/a><\/sup>In other cases, dictionary entries listing multiple numbered senses have been taken as evidence for sense ambiguity. See generally<\/em> Lee & Mouritsen, supra <\/em>note 170. For a particularly egregious example, see, for example, Health Freedom Def. Fund v. Biden, No. 21-cv-1693-AEP, 2022 WL 1134138, at *20\u201322 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2022). Dictionary entries are, linguistically speaking, far from bulletproof; they are subject to practical limitations and are not written to be legally binding. That said, it is worth noting that VanDerStok has not identified any dictionary that distinguishes completed and uncompleted senses in its entry for \u201cfirearm.\u201d<\/span>) is that (non-)completion simply does not warrant specification as part of the listed senses of these nouns. Firearm<\/em> or table <\/em>does not usually have a distinct \u201ccomplete\u201d versus \u201cuncompleted\u201d sense listed in a dictionary; instead, as discussed in Section IV.A, it has an underspecified sense, the complete meaning of which depends on context.175<\/a><\/sup>Note that this is not always a problem. In some cases, the underspecification is not practically relevant, and in other cases the underspecification is readily resolved from context.<\/span><\/p>\n

This one-sense vs. multiple-sense distinction matters for textualist theory.176<\/a><\/sup>There is also psycholinguistic debate about the role of senses in mental organization. See, e.g.<\/em>, Sean Trott & Benjamin Bergen, Word Meaning is Both Categorical and Continuous<\/em>, 130 PSYCH. REV.<\/span> 1239 (2023).<\/span> On the multiple-sense view, the interpretive debate may center on whether Congress has clearly enough replaced the \u201cordinary sense\u201d of firearm<\/em> with a technical sense. But on the one-sense view of artifact nouns, Congress is not \u201coverriding\u201d ordinary meaning in definitions like the GCA\u2019s; with these artifact nouns, context is necessary to specify what is relevant. This is what occurs in part (A) of the statutory definition.177<\/a><\/sup>18 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(a)(3)(A).<\/span> This provides a different reason from those mentioned above to reject a corpus linguistic study of the \u201ccommon\u201d use of firearm<\/em> in ordinary language. On the one-sense view, every example demonstrates the same ordinary meaning of firearm<\/em>, an ordinary meaning that must be further specified by context.<\/p>\n

Textualists should not abandon word sense disambiguation, but they should grapple with the existence of other linguistic phenomena besides lexical ambiguity. Current textualism often operates with the hammer of WSD, viewing many interpretive problems as lexically ambiguous nails. But not all linguistic indeterminacy is the product of lexical ambiguity. Treating most linguistic indeterminacy as lexical ambiguity likely contributes to interpretive overreliance on the choice among dictionary definitions. Some definitions, like those of firearm<\/em>, vessel<\/em>, or vehicle<\/em>, explain one sense that is context-dependent. The approach advanced in this Article illustrates how textualism can make progress in interpreting one sense of an artifact noun, in context.<\/p>\n

2. Clarity vs. Ambiguity<\/em><\/p>\n

Consider one more implication of the overreliance on the WSD paradigm. Begin by noting that textualists often use the word \u201cambiguity\u201d to refer to any<\/em> linguistic indeterminacy (including, for example, indeterminacy caused by vagueness, polysemy, or underspecification). For textualists, \u201cambiguity\u201d is the opposite of clarity. For linguists, lexical ambiguity is simply one type of linguistic indeterminacy, and its proper resolution may or may not be clear from context.178<\/a><\/sup>For example, it is clear how to resolve the lexical ambiguity of \u201cbank\u201d in the sentence, \u201cThe bank accepted my check.\u201d It is less clear how to resolve the ambiguity in the sentence, \u201cI saw John at the bank.\u201d<\/span> Even when context serves to resolve the lexical ambiguities of a text, there may be other unresolved indeterminacies that serve to make the text unclear.<\/p>\n

