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Susan L. Sakmar*

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook 2012, U.S. natural gas production is expected to increase almost twenty-nine percent from 21.6 trillion cubic feet in 2010 to 27.9 trillion cubic feet in 2035. Almost all of the increase is due to the projected growth in shale gas production, which is expected to account for forty-nine percent of total U.S. natural gas production in 2035, more than double its twenty-three percent share in 2010.

Figure 1: U.S. Natural Gas Production 1990-2035 (in trillions of cubic feet)[1]

Figure 1

Much has been written about shale gas being either an “energy game changer” or an environmental hazard depending on whom you ask. In contrast, far less attention has been focused on whether the U.S. should export its newfound abundance of shale gas as liquefied natural gas (LNG)[2] to foreign countries.

Overview of the U.S. Regulatory Approval Process for U.S. LNG Exports

At the outset, it is important to note that under existing U.S. law, export applications to export to most free trade agreement (FTA) countries are deemed to be in the public interest and such applications are quickly authorized by the Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy (DOE/FE).[3] Most, though not all,[4] countries that have an FTA with the U.S. require national treatment for trade in 
natural gas, including Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Peru, Republic of Korea and Singapore.[5] In addition, the U.S. has ratified a FTA that requires national treatment for trade in natural gas with Panama, which has not taken effect as of May 15, 2012.[6]

With the exception of the Republic of Korea, most of the FTA countries are not likely to be significant importers of natural gas so the real prize for a company is the authorization to export natural gas to any country, which the DOE/FE refers to as “non-FTA” countries. Applications for export authorization to non-FTA countries involve greater scrutiny and require a determination of whether the proposed exports are in the “public interest.” In evaluating whether a proposed export is within the public interest, the DOE/FE applies certain Policy Guidelines issued in 1984 that focus the analysis on:[7]

  1. The domestic need for the natural gas proposed to be exported;
  2. Whether there is a threat to the domestic security of supply; and
  3. Other factors to the extent they are shown to be relevant to a public interest determination.

Politics and Pending LNG Export Applications

In August 2012, a bipartisan group of lawmakers, including ten Democrats and thirty-four Republicans from Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma increased pressure on the Obama administration to speed up DOE/FE approval for a number of pending LNG export applications. In a letter to Energy Secretary Steven Chu, the lawmakers pointed out that the DOE/FE “does not seem to have a set timeline for decisions or a sense of urgency,” which has left a growing number of companies and projects waiting in limbo.[8]

Table 1: Applications Received by DOE/FE to Export Domestically Produced LNG from the Lower-48 States (as of October 26, 2012)[9]

Table 1

But, in an election year, it seems that politics dominates everything and the prospect of exporting U.S. LNG has increasingly become a political hot button. The political debate over whether the U.S. should export LNG began to mount last fall when concerns were raised that allowing LNG exports would lead to an increase in the domestic price of natural gas.[10] Exports are one of many factors that can have a bearing on the price of domestic gas, since they represent an additional source of demand. At the same time, over the long run, an increase in demand also tends to increase supply. The extent to which the price of natural gas interacts with its supply and demand has been a cause of much speculation in the U.S., leading to a U.S. Senate hearing in November 2011 to address the issues raised by the possibility of U.S. LNG exports.[11]

Chairman Bingaman noted in his opening remarks that the last time the Senate held a hearing on LNG was in 2005, when the U.S. anticipated the need to import growing quantities of LNG, whereas the current hearing was meant to discuss the role that LNG exports might play in the energy future of the U.S..[12] There were two main objectives of the Senate hearing.[13] The first was to understand the laws and regulations that govern LNG exports generally since those laws were put into place assuming the United States would be an importing country, not an exporting country.[14]

The second objective was to understand how LNG exports might affect the domestic market for natural gas.[15] While the implications of increased gas exports for U.S. job creation and balance of payments could be very positive, Chairman Bingaman also noted that U.S. energy security requires reliable and affordable energy prices, not just reliable supply.[16] Since U.S. gas prices are considerably lower than prices than those in much of the world, Chairman Bingaman questioned how the U.S. could “ensure that our export policy is consistent with our continued ability to reap the benefits of our newfound abundance of natural gas?”[17]

The Impact of U.S. LNG Exports on U.S. Natural Gas Prices

At the Senate Subcommittee hearing, several Senators expressed concern about the impact LNG exports could have on domestic natural gas prices, including U.S. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) who noted,

[I]t’s very understandable why North American natural gas producers would want to build LNG export terminals so they can sell natural gas to Asia and other overseas markets at four or five times the prices here. What’s less clear is how this is going to be beneficial for our businesses and our consumers who are going to have to compete with these prices? [sic][18]

In response to questions about the price increase that DOE/FE would find acceptable, the DOE/FE acknowledged the analysis was complicated and when the DOE/FE makes a public interest determination, it considers a range of factors such as the impact on jobs, balance of trade, and the impact on price.[19] Since some of the factors are influenced by price itself, the DOE/FE explicitly recognized the importance that price holds.[20]

In order to address the potential cumulative impact of granting the pending export applications, the DOE/FE indicated that it had commissioned two pricing studies that, taken together, “will address the impacts of additional natural gas exports on domestic energy consumption, production, and prices, as well as the cumulative impact on the U.S. economy, including the effect on gross domestic product, jobs creation, and balance of trade, among other factors.”[21]

What Do The Pricing Studies Show?

In January 2012, the U.S. EIA released the first pricing study analyzing the impact of U.S. LNG exports on the domestic energy market.[22] As requested by the DOE/FE, the EIA’s study reviewed the impact of specified scenarios of natural gas exports on U.S. energy markets, focusing on consumption, production, and prices.[23] The study was not intended to give an estimate of what LNG exports would likely be in the future, but to assume that the levels of exports would be either six billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) or twelve Bcf/d, discounting other possible scenarios.[24] In summary, the U.S. EIA concluded that, “increased natural gas exports lead to higher domestic natural gas prices, increased domestic natural gas production, reduced domestic natural gas consumption, and increased natural gas imports from Canada via pipeline.”[25]

On the issue of the impact of exports on U.S. natural gas prices, the EIA noted that U.S. natural gas prices are expected to increase even before considering the possibility of additional exports.[26]Nonetheless, increased natural gas exports are expected to lead to higher domestic natural gas prices, although the precise amount depends on the ultimate level of exports and the rate of phasing in increased exports.[27] For example, under the low-slow scenario, it is assumed that six Bcf/d of exports are phased in at a rate of one Bcf/d per year over six years.[28] Under this scenario, the wellhead price impacts peak at about 14% ($0.70/Mcf) in 2022, but the wellhead price differential falls below 10% by about 2026.[29] Although the impact of LNG exports varies depending on the assumptions about resource availability and economic growth, the basic assumption remains the same: “higher export levels would lead to higher prices, rapid increases in exports would lead to sharp price increases, and slower export increases would lead to slower but more lasting price increases.”[30]

In contrast to the potentially severe impacts on price found in the EIA study, an independent assessment done by Deloitte MarketPoint LLC found that any price increase resulting from U.S. LNG exports would be quite minimal.[31]

In May 2012, the Brookings Institution released a report analyzing the various pricing studies that have been conducted so far on the impact of U.S. LNG exports on the domestic price of natural gas.[32]

Table 2: Study-by-study comparison of the Average price Impact from 2015-2035 of 6 bcf/day of LNG exports (unless otherwise noted) [33]

 Table 2

* Price impact figure for EIA study reflects the reference case, low-slow export scenario.

** The Navigant study did not analyze exports of 6 bcf/day.

*** Navigant (2010 and 2012) and ICF International studies are based on Henry Hub price.

As indicated by the Brookings analysis, while the exact pricing impact of U.S. LNG exports is unclear, there is some consensus that LNG exports will lead to an increase in the domestic price of natural gas.[34] The impact of such price movements on U.S. energy policy and regulatory framework is unclear. Brookings advocates for the approval of export applications assuming that the nature of the LNG sector (in terms of the costs associated with producing, processing, and shipping the gas) and the global market in which it will compete, will place upper bounds on the amount of LNG that will be economically advantageous to export from the U.S.[35]

Pending Congressional Bills to Limit LNG Exports

While the delay in the DOE approval process for pending LNG export applications has caused market uncertainty for projects awaiting approval, it has also allowed more time for other opponents to voice concerns about the impact of U.S. LNG exports. For example, U.S. Representative Ed Markey (D-Mass.) has introduced two bills in Congress with the stated purpose of protecting U.S. consumers from increased natural gas prices and ensuring that America’s natural gas stays in America.[36] The first bill, the “North America Natural Gas Security and Consumer Protection Act”[37] would preclude the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission from approving new LNG export terminals. The second bill, the “Keep American Natural Gas Here Act,”[38] would require natural gas extracted from federal lands to be resold only to American consumers. Subsequent to the approval of Cheniere’s Sabine Pass project, Congressman Markey issued a press release continuing to express his concern that U.S. LNG exports would increase domestic prices for natural gas, harming individual and industrial users of natural gas.[39]

Congressman Markey is not alone in his view that “America should exploit her competitive advantage with lower natural gas prices to create jobs in the United States.”[40] Leaders from other industries have called on the U.S. to use its cheap natural gas to convert to products for export, as opposed to exporting the natural resource itself. For example, the CEO of Dow Chemical has argued that U.S. LNG exports should be limited since there is up to eight times more value in using America’s abundant and cheap natural gas as the raw material to create high-value products that can be exported, as opposed to simply exporting the natural gas itself.[41]

Will Environmental Opposition to Shale Gas Development Hinder LNG Exports?

