Incentivizing Harm: How the Poorly Written Fair-Play Tiebreaker Rule Can Endanger Players

Written by Martin Skladany, Professor of Law at Pennsylvania State University.

Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”), the international governing body of soccer, cannot control what happens off the field. Infamously, Honduras and El Salvador in 1969 went to war partially over the results of a football match between their respective national teams, leading to the death of thousands of individuals. FIFA has the power to minimize violence on the field, but it has instead created a fair-play tiebreaker rule for World Cup tournaments that at times encourages physical harm. 

It sounds counter-intuitive that a rule meant to incentivize fair play could do the opposite, yet in 2018, the first year it was introduced, that is precisely what happened. While well-meaning, the fair-play tiebreaker must be reformed to protect players. 

World Cup Format 

The women’s and men’s FIFA World Cups assign 32 national teams into groups of four, with the top two teams in each group advancing in the tournament, which subsequently follows a single elimination format. While fans like to debate which of the eight groups is the toughest, nicknamed the “group of death,” FIFA takes steps to evenly distribute the competition. For example, the absolute highest ranking teams in the world who make the tournament are each placed in a separate group. 

Advancing Past the Group Stage

Given the relatively low scoring nature of the game, it is common for two teams to have the same record after playing each of the three opponents in their groups. For example, two or more teams in the same group could have won one match, tied another, and lost another.

In response, FIFA created a list of how to break such ties. Meaningfully, this is most likely to happen in two scenarios. First, if two teams are tied for the second seeded spot, the tiebreakers will select one of the teams to advance and the other to send home. Second, tiebreakers are relevant if the top two teams have the same record, given that a first-place seed into the single elimination part of the tournament usually means playing a less strong team right out of the group stage: first-place teams play a runner up team from another group in the round of 16. The tiebreak rules would also apply if three or even four teams are tied in a group.  

While tiebreakers are only ever activated after each team in a group has played all three other opponents, the danger is that two teams will have the same record going into the final match of the group play and that the tiebreakers might change players’ behavior in a negative manner. This wouldn’t happen for a race between the second and third placed teams because they will always both have an incentive to do their best in their third match so that they can advance. Yet sometimes, the top two teams in a group might both not want to finish first given who they’d have to play in the round of 16.

Tiebreaker List

The tiebreakers for the 2022 men’s World Cup were organized into two steps. The first step entailed three criteria for how to rank teams within each group in descending order of importance. That is to say, if the first criteria of step one, greatest number of points obtained in all group matches, could determine on its own which team advances, there is no need to go to the second criteria of step one–superior goal difference in all group matches. In the same vein, if the first two criteria of step one cannot identify how to select a winner, the third criteria, greatest number of goals scored in all group matches, needs to be applied to see if it can resolve how to rank the teams. 

The second step would only come into play if “two or more teams in the same group are equal on the basis of the above three criteria.” If this event were to occur, their rankings would be decided as follows: 

(d) greatest number of points obtained in the group matches between the teams concerned;

(e) superior goal difference resulting from the group matches between the teams concerned;

(f) greatest number of goals scored in all group matches between the teams concerned;

(g) highest team conduct score relating to the number of yellow and red cards obtained; 

(h) drawing of lots by FIFA.

This pen-ultimate criteria−(g)−is the fair-play tiebreaker. 

The above criteria were called into action at the 2018 Men’s World Cup. After their three group matches, both Japan and Senegal had identical records (1 win, 1 tie, and 1 loss), the same goal differential (zero), and number of goals (4). In fact, they were tied on all the criteria until they got to the fair-play tiebreaker. 

Fair-Play Tiebreaker Criteria

Getting into the weeds, the fair-play tiebreaker has its own detailed criteria. Teams get points for activity on the field that leads to either yellow or red cards: 

• A player receives a yellow card: minus one point.
• A player receives a second yellow card in a match, which results in an indirect red card: minus three points.
• A player receives a direct red card: minus four points.
• A player already on a yellow card then receives a direct red card in the same match: minus five points.