For this reason, conflating linguistic ambiguity with textual indeterminacy can lead textualists astray. The typical textualist approach to clarity vs. ambiguity is to draw a line between competing word senses: If the statutory term could express sense A or sense B, we will treat it as \u201cclear\u201d so long as we\u2019re 90% (or 65% or 55%) certain it expresses A; otherwise, it is ambiguous between A and B.179<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation<\/em>, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118 (2016).<\/span><\/span> When faced with a true case of lexical ambiguity (in context, does bank<\/em> refer to a financial institution or to a river bank?), this is a sensible paradigm. But when faced with other sources of indeterminacy, this paradigm is less useful.<\/p>\n

In contrast, Justice Kavanaugh has proposed a \u201cbest reading\u201d standard: Judges should determine whether reading A or reading B is the better reading.180<\/a><\/sup>See id.<\/em><\/span> This idea animates Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo <\/em>in which the Court overruled Chevron <\/em>deference to agencies adopting reasonable interpretations of \u201cambiguous\u201d statutes and replaced it with a command for judges to implement the statute\u2019s best reading.181<\/a><\/sup>144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266, 2273 (2024).<\/span> For cases like VanDerStok<\/em>, this \u201cbest reading\u201d paradigm is a better fit than a paradigm that seeks to adjudicate between two senses of a term. To the question, \u201cAre terms like firearm<\/em>, weapon<\/em>, and frame<\/em> ambiguous between two senses in the GCA?,\u201d there is an easy answer: No. The relevant question is about the contours of the senses of these terms that the GCA expresses: Does the statutory context indicate that the Formal, Potential, and\/or Design facets are most relevant? In Justice Kavanaugh\u2019s terms, the linguistic question is one that should concern the \u201cbest reading\u201d of an entirely unambiguous sense of firearm<\/em>, weapon<\/em>, frame<\/em>, and receiver<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Attending to this distinction has implications for the rule of lenity and the degree of indeterminacy required to trigger it.182<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g<\/em>., Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360, 376 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id.<\/em> at 383 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).<\/span> The rule of lenity holds that ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved by construing the statute favorably to the defendant. Justice Gorsuch\u2019s trigger for lenity occurs when traditional interpretive tools yield no clear answer.183<\/a><\/sup>Id. <\/em>at 395 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining that \u201c[w]here the traditional tools of statutory interpretation yield no clear answer, the judge\u2019s next step isn\u2019t to legislative history or the law\u2019s unexpressed purposes. The next step is to lenity\u201d).<\/span> Justice Kavanaugh\u2019s trigger is a grievous ambiguity,184<\/a><\/sup>Id. <\/em>at 377 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (noting that \u201c[i]f a federal criminal statute is grievously ambiguous, then the statute should be interpreted in the criminal defendant\u2019s favor\u2026Importantly, the rule of lenity does not apply when a law merely contains some ambiguity or is difficult to decipher\u201d). <\/span> i.e., an unresolvable indeterminacy for which there is no \u201cbest\u201d reading. Understanding the linguistic issue in VanDerStok <\/em>to involve artifact nouns clarifies that there is no grievous ambiguity in Justice Kavanaugh\u2019s sense: There is rich statutory context that indicates which facets of meaning (i.e., the Potential and Design facets) are relevant.<\/p>\n

C. Legal Philosophy<\/em><\/p>\n

This Article\u2019s analysis also speaks to broader philosophical issues. We discuss implications for (1) the famous \u201cno vehicles in the park\u201d debate and (2) the distinction between intensional and extensional definition.<\/p>\n

1. The Hart-Fuller Debate: No Vehicles in the Park<\/em><\/p>\n

Recall the famous debate between philosophers H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller.185<\/a><\/sup>See generally <\/em>H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals<\/em>, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958);<\/span> Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart<\/em>, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).<\/span><\/span> Hart argued that a rule\u2019s text resolves most cases, while Fuller argued that decisions always require looking to a rule\u2019s purpose.186<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g<\/em>., Schauer, supra<\/em> note 150, at 1111 (stating that \u201cFuller meant to insist that it was never possible to determine whether a rule applied without understanding the purpose that the rule was supposed to serve\u201d).<\/span> This debate introduced one of the most famous and well-known hypotheticals: Imagine a rule stating that \u201cno vehicles may enter the park.\u201d Hart insisted that this rule gives rise to debate about edge cases (e.g., a bicycle or a drone) but that the easy cases are resolved by the text alone: The rule prohibits cars and trucks.<\/p>\n

