The Conservative Case for the Judiciary Accountability Act

*Aliza Shatzman

I. INTRODUCTION

The judiciary is an unaccountable workplace where some judges abuse their positions of power, mistreat their employees with impunity, and act as if they are answerable to no one. More judges engage in misconduct, including gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, than the legal community cares to admit. Fueling this injustice, the Third Branch is exempt from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the landmark antidiscrimination law that protects employees from gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in the workplace.¹ This exemption distinguishes the judiciary from Congress,² the Executive Branch,³ and most private businesses, whose employees are all protected by antidiscrimination laws.⁴

This year, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees are considering a bill, the Judiciary Accountability Act (JAA) (H.R. 4827/S. 2553), that would finally extend Title VII protections to the judiciary.⁵ Judicial accountability is, or should be, a bipartisan issue. Both Democratic⁶ and Republican⁷ judicial appointees mistreat their law clerks. Furthermore, both liberal and conservative clerks experience harassment and retaliation from the most powerful members of the legal profession—judges—with limited recourse available.⁸ Troublingly, as of August 2022, the JAA currently has only one Republican co-sponsor in the House⁹ and no Republican co-sponsors in the Senate.¹⁰

This article argues that Republican lawmakers should support the JAA because it promotes the conservative principles of curbing government abuses of power and enforcing the rule of law.¹¹ The JAA would rein in unaccountable judges who abuse their positions of power and act as if they are above the law. Additionally, the JAA would end the judiciary’s Title VII immunity, checking judicial behavior and holding judges to the same standards as members of the other two branches of government—including congressmen and chief executives—as well as employers in private businesses. Furthermore, the JAA would ensure that the next generation of attorneys—from the most conservative to the most liberal—are not driven out of the profession due to harassment and retaliation.¹²

In this article, I first discuss the scope of judicial misconduct, outline the Judiciary Accountability Act, and use my personal experience with harassment and retaliation by a former DC Superior Court judge to underscore why this legislation is so urgently necessary. Then, I explain why conservatives should support the JAA, explore conservative arguments against the JAA, and engage with some alternatives to the JAA, concluding that the JAA is the best path forward.

II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT IS PERVASIVE

Misconduct is pervasive and unaddressed in the federal courts.¹³ Troublingly, judiciary leadership, including the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, have, until recently, repeatedly refused to conduct a widescale workplace culture assessment, making it difficult to measure the scope of the problem.¹⁴ Judiciary leadership insists that harassment and retaliation are not pervasive problems within the federal courts.¹⁵ However, judiciary employees who have experienced or witnessed mistreatment know differently.¹⁶

In 2018, U.S. Courts Administrative Officer James Duff proudly proclaimed that, in some years, including 2016, there were “zero” complaints filed by law clerks against judges.¹⁷ However, the judiciary only created a separate “judicial employees” category for its judicial complaint data in 2019, so it would have been nearly impossible to assess the number of complaints filed by law clerks.¹⁸ Furthermore, the dearth of complaints by law clerks against judges is likely due in part to the lack of channels for reporting misconduct.¹⁹

Between October 1, 2020 and September 30, 2021, there were only 11 formal complaints filed by judicial employees against judges under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act,²⁰ which is the formal complaint process for the federal judiciary.²¹ However, according to a 2021 internal D.C. Circuit survey that was leaked to The Washington Post, fifty-seven judicial employees in that circuit experienced “problematic behavior” like gender discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and bullying, and an additional 134 either witnessed or heard about such misconduct.²² This mismatch with Duff’s assertion suggests both that the judiciary’s records do not capture the full scope of misconduct in the Third Branch and that the judiciary cannot be expected to adequately self-police on these issues.

Law clerks rarely file formal complaints against judges²³ because they fear retaliation by the judge or reputational harm in the legal community.²⁴ While anecdotal data indicate that harassment and retaliation are persistent problems,²⁵ judges are rarely disciplined, further disincentivizing filing complaints.²⁶ The most serious discipline judges receive are rare public reprimands.²⁷ Reprimands have no tangible consequences to judges’ lives—in contrast to the enormous life- and career-altering consequences the victims of their mistreatment face.²⁸ The threat of removal has also proven inconsequential in deterring problematic behavior by life-tenured judges, since removal requires congressional impeachment, which rarely happens.²⁹