In additional to political opposition to U.S. LNG exports, there is some risk that environmental opposition to shale gas development will spill over into opposition to U.S. LNG exports. For example, the Sierra Club has opposed a number of LNG export projects and has argued that the environmental impacts associated with natural gas production must also be considered in determining whether U.S. LNG exports are in the “public’s interest.”[42] While the Sierra Club contends that all environmental impacts from natural gas production need to be considered, their brief highlighted particular environmental concerns pertaining to hydraulic fracturing and shale gas development.[43] In summary, the Sierra Club maintains that DOE’s approval for LNG exports could have “major environmental impacts through the [United States], and especially in the Northeast, where [U.S. LNG exports] will intensify Marcellus Shale extraction activities.”[44]

The Sierra Club’s opposition to LNG export projects coincides with its intensified effort to ensure that, as coal fired power plants are retired, they are not replaced with natural gas power plants.[45] To that end, the Sierra Club recently announced that it is launching a new “Beyond Gas” campaign that represents a significant expansion of the group’s on-going efforts against other major fossil fuels and is modeled after the decade-old “Beyond Coal” campaign that sought to phase out coal fired power plants.[46] According to the Sierra Club, it will seek to “prevent new gas plants from being built wherever we can.”[47]

It remains to be seen whether the environmental opposition to U.S. LNG exports will intensify. However, some reports have acknowledged that since the case for U.S. LNG exports depends on the continued development of shale gas, the public’s concerns over the environmental impacts of shale gas development must be resolved.[48]

Will Political Pressure Spur Action on Pending Export Applications?

Some policymakers and business leaders have urged the U.S. to approve the export licenses and have expressed the view that the market should dictate whether U.S. LNG exports happen or not.[49] For example, at the November 2011 Senate hearing, Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), indicated she is inclined to let the market sort out the issue and stated that “our proper course won’t be sweeping legislation or layers of new regulation. Instead, it will be to ensure a degree of comfort that our newfound energy security can be maintained under current export rules.”[50]

The DOE/FE appears to be in no hurry to decide the pending export applications or release a much-anticipated second study addressing the economic impacts of LNG exports, which was originally expected in early 2012, but is now delayed until sometime later in 2012.[51] Moreover, DOE/FE recently posted an update on its website indicating that the economic impacts study will be open to public comment which will likely result in additional delays.[52]  In the meantime, it is open to debate whether U.S. LNG exports are in the “public’s interest” or not.

 


Preferred Citation: Susan L. Sakmar, America’s Natural Gas: From Shale Gas to LNG Exports, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 22 (2012), https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hblr//?p=2572.

* Visiting Assistant Professor and Andrews Kurth Energy Law Scholar, University of Houston Law Center; Adjunct Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law; licensed attorney in State of California.

[1] U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2012 (Early Release) fig. 2 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er%282012%29.pdf.

[2] LNG is natural gas that has been cooled until it reaches a liquid state, which then allows it to be transported. LNG is usually shipped on special LNG tankers but it can also be transported via truck or container.

[3] 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2006).

[4] For example, Costa Rica and Israel do not require national treatment for trade in natural gas. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, How to Obtain Authorization to Import and/or Export Natural Gas and LNG (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/How_to_Obtain_Authorization_to_Import_an.html.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Policy Guidelines and Delegation Orders Relating to the Regulation of Imported Natural Gas, 49 Fed. Reg. 6,684 (Feb. 22, 1984).

[8] Letter from James Lankford, U.S. Rep., et al., to Steven Chu, Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy (Aug. 7, 2012), http://lankford.house.gov/sites/lankford.house.gov/files/Sec%20Chu%20LNG%20Export%20Suppport%20Letter%20TX%20OK%20LA%20AR0001.pdf.

[9] Office of Oil and Gas Global Sec. and Supply, Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Applications Received by DOE/FE to Export Domestically Produced LNG from the Lower-48 States (as of Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/reports/Long_Term_LNG_Export_10-26-12.pdf.

[10] See, e.g., Benjamin Lefebvre, Should the U.S. Export Natural Gas?, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 2012, at R10, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444226904577561300198957854.html (featuring debate on potential price increases by two energy analysts).

[11] LNG Export Approvals, Market Impact: Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Energy and Natural Res. (Nov. 8, 2011) (opening statement of Chairman Bingaman), http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democratic-news?ID=242b6b91-cb66-49f5-a4bb-8b2dc54d89e1.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Susan L. Sakmar, Politics and US LNG Export Project Heat Up, Natural Gas & Electricity Journal, Sept. 18, 2012, http://www.naturalgaselectricitynews.com/sample-articles/politics-and-us-lng-export-projects-heat-up.aspx.

[19] Id.

[20] The Department of Energy’s Role in Liquefied Natural Gas Export Applications: Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Energy and Natural Res. (Nov. 8, 2011) (statement of Christopher Smith, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Oil and Natural Gas Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy), http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=58b62501-e2e1-40aa-b024-8e45ab3d4569.

[21] Id.

[22] U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/pdf/fe_lng.pdf.

[23] Id. at 1.

[24] Id.

[25] Id. at 6.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at 8.

[29] Id.

[30] Id. at 9.

[31] Deloitte MarketPoint LLC and the Deloitte Ctr. for Energy Solutions, Made in America: The economic impact of LNG exports from the United States (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Energy_us_er/us_er_MadeinAmerica_LNGPaper_122011.pdf.

[32] Charles Ebinger et al., Brookings Institution Energy Security Initiative, Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas (May, 2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/05/02-lng-exports-ebinger.

[33] Id. at 33.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at vi–vii.

[36] Press Release, Natural Res. Committee, Markey Introduces Legislation to Keep American Natural Gas in America (Feb. 14, 2012), http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/press-release/markey-introduces-legislation-keep-american-natural-gas-america.

[37] H.R. 4024, 112th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2012), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr4024.

[38] H.R. 4025, 112th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2012), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr4025.

[39] Press Release, Congressman Ed Markey, Markey: Sabine LNG Export Facility Approval Would Help Export U.S. Manufacturing Jobs (Apr. 17, 2012), http://markey.house.gov/press-release/markey-sabine-lng-export-facility-approval-would-help-export-us-manufacturing-jobs.

[40] Kate Winston, Senators question price impact of LNG exports, Platts Energy Week, Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.wusa9.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=174167.

[41] Christopher Helman, Dow Chemical Chief Wants to Limit U.S. LNG Exports, Forbes, Mar. 8, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/03/08/dow-chemical-chief-wants-to-limit-u-s-lng-exports/ (citing Dow Chemical CEO Andrew Liveris).

[42] Sierra Club’s Motion to Intervene, Protest, and Comments, Dominion Cove Point LNG, LP., FE Docket No. 11-128-LNG, (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/authorizations/2011_applications/Motion_to_Intervene_Sierra_Club_02_06_12.pdf.

[43] Id. at 22–24.

[44] Id. at 47.

[45] Amy Harder, War Over Natural Gas About to Escalate, Nat’l Journal, May 3, 2012, http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy-report/war-over-natural-gas-about-to-escalate-20120503.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] See Ebinger, supra note 32, at 9–10.

[49] Tennille Tracy, U.S. Gas Exports Put on Back Burner, Wall St. J., May 31, 2012, at B3, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304821304577436470209675022.html.

[50] See Sakmar, supra note 18.

[51] Id.

[52] U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Status of LNG Export Study, Natural Gas Import & Export Regulation, http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).

 

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Usha Rodrigues

Public Inroads in Private Equity

The law has long confined the average investor to trading in public securities[1] while allowing wealthy—or “accredited”[2]—individual investors access to a panoply of private securities, including investment vehicles such as hedge funds and private equity funds. Nevertheless, pressure to let the general public into private equity has been growing. Two forces have contributed to this mounting pressure. First, public investors are eager to try their hand at investing in private enterprise. Second, private firms need capital. In the face of these forces, the sharp line that has long separated public and private firms has become increasingly blurred.[3]

Consider the story of the emerging growth company (EGC), or “Initial Public Offering (IPO) on-ramp,” provision of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). In its first few months on the books, this provision had effects far different from what its drafters envisioned. The JOBS Act’s IPO on-ramp was intended to ease regular companies’ path to going public; instead, it has inadvertently made it easier for the average investor to get a taste of private equity via special purpose acquisition corporations (SPACs). This piece will briefly describe SPACs, the IPO on-ramp, and how shell companies have taken advantage of a legislative provision intended to bring cash-hungry young companies directly to market. This piece will close with a few thoughts on lessons the story of SPACs’ interaction with the JOBS Act may offer regarding the increasingly indistinct line that divides public and private investment.