Fuller disagreed. What if, asked Fuller, the city council installed as a memorial a non-functioning World War II truck in the park? Fuller suggested that this truck would be permitted by the rule. More importantly, Fuller thought that what explains this judgment is the rule\u2019s purpose. This debate spawned decades of legal philosophical debate about the role of text and purpose in interpretation.<\/p>\n

In recent years, empirical legal scholars have turned attention to this hypothetical. Experimental jurisprudence studies have examined ordinary people\u2019s judgments about the \u201cno vehicles\u201d rule.187<\/a><\/sup>E.g.<\/em>, Noel Struchiner, Ivar R. Hannikainen & Guilherme da F. C. F. de Almeida, An Experimental Guide to Vehicles in the Park<\/em>, 15 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING<\/span> 312 (2020); Ivar R. Hannikainen, Kevin P. Tobia, Guilherme da F. C. F. de Almeida, Noel Struchiner, Markus Kneer, Piotr Bystranowski, Vilius Dranseika, Niek Strohmaier, Samantha Bensinger, Kristina Dolinina, Bartosz Janik, Egle Lauraitye, Michael Laakasuo, Alice Liefgreen, Ivars Neiders, Maciej Prochnicki, Alejandro Rosas, Jukka Sundvall & Tomasz Zuradzk, Coordination and Expertise Foster Legal Textualism,<\/em> 119 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCIS.<\/span> 1 (2022). See generally<\/em> Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de Almeida, Noel Struchiner & Ivar Hannikainen, Rules<\/em>, in<\/em> CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE<\/span> (Kevin Tobia ed., Cambridge Univ. Press forthcoming 2025) (discussing the role of experimental jurisprudence in addressing questions about rule interpretation).<\/span> For example, one study confirms that there are easy and hard cases: Most laypeople, law students, and judges agree that a car is a vehicle; but all populations are divided about other entities, like drones and canoes.188<\/a><\/sup>Tobia, supra <\/em>note 172, at 766\u201368.<\/span> Interestingly, the rates of disagreement are similar among populations; for example, judges are just as divided as laypeople are over whether a canoe is a vehicle.189<\/a><\/sup>Id. <\/em>(noting that about 45% say \u201cyes\u201d and 55% say \u201cno\u201d).<\/span><\/p>\n

One might conclude from the similarity among the populations (e.g., cars are vehicles; crutches are not) that there is a stable core of ordinary meaning. This is the result, presumably, taken by scholars who use these survey results as a baseline against which to assess the accuracy of new tools, like word embeddings190<\/a><\/sup>Jonathan H. Choi, Measuring Clarity in Legal Text<\/em>, 91 U. CHI. L. REV<\/span>. 1, 19\u201321 (2024).<\/span> and ChatGPT,191<\/a><\/sup>E.g.<\/em>, Christoph Engel & Richard H. McAdams, Asking GPT for the Ordinary Meaning of Statutory Terms<\/em> (Univ. Chi. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 848, 2024).<\/span> in measuring ordinary meaning. Alternatively, one might emphasize that the disagreement about some cases (e.g., canoe) reinforces that it is hopeless to achieve interpretive determinacy\u2014at least in hard cases.<\/p>\n

A different interpretation of these data is that they underscore the importance of context and illustrate the limits of relying exclusively on individual words in interpretation (and tools and paradigms that emphasize word meaning, like dictionaries and early approaches to legal corpus linguistics). Interpreting \u201cno vehicles may enter the park\u201d requires consideration of more than just the word vehicle<\/em>. Empirical studies demonstrate this effect. Laypeople evaluate what is a vehicle under the rule \u201cno vehicles in the park\u201d differently from their evaluation of what is simply a vehicle<\/em>.192<\/a><\/sup>Kevin Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning<\/em>, 134 HARV. L. REV. 726 <\/span>app. (2020).<\/span> Moreover, changing the background context affects people\u2019s understanding of the category boundaries of artifact nouns like vehicle<\/em> in a rule \u201cno vehicles in the town square.\u201d193<\/a><\/sup>Waldon, Condoravdi, Levin & Degen, supra <\/em>note 68, at 691.<\/span><\/p>\n