With the fair-play tiebreaker, Japan had two fewer yellow cards than Senegal, so they advanced into the single-elimination portion of the tournament, while Senegal was eliminated. Even though the fair-play tiebreaker worked like it was designed, it didn’t stop some commentators from complaining that it disincentivized teams that play more physical games. Yet that is the point of the fair-play tiebreaker– to penalize those who foul more dangerously, which all the teams knew going into the tournament. 

How the Fair-Play Tiebreaker Can Turn Dangerous

There have been numerous instances in soccer where the incentive to play competitively were skewered. Most famously, this occurred in the 1982 World Cup when Austria played West Germany in the “Disgrace of Gijón.” After the first half of play, both teams did their best to not exert themselves because if the score remained the same they would both go through to the knockout round. The statistics showed this—for example, in the absurdly high pass completion rates of 99% for Austria and 98% for West Germany. Fans were outraged—with a German fan allegedly burning his own country’s flag. Others burned money. The play-by-play commentator for Austrian TV pleaded with viewers to change the channel in protest. After the game, West German fans went to the hotel where the German team was staying to complain, with players responding by throwing water bombs on the fans from the hotel balcony. 

The design flaw of tiebreaker criteria is that they assume teams always want to finish first in their group. Teams might not want to do so if other groups experience upsets. The tournament is designed, generally speaking, to have the four first-place finishing teams from groups A through D go to the left side of the tournament bracket, while the second-place finishing teams from the same groups go to the right side of the bracket. The four first-place finishing teams from groups E through H go to the right side of the bracket and the second-place finishing teams from these groups are slotted into the left side of the bracket. If all four of the teams in groups A through D that were expected to finish in first place instead come in second, the right side of the bracket has all eight teams that were tournament favorites, while the left side of the bracket has less dominant teams. Yet each half of the bracket will produce only one team to reach the final. 

If this shift of tournament favorites appears to be unfolding and two teams find themselves tied on many of the tiebreaker criteria after two matches and are scheduled to play each other in the last group match, they both have an incentive to tank the match if winning would put them on the side of the tournament bracket with a stronger set of teams. 

Many things could happen in such a scenario where both teams have an incentive to lose beyond having players put in a half-hearted effort like the Austrians and West Germans. For example, coaches could rest most of their starters and field their bench players. Fans and ethicists will disagree if both teams should give it their all on the field in an effort to win, even if doing so means a substantially lower chance of advancing deeply into the tournament. Yet, the fair-play tiebreaker introduced something insidious in such a scenario. 

For teams who want to come in second, the fair-play tiebreaker can give them an incentive to try to pick up more yellow or red cards by fouling the opposing side in dangerous ways. Having more cards as a team would lead your team to lose the fair-play tiebreaker and take second place in the group. In essence, teams would have the incentive to do the exact opposite of what the rule was intended to incentivize: non-dangerous play, like it did in the Japan-Senegal tiebreaker. Thus, even if both teams try not to score and use their bench players, those on the field will still be incentivized to foul the other side vigorously enough that it draws cards.

This is dangerous for at least three reasons. First, key players could get hurt and miss the rest of the tournament, possibly altering the course of the World Cup. Second, athletes could sustain significant injuries that could affect their careers. Third, less tragic but more surreal, is the fact that players who would be fouled roughly would be put in the position of faking not being hurt, so as not to give the other side a coveted yellow card. While this would eliminate, for one match, the scourge of soccer players diving, or feigning injury to gain an unfair advantage, it is not worth creating an even greater perversity. 

FIFA has in place another regulation that at first blush looks like it would reduce this incentive to foul—any player receiving two yellow cards will miss the next game. Yet, this rule has also been gamed in the past—David Beckham admitted to seeking a yellow card in a “World Cup qualifier against Wales in 2004 in order to serve a suspension while he was injured.”

Many teams might decide that missing a starter due to a one game suspension would be better than playing on the harder side of the tournament bracket. More cunningly, a team could conceivably arrange for bench players to start the game and pick up the yellow or red cards.

2018 Men’s World Cup Mess

In the 2018 tournament, Belgium and England, two soccer powerhouses, were in the same group. Having both won their first two matches, the two teams were set to play each other to determine the winner of the group.  