Several aspects of a judicial chambers make it a uniquely dangerous workplace that is particularly conducive to harassment. First, there is an enormous power disparity between law clerks and judges. Law clerks are typically fresh-out-of-law-school lawyers who opt for a pay cut in order to spend one or two years learning from a judge.³⁰ Their powerful superiors either enjoy life tenure (for most federal judges) or ten- or fifteen-year terms (for Article I judges and most state court judges).³¹ Clerks, as a result, often depend on judges for references to secure their next jobs.³² In the best of circumstances, judges will be lifelong mentors, supporting the law clerks throughout their careers. But in the worst of circumstances, a negative clerkship experience can devolve into a long-term, far-reaching, retaliatory, and sour relationship between judge and clerk. Even a lukewarm reference can destroy a law clerk’s career.³³

Judges face no oversight in their day-to-day dealings with clerks.³⁴ In the typical judicial chambers, two law clerks, a judge, and perhaps a judicial assistant work behind closed doors for long hours under stressful circumstances. Furthermore, the internal courthouse workplace dispute resolution plan, known as Employee Dispute Resolution (EDR),³⁵ is notoriously flawed, lacking both confidentiality and impartiality.³⁶ These troubling features of judicial chambers are compounded by the fact that law clerks have fewer workplace protections than employees in other industries.³⁷

III. THE JUDICIARY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

The Judiciary Accountability Act (JAA)³⁸ offers a solution to this outrageous lack of accountability in the federal judiciary. It would extend workplace protections to judiciary employees, and it would hold judges accountable for their poor behavior.

The JAA would finally extend Title VII protections to judiciary employees—including law clerks and federal public defenders³⁹ —enabling them to sue their harassers and seek damages⁴⁰ for harm done to their careers, reputations, and future earning potential.⁴¹

Additionally, the JAA would increase judicial accountability by revising the definition of “judicial misconduct” in Title 28 of the U.S. Code to include discrimination and retaliation.⁴² It would also clarify that misconduct investigations can continue even if the judge who faces misconduct allegations retires, resigns, or dies.⁴³ Additionally, the JAA would create a Commission on Judicial Integrity,⁴⁴ which would oversee several important initiatives, including standardizing Employee Dispute Resolution Plans,⁴⁵ creating a confidential reporting system,⁴⁶ crafting a workplace misconduct prevention policy,⁴⁷ and administering workplace culture assessments.⁴⁸

The JAA would finally require the judiciary to collect and report data on workplace culture,⁴⁹ the outcomes of judicial complaints,⁵⁰ and diversity in hiring.⁵¹ These are notoriously under-scrutinized areas, and the lack of data in these areas has enabled some judges to get away with misconduct for far too long.⁵²

IV. CASE STUDY: MY EXPERIENCE WITH HARASSMENT AND RETALIATION

Early in law school, I decided to become a homicide prosecutor—and during law school, I interned with four different U.S. Department of Justice offices, all during the Trump administration, which further solidified my opinions on crime.

I decided to clerk in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”) for a judge more progressive than myself. My law school had instructed me to “apply broadly”—meaning across the geographical and political spectra—and to accept the first clerkship I was offered.⁵³ The judge presided over felony cases, meaning that I would get a crash course in criminal prosecution right out of law school.

Unfortunately, my clerkship destroyed my career aspirations and set me on a different path.⁵⁴ Beginning just weeks into my clerkship, the judge began to harass me and discriminate against me because of my gender.⁵⁵ He would kick me out of court, telling me that I “made him uncomfortable” and he “just felt more comfortable with” my male co-clerk. He told me I was “aggressive” and “nasty” and that I had “personality issues.” The day I found out that I passed the Bar Exam—an enormous day in any young attorney’s life—he called me into his chambers and told me, “You’re bossy! And I know bossy because my wife is bossy!”

I was devastated. I cried in the courthouse bathroom at work and cried myself to sleep at night. I wished I could be reassigned to a different judge. However, my workplace did not have an Employee Dispute Resolution Plan in place that might have enabled me to be reassigned—it was implemented one year after my clerkship ended.⁵⁶

Eventually, the judge ended my clerkship early, telling me that I “made him uncomfortable” and “lacked respect for” him. I contacted D.C. Courts Human Resources (“HR”), but they told me there was nothing they could do because “HR doesn’t regulate judges” and “judges and law clerks have a unique relationship.” Then they asked me whether I knew that I was an “at-will employee.”