This Article\u2019s case study in artifact nouns enriches this second, contextual interpretation. The meaning of artifact nouns is context dependent, influenced by the object\u2019s functional potential and design. For rules that regulate conduct, these facets\u2014functional potential and design\u2014are often closely connected with the purpose of the rule. For example, imagine \u201cno vehicles may enter the park\u201d is passed for the purpose of keeping the park safe. Can a bicycle enter the park? A bicycle may not be considered a vehicle <\/em>in all contexts; however, its design and functional potential characteristics are such that it can move so quickly as to injure someone. In our hypothetical example, context\u2014in particular, policymaker objectives\u2014identifies these dimensions as the relevant facets of vehicle<\/em>, which in turn may suggest a particular interpretive result, namely that the \u201cno vehicles\u201d rule prohibits bicycles. Of course, if noise or emissions are the policy concerns, this cuts the other way.<\/p>\n

Other theoretical frameworks suggest similar interpretive outcomes. Hart suggested that purposes play a role outside of the core of settled meaning, in the penumbra.194<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> Hart, supra <\/em>note 185, at 614 (suggesting that for questions \u201cin the penumbra,\u201d judges look to the \u201caims, purpose, and policies\u201d of the law).<\/span> And Eskridge proposes that \u201c[t]ext and purpose are like the two blades of a scissors; neither does the job without the operation of the other.\u201d195<\/a><\/sup>WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,<\/span> INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION<\/span> 9 n.18 (2016) (noting that \u201c[t]he scissors metaphor is inspired by L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism<\/em>, 82 U. PA. L. REV.<\/span> 429, 452\u201361 (1934) (suggesting that Law and Society are like two blades of a scissors)\u201d).<\/span> Recent work in cognitive science concludes that laypeople use both a rule\u2019s text and purpose when evaluating rule violation.196<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>Struchiner, Hannikainen & de Almeida, supra<\/em> note 187.<\/span><\/p>\n

This Article\u2019s theory is subtly, but importantly, different from these other views that emphasize context and purpose. Our point is not that a rule\u2019s purpose informs people\u2019s application of a rule,197<\/a><\/sup>See id.<\/em>; see also<\/em> Kevin Tobia, Brian Slocum & Victoria Nourse, Progressive Textualism, <\/em>110 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1488\u201392 (<\/span>summarizing recent studies on purpose\u2019s contribution to ordinary understanding of rules).<\/span> or that purpose can override text in cases of conflict. Our point is that there is a more fundamental problem with the \u201ctext vs. purpose\u201d dichotomy.<\/p>\n

This \u201ctext vs. purpose\u201d dichotomy is at the heart of many discussions of the Hart-Fuller debate. Consider, for example, legal philosopher Fred Schauer on the World War II Truck example, asking does a non-functioning truck count as a vehicle<\/em> for the purposes of the rule?:<\/p>\n

The war memorial made out of a functioning military truck really was a vehicle<\/em>\u2026It was Fuller\u2019s point that language could not\u2026ever be sufficient to produce a core or clear case, because in at least some instances the clear application of clear language would nonetheless produce an absurd result. Only by always <\/em>considering the purpose behind the rule, Fuller believed, could we make sense of legal rules and indeed of law itself.198<\/a><\/sup>FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER<\/span> 156 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009).<\/span><\/p>\n

This is one of many examples illustrating the traditional understanding of the debate about vehicles in the park: First, we begin with some clear cases of vehicles (e.g., trucks). Both Hart and Fuller endorse this conclusion.199<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> Hart, supra<\/em> note 185; Fuller, supra<\/em> note 185.<\/span> Hart thinks that for these clear or easy cases, text alone resolves interpretation.200<\/a><\/sup>Hart, supra<\/em> note 185.<\/span> Fuller disagrees, claiming that we always need to consider purpose, even for some \u201ceasy\u201d cases, such as the example of a non-functioning truck, which is a truck.201<\/a><\/sup>Fuller, supra<\/em> note 185.<\/span><\/p>\n

