The Declaration of Independence celebrates its semiquincentennial in 2026. Across 250 years, the study of the Declaration and its impact have, of course, been extensive. It is credited for so many things–including establishing tests for legitimacy of government; setting the rules for identifying the source from which governments derive their powers and the critical element of consent of the governed; articulating self-evident truths about the nature of freedom and equality; explaining the unalienable nature of rights; identifying a non-exclusive list of unalienable rights as to include life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and enumerating which grievances may justify revolution. And the nature of the Declaration as an instrument of persuasion for domestic and foreign readers is also well documented. There is, however, a related lesson to be drawn from the Declaration of Independence that has been underexplored: It was an exercise and exemplar of “reason-giving,” arguably kindling by example a custom and culture of reason-giving in American law and politics.
The very first paragraph of the Declaration acknowledges that setting forth reasons to act must be considered a necessary prerequisite for their declaration to be respected. First, the seriousness of the affair triggers the necessity for reason-giving: “When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God entitle them.” If, indeed, so serious an act is to be justified, then, “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.” An action as serious as this must be accompanied by a list of reasons against which its validity may be judged. The signers of the Declaration phrase it this way not simply saying that they understand the utility of reasons to persuade. As written, instead, the language recognizes a necessity of stating reasons as a necessary prerequisite to the action proposed as a measure of respect and fulfillment of a deontological duty.
The Declaration of Independence’s insistence on reason-giving kindled a culture of “reason-giving” surrounding political and legal decisionmaking that operates as a critical component in establishing the legitimacy of those decisions, instills confidence in adherence to limits on authority, and projects consistency with the Rule of Law. Indeed, the signers of the Declaration were setting forth a list of grievances, many of which were grounded in the arbitrariness of the action of King George. By acknowledging a mandate for reason-giving before acting, the signers were impliedly, by example, setting up a direct contrast with action that is arbitrary, ipse dixit, or otherwise devoid of reasons, providing reasons ex ante that themselves then necessarily become the focused targets against which the legitimacy and wisdom of the action can be judged.
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