Volume 17

David W. Opderbeck*[This essay is available in PDF at this link] Abstract The seafloor and its communications infrastructure is a key warfare domain. The global Internet depends on networks of undersea transcontinental cables that are remarkably vulnerable to physical attacks by conventional forces and shadow fleets. Nearly all this infrastructure is privately owned by a small number of providers, including increasingly massive hyperscalers such as Google, Microsoft, and Meta. Responses to incidents that could either be attacks or unfortunate accidents are complicated by questions of intent and attribution as well as by applicable legal frameworks. The law of the sea […]

Uri Volovelsky † & Sivan Shlomo Agon ‡[This essay is available in PDF at this link] Abstract Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are blockchain-based entities that operate without centralized management or shareholders, enabling worldwide token holders the option of participating in their governance through self-executing smart contracts. With approximately fifty thousand DAOs controlling over $30 billion in assets, these organizations offer unprecedented efficiency and global collaboration, enabling stakeholders to participate and contribute to the operation of DAOs regardless of their jurisdiction or physical presence. DAOs, however, also present significant legal and regulatory challenges, particularly concerning liability, contractual enforcement, tax obligations, and

Articles Decentralized Autonomous Organizations and the Anti-Money Laundering Challenge: Rethinking Global Frameworks for a Leaderless World By Uri Volovelsky & Sivan Shlomo Agon Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are blockchain-based entities that operate without centralized management or shareholders, enabling worldwide token holders the option of participating in their governance through self-executing smart contracts. With approximately fifty thousand DAOs controlling over $30 billion in assets, these organizations offer unprecedented efficiency and global collaboration, enabling stakeholders to participate and contribute to the operation of DAOs regardless of their jurisdiction or physical presence. DAOs, however, also present significant legal and regulatory challenges, particularly concerning

Naz Khatoon Modirzadeh*[This essay is available in PDF at this link] Abstract In this Article, I examine a phenomenon unfolding within the United States’s military legal establishment: an effort by a segment of military lawyers to define how the law of armed conflict (LOAC) applies to the wars they anticipate fighting in the future. At the heart of this project lies a reconfiguration of what I call American international humanitarian law (IHL): the United States’s distinctive assemblage of legal interpretations, operational practices, and normative commitments that shape its approach to the conduct of hostilities. While LSCO lawyering is often framed internally

Jason Jia-Xi Wu*1[This essay is available in PDF at this link] Abstract The United States and China are engaged in a regulatory arms race over artificial intelligence (AI). Yet, existing debates often overlook a critical factor shaping this AI race: federalism, or the division of regulatory authority between central and local governments. In the United States, states lead in AI regulation, with the federal government taking a limited, backseat role. In China, although authority remains more centralized, local governments have played a pivotal role in implementing and experimenting with AI policies. While institutional differences remain, both countries exhibit signs of partial

Dan Maurer*[This essay is available in PDF at this link] Abstract This article describes the legal confusion that surfaces when a senior military commander dissents from, disobeys, or more offensively defies an apparently lawful order from the commander-in-chief to use force in ways that might check, curb, frustrate, or violate the constitutional liberties of the domestic public. Relying on both hypothetical and historical examples in which the constitutional values of civilian control of the armed forces and domestic civil rights collide, this article suggests that routine reliance on traditional civil-military relations theory and the military’s own criminal law only sets the