David A. Koplow [*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction The theory and practice of “social distancing” were suddenly thrust upon a startled U.S. and global population by the novel coronavirus pandemic in spring 2020, as we all learned the importance of establishing adequate buffer zones around ourselves and sustaining a rigid keep-out perimeter against potential threats. Where common sense was insufficient, law augmented this effective barrier against intermingling and enforced the rigorous strictures of separation for mutual protection. This Article addresses an analogous but very different genre of distancing: the requirement under the […]

Kristen E. Eichensehr [*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction In June 2021, Texas enacted the Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act (LSIPA) to prohibit both companies and Texas governmental entities from entering into agreements relating to critical infrastructure with companies that have certain ties to China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia.[1] Spurred by concerns about a wind farm development by a Chinese company near a U.S. military installation,[2] the statute is intended—according to the bill sponsor—to “ban” the listed governments “from connecting physically/remotely into Texas critical infrastructure due to acts of aggression towards the

Sarah Beller [*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.     Introduction As Professor Xi Xiaoxing and his family slept, a dozen armed Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents broke into their house and arrested him.[1] The government charged Xi with selling trade secrets to China[2] and Temple University subsequently stripped him of his position as Chair of the Physics Department.[3] Professor Xi then received a one-sentence letter: The United States of America . . . provides notice to defendant Xiaoxing Xi and to the Court, that pursuant to Title 50, United States Code,

Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction In May 2019, during remarks at the annual International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid offered her government’s views on a number of key international legal questions relating to cyberspace.[1] Expressing concern at the growing frequency of malicious cyber operations, she announced the following: Estonia is furthering the position that states which are not directly injured may apply countermeasures to support the state directly affected by the malicious cyber operation. The countermeasures applied should follow the principle of

Daniel Larsen[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction The Trump Administration’s 2019 indictment of Julian Assange[1] under the Espionage Act of 1917[2] set off a wave of alarm across the press.[3] A decade earlier, the Obama Administration had launched what was called a “war on leakers”[4] as it became the first administration in history to regularly deploy the Espionage Act against sources who passed classified information to journalists.[5] The Trump Administration became the second.[6] These leak prosecutions have intensified longstanding scholarly fears that the eventual targets of Espionage Act prosecutions could be

Pavan S. Krishnamurthy & Javier Perez[*] [Full text of this Article in PDF is available at this link] I.   Introduction On June 3, 2020, General (ret.) James Mattis addressed protesters who were physically dispersed from Lafayette Square to facilitate what he considered to be a photo opportunity by President Trump at St. John’s Church in The Atlantic: I have watched this week’s unfolding events, angry and appalled . . . . The protests are defined by tens of thousands of people of conscience who are insisting that we live up to our values—our values as people and our values as