By Major R. Scott Adams. This Article will show that LOAC does not transform combatants into noncombatants under the hors de combat concept. It will then show that current U.S. policy is overly restrictive by erroneously granting noncombatant status to persons hors de combat.
Threats against aviation change constantly; countermeasures developed to combat emergent threats will become obsolete as new threats appear. Therefore, it is imperative for security practitioners to stay ahead of their enemies by identifying potential threats. This Article discusses ways in which current procedures fall short and should be reassessed.
This article summarizes the nature and purpose of the government’s terrorist watchlists, discusses the rules followed by agency screeners, explores the civil liberties implications of watchlisting, and identifies the need for oversight of the process.
By Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF (Ret.)* The Washington Post recently ran a story entitled “Would declaring ‘war’ on ISIS make victory more certain—or would it even matter?”[1] Among other things, it stated that today, “[m]ost legal scholars find a war declaration irrelevant.” Maybe so, but I’m not one of them. One scholar was quoted as saying that “[d]eclaring war does not serve any real function under modern international law, and it is not required as a matter of U.S. constitutional practice in order to wage war.” Another argued that a formal declaration of war (against the Islamic
By Sahand Moarefy By partially unwinding the sanctions regime against Iran, the United States has sought to achieve two goals: provide Iran some meaningful level of economic relief such that it carries through with its commitment to scale back its nuclear program, while preserving the U.S.’s architecture of sanctions that target Iran for non-nuclear reasons. Barring any additional actions by policymakers, this paper argues that the United States has unwound sanctions based on legal distinctions that make it unlikely that it can achieve these goals. The paper concludes by sketching possible solutions for U.S. policymakers. INTRODUCTION On July 14,
by Christopher Izant “[I]t would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than we are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost certainly will take place in the future.”[1] The use of cell site simulators by law enforcement presents the most recent case of technology outpacing the law. Without a governing statute or Supreme Court ruling, law enforcement agencies’ procedures for using this technology
