Abstract

The United States (U.S.), China, and the European Union (EU) are engaged in a national security-driven economic competition over advanced technology. Many scholars and commentators focus on the external dimension of this geopolitical contest; that is, they describe the strategic choices by each actor in terms of geopolitical realities, threat perceptions, and relative power. However, this Article brings to the fore the internal dimension of the global tech war. We argue that each player’s strategy in the tech war is a function of its internal features, including basic constitutional powers, domestic legal institutions, and the relationships between the government and private industry. We show how these internal features enable the United States, China, and the EU to deploy certain strategies while constraining them with respect to other strategies. Comparing key U.S., Chinese, and EU domestic features reveals important insights about their respective strengths and weaknesses in waging the global tech war, and it offers predictive insights about the tech war’s likely future.

*Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia Law School.

**J.D., Columbia Law School, 2023.

***Liviu Librescu Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations.

We are grateful to Karen Alter, Rachel Brewster, Elena Chachko, Anupam Chander, Adam Chilton, Larissa Danovitch, Ashley Deeks, Matthew Erie, Aaron Friedberg, Peter Harrell, Benton Heath, Katie Klain, Ben Liebman, Katerina Linos, Chris Miller, Tim Meyer, Abraham Newman, Weijia Rao, Adam Shankman, Thomas Streinz, and Angela Zhang for their interviews or helpful comments, and to the Martin and Selma Rosen Research Fund for support.