One year later, I was finally back on my feet. I secured my dream job as a prosecutor in the D.C. U.S. Attorney’s Office (“USAO”). I was two weeks into training when I received devastating news that altered the course of my life. The USAO told me the judge had made negative statements about me during my background investigation, that I “would not be able to obtain a security clearance,” and that, therefore, my job offer was being revoked.⁵⁷ A few days later, an interview offer for a different position with the same office was also revoked, based on the judge’s same negative reference. I was only two years out of law school, and the judge seemed to have limitless power to ruin my reputation and destroy my career.

I was eventually able to read the outrageous and misleading reference. By then, it was too late. The damage had been done. I was blackballed from what I thought was my dream job. I will likely never work as a federal prosecutor.

No one—not even a Senate-confirmed judge—should be able to mistreat their employees with impunity. However, the judiciary is a uniquely unaccountable workplace, where those tasked with interpreting the law are not subject to the rule of law—at least not where workplace harassment is concerned. As if mistreating one’s law clerks during their clerkships was not terrible enough, some judges are emboldened to exert far-reaching authority over their former clerks’ careers. There are no guardrails to prevent the type of mistreatment I experienced during my clerkship and in the years following it. Law clerks have neither legal protections nor recourse when the most powerful members of the profession abuse their positions of power.

I became aware of the proposed JAA while I was engaged in the formal judicial complaint process in the summer and fall of 2021. Since then, I have spoken with many House and Senate offices, both Democratic and Republican, including those involved with drafting the JAA, to urge their bosses to support this critical legislation. I highlighted my personal story to personalize abstract issues. My experience with harassment and retaliation by a former D.C. Superior Court judge underscores why the JAA is so urgently needed. I wish the JAA had protected me when I was a law clerk.

V. CONSERVATIVES SHOULD SUPPORT THE JUDICIARY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

The JAA should receive bipartisan support. Both Democratic and Republican appointees harass their clerks,⁵⁸ and both liberal and conservative clerks experience mistreatment.⁵⁹ House and Senate Republicans should support the JAA, considering how much it aligns with conservative principles like enforcing the rule of law and curbing government abuses of power.

The JAA would finally extend Title VII protections to more than 31,000 federal judiciary employees.⁶⁰ It is baffling that an entire branch of the federal government is so lawless. The judiciary is distinct from Congress and the Executive Branch, where staffers are protected by, and lawmakers are subject to, Title VII.⁶¹ In fact, Congress extended additional workplace protections to more employees, including interns, in 2018.⁶² Unpaid congressional interns are protected by Title VII, yet young attorneys working for life-tenured federal judges are not. Conservatives should demand that the judiciary be subject to the same standards as other government branches and most private businesses, where employees are protected by various antidiscrimination laws.⁶³ Continuing to exempt the judiciary from Title VII sends a powerful message to misbehaving judges that they are above the laws they interpret. Subjecting judges who harass their clerks to Title VII litigation would curb government abuses of power by judges who mistreat their clerks with impunity.

If a law school graduate decides to work at a law firm, on the Hill, or at the White House, they are protected under civil rights laws. If they are mistreated by their employers, they can seek legal redress. However, if they decide that, for their first job, they want to spend a year or two learning from a judge, these young lawyers may experience harassment and retaliation with no legal recourse. Judiciary employees are not asking for special protections.⁶⁴ Title VII, which applies to their counterparts in similar industries, should apply to them as well.

Arguably, the judiciary needs Title VII even more than the other two branches of government, because these powerful employers—judges—enjoy life tenure.⁶⁵ Compared to a congressional office—with about half a dozen staffers in a House office and about a dozen staffers in a Senate office—a judicial chambers has a fraction of the staff and an employer with more unchecked power. A judicial chambers is more geographically isolated and more physically imposing than a congressional office. There is nowhere for a mistreated clerk to go to escape their harasser—no alternative supervisor to work for or to contact for assistance. Furthermore, members of Congress are accountable to the public—the voters—through elections every two or six years. Most federal judges have life tenure, making them effectively accountable to no one.⁶⁶

Judges who mistreat their clerks are committing egregious abuses of power. Judges are empowered with the authority to make decisions every day that affect fundamental aspects of litigants’ lives—including decisions about their liberty. And yet, those to whom we entrust the most power are immune from suit. Misbehaving judges evade scrutiny over their mistreatment of clerks; they also avoid accountability for committing misconduct.⁶⁷

VI. CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION TO THE JAA

Some conservative organizations, members of Congress, and judges⁶⁸ have voiced opposition to the JAA.⁶⁹ They argue that the JAA introduces intrusive regulation, particularly by imposing a centralized Commission on Judicial Integrity;⁷⁰ that the judiciary is a unique branch of government that can and should self-police;⁷¹ and that the JAA threatens “judicial independence.”⁷² Some Republican congressional offices have also questioned whether the JAA would chill hiring and whether it would be effectively utilized.⁷³.