 Introducing SPACs

A SPAC is a type of “blank-check” company that goes public to raise a pool of cash and then begins a hunt for a target.[4] The bulk of the IPO proceeds are locked up in a trust account, invested in government-backed securities, and kept safe from the interference of the managers.[5] Once a target is identified, the SPAC managers disclose material financial information about it to shareholders, who then have a say on whether the acquisition occurs by way of voting or opt-out rights.[6] If no suitable target is found, or if a shareholder is unhappy with the deal, she can receive most of her money back—an average of ninety-eight cents on the dollar—from the trust account.[7] But if a SPAC shareholder does like the deal, then she will end up having owned a piece of an acquisition vehicle—in essence, a one-off private equity fund.[8]

The beauty of the SPAC model is that it bifurcates the process of going public, making it faster and cheaper. When the SPAC itself goes public, it is basically an empty shell, so any disclosures required under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) are minimal and cheap.[9] The SPAC’s Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) filings are likewise minimal; in essence, they involve nothing more than reporting the rate of return generated in the trust account.[10] If and when the SPAC acquires a target—usually a private company—that target immediately becomes public without the hassle, disclosures, and delay that accompany a typical IPO.[11]

JOBS Act and SPACs

SPACs offered a rare chance for the average investor to participate in the rarified world of investing in private targets, while simultaneously offering those targets an easy route to an IPO. The JOBS Act took a decidedly different approach to blurring the line between public and private investment. Rather than letting the general public into private equity investments, the drafters tried the converse: encouraging more private firms to go public. Yet despite the JOBS Act’s focus on making it easier to bring traditional operating companies to the public market, its provisions have proven unexpectedly appealing for SPACs. Thus, legislation intended to help conventional companies go public is also facilitating a form of private equity investment.

SPACs’ business structure was in place long before the passage of the JOBS Act; indeed, they predated the Act by more than a decade.[12] The whole point of the JOBS Act’s EGC provision was to coax small-cap companies into going public by reducing the burdens of public disclosure and ongoing federal regulation, thereby providing the benefit of access to the public capital markets previously unavailable to them. I thought surely the passage of the JOBS Act was bad news for SPACs. Why agree to be acquired by a SPAC when you can easily go public on your own? The JOBS Act, however, had an unanticipated effect on the SPAC market because the JOBS Act’s IPO on-ramp provision makes it easier and cheaper for any small corporation to go public.[13]

As it turned out, the JOBS Act was not all bad news for SPACs because many SPACs themselves decided to go public using the IPO on-ramp. Indeed, in the eight weeks after the JOBS Act’s passage, over a dozen of the companies taking advantage of the new on-ramp option were SPACs.[14] Four months after the JOBS Act’s passage, one out of every nine EGCs was a SPAC.[15] The trend has not abated; in the first half of August 2012, one out of five firms that made use of the IPO on-ramp provision were SPACs.[16] To say the least, SPACs are making good use of the EGC option.

At first blush, SPACs’ use of the JOBS Act’s on-ramp seems counter-intuitive. It already was, and still is, easy for SPACs to go public under the conventional 1933 Act registration process. After all, SPACs’ disclosures at the start-up phase are largely boilerplate, along the lines of “this is who we are, this is how much money we plan to raise, this is how much we are setting aside in trust.”[17] If it is so easy for SPACs to register under the 1933 Act, why should they bother with the on-ramp provision offered by the JOBS Act?

The answer to this question stems from economic realities. As it turns out, successful SPACs—that is, SPACs that complete acquisitions—can save a lot of money in securities regulation compliance costs by making use of the IPO on-ramp. The payoff comes from greatly reduced ongoing reporting requirements imposed by the Exchange Act.In particular, EGC status under the JOBS Act lasts up to five years, as long as revenues, market capitalization, and debt issuances stay low,[18] and with that status come “scaled-back disclosures, certain exemptions to executive-compensation disclosures and attestation requirements for the auditors.”[19] These features make EGC SPACs comparatively more attractive to potential targets. A private company looking to go public on the cheap (i.e., at even less expense than the JOBS Act’s on-ramp promises) might well favor an EGC SPAC acquirer that promises lower disclosure burdens over a traditional public company acquirer—or, for that matter, a non-EGC SPAC—both of which would require the Exchange Act’s more in-depth disclosure. Time will tell whether EGC SPACs prove to be more successful acquirers than traditional acquirers and non-EGC SPACs.

In sum, despite reformers’ best intentions, many of the first companies to file as EGCs were not small operating companies rushing to access the capital markets as soon as regulatory barriers fell away. Instead, they were firms looking to acquire private firms down the road and take them public. Even so, the net effect may be what the JOBS Act’s drafters intended: if these new EGC SPACs have their way, they will acquire private firms, and thus bring more small firms to the public markets. Yet the SPAC EGCs will accomplish this goal in a roundabout way. More small firms will go public, as the JOBS Act envisioned, but by way of shell companies that allow the general public to participate in the uniquely public form of private equity that SPACs offer. While successful EGC SPACs will thus bring more firms public, they will at the same time allow their own investors to participate in a species of private equity investment, a kind of investment traditionally reserved for accredited investors. All of this supports a telling conclusion: both regulators and the market itself are exerting pressure on the line separating public and private investment, and these two separate forces can combine to produce unanticipated results.

Blurring the Line Between Public and Private

In conclusion, SPACs and the JOBS Act, both considered singly and taken together, signal the mounting pressure building over the divide between public and private investment. SPACs are mechanisms that let the public make private equity-like investments. The IPO on-ramp is an attempt to entice private companies to the public markets. Yet even more tellingly, these separate phenomena have recently interacted in an unexpected way, revealing how difficult it can be for reformers to revise the public-private boundary with any degree of certainty.

SPACs and the JOBS Act’s IPO on-ramp are but two examples of recent trends that suggest that the line separating the public and private investment spheres may be blurring. Another example, the CROWDFUND Act, applies pressure on the other side of the public-private line: rather than making it easier for more private companies to access the public markets, it allows unaccredited investors a chance to invest limited sums in private companies for the first time.[20]

Securities regulation ultimately involves a delicate balancing act, with investors’ need for protection and firms’ thirst for capital pulling in opposite directions. The traditional balance reserved robust investor protection for the public markets, and allowed wealthy investors exclusive access to more risky, and potentially more profitable, private firm investment.[21] But SPACs are a sign that the general public also desires to furnish capital to private firms in exchange for the chance to earn a higher rate of return.  At the same time, the JOBS Act signals a desire on the part of regulators and firms alike to allow companies to enjoy the benefits of being public while reducing some of the burdens that have traditionally accompanied public status.  Such examples thus, in different ways, indicate that the public-private boundary may be shifting dramatically.

 


Preferred citation: Usha Rodrigues, SPACs and the JOBS Act, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 17 (2012), https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hblr//?p=2488.

† Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  I thank Mike Stegemoller and the staff of the Harvard Business Law Review.  Any errors are my own.

[1] See, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).

[2] Rule 501 of Regulation D describes several categories of accredited investors, including certain banks, charitable organizations, and certain high net worth individuals, who may invest in securities that are not registered. 17 C.F.R.  § 230.501(a) (2012). Most notably, individuals with a net annual income of over $200,000 or a total net worth of over one million dollars may invest in securities that are not registered provided that those securities meet the general disclosure requirements of Rule 502. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2012).

[3] For a few recent scholarly discussions of the public-private divide, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act (Georgetown Law and Econ. Research Paper, No. 12-002, 2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984686; Adam C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 12-010, 2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103246; Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with the author).

[4] Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of SPACs, 37 Del. J. Corp. L. (forthcoming 2012).

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 172, 225 (2008) (“SPACs are a species of private equity: these are capital pools organized to acquire individual businesses. But because of the general requirement that the initial acquisition comprise eighty percent of its assets, SPACs typically only acquire a single privately-held business. Despite these important distinctions, SPACs otherwise attempt to mimic private equity returns by employing comparable structures and practices. For example, SPACs utilize similar leverage to increase the size and potential returns of their acquisitions. The managers of SPACs are also typically provided twenty percent of the initial share offering at nominal amounts; ownership they are required to maintain until and after consummation of an acquisition.”).

[9] Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: Spac and Span, or Blank Check Redux?, 85 Wash. U.L. Rev. 931, 950–51 (2007) (describing typical SPAC registration disclosure).

[10] Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 4.

[11] Some call SPACs back-door IPOs, but SPACs differ from the seedier reverse mergers that led to so many Chinese companies with questionable accounting practices going public. Id.

[12] Riemer, supra note 9, at 944–45.

[13] For example, emerging growth companies need to disclose only two years of audited financial information prior to going public. 15 U.S.C.A. 77g(a)(2)(A) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). They are not subject to Sarbanes-Oxley’s dreaded internal controls provision. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262(b) (West 2009& Supp. 2012) amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).

[14] Emily Chasan, Meet the JOBS Act’s Jobs-Free Companies, Wall St. J., June 4, 2012, at B1.

[15] Chris Hitt, “I Am Shocked, Shocked”: Blank Check Companies and the “Scandal” of the JOBS Act, Blogmosaic (Aug. 16, 2012), http://blogmosaic.knowledgemosaic.com/2012/08/16/spacs-as-egcs/.

[16] Id.

[17] See, e.g., Acquicor Tech. Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sept. 2, 2005).

[18] 15 U.S.C.A. 77b(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).

[19] Chasan, supra note 14.

