Volume 12

Mark M. Jaycox[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction In 2013, investigative journalists disclosed that the U.S. government had used section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act as authorization for a now-defunct surveillance program that collected the daily call records of Americans from telecommunications companies.[1] Reporting also revealed that section 702 was, and still is, read to authorize the collection of Americans’ information from the telecommunications backbone,[2] even though section 702 targets foreigners outside the United States for foreign intelligence information.[3] Since then, national security scholars have applied particular scrutiny to those two […]

Nino Guruli[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction There is a common refrain in U.S. legal scholarship that an assertive exercise of judicial power in matters of national security jeopardizes established institutional arrangements. In war and national security, the executive takes the lead, with some legislative oversight.[1] The legislative branch is constitutionally empowered and institutionally suited to check executive excesses in war and national security. The argument tends to go something like this: robust judicial review that thoroughly engages with the substance of executive power and decision making in national security is likely