A. It Is Time to Centralize and Standardize the Judiciary’s Approach To Workplace Misconduct.

Some have criticized the breadth of the Commission on Judicial Integrity’s oversight mandate, arguing instead for decentralized governance within the judiciary and claiming that each courthouse has unique needs.⁷⁴ However, this Commission would neither regulate judges’ day-to-day dealings with their clerks nor their rulings. Its purpose is to oversee and administer the JAA’s programs—including the workplace misconduct prevention policy, the standardized EDR Plan, the confidential reporting system, the data collection initiatives, and the workplace culture assessments.⁷⁵

It is time to centralize and standardize judiciary workplace policies so that every law clerk, no matter what state and courthouse they work in, knows there are safe places for them to go to report misconduct and seek assistance. Current judiciary policies are either nonexistent or ineffective. Judges investigate their colleagues, both internally through EDR and through formal complaints under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.⁷⁶ These policies create both the appearance of and an actual conflict of interest. As a result, judges rarely face discipline.

While some continue to quibble about specific provisions of the JAA, as it stands, law clerks lack basic workplace protections. Nothing about the judiciary suggests that it should be uniquely exempt from civil rights laws. Judges who enforce antidiscrimination laws should themselves be subject to them. Judiciary employees who go to work in courthouses across the country deserve the same access to the justice system as the litigants who appear before them.

The judiciary is a sprawling workplace that spans hundreds of courthouses across all fifty states.⁷⁷ Perhaps this could cut in favor of internal self-policing at individual courthouses, especially if judges could point to unique characteristics of their courthouses requiring special policies. However, judges in courthouses across the country have proven themselves unable and unwilling to self-police misconduct in their ranks.⁷⁸ As misconduct allegations and investigations into other insular organizations like police unions⁷⁹ and the military⁸⁰ have shown, attempts to self-regulate often fail.

Some judges have privately voiced concerns about whether judicial complaints and investigations under the JAA could be politically weaponized by an overbearing, highly partisan Congress.⁸¹ For example, a Democratic-majority Congress could threaten to investigate conservative or Republican-appointed judges for misconduct if they do not rule a certain way. However, under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, individual members of Congress already can theoretically pressure chief judges to initiate investigations into judges, even absent a complaint by a law clerk.⁸² Congress has not politicized this process in the more than four decades since the policy has been in place.⁸³

Opposition to the JAA under the guise of “judicial independence” is particularly disingenuous.⁸⁴ The JAA, which would finally implement basic workplace policies and create some judicial accountability, has nothing to do with ensuring that judicial rulings are free from outside political influence.⁸⁵ What most threatens judicial independence is when notorious harassers, including misogynistic judges, are never disciplined. What are female litigants to think when they appear before these notoriously misbehaving judges—particularly if the judges are presiding over Title VII cases? Judicial independence in decision-making is distinct from workplace conduct.

B. There Are No Downstream Political Implications For Extending Title VII To the Judiciary.

Conservative congressional offices are willing to engage on the subjects of judicial accountability and increased workplace protections for judiciary employees.⁸⁶ However, some offices have privately raised concerns about specific aspects of the bill.⁸⁷ In this section, I engage with two points of concern: first, that the JAA will either chill hiring by judges seeking to avoid lawsuits or complaints down the road; and second, that mistreated law clerks will not actually sue judges under Title VII.

The JAA will not chill hiring.⁸⁸ In 1995, Congress extended Title VII to both itself and the Executive Branch.⁸⁹ At the time, the Judicial Conference vociferously opposed extending Title VII protections to judiciary employees, in part because “[t]he judiciary currently provides its employees with protections similar to those enumerated in” the statutes.⁹⁰ Since 1995, there has been no evidence to suggest that either branch of government’s hiring patterns were affected by extending Title VII protections to their employees.