[20] Title III of the JOBS Act, the CROWDFUND Act, allows issuers to sell up to one million dollars of securities in a twelve-month period without Securities Act of 1933 registration. Any investor can invest in these companies—they are not reserved for accredited investors only. If an investor’s annual net worth or income is less than $100,000, she can invest no more than 5% of her net worth or annual income or $2,000, whichever is greater. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L No. 112-106, sec. 302, § 4(a)(6)(B)(i), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012). If an investor’s annual net worth or annual income is equal to or more than $100,000, then she can invest no more than the greater of 10% of her net worth or annual income and $100,000. Id.

[21] Individuals qualify as accredited investors by having a net annual income of over $200,000 or a total net worth of over one million dollars. 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2012).  SEC regulations and industry practice dictates that only this special class of individual investors can invest in hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds. Thus, historically at least, ordinary investors have been shut out of the private market, except via pension funds that in effect pool the resources of many investors into an accredited-investor fund. No private market mutual funds currently exist.

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Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz* and D. Daniel Sokol **

In late June 2012, Barclays entered a $453 million settlement with U.K. and U.S. regulators due to its manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) between 2005 and 2009.[1] The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division was among the antitrust authorities and regulatory agencies from around the world that investigated Barclays.

We hesitate to draw overly broad conclusions until more facts come out in the public domain. What we note at this time, based on public information, is that the Libor conspiracy and manipulation seems not to be the work of a rogue trader. Participation in a price fixing conduct, by its very nature, requires the involvement of more than one firm. In this case, the conspiracy seems to have been organized across firms and required the active knowledge of a number of individuals at relatively high levels of seniority among certain Libor setting banks. Such collusion across firms is at the core of illegal antitrust behavior. The Supreme Court has deemed combating the pernicious effects of cartels so central to antitrust’s mission that it has stated that cartels are “the supreme evil of antitrust.”[2]

The involvement of more than one bank in such a cartel is a significant corporate governance failure due to the coordination that such a cartel would have required among the various cartel members. It is perhaps even more surprising that the Libor cartel seems to have occurred in such a highly regulated industry after a wave of corporate governance reforms post-Enron and a push for greater internal compliance in the early 2000s. Yet, the very nature of the manipulation, in hindsight, seems rather obvious. The rate did not move for over a year until the day before the financial crisis of 2009 hit.[3] Also, quotes by the member banks that were submitted under seal moved simultaneously to the same number from one day to the next during that time period.[4] Had any member bank that sets Libor or any antitrust authority undertaken an econometric screen, they likely would have detected these anomalies, undertaken a more in-depth investigation, and discovered the wrongdoing.

This essay explores the use of econometric screens, either by enforcement authorities or firms themselves, as a tool to both improve detection of potential price fixing cartel behavior and police illegal firm behavior.

 I.               The Use of Econometric Screens

The art of flagging unlawful behavior through economic and statistical analyses is commonly known as screening. A screen is a statistical test based on an econometric model and a theory of the alleged illegal behavior, designed to identify whether manipulation, collusion, fraud, or any other type of cheating may exist in a particular market, who may be involved, and how long it may have lasted.[5] “Screens use commonly available data such as prices . . . market shares, bids, transaction quotes, spreads, volumes, and other data to identify patterns that are anomalous or highly improbable.”[6]

As established through the identification of the alleged Libor conspiracy and manipulation, and other previous successes, screens can be very powerful tools when properly developed and implemented; however, they do require expertise. There are two golden rules of screens: (i) one size does not fit all; and (ii) if you put garbage in, you get garbage out.[7] Without expertise in developing a screen, the attempt at screening will likely fail. Such failure should not be attributed to the screening methodology itself generally, but to the errors in development and application in a particular case.[8]

In general, we can point to six requirements to appropriately develop and implement an effective antitrust screen for collusive behavior: (i) an understanding of the market at hand, including its key drivers, the nature of competition, and the potential incentives to cheat—both internally and externally—for the firm; (ii) a theory on the nature of the cheating; (iii) a theory on how such cheating will affect market outcomes; (iv) the design of a statistic capable of capturing the key factors of the theory of collusion, fraud, or the relevant type of cheating; (v) empirical or theoretical support for the screen; and (vi) the identification of an appropriate non-tainted benchmark against which the evidence of collusion or relevant cheating can be compared.[9]

 II.             Screens and the Libor

Worldwide investigations have been launched on allegations of a possible conspiracy by several major banks to manipulate the U.S. dollar Libor and Libor rates denominated in other currencies. These investigations followed the application of empirical screens that flagged unexpected patterns in the Libor setting, representing the latest example of the power of screens to flag potentially illegal behavior in the antitrust context.

Arguably, the investigations into Libor manipulation and alleged collusive activity began with a series of articles published in the Wall Street Journal in April and May of 2008 which alleged that several global banks were reporting unjustifiably low borrowing costs for the calculation of Libor.[10] The Wall Street Journal noticed that from January 2008, the banks’ individual Libor quotes were too low when compared to their respective credit default swaps prices.[11]

Abrantes-Metz et al. followed with an August 2008 working paper in which these and other patterns were studied in greater detail using econometric screens.[12] This working paper noted that: (i) the Libor was essentially constant for a long period prior to the financial crisis, since at least January 2007, while comparable rates varied over time; (ii) most banks’ quotes were identical for most of the same period while the banks’ market implied credit ratings varied over time and in comparison to each other, meaning that some differences (even if slight) in their borrowing costs, and hence in their Libor quotes, would have been expected; and (iii) the Libor was unresponsive to changing market conditions in the late spring and early summer of 2008 when risk in the economy was already starting to increase.[13] Other research on the Libor was then conducted that identified additional irregularities.[14]

 III.           The New Antitrust Paradox Part I

In 1978, Robert Bork published the Antitrust Paradox in which he decried the lack of sound economic analysis in antitrust law.[15] The paradox was that a law that was supposed to lead to greater efficiency actually raised prices because legal analysis was not rooted in economics.[16] The antitrust law of today is quite different from that of the period during which Bork wrote. In its present form, antitrust is perhaps the area in which the economic analysis of law has driven doctrinal and policy developments more than any other substantive field.[17]

Antitrust cases addressing issues such as mergers, predation, tying, and bundling have applied industrial organization economics in identifying behavior that might distort the market.[18] This sophisticated analysis is not limited to agency practice. Antitrust case law cites law reviews that use economic analysis and economics journals in its decisions.[19] One cannot undertake antitrust analysis—whether by agencies or private parties—in either the merger area or civil antitrust litigation without significant economic analysis at every stage of decision-making. Even firms’ business strategies take antitrust considerations into account.[20]

This rigorously applied industrial organization analysis of antitrust on the civil side is distinct from antitrust analysis on the criminal side. In certain critical ways, antitrust cartel enforcement in the United States looks more like other non-antitrust, white-collar crime enforcement than the heavily economics-driven antitrust monopolization or merger enforcement. Indeed, U.S. criminal antitrust enforcement is different not merely from other areas of antitrust but from some other areas of white-collar crime in which econometrics play a more significant role.

 IV.          The New Antitrust Paradox Part II

The DOJ Antitrust Division’s criminal enforcement does not only differ from the rest of the Antitrust Division in its lack of econometric screening. The reluctance to use screening methods also puts antitrust criminal enforcement at odds with some other types of financial crime enforcement. Indeed, screens are used regularly in the detection of financial wrongdoing, tax evasion, and bid rigging.[21] Econometric screens were employed to flag illegal behavior in financial markets in several notable instances, including the recent stock options backdating and spring loading cases from the mid 2000s and the 1994 break of an alleged conspiracy by NASDAQ dealers in which odd-eighths quotes were avoided.[22] Detection of both of these scandals was triggered by the application of screens to financial data and generated large-scale public investigations as well as private litigation.[23]

Other regulatory agencies worldwide routinely use screens to help detect illegal behavior in other areas and markets, not only conspiracies and manipulations, but also insider trading, tax evasion, revenues management, and other types of accounting manipulations. These agencies include the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. [24]

 V.            How Screens Fit into Current Antitrust Enforcement

The most important recent development in criminal antitrust enforcement has been the introduction of the leniency program. Leniency destabilizes a cartel through defection of a cartel member who reports the cartel activity to antitrust authorities in return for a reduced penalty.[25] Yet, in spite of the success of leniency, current antitrust enforcement seems far from optimal deterrence of cartels, with detection rates of approximately twenty percent.[26]

We believe that the use of antitrust econometric screens will encourage increased cartel detection and increase costs for the creation of new cartels. Screens have already been used to detect anomalies in pricing in a number of jurisdictions. Notable screens include those done by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission,[27] Brazil’s C.A.D.E.,[28] and Mexico’s C.F.C.,[29] among others.

Screens complement the leniency program, as they are able to draw enforcers’ attention to anomalous behavior that the leniency program cannot detect. It may well be that leniency is more likely to fail to detect some of the most successful cartels, whose members have less incentive to apply for leniency because they all enjoy significantly larger profits than under non-collusion. Ironically, these may also be the cartels that cause the most harm to consumers. Cases detected through leniency programs are, after all, self-selected. Screens might also assist in the detection of cartels in economic sectors different from those historically detected by leniency.