We seek to question this central text vs. purpose dichotomy. For example, we reject the assumption that a truck is simply within the core of the meaning of vehicle<\/em> in all contexts. On Schauer\u2019s account above, this is a starting point that both Hart and Fuller share. Everyone agrees that a truck is a vehicle. The disagreement simply concerns whether text (linguistic meaning) trumps purpose.<\/p>\n

To elaborate our account, recall our hypothetical law with the text \u201cno vehicles may enter the park,\u201d passed for the purpose of keeping the park safe. Now imagine that a commemorative, non-functional truck is installed in the park. One way to analyze this case is to posit a conflict between text and purpose:<\/p>\n

Text: The rule is violated because any truck is a vehicle.
Purpose: The rule is not violated because this truck does not threaten the safety of people in the park.<\/p>\n

Did the truck violate the rule by entering the park? The traditional understanding of the Hart-Fuller debate would see the answer \u201cyes\u201d as evidence of purposivism. A truck is simply a vehicle, as the quotation from Schauer above illustrates. What leads us to say that this truck is permitted is a desire to override the clear linguistic meaning with consideration of purpose or consequences.<\/p>\n

This Article\u2019s theory of artifact nouns and their facets of meaning supports a different interpretation. If the World War II truck is allowed by the rule, it is not necessarily because people elevate the rule\u2019s purpose over its clear text, which includes all trucks. Instead, we propose the meaning of vehicle<\/em> (i.e., the \u201ctext\u201d) is specified by context. And the stated purpose of the rule is relevant context in understanding what vehicle<\/em> means. In other words, people construe vehicle<\/em> to exclude this non-functional truck because they understand the in-context meaning of vehicle to make relevant a vehicle\u2019s functionality\u2014not because the rule\u2019s purpose overrides the common truck-inclusive meaning of vehicle.<\/p>\n

Similarly, if bicycles are prohibited by the \u201cno vehicles\u201d rule in our hypothetical, it is not necessarily because the rule\u2019s purpose fills in gaps left open in its \u201ccore\u201d textual meaning, nor because considerations of purpose are weighed against the rule\u2019s plain text. These explanations presuppose that the words of the rule are sufficient to determine a linguistic interpretation, one which may be augmented or overridden by purposive considerations. But out of context, there is no complete interpretation of vehicle <\/em>in \u201crules about vehicles\u201d and hence no interpretation of such rules.202<\/a><\/sup>Of course, if someone asked, \u201cIs a car a vehicle?,\u201d with no other context, one can provide an answer. And there is systematicity in such answers. More people will agree that a car is a vehicle than a baby stroller is, even though both are (and are not) vehicles in certain more specified contexts. See, e.g.<\/em>, id. <\/em>However, there are multiple explanations available for this pattern, including that people respond to this question by endorsing their estimate of the most frequent contextual resolution of the indeterminate term vehicle.<\/em> <\/span> In our \u201cno vehicles\u201d hypothetical, text and purpose must jointly conspire to produce an interpretation: That is, purposive considerations resolve an indeterminacy in vehicle<\/em> which is not otherwise resolvable in the provided context. This suggests that, at least insofar as artifact nouns are concerned, the \u201ctext-purpose dichotomy\u201d assumed by previous accounts offers an incomplete, and perhaps even misleading, starting point for theorizing about legal interpretation of artifact nouns.<\/p>\n

Finally, we note a second important way in which \u201ctext\u201d and \u201cpurpose\u201d are complementary, rather than oppositional, notions when it comes to artifact noun interpretation. With artifact nouns, context can indicate the relevance of design (i.e., an object\u2019s intended purpose) and functional potential (i.e., its possible purpose). These facets of meaning are relevant to the textual or linguistic analysis of artifact nouns. In this sense, purposive considerations are at the heart of an artifact noun\u2019s meaning.<\/p>\n

In concluding this discussion, let us return briefly to Hart and Fuller.203<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>Hart, supra <\/em>note 185; <\/span>Fuller, supra <\/em>note 185.<\/span><\/span> Hart claimed that for some cases (\u201ceasy\u201d cases, in a core of settled meaning), no consideration of morals or purpose is necessary. Fuller claimed that purposive reasoning is needed in all cases.204<\/a><\/sup>See id.<\/em><\/span> Although Hart and Fuller debated \u201clegal interpretation\u201d generally, their extended discussion concerned one rule about vehicles in the park; we limit our conclusions to that case and the class of interpretive problems centered on artifact nouns.<\/p>\n