I have spoken with many federal and state court judges from a variety of jurisdictions about the JAA.⁹¹ Anecdotally, many federal judges support the JAA or some other increased workplace protections for employees and accountability for their colleagues.⁹² Furthermore, state court judges are already subject to Title VII or similar state antidiscrimination laws, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983; these judges still handle their judicial tasks effectively, hire law clerks without issue, and conduct business efficiently.⁹³ At least half a dozen federal judges who previously served on their state benches have stated that they do not believe that they should suddenly become exempt from antidiscrimination laws because of a change in jurisdiction; nor do they believe that something about themselves as employers suddenly changed when they received life tenure.⁹⁴

Congressional offices have also asked whether judiciary employees, including law clerks and federal public defenders, will actually sue their powerful superiors under the JAA. State court employees can sue judges under Title VII and state antidiscrimination laws; yet, they rarely feel empowered to do so.⁹⁵ Multiple congressional staffers even argued that suing a judge would make the judiciary employee unemployable in the legal community.⁹⁶

These concerns are unwarranted. Evidence suggests the JAA will be utilized and will have a material effect on judicial workplaces. In fact, some judiciary employees are trying to sue right now.⁹⁷ Former North Carolina Assistant Federal Public Defender Caryn Strickland is currently engaged in litigation against judiciary officials in the Fourth Circuit for gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.⁹⁸ Ms. Strickland can only rely on Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process claims because federal defenders’ offices are also currently exempt from Title VII.⁹⁹

These same arguments could have been raised against extending Title VII to the Legislative and Executive Branches in 1995 but would have rung similarly hollow. Regardless of survivors’ appetite for litigation, they should not be denied the right to sue their harassers. Furthermore, potential liability for employers is a strong disincentive for harassment. Additionally, the argument about unemployability in the legal community cuts both ways. It will be more difficult for the former clerk to find a legal job after suing a judge, just as it will be more difficult for them to find a legal job after filing a complaint against a judge. However, judiciary employees who are driven from the profession and face financial hardship must be able to sue and seek damages.

Most importantly, the JAA does much more than just extend Title VII protections to judiciary employees—it establishes courthouse workplace protections and creates judicial accountability.¹⁰⁰ By requiring the judiciary to collect and publish data, including the results of a desperately needed workplace culture assessment, the JAA would finally quantify the scope of the problem.¹⁰¹ No matter how many judiciary employees take advantage of the Title VII protections, many more will utilize the workplace misconduct prevention policy, the confidential reporting system, and the standardized EDR Plan.¹⁰² Every employee will benefit from a publicly reported climate survey of the judiciary as well as data on law clerk and public defender hiring and the outcomes of judicial complaints.

The JAA is not perfect. For example, it will not remove EDR and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act investigations from the judiciary’s chain of command. It should. Judges should not investigate their colleagues. Additionally, the JAA will not revise the provision in Title 28 of the U.S. Code that allows a judge to continue collecting his pension if he retires rather than resigns amid a misconduct investigation—collecting taxpayer dollars after committing misconduct.¹⁰³ It should. However, judiciary employees cannot wait another year for urgently needed reforms.

VII. CONSERVATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO THE JAA

Some judges and conservative congressional offices have suggested alternatives to the JAA.¹⁰⁴ The first is to utilize an internal U.S. Courts Administrative Office (“AO”) process, rather than Title VII, to adjudicate workplace disputes.¹⁰⁵ The second is to sever the JAA—passing the Title VII protections now, while addressing the judicial accountability, data collection, and judicial oversight provisions later, perhaps in a separate bill.¹⁰⁶ While extending Title VII to the judiciary is better than doing nothing, both of these proposals are undesirable.

A. Current Internal Processes for Adjudicating Workplace Disputes in the Judiciary are Ineffective.

The judiciary has proven itself unable or unwilling to self-police.¹⁰⁷ Congress should not give the federal judiciary any more opportunities to offer toothless “reforms.” Following public misconduct allegations against former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski in 2017,¹⁰⁸ the following year, the Judicial Conference of the United States, which is the national policymaking body for the federal courts, created a Workplace Conduct Working Group to make internal policy recommendations.¹⁰⁹ The Working Group released an interim report in 2019, offering a few hollow proposals and continuing to insist that harassment and misconduct are not pervasive within the federal courts.¹¹⁰ Judiciary leadership continues to tout its EDR Plan,¹¹¹ claiming that Title VII protections are unnecessary and duplicative.¹¹² However, EDR Plans among the federal courts are notoriously ineffective.¹¹³ They are not standardized among all federal courthouses; the proceedings are not confidential; and the judges overseeing EDR complaints are not impartial arbiters.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, in many cases, judiciary employees attempting to utilize the EDR Plan lack basic due process rights.¹¹⁵

On March 16, 2022, just hours before the House Judiciary Subcommittee hearing to discuss the JAA,¹¹⁶ and after more than four years of work, the Working Group released another Report.¹¹⁷ The Report offered a few meaningless reforms to EDR and again claimed that the judiciary is an exemplary workplace that can self-police.¹¹⁸ Two judiciary representatives from the Working Group testified at the hearing the next day, making the same hollow claims.¹¹⁹

Arguments about judicial independence and judicial exceptionalism are troublesome, since judges have been notoriously unwilling to discipline their colleagues, even in the face of appalling misconduct.¹²⁰ The judiciary has also strenuously opposed oversight.

