Brig. Gen. (ret.) David Wallace, Col. Shane Reeves, and Maj. Trent Powell [*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction Civilians contribute to nearly every war effort, and always have. Throughout history, non-military personnel have supplied logistic, economic, administrative, and political support to parties in armed conflicts. When civilian contributions are indirect and away from battlefields, there has historically been little concern about those participants jeopardizing their protected status under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). More recently, however, belligerents have begun using civilians in capacities that involve greater or more direct participation in […]

Elizabeth K. Kiessling[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction States increasingly use their military forces to execute “gray zone tactics” in pursuit of strategic objectives.[1] These tactics exceed the limits of accepted peacetime competition between states but avoid rising to a level that would warrant a conventional military response.[2] Whether by design, necessity, or chance, these tactics fall somewhere between war and peace on the use-of-force spectrum, though exactly where they fall is difficult to say with any certainty. Do military-on-military gray zone tactics violate the prohibition on the threat of or use

Mark M. Jaycox[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction In 2013, investigative journalists disclosed that the U.S. government had used section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act as authorization for a now-defunct surveillance program that collected the daily call records of Americans from telecommunications companies.[1] Reporting also revealed that section 702 was, and still is, read to authorize the collection of Americans’ information from the telecommunications backbone,[2] even though section 702 targets foreigners outside the United States for foreign intelligence information.[3] Since then, national security scholars have applied particular scrutiny to those two

Nino Guruli[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction There is a common refrain in U.S. legal scholarship that an assertive exercise of judicial power in matters of national security jeopardizes established institutional arrangements. In war and national security, the executive takes the lead, with some legislative oversight.[1] The legislative branch is constitutionally empowered and institutionally suited to check executive excesses in war and national security. The argument tends to go something like this: robust judicial review that thoroughly engages with the substance of executive power and decision making in national security is likely

Jeremy K. Davis[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction In the early morning hours of January 3, 2020, an American MQ-9 Reaper drone fired several missiles into a motor vehicle convoy leaving Baghdad International Airport.[1] Among those killed in the U.S. attack was Major General Qassim Soleimani, Iran’s top security and intelligence commander and the leader of the powerful Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[2] U.S. President Donald Trump directed the drone strike in response to “an escalating series of armed attacks in recent months by the Islamic Republic of Iran

Scott Harman-Heath[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] Introduction For nearly three months beginning in September 2017, the United States detained a U.S. citizen “unnamed, uncharged, and, despite his request, without access to counsel.”[1] The government asserted that John Doe was detained as an enemy combatant in Iraq and that no party had Article III standing to seek judicial review of Doe’s detention.[2] The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) contested the legality of Doe’s ongoing detention by seeking a writ of habeas corpus on Doe’s behalf, pursuant to a doctrinal exception called “next friend standing.”[3] The