{"id":2349,"date":"2016-05-31T14:04:46","date_gmt":"2016-05-31T14:04:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/?p=2349"},"modified":"2016-05-31T14:04:46","modified_gmt":"2016-05-31T14:04:46","slug":"the-highest-pharmaceutical-companies-in-the-land-the-legal-ramifications-of-private-sector-objections-to-the-death-penalty","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/2016\/05\/31\/the-highest-pharmaceutical-companies-in-the-land-the-legal-ramifications-of-private-sector-objections-to-the-death-penalty\/","title":{"rendered":"The Highest Pharmaceutical Companies in the Land: The Legal Ramifications of Private Sector Objections to the Death Penalty"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Rose Carmen Goldberg*<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

\u201cWelcome to Groundhog Day,\u201d as former Justice Scalia once said<\/a>. The scene is familiar. This month, yet another pharmaceutical company has voiced opposition to use of its drugs in executions. In a public statement<\/a>, pharmaceutical juggernaut Pfizer announced it will not supply drugs for lethal injections, and will enforce strict distribution restrictions to this end. Yet the scene is also different. Though many pharmaceutical companies<\/a> have spoken out against the death penalty before, Pfizer\u2019s ban is rightly regarded as a watershed<\/a>. As the second largest<\/a> pharmaceutical company in the world, its policy is likely to substantially impact the already dwindling<\/a> availability of lethal injection drugs. This is legally significant for two interrelated reasons.<\/p>\n

First, Pfizer\u2019s move may bring lethal injection protocols closer to constituting a \u201csubstantial risk of serious harm.\u201d This is an essential prong of the two-part Baze v. Rees<\/em><\/a> test that courts use to assess the constitutionality of lethal injection methods under the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In effect, Pfizer has closed off one of the last open market sources of traditional lethal injection drugs. As a result, states are even more likely to resort to alternatives, such as non-FDA approved drugs (\u201coff-label\u201d), which come with increased risks of harm to prisoners. As a general matter, off-label drug use lacks the FDA-supported evidentiary bases and labeling instructions that promote sound administration. In the death penalty context, where medical expert involvement and clinical data are especially lacking<\/a>, the risks attendant on off-label use reach \u201csubstantial\u201d proportions. Simply put, Pfizer\u2019s ban pushes states toward riskier options and brings them that much closer to breaching constitutional protections.<\/p>\n

Second, the\u00a0Baze <\/em>standard also turns on whether an execution protocol is \u201cobjectively intolerable<\/a>.\u201d Pfizer\u2019s choice is poised to further establish the required sense of intolerableness. That Pfizer, a profit-motivated institution, has found cause to disclaim lethal injection shows that the intolerableness of this practice now runs quite deep. Unlike public sector anti-death penalty activists and religious objectors, Pfizer does not act primarily out of moral obligation or respect for the intrinsic value of human life. Yet even Pfizer has found the death penalty intolerable. Pfizer\u2019s message has thus further expanded the intolerableness of lethal injection across institutional divides.<\/p>\n

In a more straightforward sense, Pfizer\u2019s ban will affect the degree of \u201cintolerableness\u201d because this standard depends on frequency of use. The fewer the number of states that use a given method of execution, the less tolerable it is. Many states, attuned to the risks of lethal injection stemming from decreased drug supplies and the lack of FDA-approved drugs in particular, have already instituted moratoriums<\/a>. Pfizer\u2019s decision portends more. Indeed, in the wake of the Supreme Court\u2019s most recent Baze <\/em>case<\/a>, in which the Court found that the degree of intolerableness had not yet reached constitutional dimensions, the state stayed<\/a> the very execution that the Court had sanctioned. It was unable to access \u201cappropriate\u201d drugs. These indicia of intolerableness are only bound to become more stark, and judicially cognizable.<\/p>\n

Baze<\/em> remains the authoritative doctrine on the constitutionality of methods of execution, as the Court\u2019s decision in Glossip v. Gross<\/em><\/a> confirmed last summer. Glossip<\/em> added a few controversial twists to the Baze<\/em> standard that divided the Court, such as an apparent requirement that prisoners identify known available alternatives in order to nullify a given lethal injection protocol. Nevertheless, given the potential significance of Pfizer\u2019s decision under the Baze<\/em> standard\u2019s core tenets, we are perhaps getting closer to the Supreme Court issuing an opinion of its own of the same ilk as Pfizer\u2019s. Indeed, Pfizer purports to make \u201cits products to enhance and save the lives of the patients [it] serve[s]<\/a>\u201d and the Supreme Court arguably rules to protect the integrity of human life<\/a>. Consistent with these values, the Supreme Court now has sturdier ground, and perhaps an obligation, to likewise \u201cstrongly object<\/a>\u201d to lethal injection capital punishment. As Justice Sotomayor once said<\/a>, to do otherwise is to leave prisoners \u201cexposed to what may well be the chemical equivalent of being burned at the stake.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

*<\/a> Rose Carmen Goldberg holds a J.D. from Yale Law School; an M.P.A from Columbia University; and a B.A. from St. John\u2019s College, Santa Fe, New Mexico.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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