Under these circumstances, and based on the judiciary’s failures in the EDR context, the AO should not be permitted to craft its own internal policy to mirror Title VII. Title VII may not be perfect,¹²¹ but it is better than anything the judiciary has come up with to self-regulate. The judiciary has been trying to self-regulate for 250 years and has been unable to prevent and discipline misconduct in its ranks.¹²²

B. Every Component of the JAA Is Crucial.

Partisanship in recent years has rendered Congress unable to pass much legislation,¹²³ making it imprudent to rely on future congressional action. With the JAA finally gaining momentum across the political spectrum, now is not the time for half measures. Therefore, Congress should not sever the JAA to focus on the Title VII protections now, with the intent of passing a second bill later. Lawmakers should act swiftly and decisively to protect judiciary employees.

Critically, the JAA as written does much more than simply extend Title VII protections. In fact, the other parts of the bill—the workplace misconduct prevention policy, confidential reporting system, standardized EDR Plans, workplace culture assessment, and data collection and dissemination programs—will assist the entire judiciary workforce and promote the judiciary’s mission. Similar legislation extending workplace protections to Congress and the Executive Branches, such as the Congressional Accountability Act (“CAA”) and the Executive and Presidential Office Accountability Act (“EPOAA”), did much more than just extend Title VII protections to those branches.¹²⁴ The CAA and the EPOAA, which have transformed federal workplaces in their respective branches, achieved their success by taking a holistic approach to workplace protections, rather than just extending Title VII to their employees.

C. Change Is Headed to the Judiciary

While these two alternatives to the JAA would not make the meaningful reforms for which I am advocating, my conversations with conservative congressional offices and judges make me hopeful that the JAA can receive bipartisan support. A wide swath of Congress, as well as a wide swath of the judiciary’s rank and file, support increased workplace protections for judiciary employees and increased accountability for judicial misconduct.¹²⁵ It is primarily the judiciary’s leadership—a powerful lobby—that aggressively opposes congressional oversight.¹²⁶ However, congressional Republicans should listen to their constituents, who are affiliated with courthouses across the country and who would benefit immensely and immediately from the JAA.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Many members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees were law clerks themselves. Some of their staffers are former clerks. What would these members of Congress and staffers have done if they were harassed at work? Would they have been driven from the profession? That would have been an enormous waste of their training and talents.

There are federal courthouses in all fifty states, meaning the JAA touches every state.¹²⁷ Every Senator and nearly every House member represents constituents whose workplaces would be made safer by the JAA.¹²⁸ While politicians of all parties regularly defend and support judges for partisan reasons, they neglect law clerks—the next generation of progressive and conservative thinkers and decision-makers—who are tossed aside and driven from the profession by misbehaving judges bent on destroying their careers out of malice or vindictiveness.¹²⁹

The judicial workplace should set the standard for workplace civility, safety, and accountability. Judiciary employees—from the most left-leaning progressive to the most right-leaning conservative—cannot wait another year for the JAA’s urgently needed reforms. Conservatives should support the JAA because it would align the judiciary with the other branches of government and with most private employers. Every conservative should be outraged by the lawlessness and unaccountability of our judiciary.

* Aliza Shatzman is an attorney and advocate in Washington, DC who writes and speaks about judicial accountability. Ms. Shatzman is the President and Co-Founder of The Legal Accountability Project, a nonprofit aimed at ensuring that law clerks have positive clerkship experiences, while extending support and resources to those who do not. Ms. Shatzman’s writing on this subject has previously appeared in the UCLA Journal of Gender & Law, NYU Journal of Legislation & Public Policy, Yale Law & Policy Review, Above the Law, Law360, Ms. Magazine, Slate, and Balls & Strikes. Ms. Shatzman earned her BA from Williams College in Williamstown, Massachusetts, and her JD from Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, Missouri, where she was an Associate Editor of the Journal of Law & Policy.

Image credit: Carina McMillin

*Aliza Shatzman

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