At first our theory might seem to provide new support for Fuller. We have argued that artifact nouns like vehicle<\/em> are necessarily context-dependent. In other words, there is no \u201ccore of settled meaning\u201d for the term vehicle<\/em>, in the sense that even some trucks or cars could fall outside of the contextual meaning of vehicle.<\/em> We always need to consider context to specify the term\u2019s meaning.<\/p>\n

However, insofar as Schauer\u2019s reading of Fuller is right, and Fuller agreed that the World War II truck is always within the meaning of vehicle<\/em>,205<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> SCHAUER<\/span>, supra<\/em> note 198.<\/span> our results chart a third path forward. In some cases, in which it appears that purpose trumps text, what really occurs is that the linguistic context indicates the relevance of an artifact noun\u2019s design or potential function. Assume that someone agrees that a commemorative, non-functioning truck does not violate the \u201cno vehicles in the park\u201d rule,206<\/a><\/sup>In a survey of laypeople, law students, and lawyers, this example proves divisive. See <\/em>Tobia, supra <\/em>note 172, at 766.<\/span> passed for the purpose of reducing park emissions. This is not necessarily a demonstration of intuitive purposivism, in which the person elevates a rule\u2019s purpose over its text. Instead, our theory posits that this is a demonstration of the person\u2019s sophisticated attention to context. The non-functioning truck is simply not within the contextual meaning of vehicle.<\/em><\/p>\n

2. Intensional vs. Extensional Definition<\/em><\/p>\n

The analysis here also illuminates the relevance of the distinction between intensional and extensional definition, which divides textualists on the Supreme Court.207<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>Eskridge, Slocum & Tobia, supra<\/em> note 38, at 1630\u201335.<\/span> Terms like vehicle<\/em> can be defined extensionally through the set of entities falling under the term. For example, extensionally defined, vehicle<\/em> denotes the set of car, truck, bus, etc. An intensional<\/em> definition characterizes vehicle<\/em> through its features: For example, a vehicle<\/em> is an entity that can self-propel and carry an object. In this section, we briefly explain how this case study in artifact nouns further illustrates the usefulness of intensional definition.<\/p>\n

Consider the \u201coriginal meaning\u201d of the disputed provisions in VanDerStok <\/em>(i.e., the 1968 meaning). <\/em>The Gun Control Act was passed in 1968, and the provisions disputed in VanDerStok<\/em> were not affected by later amendments. \u201cGun parts kits\u201d were not manufactured and sold until decades later. An extensional approach to the original meaning of firearms<\/em> might suggest that gun parts kits are not within that meaning. This approach might be buttressed by research demonstrating that it was rare or uncommon to refer to \u201cgun parts kits\u201d or parts as firearms<\/em> in 1968.<\/p>\n

In contrast, an intensional approach might begin by identifying the features that characterized firearm<\/em>, such as those that have a high cue validity for firearm in 1968.208<\/a><\/sup>For an implementation of this approach, see generally Gries, Slocum & Tobia, supra<\/em> note 151.<\/span> For example, the feature \u201chaving a beak\u201d has a high cue validity for the category of birds: Many (all) birds have beaks, and most non-birds lack beaks. For firearm<\/em>, the GCA\u2019s definition itself identifies plausible original features that have a high cue validity: a weapon which will expel a projectile through the action of an explosive; a weapon which is designed to expel a projectile through the action of an explosive; and a weapon which may be readily converted to expel a projectile through the action of an explosive. These features identify weapons that are designed to or may readily be converted to fire (e.g., an unloaded gun or a gun separated from its magazine), overlapping with the original 1968 extensional definition of firearm<\/em>. But these features also identify weapons that fit the intensional criteria but which no one would have pointed to in 1968, such as firearms that were only invented later.<\/p>\n

