{"id":2997,"date":"2018-11-13T14:06:27","date_gmt":"2018-11-13T14:06:27","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/?p=2997"},"modified":"2019-02-20T17:58:35","modified_gmt":"2019-02-20T17:58:35","slug":"who-will-gain-from-floridas-1000000-restored-felon-voters","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/2018\/11\/13\/who-will-gain-from-floridas-1000000-restored-felon-voters\/","title":{"rendered":"Who Will Gain From Florida\u2019s 1,000,000 Restored-Felon Voters?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>By Eric Allen Kauk*<\/p>\n<p>Last week voters in Florida passed a <a href=\"https:\/\/dos.elections.myflorida.com\/initiatives\/initdetail.asp?account=64388&amp;seqnum=1\">state constitutional amendment<\/a> that automatically restored the right to vote to more than 1,000,000 people who were previously convicted of felonies, and who have successfully served their sentences.\u00a0 The amendment was widely-supported by many groups including the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aclu.org\/blog\/human-rights\/treaty-ratification\/why-have-15-million-floridians-been-banned-voting\">ACLU<\/a>, the Koch brothers-backed <a href=\"https:\/\/freedompartners.org\/latest-news\/freedom-partners-endorses-amendment-4-in-florida\/\">Freedom Partners<\/a>, and the <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/politicaleq\">Harvard Campaign for Political Equality<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h4><strong><u>Historical Context<\/u><\/strong><\/h4>\n<p>In the 1868 aftermath of the U.S. Civil War, Florida enacted a constitutional provision to bar all people with felony convictions from voting.\u00a0 Clear legislative history shows that felon disenfranchisement efforts were enacted, as one legislator wrote, to \u201cprevent a negro legislature.\u201d A <a href=\"https:\/\/www.brennancenter.org\/sites\/default\/files\/legacy\/d\/download_file_38222.pdf\">report<\/a> published by the Brennan Center for Justice at the NYU School of Law describes Florida\u2019s felon disenfranchisement scheme as a Reconstruction-era \u201cmechanism intended to suppress political power of newly freed slaves.\u201d<\/p>\n<h4><strong><u>A New Day<\/u><\/strong><\/h4>\n<p>After passing this constitutional amendment, Florida will now welcome more than 1,000,000\u00a0 previously-convicted Floridians (including <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sentencingproject.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/89\/2016\/10\/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf\">418,000 black adults<\/a>) back to the polls.\u00a0 Many recognize and are celebrating the social positive of this change on the level of abstract principle.\u00a0 However, questions remain about the more concrete political ramifications passage of this amendment may have on the relative political power between Democrats and Republicans in this swing state. We have very recent precedent for this kind of situation in Maryland that could shine light on the future in Florida.<\/p>\n<h4><strong><u>Maryland 2016<\/u><\/strong><\/h4>\n<p>In 2016 Maryland passed a constitutional amendment restoring the right to vote to persons previously convicted of felonies (<a href=\"http:\/\/mgaleg.maryland.gov\/webmga\/frmMain.aspx?stab=01&amp;pid=billpage&amp;tab=subject3&amp;ys=2015rs&amp;id=HB0980\">HB 980<\/a> 2016.)\u00a0 Maryland\u2019s monthly <a href=\"https:\/\/elections.maryland.gov\/voter_registration\/stats.html\">voter registration activity reports<\/a> after February 2016 (when HB 980 became law) show us a strong Democrat advantage in new voter registrations immediately following re-enfranchisement of felons.\u00a0 In the 12-month period prior to Maryland\u2019s felon-restoration amendment going into effect, 49.08% of all new voter registrations were affiliated with the Democrat party.\u00a0 In the two years since the amendment became law, 56.35% of the voter registrations have been Democrat, a 7.27% advantage.\u00a0 In that time period, net totals of new registrations to the Democrat party out-paced new registrations to the Republican party by a total of 278,256 voters, another clear advantage for Democrats.\u00a0 Democrat voter registration increased distinctly immediately following Maryland\u2019s felon-restoration amendment going into effect.<\/p>\n<h4><strong><u>Florida 2020<\/u><\/strong><\/h4>\n<p>In recent years, presidential elections in Florida have consistently been tight, with the last five being decided by an average margin of victory of <a href=\"https:\/\/uselectionatlas.org\/RESULTS\/\">160,977 votes<\/a>.