Main Volumes

By Jerry Brito* & Tate Watkins** — Click here to read the full text of the Article There has been no shortage of attention devoted to cybersecurity, with a wide range of experts warning of potential doomsday scenarios should the government not act to better secure the Internet. But this is not the first time we have been warned of impending dangers; indeed, there are many parallels between present portrayals of cyberthreats and the portrayal of Iraq prior to 2003, or the perceived bomber gap in the late 1950s. This Article asks for a better justification for the increased resources […]

By Steven M. Bellovin*, Scott O. Bradner**, Whitfield Diffie***, Susan Landau****, and Jennifer Rexford***** — Click here to read the full text of the Article In an effort to protect its computer systems from malevolent actors, the U.S. government has developed a series of intrusion-detection and intrusion- prevention systems aimed at monitoring and screening traffic between the internet and government systems. With EINSTEIN 3, the government now may seek to do the same for private critical infrastructure networks. This article considers the practical considerations associated with EINSTEIN 3 that indicate the program is not likely to be effective. Considering differences

By Vik Kanwar* — Click here to read the full text of the Review Essay Vik Kanwar reviews: P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (Penguin Press 2009), Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots (Chapman & Hall 2009), William H. Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 2009), and Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: The Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons (Ashgate Press 2009). * Assistant Professor, Jindal Global Law School (JGLS). O.P. Jindal Global University, National Capital Region of Delhi, India. Assistant Director, Centre on Public Law

By Phillip B. Heymann* — Click here to read the full text of the Essay In response to various scholarly commentaries, Professor Philip Heymann argues that applying the law of war outside of the “normal state-against-state context,” in order to justify military detention, involves an “increased risk of mistakes, unfairness, and resentment by our allies,” as “in the context of a traditional war,” the law of war would otherwise provide “protective conditions that are not present when the context changes to international terrorism.” With a proposed modification to the Speedy Trial Act, Professor Heymann argues that shifting to a law

By David D. Clark* and Susan Landau** — Click here to read the full text of the Essay As a result of increasing Internet insecurity — DDoS attacks, spam, cybercrime, and data theft — there have been calls for an Internet architecture that would link people to packets (the fundamental communications unit used in the Internet). The notion is that this technical “fix” would enable better investigations and thus deterrence of attacks. However, in the context in which the most serious national-security cybersecurity threat the US faces is data exfiltration from corporate and government sites by other jurisdictions, such a

By Eric Sandberg-Zakian* — Click here to read the full text of the Article Eric Sandberg-Zakian addresses nonmilitary preventive detention, a scheme that has gained support as a sensible alternative to holding suspected terrorists now that indefinite, unreviewable military detention is no longer an option. Such a program would empower the government to detain suspects who are potentially dangerous but cannot be shown to be proper targets of AUMF-authorized military force or proven guilty of criminal acts beyond a reasonable doubt. Sandberg-Zakian identifies two major constitutional challenges—one under the Suspension Clause and the other under the Supreme Court’s decision in