The existence of intensional definition counts against an \u201coriginalist\u201d argument that seeks to reject the government\u2019s view in VanDerStok<\/em> on the basis that the 1968 meaning of firearm<\/em> excludes these kits simply because no one associated such kits with \u201cfirearms.\u201d One of us has proposed that, for textualists, intensional definition, rather than extensional definition, is generally a more promising approach to interpretation.209<\/a><\/sup>See <\/em>Eskridge, Slocum & Tobia, supra<\/em> note 38, at 1630\u201335.<\/span> The details of this debate take us too far from the analysis offered in this Article, but the more modest point here is that originalism about statutory meaning does not require rejecting category members that no one \u201cexpected.\u201d One can adopt intensional<\/em> originalism.<\/p>\n

Readers familiar with debates about constitutional originalism will recognize a correspondence between \u201coriginal expectations originalism\u201d and extensional definition and \u201coriginal public meaning originalism\u201d and intensional definition.210<\/a><\/sup>Cf.<\/em> John Perry, Textualism and the Discovery of Rights<\/em>, in<\/em> PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE<\/span> LAW<\/span> 105, 105\u201329 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (arguing for the necessity of distinguishing \u201cmeaning-textualism\u201d from \u201cconception-textualism\u201d).<\/span> Consider questions like: Could the original meaning of arms<\/em> in the Second Amendment include arms that no one would have expected at the Founding; could the original meaning of \u201cunreasonable searches\u201d include searches of cell phones; could the original meaning of a statute from the 1850s concerning vehicles<\/em> apply to airplanes invented decades later? It is easy to answer \u201cyes\u201d to these questions with intensional definition. An original 1850 intensional definition of vehicle<\/em> could include airplanes, even if the original extensional definition excludes them. In constitutional law, modern public meaning originalists have gravitated towards the intensional approach, although recent emphasis of \u201chistory and tradition\u201d pulls some analyses in the direction of a more extensional analysis.<\/p>\n

Again, here we do not defend intensional over extensional definition for interpretation\u2014although it is difficult to square many originalist applications with a purely extensional theory of original meaning. However, recognizing the availability of intensional definition provides an avenue to accommodate the arguments of this Article within an originalist approach to statutory meaning.<\/p>\n

Considering intensional definition also underscores a second point about context sensitivity. Our analysis of artifact nouns is highly context sensitive, and some might object that language is not. Some things cannot be firearms in any context. And firearm<\/em> calls to mind a certain thing, a gun, suggesting that its meaning does not entirely depend on context.<\/p>\n

Our account is consistent with these intuitions. The first intuition is that there are some things that cannot be category members in any context. A hunk of metal is never a firearm, and an egg is never a motor vehicle. The second intuition is that these nouns seem to have a stable conceptual core that licenses generalizations. For example, vehicle<\/em> calls to mind a certain set of features, and we are inclined to say that a truck is a better example of a vehicle than a bicycle even if a bicycle is also a vehicle<\/em> in some contexts.<\/p>\n

Our theory of artifact nouns is highly context sensitive, but it also accommodates these intuitions. First, consider the intuition that some entities are not category members in any context such as a hunk of metal as a firearm. Insofar as none of the facets of the artifact noun\u2019s meaning are applicable to this entity, this conclusion is consistent with our theory. Category members can also be ruled out when context indicates the relevance of certain facets of meaning. Recall that in the context of the GCA, a toy gun or cake that looks like a gun frame is not a firearm. In other contexts that emphasize certain formal and constitutive properties, those entities would be firearms. Moreover, in other contexts, the facets of meaning will be specified in a way that rules out certain entities. For example, imagine that in the middle of a war, a soldier yells to another, \u201cI\u2019m all out of ammo, pass me a firearm.\u201d The functional facet in this context is not the same as it is in the GCA. Here, the soldier refers to a firearm that will immediately shoot. Finally, the modal \u201creadily\u201d in \u201creadily be converted to\u201d is necessarily context sensitive. It would be strange to understand this term to imply that only objects readily convertible in 1968 are included. One way to interpret this phrase is as a hearer-centric term,211<\/a><\/sup>See<\/em> Jeesoo Nam, Indexicals in the Constitution<\/em> (draft).<\/em><\/span> communicating that originally the meaning of \u201creadily\u201d should be completed by its current hearer. Another possibility would be to give the term an intensional meaning.<\/p>\n