Successful screens provide enforcers clues about behavior that increase the likelihood of finding hard evidence of a conspiracy.[30] Increased enforcement activity due to the investigation around the screen may be enough to encourage at least one firm to be more likely to defect from a cartel and to seek leniency.[31]

Similarly, as part of its overall compliance program, a company may choose to run its own cartel screen to ensure that its own compliance systems are effective. A company that finds unlawful behavior internally will get the benefits of leniency from antitrust authorities. In doing so, the investment in its good governance pays off because of a firm’s own reduced penalties and in the increased costs that its rivals in the industry—and fellow cartel members—will face in terms of fines, imprisonment of key individuals, litigation uncertainty, and reputation costs.

 VI.          Conclusion

The alleged Libor collusion and manipulation is something that antitrust authorities or the banks themselves could have detected had they used econometric screens. We believe that as antitrust agencies use screens more often, firms will be more likely to use screens as a prophylactic measure in the regular risk assessments they undertake to comply with antitrust law. What explains the lack of adoption of screens by the DOJ is that it, like many organizations, is slow to respond to changes. However, in a world of uncertainty, organizations may copy other organizations, as competition will eliminate inferior ideas.[32] Given how many other antitrust agencies and other non-antitrust US agencies implement screens, we believe that imitation should overcome the uncertainty that DOJ Antitrust has with screens.

 


Preferred citation: Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & D. Daniel Sokol, The Lessons from Libor for Detection and Deterrence of Cartel Wrongdoing, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 10 (2012), https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hblr//?p=2451.

* Adjunct Associate Professor at NYU Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, and Principal at Global Economics Group. I thank Albert Metz for discussions.

** Visiting Professor of Law (2012-13) University of Minnesota School of Law, Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I want to thank Claire Hill and Bruce Shnider for their suggestions.

[1] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (Jun. 27, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html.

[2] Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).

[3] Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Libor Manipulation?, 36 J. Banking & Fin. 136, 144 (2012). The authors mark the beginning of the financial crisis with three related announcements on August 9, 2007, concerning: “(a) a coordinated intervention by the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the Bank of Japan; (b) AIG’s warning that defaults were spreading beyond the subprime sector; and (c) BNP Paribas’ suspension of three mortgage-backed funds.” Id. at 140.

[4] Id. at 144.

[5] See generally Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Design and Implementation of Screens and Their Use by Defendants, CPI Antitrust Chron. (Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6547 (describing the design of successful econometric screens).

[6] Id. at 2.

[7] Id. at 3

[8] Id.

[9] Cf. Rosa Abrantes-Metz & Patrick Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and Their Multiple Applications, 24 Antitrust 66 (2009) (providing a survey of screening methodologies and their multiple applications); Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Behavioral Screening and the Detection of Cartels, in European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2007) (suggesting the increased use of screens to promote cartel detection).

[10] Carrick Mollenkamp & Laurence Norman, British Bankers Group Steps Up Review of Widely Used Libor, Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 2008 at C7; Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate, Wall St. J., May 29, 2008, at A1.

[11] Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 10.

[12] Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 3.

[13] Id.

[14] E.g., Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the Libor Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs? (Working Paper, 2010), available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~youle001/libor_4_01_10.pdf; Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Tracking the Libor Rate, 18 Applied Econ. Letters 1 (2011); Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & Albert D. Metz, How Far Can Screens Go in Distinguishing Explicit from Tacit Collusion? New Evidence from the Libor Setting, CPI Antitrust Chron. (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6642; Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Libor Litigation and the Role of Screening, CPI Antitrust Chron. (Jul. 28, 2011), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6521.

[15] Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (1978).

[16] Id.

[17] See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond, 78 Antitrust L.J. 147, 147–54 (2012); see also Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 429, 439 (2012) (“The evolution of antitrust has been shaped by changing lines of economic thinking and ideologies.”).

[18] For an overview of the literature, see, for example, Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds.) (forthcoming); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Issues in Competition Law and Policy (Wayne Dale Collins ed., 2008).

[19] See, for example, Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), which cited an economic textbook, and articles from the Journal of Law and Economics, Rand Journal of Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Political Economy in addition to law review articles that use economic analysis.

[20] See generally Thomas B. Leary, The Dialogue Between Students of Business and Students of Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1 (2003).

[21] See, e.g., Patrick Bajari & Jungwon Yeo, Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions, 21 Info. Econ. & Pol’y 90, 100 (2009); Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. Fin. Econ. 271, 294 (2007); Mark Nigrini, A Taxpayer Compliance Application of Benford’s Law, 18 J. Am. Tax’n Ass’n 72, 87 (1996); Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 518, 537 (1993); Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding, 30 Rand J. Econ. 263, 287 (1999).

[22] Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, The Power of Screens to Trigger Investigations, 10 Sec. Litig. Rep., Nov. 2010, at 18–21.

[23] Id.

[24] Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & Andrew Verstein, Revolution in Manipulation Law: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 14 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. (forthcoming).

[25] D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement, 78 Antitrust L.J. 201, 204­–07 (2012).

[26] Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 531, 535 (1991) (analyzing the period 1961–1988).

[27] See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., A Variance Screen for Collusion, 24 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 467 (2006) (searching for collusion in gasoline markets).

[28] See Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo, Screens in the Gas Retail Market: The Brazilian Experience, CPI Antitrust Chron. (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6645.

[29] See Carlos Mena-Labarthe, Mexican Experience in Screens for Bid-Rigging, CPI Antitrust Chron. (Mar. 13 2012), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6644.

[30] On what constitutes a conspiracy for antitrust purposes, see Louis Kaplow, On The Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 683 (2011); see also William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 393 (2011); William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 405 (2007).

[31] We note that not all screens will be effective and that screens are more resource intensive than merely waiting for a leniency applicant to provide hard evidence. However, the investment in some screens by the agency will encourage more firms to essentially privatize enforcement and run their own screens in industries in which the possibility of collusion may be significant.

[32] See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 211, 213–14 (1950).

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Chester S. Spatt

It is a great pleasure to provide keynote remarks at this weekend’s conference on “Complexity and Change in Financial Regulation” at the Harvard Law School. In my comments tonight I will try to build from my experiences as a former Chief Economist of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 2004 through 2007 and as a close observer of the evolution of financial regulation in the aftermath of the financial crisis to focus upon the “Complexity of Regulation.” While our financial system is itself very complex, our financial regulators would benefit in many cases by designing simple and robust approaches that build off of basic principles and that emphasize the role and importance of economic incentives and markets.

While I recognize that to some degree complexity in financial structure breeds complexity in regulation, often the causality is reversed. Complexity in regulation leads to complexity in financial structures and systems, particularly in light of the efforts of market participants to mitigate the costs and complications induced by regulation, including attempts to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Consequently, much of the costs of regulation in my view are associated with its intricacies. It also is useful to recognize that complexity in regulation leads to huge entry barriers associated with the cost of regulatory compliance. Instead of addressing “too big to fail,” this can lead to maintaining “too big to fail” institutions. This is a connection that appears to be underappreciated by our financial regulators.

Given these broad perspectives, you might not be surprised to hear that I feel that the extent of complexity in financial regulation has been, to a degree, excessive. For example, regulators often would do far better in accomplishing their regulatory goals by adapting relatively simple standards and principles that force market participants to internalize the consequences of their actions.

Economic principles emphasize the importance and power of relatively robust regulation, but in many contexts there has been little effort to try to utilize robust alternatives. An example that I will emphasize is the case of bank capital. While bank capital standards have risen in the aftermath of the financial crisis, they have not risen to levels that would internalize the full costs of risk-taking by heavily-leveraged institutions.[1] Note that the terminology “bank capital” refers to the bank’s equity, as distinct from its debt financing, which just reflects how the bank funds or finances itself. But the essence of the “too big to fail” problem is the government backstopping the risk-taking by banks by preventing failure and default on debt in the face of systemic risk. Consequently, the pricing of debt on an ex ante basis does not sufficiently penalize the firm for the costs of its risk-taking. In contrast, governments have been willing to allow the value of a bank’s equity to collapse. High capital standards would essentially provide a solution to the “too big to fail” problem as it would internalize the costs of failure within the bank’s funding cost, rather than seeking support from taxpayers. A high capital or equity requirement forces the firm to deleverage. But as financial theory teaches a) equity and debt are substitutes in funding the firm and b) the overall cost of funding the enterprise is not substantially influenced by how the firm chooses to fund itself—at least absent governmental subsidies.[2] This is a basic precept in financial theory, the Nobel Prize-winning Modigliani-Miller theory, understood by most recent MBA graduates. While some observers suggest that equity capital is dramatically more expensive than debt,[3] this is inconsistent with the basic principles of efficient pricing on which our markets are built and does not reflect the true underlying riskiness and marginal costs of equity and debt.

