Volume 14, Issue 2
Volume 14, Issue 2 is out!
Oona A. Hathaway[*] [This essay is available in PDF at this link] The last several decades have witnessed a dramatic decline in the capacity of the U.S. Congress to constrain the president’s unilateral decisions to send the United States to war. That erosion of congressional authority has accelerated since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Today, Congress’s ability to limit the exercise of presidential decisions to deploy force abroad is highly constrained. Presidents of both parties have expansively interpreted presidential authority to make decisions to use force, and Congress has proven unable or unwilling to insist on playing its formal
Alden A. Fletcher[*] [This essay is available in PDF at this link] The resurgence of private militias claiming the protection of the Second Amendment raises a startling question: is the United States a country without a legal monopoly on the use of force? Perhaps not. The constitutions of forty-eight states contain strict subordination clauses that declare, in one way or another, that “in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.” This strict subordination clause has attracted attention as part of efforts to regulate and prohibit private militias, but it has been largely
by Kristina Daugirdas & Katerina Linos[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] In the early 2000s, small “coalitions of the willing,” flexible networks, and nimble private-public partnerships were promoted as alternatives to bureaucratic, consensus-seeking, and slow-moving international organizations. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was established as an efficient alternative to the lumbering World Health Organization. The Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Forum, and the Financial Action Task Force were lauded as global market regulators. The Pompidou Group, the Dublin Group, and Interpol were touted as effective police networks in the battle
by Gary B. Gorton and Jeffery Y. Zhang[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] Introduction The advent of cryptocurrencies—particularly stablecoins, which are digital tokens that can circulate as private money—has ignited a debate on the government’s role in providing a sovereign alternative. This sovereign alternative is oftentimes referred to as a “central bank digital currency.” Dozens of governments and central banks are now deciding whether to create one and, if so, how to design and operationalize it. We seek to advance the debate on central bank digital currencies by presenting insights from a parable, The