Second, consider the intuition that artifact nouns have a stable conceptual core. This idea is premised on intensional definition\u2014there are essential features that define these nouns. This proposal is intuitive and runs through Schauer\u2019s analysis of the \u201cno vehicles\u201d hypothetical: There is something that vehicle<\/em> calls to mind like a car, so the term must have a stable core of context-invariant meaning. We agree with the first part of this claim. The term vehicle<\/em> calls to mind certain properties, and it is sensible to use these properties to endorse statements about artifact nouns that cut across contexts: A car is generally a better example of a vehicle than a wheelchair. An explanation for this phenomenon is prototype theory,212<\/a><\/sup>Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization<\/em>, in<\/em> COGNITION & CATEGORIZATION 28, <\/span>28\u201348 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara Lloyd, eds., 1978).<\/span> which posits that certain category members are seen as more \u201ccentral\u201d than others. One way to elaborate this idea is through the possession of category features, in a way that is similar to the proposal to use category features as a basis for intensional definition. On this theory of artifact nouns, there is still substantial context sensitivity. In some contexts, a non-functioning truck is a vehicle, but in others it is not. But there is also a compatible explanation for our sense that, in general, a truck is a good example of a vehicle.<\/p>\n

VII. Conclusion<\/span><\/p>\n

Extending a scholarly tradition at the intersection of law and linguistics,213<\/a><\/sup>See, e.g<\/em>., LAWRENCE SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES<\/span> (Univ. Chicago Press 1993) (examining, as the first book to do so, the linguistic analysis of the law).<\/span> this Article employed linguistic theory and empirical methods to enrich current textualist theory and analysis.<\/p>\n

As a specific case study, we answer a question about the GCA\u2019s meaning\u2014the question at the center of Garland v. VanDerStok<\/em>. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision will impact the regulation and accessibility of firearms across the country.<\/p>\n

More broadly, this analysis illustrates how textualists should reason about artifact nouns. When it comes to the artifact nouns in VanDerStok<\/em>, like weapon, firearm<\/em>, frame, receiver, <\/em>and those elsewhere like vehicle or vessel, context informs interpretation by identifying the relevant essential facets of those nouns\u2019 ordinary meanings. We showed that this analysis has implications not only for the interpretational disputes in VanDerStok <\/em>but also for theories of statutory interpretation more generally.<\/p>\n

We supported this theoretical analysis with new empirical data which demonstrates that ordinary Americans use and comprehend artifact nouns in a way that is both flexible and systematic. This Article documents over one hundred examples of people describing weapon parts kits as a \u201cfirearm,\u201d \u201cweapon,\u201d \u201crifle,\u201d or a similar term. It also presents an original survey experiment, supporting the same interpretation. These findings support the broader analytical framework explored in this article.<\/p>\n

The Article has concrete practical implications for the Supreme Court\u2019s analysis of VanDerStok<\/em>, a case which has profound implications for the regulation of \u201cghost guns\u201d or \u201cgun parts kits,\u201d which have been involved in several mass shootings. This Article\u2019s extended case study also has implications for statutory interpretation practice, clarifying the interpretation of artifact nouns in many other cases, and theory. For example, the results illustrate how textualists should supplement the common \u201cword sense disambiguation\u201d paradigm. Finally, the results have broader implications for legal philosophy, providing a deeper explanation for a resolution between textualists and purposivists.<\/p>\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[*]<\/a> Fritz Postdoctoral Fellow, Georgetown University<\/p>\n

[**]<\/a> Professor of Linguistics, Stanford University<\/p>\n

[***]<\/a> Professor of Computer Science, Brandeis University<\/p>\n

[****]<\/a> Professor of Linguistics and Computer Science, Georgetown University<\/p>\n

[\u2020]<\/a> Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. For excellent editorial assistance, thanks to the Harvard Journal on Legislation, especially Marissa Medici and Mia Berman; for outstanding research assistance thanks to Alexa Bieber, Connor Berry, Brendan Gallomore, Jake Irving, and Jack O\u2019Hara; and for helpful comments, great thanks to Joseph Blocher, Beth Levin, and Richard Schmalbeck.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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View PDF Version<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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