Requiring a bank to have sufficiently high capital, such that the capital would bear any risks that the bank creates, would be a much more robust approach to the “too big to fail” problem in my judgment than the routes designed by our legislators and regulators.[4] For example, as a byproduct of the financial crisis regulators have not attempted to scale back mega institutions and indeed, have permitted many to grow through acquisition of weak institutions (to address the immediate problems of the day). While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) requires that systemically important institutions have “living wills”[5] and the FDIC be empowered with “resolution authority” to resolve mega institutions,[6] does the marketplace and the pricing of debt contracts reflect a belief that the largest financial institutions would be resolved cleanly in the event of a perceived systemic crisis? The answer to that is no. The basic point that I would emphasize is that the complexity of these institutions, as illustrated by the difficulties with “global resolution,” undercuts the credibility of Washington’s solutions to “too big to fail.” I should note that a fundamental source of complexity is the global nature of our institutions and the national structures to regulation, which leads to considerable regulatory competition and only limited coordination.

A closely related example is the Volcker Rule, which essentially bans proprietary trading by the major financial institutions.[7] Some aspects of what is envisioned seem rather simple and clear-cut, but other features illustrate the inherent complexity of this regulation. On the one hand, it is relatively straightforward for the major financial services firms to give up their proprietary trading and hedge fund units, and indeed many of the Wall Street firms divested these activities in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.[8] On the other hand, the dealer and market-making function to facilitate the trading activities of firm customers is a central activity of financial intermediaries. Distinguishing trades that are undertaken to facilitate customer business from those that are motivated by the firm’s interest in creating trading profits can be challenging. At the heart of the regulatory proposals underlying the Volcker Rule is an attempt to develop “metrics” to try to distinguish such trades. But this is a tough distinction indeed—and at the heart of the complexity of Volcker. Indeed, recent headlines are highlighting the difficulty in implementing Volcker by the statutory deadline this summer.[9] Recently, Congressman Barney Frank has even called for the implementation of a simplified version.[10]

Yet what are we really trying to accomplish with Volcker? Most everyone agrees that we are not trying to block legitimate market-making, but instead we are trying to prevent the presence of “too big to fail” guarantees applying to proprietary trading and ensure that large banks and financial institutions bear the consequences of their risk-taking. Of course, the potential focus on complex “metrics” leads to considerable complexity in the proposed implementation and potential serious distortions in the market-making process. Ironically, government officials have exempted U.S. Treasuries from Volcker,[11] appearing to acknowledge that Volcker would raise the liquidity costs of trading Treasuries—certainly suggesting that the costs for market making are real. Now European sovereigns are seeking similar relief for their bonds trading in the U.S.[12] and not adopting analogues for firms supervised by their jurisdictions.[13] Yet there is a potential broad solution for the types of risk-taking that Volcker is designed to confront and other types of excessive risk-taking, namely high capital standards.

Much of the focus on hard-to-implement and very complex standards, such as the Volcker Rule, would be far less significant if major financial institutions simply were forced to bear the consequences of their actions by high equity (and capital) standards. To the extent that it is apparent that government would not bail out equity, but will bail out creditors, high equity is crucial to ensuring the internalization of funding consequences and costs.

This highlights a central aspect to financial regulation in the aftermath of the financial crisis, namely that in many cases alternative approaches could be used to address key features of the same underlying problem. In the language of economics, alternative regulations would provide imperfect substitutes for one another. In the case of such substitutes there may be miscounting of the benefits relative to the costs in cost-benefit analysis. In these types of situations we might expect that the benefits, such as those associated with the reduction or elimination of “too big to fail,” may be substantially duplicated and thus overstated, while the costs of simultaneously adopting different approaches may be closer to additive. In effect, there would be diminishing returns to multiple approaches to a regulatory problem.

An interesting example of the theme that regulations can be substitutes for one another arises in the treatment of credit rating agencies under the Dodd-Frank Act. On the one hand, the Dodd-Frank Act directs regulators to remove references to credit ratings in various financial regulations.[14] This limits the ability of rating agencies to sell regulatory treatment and limits the extent of systemic risk when a rating agency misjudges the underlying risk. Removing reliance on ratings for regulatory purposes suggests that regulators should be comfortable with rating agencies establishing their own norms, leading to competition in the definition of ratings. However, the Dodd-Frank Act also pursues a second theme with respect to rating agencies, stressing the importance of close supervision of the rating agencies by the regulator and relatively uniform standards and definitions.[15] This is just the opposite of encouraging competition. Indeed, the case for uniform rating standards and definitions under tight supervision of the regulator would be much more compelling if the regulator were to use the ratings for determining regulatory treatment. As you can see, these two broad perspectives—reducing reliance on ratings for regulatory purposes and tighter supervision and more uniformity in standards—serve as substitutes for one another.

Credit ratings point to a number of interesting examples of how governments think about the information generated by market participants.[16] On the one hand, there is the desire to outsource aspects of the regulatory process, but on the other hand huge suspicion by government officials of the information that would arise from such processes with respect to sovereign credits. By way of illustration, this has emerged vividly on many fronts with concerns about the quality of sovereign credits. For example, in the aftermath of the downgrade of the United States by Standard and Poor’s, the Treasury said that S&P had engaged in “terrible judgment.”[17] In Italy, the police even raided a credit rating agency in the face of an adverse judgment.[18] The European sovereign debt crisis led to a ban on naked credit default swaps and short selling of financials in some European countries as well as attempts to undercut the definition of a “credit event” in Greece.[19] There can be tremendous information in credit default swap pricing—at least if there is not an attempt to manipulate the underlying credit event. On other fronts, “the European Union’s (EU) application of Basel bank capital rules placed ‘zero risk weight’ on EU sovereign debt, as if these instruments were not subject to credit risk, creating huge artificial incentives for banks to hold these sovereign credits.”[20] Instead of being motivated by investor protection, such treatment appears to be an attempt to increase the demand for sovereign debt and the ease with which incumbent officials can continue to issue it.[21] Even the purchases of sovereign debt by the European Central Bank would inflate its demand, thereby artificially raising the price and complicating the problem of sorting out the natural private sector interest in the bonds.[22]

This broad class of government policies, “by weakening the integrity of market pricing”, can reduce the sovereign’s own access to funding over time.[23] It certainly would have been difficult to see how these could be acts of investor protection, which is a core justification for much of financial regulation. It is important for government officials around the globe to have a healthy respect for market institutions rather than suspicion about these arrangements, especially when applied to their government’s own credits. This would not require the type of complexity that appears to be the hallmark of much regulatory policy.

Central clearing of relatively standardized derivatives is another important focus under the Dodd-Frank Act.[24] This is leading to a fundamental redesign of the trading of derivative securities and swaps and the required use of central counter-parties (CCPs) for relatively standardized instruments. The re-engineering of these markets is proving to be tremendously complicated. While I am somewhat sympathetic to the use of the CCPs as a way to reduce contagion associated with counter-party risk and to make the risk structure more transparent, it is not clear that the use of clearinghouses will actually reduce systemic risk.[25] Risks are not eliminated when matched through a clearinghouse. Indeed, the incentives to trade with weak counter-parties would be heightened (because of more favorable pricing), and more generally, the clearinghouse would tend to attract transactions that it was mis-marking.[26] If market participants perceived the risk of trading through the clearinghouse were low (e.g., due to a potential federal guarantee) market participants would increase their risk exposures.[27] For these reasons, as well as the concentration of risk in the CCP, it is plausible that central clearing would raise systemic risk greatly when another crisis occurred and perhaps even raise the likelihood of a crisis.[28] While many observers have pointed to the lack of clearinghouse failures during the financial crisis a few years ago, in fact in recent decades there have been a number of clearinghouse failures, and the nature of the risks that would be assumed by a swap clearinghouse would be huge compared to that in traditional clearinghouses.[29] “Indeed, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke attributed the [absence of such failures] during the financial crisis to ‘good luck’” and summarized the relevant takeaway as follows: “As Mark Twain’s character Pudd’nhead Wilson once opined, if you put all your eggs in one basket, you better watch that basket.”[30] To avoid the potential collapse of a major clearinghouse would require very strong risk management and backstops from Washington, D.C. The complexities associated with the operation and design of a swaps clearinghouse will be vast.

In trying to identify simple and robust perspectives to guide the financial regulatory process, it is helpful to focus briefly on cost-benefit analysis. This has been an especially visible issue in Washington, D.C., in the aftermath of last year’s decision by the District of Columbia Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, striking down the SEC’s proxy access rule due to an inadequate and inconsistent cost-benefit analysis.[31] The court’s ruling, following earlier decisions by the D.C. Circuit overturning the SEC’s independent mutual fund chair and director rule in 2005 and 2006,[32] highlights what should be central criteria for financial regulation under administrative law and economic principles. It is challenging to do cost-benefit analysis right, but until last year’s decision there was relatively little inclination by financial regulators to take the challenge seriously. In my view, the development of evidence in support of rule-making and to determine the direction of potential rule-makings is quite important. Among other tools, this emphasizes the importance of natural experiments—perhaps even randomized ones—as well as serious before-and-after analyses to assess the impact of regulations. Indeed, one way to give before-and-after analyses teeth would be to “sunset” (end) the rule adoption after a number of years, so that its merits would need to be reargued, in part using the data generated from the initial rule adoption.[33] More generally, excess complexity in the formulation of a regulation can be a serious impediment to the generation of meaningful evidence.

