Main Articles, Volume 15

Sovereignty, Article II, and the Military During Domestic Unrest

[et_pb_section fb_built=”1″ _builder_version=”4.23.1″ global_colors_info=”{}”][et_pb_row _builder_version=”4.23.1″ background_size=”initial” background_position=”top_left” background_repeat=”repeat” global_colors_info=”{}”][et_pb_column type=”4_4″ _builder_version=”4.16″ custom_padding=”|||” global_colors_info=”{}” custom_padding__hover=”|||”][et_pb_text _builder_version=”4.23.1″ background_size=”initial” background_position=”top_left” background_repeat=”repeat” global_colors_info=”{}”] Christopher Mirasola[*] [This essay is available in PDF at this link] In this article, I contest two theories of inherent presidential power, rooted in Article II, to use the military to respond to domestic unrest during peacetime. This question is more contested than one might imagine. Based on all available evidence, in June 2020 President Trump relied on a doctrine of inherent Article II authority to deploy thousands of National Guard personnel to the streets of Washington, D.C. in response to Black […]

Main Articles, Volume 14

How the Erosion of U.S. War Powers Constraints Has Undermined International Law Constraints on the Use of Force

Oona A. Hathaway[*] [This essay is available in PDF at this link] The last several decades have witnessed a dramatic decline in the capacity of the U.S. Congress to constrain the president’s unilateral decisions to send the United States to war. That erosion of congressional authority has accelerated since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Today, Congress’s ability to limit the exercise of presidential decisions to deploy force abroad is highly constrained. Presidents of both parties have expansively interpreted presidential authority to make decisions to use force, and Congress has proven unable or unwilling to insist on playing its formal

Main Articles, Volume 14

Strict Subordination: The Origins of Civil Control of Private Military Power in State Constitutions

Alden A. Fletcher[*] [This essay is available in PDF at this link] The resurgence of private militias claiming the protection of the Second Amendment raises a startling question: is the United States a country without a legal monopoly on the use of force? Perhaps not. The constitutions of forty-eight states contain strict subordination clauses that declare, in one way or another, that “in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.” This strict subordination clause has attracted attention as part of efforts to regulate and prohibit private militias, but it has been largely

Main Articles, Volume 14

Back to Basics: The Benefits of Paradigmatic International Organizations

by Kristina Daugirdas & Katerina Linos[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] In the early 2000s, small “coalitions of the willing,” flexible networks, and nimble private-public partnerships were promoted as alternatives to bureaucratic, consensus-seeking, and slow-moving international organizations. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was established as an efficient alternative to the lumbering World Health Organization. The Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Forum, and the Financial Action Task Force were lauded as global market regulators. The Pompidou Group, the Dublin Group, and Interpol were touted as effective police networks in the battle

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