\u00a0 Florida is a significant state for presidential elections, because the candidate that wins Florida captures all <a href=\"https:\/\/www.archives.gov\/federal-register\/electoral-college\/allocation.html\">29 of Florida\u2019s electoral college votes<\/a>. Florida\u2019s 29 electoral college votes ranks as\u00a0 third most in the country, behind only California\u2019s 55 and Texas\u2019s 38.\u00a0 Florida\u2019s newly-re-enfranchised voters will have a significant impact in the 2020 presidential election.<\/p>\n<p>The impact will be determined by which party embraces, educates and mobilizes this new group of voters going forward.\u00a0 But, make no mistake, the parties are not starting on an equal playing field. \u00a0As of September 30, 2018 there were already <a href=\"https:\/\/dos.myflorida.com\/elections\/data-statistics\/voter-registration-statistics\/voter-registration-monthly-reports\/voter-registration-by-party-affiliation\/\">257,185 more Democrats<\/a> registered in Florida than Republicans.\u00a0 Further, in 2018 Florida gained a total of <a href=\"https:\/\/dos.myflorida.com\/elections\/data-statistics\/voter-registration-statistics\/voter-registration-monthly-reports\/voter-registration-new-and-removed\/\">531,577 new registered voters. <\/a>\u00a0If nothing extraordinary happens, and Florida simply experiences an increase in Democrat new voter registrations similar to that of post-amendment Maryland, there will be an advantage of an additional 77,291 new Democratic voters over new Republican voters before the general election in 2020.\u00a0 In Florida, the Presidential general election <a href=\"https:\/\/dos.myflorida.com\/elections\/data-statistics\/elections-data\/voter-turnout\/\">voter turnout averages 74%<\/a> over the last 4 cycles.\u00a0 Without expending additional resources, the Democratic Party in Florida is essentially starting the 2020 Presidential race with a lead of at least 52,722 voters already at the polls.\u00a0 Overcoming this Democrat Party advantage in a time of politic divide is a tall task for Republicans.<\/p>\n<p>Florida is a 2020 battleground state with Democrats poised for success if they just don\u2019t get complacent.\u00a0 In the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump won Florida by a slim <a href=\"https:\/\/uselectionatlas.org\/RESULTS\/\">112,911-vote<\/a> margin of victory.\u00a0 In the 2018 mid-terms, Democrat Bill Nelson and Republican Rick Scott have fought for Florida\u2019s Senate, separated only by the thinnest margin.\u00a0 And, Democrat Andrew Gillum and Republican Rick DeSantis have been locked in a virtual stalemate in the Florida Governor\u2019s race.\u00a0 The balance of political power in Florida, teeters on a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2018\/11\/12\/politics\/2018-election-florida-recount-what-to-watch-for\/index.html\">razor\u2019s edge<\/a>.\u00a0 With the passing of this amendment, the weight of more than 1 million restored-felon residents of Florida who will be newly-eligible to vote in their first presidential election can tip the scales in 2020.\u00a0 The party that is willing to give restored-felons a second-chance has the opportunity to sway the political future of Florida and the Nation, by riding this restored-felon wave.\u00a0 Which party will open-wide their arms to embrace this potentially influential constituency?<\/p>\n<p>*Eric Allen Kauk is a fully restored individual and is a 2L at Stetson University College of Law.\u00a0 He can be reached at ekauk@law.stetson.edu<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Eric Allen Kauk* Last week voters in Florida passed a state constitutional amendment that automatically restored the right to [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":2998,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2,1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2997","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog","category-uncategorized"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/89\/2018\/11\/vote-661888_1920-1160x870.jpg","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/peZQka-Ml","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2997","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2997"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2997\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2998"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2997"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2997"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/lpr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2997"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}