Numerous powerhouses had failed to live up to expectations in the group stage. The 2014 champions, Germany, were eliminated. Argentina placed second in their group even though the country was blessed with an unreal collection of attacking talent—Sergio Agüero, Paulo Dybala, Gonzalo Higuaín, and also Lionel Messi—such that they left the Italian League’s co-top scorer at the moment, Mauro Icardi, an Argentinean, off their team. Such early tournament stumbles by Germany and Argentina left one half of the bracket stacked with dominant teams (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, Uruguay), while the other half of the bracket only featured one pre-tournament serious contender, Spain, along with a solid Croatia. The problem was that the team that would win Belgium and England’s group would be placed into the stacked half of the tournament bracket, which would make it much harder for them to get to the finals. 

Amazingly, Belgium and England were tied on all of the first three criteria to resolve tiebreakers—record, goal differential, and goals scored. After two matches each, Belgium had three yellow cards, while England’s squad had two yellows. 

Both the Belgians and the British were incentivized by FIFA to foul hard, which could lead to serious injuries. Commentators understood this. FIFA realized it as well. However, FIFA refused to change or suspend the rule, instead issuing a warning that any English or Belgian player who was deemed to be angling for a card would be suspended. Such a response potentially just increased the risk of injury to players. Instead of accumulating yellow cards by insulting the referee or moving too slowly on a corner kick, players would in theory have to gain a yellow card only through challenges that were too rough or tackles that went beyond a simple penalty. FIFA would find it challenging to suggest that an athlete playing aggressively was doing so for nefarious reasons. 

Belgium won. Ultimately, both teams made it to the semifinals, with each failing to make it to the final. So, they were left to play each other again for third place in the tournament. Belgium won the rematch and took third place overall.  

So, we are left to look at how to reform going forward—something FIFA has resisted by continuing to use the fair-play tiebreaker in the 2022 Men’s and 2023 Women’s World Cup tournaments. 

Reform 

Besides simply eliminating the fair-play tiebreaker completely, which would take away its potential benefits under normal circumstances, FIFA should consider two options, which could be implemented two different ways. 

Option one would be creating the ability to suspend the fair-play tiebreaker whenever a future situation analogous to the Belgium and England scenario arises. Option two, again when two teams were tied for first place going into a head-to-head final group stage match, would be for FIFA to announce that the winner of the match would get the chance to decide their placement in either half of the tournament bracket. 

FIFA could implement either of the two options through two separate procedures, which mirror the the philosophical differences between rules and principles. Common law countries such as the U.S. attempt to elucidate as many precise rules as possible to minimize discretion and increase certainty. Civil law countries such as France attempt to express general principles and hold actors to the spirit of those principles, which provides for more flexibility. 

First, FIFA could generate a detailed, complex rule to decide when the fair-play tiebreaker should be suspended or if the prevailing team should select their half of the bracket to join. For example, such a rule-based attempt could include the world ranking of each future opponent to see if either the top or bottom half of the knockout stage of the tournament was significantly easier to advance through. The aim of such a common law approach would be to attempt to give all teams advanced notice of regulations and attempt to account for all contingencies. 

Second, FIFA could create an advisory board consisting of individuals not from either nationality to determine if the fair-play tiebreaker should be suspended for one match or if the winner should get to select which half of the bracket to join. The body would apply a standard-like or principle-like approach in its decision making. Either a standard or principle-based approach would mimic civil laws’ attempt to state guiding principles that adjudicators should aim to fulfill instead of intricate rules that provide for less discretion. This method would be less complicated to explain, but might potentially be subject to criticism of unfair decision making against one team in favor of another. 

Conclusion

FIFA often values money over humans. During the 2022 Men’s World Cup alone, FIFA engaged in sports-washing a nondemocratic regime’s violations of human rights, and looked the other way when hundreds, if not thousands, of construction workers died building soccer stadiums in unsafe conditions. Moreover, they demanded that athletes play in Qatar’s extreme heat despite concerns from medical professionals.  

Unlike the tragic examples above, there is no perverse financial incentive preventing the reform of the fair-play tiebreaker. FIFA must have a modicum of courage and flexibility to improve a rule so it never incentivizes players to turn the beautiful game into a dangerous farce.

Martin Skladany is a professor of AI, intellectual property, law & technology, and law & international development at Penn State Dickinson Law.