{"id":2346,"date":"2011-09-20T22:08:15","date_gmt":"2011-09-21T02:08:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/harvardnsj.com\/?p=2346"},"modified":"2013-02-15T17:31:41","modified_gmt":"2013-02-15T22:31:41","slug":"glennon-libyan-triumphalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.harvard.edu\/nsj\/2011\/09\/glennon-libyan-triumphalism\/","title":{"rendered":"Libyan Triumphalism"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Prof. Michael Glennon —<\/strong><\/p>\n

When a policy works, history looks inevitable.\u00a0 Risks that loomed large when it was commenced disappear; the perils, in retrospect, seem to have been overblown.\u00a0 Impetuousness, in the glow of victorious hindsight, becomes boldness.\u00a0 Recklessness becomes far-sightedness.<\/span><\/p>\n

Surviving a barrel-ride over Niagara Falls does not make it a good idea, however, and the happy outcome of Kaddafi\u2019s removal does not make the Libyan project a sensible enterprise for the United States and its allies to have undertaken\u2015let alone a model for future interventions.<\/span><\/p>\n

A risk, whatever the ultimate outcome, remains a risk, and an undue risk, even when the worst does not come to pass, remains an undue risk.\u00a0 The foreseeable risks and costs, real and potential, that were associated with the Libyan action when it was undertaken, were excessive relative to the putative benefits.<\/span><\/p>\n

What costs and risks were knowable on March 19 when the attacks were launched?\u00a0 Plenty:<\/span><\/p>\n