Adherence to economic principles is an important way to strive for simplicity in the regulatory process. While much of the focus of the Circuit Court’s proxy access decision addressed inconsistencies in the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis, at least some aspects of that rule also suggested conflict with economic principles.[34] I thought that a particularly striking aspect of the overturned proxy access rule was that the coalition of shareholders who would be permitted to nominate candidates to be placed on the corporation’s official proxy ballot needed to own at least 3% of the company’s shares for at least three prior years.[35] The latter restriction seems at variance with the traditional concept of the full transferability of ownership rights through a sale. Ownership of an asset is a claim to its future rather than something vested by virtue of history.[36]

A final theme that I would like to highlight in my discussion of simplicity vs. complexity in regulation is the importance of transparency and disclosure. This arises at many levels. First, I think that it is very important that the decision-making process of the regulators be exposed to sunlight with serious opportunity for diverse perspectives at the regulator to be articulated. Such conversations would reduce the effective complexity of regulation by contributing to the understanding of the public. Yet remarkably, a recent Wall Street Journal article highlights the almost total absence of public meetings by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve in the last two years and even errors by not properly recording dissents.[37] Transparency is important not only for statements about monetary actions, but also with respect to the rule-making (and along other lines for the detail underlying liquidity facilities).[38]

Disclosure also is an important substantive value in the regulatory process for regulators to take seriously. Yet in some situations regulators appear to have discouraged disclosures. An interesting example along these lines is the limited disclosures by Bank of America during its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, with the apparent strong encouragement of the Federal Reserve and Treasury.[39] Indeed, more extensive and informative disclosures to shareholders would likely have led to the rejection of the acquisition, heightening concerns about the possible collapse of Merrill Lynch. The example of stress tests also is an interesting one in which the concerns of systemic risk regulators and banking supervisors would not have emphasized disclosure and indeed, the absence of any disclosure until the latter stages of the 2009 stress tests was striking.[40] Yet disclosure is a fundamental principle in America’s capital markets, and indeed to the extent that banks plan to address stress test results with a capital raising, it is crucial that investors be apprised of the planned uses of the funds (including providing a capital cushion) rather than being misled. Full disclosure also is very simple (especially compared to incomplete disclosure)—the structure of information that is available to market participants would be transparent and recognized by all.

Financial regulation benefits from an emphasis on simple rather than complicated rules that avoid creating needless distortions, undertake serious cost-benefit analyses, use transparent rule-making processes, and emphasize disclosure and incentives.

I appreciate your listening and reflecting upon my remarks and would welcome any questions that you might have. Thanks very much.

 


Preferred citation: Chester S. Spatt, Complexity of Regulation, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 1 (2012), https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hblr//?p=2299.

† Chester S. Spatt is the Pamela R. and Kenneth B. Dunn Professor of Finance at the Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon University, where he has been a faculty member since 1979. Professor Spatt also served as the Chief Economist of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D.C. from July 2004 until July 2007.  He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Sloan Foundation.

[1] See Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Capital is Not Expensive 11–19 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 86, 2011) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1669704.

[2] Id. at 17–18.

[3] See id. at 1.

[4] Anat R. Admati and Martin Hellwig, Good Banking Regulation Needs Clear Focus, Sensible Tools, and Political Will, Int’l Centre for Fin. Reg. 5 (Dec. 2011) http://www.icffr.org/assets/pdfs/February-2012/ICFR—Financial-Times-Research-Prize-2011/A-Admati-and-M-Hellwig—Good-Banking-Regulation-N.aspx, in advocating high capital standards, also emphasize that “regulation should focus on measures that are cost effective and that do not require that supervisors know more than is feasible.”  Allan H. Meltzer, Banks Need More Capital, Not More Rules, Wall St. J., May 16, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304192704577405821765336832.html, also calls for high capital standards and points to the difficulty designing and implementing regulation (using the example of the ambiguity as to whether the recent losing trades of JP Morgan Chase would have been covered by the Volcker Rule, if it had been in effect) and advocates outright repeal of Dodd-Frank.

[5] Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(d)(1) 124 Stat. 1376, 1426 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].

[6] Id. § 204.

[7] See id. sec. 619 § 13.

[8] See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, Bank of America Cuts Back Its Prop Trading Desk, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/bank-of-america-cuts-back-its-prop-trading-desk/.

[9] See, e.g., Craig Torres & Cheyenne Hopkins, Bernanke Says Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule Won’t Be Ready by July 21 Deadline, Bloomberg, Feb. 29 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-29/bernanke-says-dodd-frank-s-volcker-rule-won-t-be-ready-by-july-21-deadline.html.

[10] Ben Protess, Barney Frank Wants Simpler Volcker Rule by Labor Day, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/barney-frank-wants-simpler-volcker-rule-by-labor-day/.

[11] Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619 § 13.

[12] Cheyenne Hopkins, U.S. Regulators Exploring Volcker Exemption for Foreign Sovereign Debt, Bloomberg, Feb. 1, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-01/u-s-regulators-weigh-volcker-exemption-for-sovereign-debt.html.

[13] Sarah N. Lynch & Dave Clarke, Volcker Rule May Disadvantage U.S. Banks: OCC’s Walsh, Reuters, Jan. 17, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/17/us-financial-regulation-volcker-idUSTRE80B1QB20120117.

[14] Dodd-Frank Act § 939.

[15] See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 932 § 15E.

[16] See Statement No. 320, Chester S. Spatt & Peter J. Wallison, Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm., A Regulatory Blueprint for Mismanaging the Sovereign Debt Crisis 1 (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.aei.org/paper/economics/financial-services/a-regulatory-blueprint-for-mismanaging-the-soverign-debt-crisis/.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. at 1–2.

[20] Id. at 2.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] See Dodd-Frank Act § 723.

[25] Chester S. Spatt, Statement for Senate Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment Hearing on Derivatives Clearinghouses: Opportunities and Challenges 2 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Spatt, Opportunities and Challenges]; see also Chester S. Spatt, Designing Reliable Clearing and Settlement Systems for Enhancing the Transparency and Stability of Derivatives Markets, Presentation at the Wharton School Financial Institutions Center Conference on Strengthening the Liquidity of the Financial System (June 28, 2011) (on file with author).

[26] See Spatt, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 25, at 2–3.

[27] See id. at 2; see also Mark J. Roe, Derivatives Clearinghouses Are No Magic Bullet, Wall St. J., May 6, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703871904575216251915383146.html.

[28] Spatt, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 25.

[29] Id. at 3–4.

[30] Id. at 4 (quoting Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the 2011 Financial Markets Conference: Clearinghouses, Financial Stability, and Financial Reform 8–9 (Apr. 4, 2011)); see also Editorial, Pudd’nhead Wilson in Washington, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704658704576274870104134358.html.

[31] Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

[32] See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Chamber I), 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir 2005) (overturning the SEC’s independent and mutual fund chair and director rule because the SEC failed to consider the cost of compliance and alternative rules); see also Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the SEC did not follow adequate procedures in its response to Chamber I).

[33] Chester S. Spatt, Measurement and Policy Formulation, Speech at the Meeting of the Society for Financial Econometrics at the University of Chicago, 5–6 (June 2011).

[34] See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–50.

[35] Id. at 1147.

[36] Cf. Statement No. 297, Marshall Blume et al., Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm., Proxy Access and the Market for Corporate Control 2 (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.aei.org/files/2010/09/13/Statement%20No.%20297.pdf.

[37] Victoria McGrane & Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Writes Sweeping Rules from Behind Closed Doors, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204059804577225122892450312.html

[38] With respect to the transparency of liquidity facilities, see, for example, Bob Ivry & Craig Torres, Fed’s Court-Ordered Transparency Shows Americans Have Right to Know, Bloomberg, Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-22/fed-s-court-ordered-transparency-shows-americans-have-a-right-to-know-.html.

[39] See Chester S. Spatt, Regulatory Conflict: Market Integrity vs. Financial Stability, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 625, 630–32 (2010) [hereinafter Spatt, Regulatory Conflict]; see also Chester S. Spatt, Economic Principles, Government Policy and the Market Crisis, Keynote Address at the Western Finance Association 17 (June 19, 2009).

[40] Spatt, Regulatory Conflict, supra note 39, at 629.

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Melissa A. Boudreau*

The European sovereign debt crisis has generated a number of controversial restructuring proposals that would have seemed appropriate only for emerging markets just a few years ago, but now are among the few options available to sustain the Eurozone. The leading proposal involves legislation that would mandate collective action clauses in untendered bonds governed under local law.  This Note evaluates whether enacting this legislation and utilizing it in a debt restructuring would engender successful investor claims of invalid expropriation against the sovereign in American courts, and concludes that a successful claim of invalid expropriation is unlikely.

Introduction

On April 23, 2010, Prime Minister of Greece George Papandreou called his country’s economy a “sinking ship” and requested an international bailout package.[1]  If he had revisited the maritime analogy two years later, Papandreou likely would have described Greece’s economy in early 2012 as resting upon a fragile life raft.  Despite receiving two separate bailout packages and implementing austerity measures, Greece has been unable to get its deficit under control.[2]  This sovereign debt crisis is not unique to Greece,[3] and many believe that the solution to the Eurozone’s economic woes must involve persuading bond investors to accept less than the obligation owed to them.[4]  Sovereigns could use a number of different methods to achieve this result, all with varying levels of state coercion.[5]  One such method is examined below.

Greece will be used as a case study in this paper, but the analysis presented here is by no means limited to Greek bonds.  Indeed, a surprising number of Eurozone periphery countries have significant amounts of local-law debt.[6]  Therefore, the applicability of the analysis presented below should be far-reaching in the Eurozone crisis, as the outcome in Greece may establish a template for future Eurozone restructurings.[7]  As one insider acknowledged, “It is not about Greece.  It is not about the money.  Most banks have written down their Greek bonds.  It is about a precedent for the rest of Europe and how the rules will be set going ahead.”[8]

I.   Background

After much media speculation throughout January 2012,[9] the Greek Parliament approved Law 4050/2012 on February 23, 2012.[10]  This law, known as the Greek Bondholder Act,[11] closely mirrors the model outlined in a 2010 paper by Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati.[12]  This similarity is unsurprising, for Buchheit is the head of the legal team retained by Greece to navigate the restructuring.[13]  Because the Greek government has not yet released an official English translation of the Greek Bondholder Act,[14] this Note will reference the issues presented in the Buchheit and Gulati model along with its so-called “Mopping-Up Law.”[15]

A.   Relevant Aspects of Greek Bonds

The critical aspect of Greek bonds for the purposes of this analysis is the governing law.  “Local law” governs an estimated 90% of these bonds.[16]  Generally, investors are wary of bonds with local-law clauses because they present the possibility for the sovereign to change its law to facilitate a restructuring of its own debt.[17]  In the past, these doubts predominantly have been associated with bonds in emerging markets; investors have not had similar misgivings with bonds issued under local law in industrial markets because the reputational sanctions that inevitably would result have offered sufficient deterrence.[18]  Even with the threat of reputational sanctions, however, countries have restructured under local law,[19] but in none of these instances were the stakes as high as those in the Greek restructuring.[20]  In fact, according to Buchheit and Gulati, “No other debtor country in modern history has been in a position significantly to affect the outcome of a sovereign debt restructuring by changing some feature of the law by which the vast majority of the instruments are governed.”[21]

Additionally, the bonds governed under Greek law were not drafted with a collective action clause (“CAC”).[22]  CACs are clauses in loan agreements that provide a supermajority of investors with the power to modify essential payment terms of the agreement.[23]  Because this provision was absent from the original local-law bonds, Greece was not given the power to amass a supermajority of investors to facilitate a debt restructuring for these particular bonds.

B.      Overview of the Mopping-Up Law

The Greek restructuring proposed by Buchheit and Gulati is a bond exchange offer with a state-mandated collective action clause.  It likely drew inspiration from a bond exchange offer with exit consents, so a brief explanation of exit consent restructuring is helpful.[24]  In a bond-exchange offer with exit consents, the debtor offers investors the option to swap their bonds with bonds having more flexible payment terms.[25]  To encourage other bondholders to take part in the exchange, the sovereign will require consenting bondholders to waive certain protections in the old bond that do not require unanimity for amendment.[26]  In this way, holdout bondholders could be left with bonds lacking certain contractual protections.[27]  Unfortunately, because the Greek local-law bonds disallow amending the terms of the bonds after issuance,[28] restructuring via traditional exit consents is unworkable in this instance.[29]

Thus enters the Mopping-Up Law.  Instead of directly modifying contractual language, the Mopping-Up Law would change local law to effectively incorporate a collective action clause in all untendered local-law bonds.[30]  Buchheit and Gulati suggest that the law could work as follows:

[L]ocal law would be changed to say that if the overall exchange offer is supported by a supermajority of affected debtholders (say, 75%, to use the conventional CAC threshold), then the terms of any untendered local law bonds would automatically be amended so that their payment terms (maturity profile and interest rate) match those of one of the new instruments being issued in the exchange.[31]

The incorporation of this clause via the contract’s governing law does not result in the sovereign directly taking tangible assets from investors.  Instead, it leaves the dirty work to the consenting bondholders.[32]  In this way, it is comparable to an exit consent restructuring.[33]  Similarly, the sovereign is still tasked with convincing a supermajority of investors to support the overall exchange offer.  This is “consistent with the fundamental principle that a sovereign debtor bears the burden of persuading its creditors that a debt restructuring is essential, that the terms of the restructuring are proportional to the debtor’s needs, and that the sovereign is implementing economic policies designed to restore financial health.”[34]  The central question is whether the sovereign must convince all investors or just a supermajority.[35]

C.     Scope of This Inquiry

The scope of this Note is narrow.  It examines whether American courts would find the Mopping-Up Law to be an invalid expropriation under international law.  This is certainly not the extent of a general inquiry into the Mopping-Up Law—other questions of international law will remain, such as those raised under Article 17 of the Greek Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols, and unfair or inequitable treatment[36]—but addressing this particular element is far more manageable for one short paper.

Moreover, the American legal system is among the most protective systems in the world with regard to private property rights.[37]  Therefore, “[W]hile a U.S. court’s interpretation of the international law of expropriation may not be representative of the views of all or even most countries, a U.S. court’s interpretation does represent a kind of floor for assessing the legality of government action under international law.”[38]  Assuming that U.S. courts are highly protective of bondholder rights, this analysis presents a perspective of what government actions are “clearly permissible” within the context of international law.[39]

II.   Potential Sovereign Immunity

Before embarking on an expropriation analysis, courts must address the threshold issue of sovereign immunity.  Sovereign immunity stems from two sources in U.S. law: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the act of state doctrine.

A.   Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)[40] provides the “sole basis” to bring claims in the United States against a foreign state.[41]  Under the FSIA, foreign states are immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, subject to certain exceptions.[42]  Therefore, if a claim does not fall within a statutory exception, U.S. courts lack jurisdiction and will dismiss the claim.[43]  These statutory exceptions range from waivers of immunity to terrorism.[44]

Most relevant to the immediate inquiry, a sovereign may be haled to U.S. court if its actions constitute an expropriation.[45]  For this exception to apply, “rights in property” must be taken “in violation of international law,” and that property must be related to “commercial activity” carried on in the United States by the sovereign.[46]  In interpreting this particular provision, U.S. courts have attempted to square their interpretations with the law of expropriation under international law.[47]  Unfortunately for investors, many courts have interpreted the term “property” in this provision to be tangible property only, not including contractual rights.[48]  Part III provides an in-depth discussion of U.S. courts’ expropriation analyses arising under the FSIA.

B.   Act of State Doctrine

If investors persuade the court that a FSIA exception applies, they still must overcome the act of state doctrine to proceed with their claims.  Put simply, the act of state doctrine “provides . . . that United States courts will not judge the validity of official acts of a foreign government carried out within its own territory.”[49]  The Supreme Court articulated this doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez[50]:

Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.[51]

More recently, the Court has declared that the act of state doctrine applies when “the relief sought or the defense interposed would . . . require[] a court in the United States to declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory.”[52]  The foundation for this doctrine lies in the separation of powers inherent in the U.S. federal government.[53]  To ensure harmony in conducting foreign affairs, decisions of the judicial branch cannot be in conflict with those of the executive branch.[54]  Courts commonly fail to reach the merits of an expropriation claim because of the act of state doctrine.[55]

But there are exceptions to this broad doctrine.  In 1964, Congress passed the Second Hickenlooper Amendment[56] in an effort to limit the application of the act of state doctrine in expropriation claims.  It states, in relevant part:

[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking . . . by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law . . . .[57]

This would suggest that claims of expropriation are within the purview of U.S. courts, without regard to the act of state doctrine.  However, most courts have found the Second Hickenlooper Amendment to be a very narrow exception to the doctrine.[58]

One case that solidly supports a limited reach of the act of state doctrine is Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago.[59]  The facts of Allied Bank are somewhat analogous to the current events in Greece.  In the midst of a financial crisis, the Central Bank of Costa Rica issued regulations that effectively suspended all external debt payments.[60]  This constituted an event of default under the terms of the relevant notes, and investors sued for the full amount outstanding.[61]  The district court had held that the act of state doctrine applied, noting that to hold otherwise would “put[] the judicial branch of the United States at odds with policies laid down by a foreign government on an issue deemed by that government to be of central importance.”[62]  On appeal, the Second Circuit first held that the actions of the Costa Rican government were “fully consistent with the law and policy of the United States,”[63] but on rehearing en banc, the court reversed its prior decision on policy grounds.[64]  In arriving at this determination, the Second Circuit relied upon the policy outlined in the amicus brief proffered by the Department of Justice.[65]  The government’s brief noted that the court’s prior interpretation of U.S. policy was incorrect, and that the proper means for restructuring this debt was in an International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)-approved economic adjustment program.[66]  The brief then remarked that U.S. policy was “strongly supportive of this approach to resolve the current international debt problem.”[67]  Persuaded by the Justice Department’s policy argument, the Second Circuit concluded that investors’ “extinguished” right to receive interest payments constituted a “taking”[68] and therefore that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable.[69]

However, the Second Circuit’s subsequent rulings caution against drawing broad conclusions about expropriation and the act of state doctrine from Allied Bank.  Just a few months after deciding Allied Bank, the Second Circuit held that the act of state doctrine applied in another expropriation analysis.[70]  Indicating that the doctrine was still strong in light of Allied Bank, the court noted that “each case [must] be analyzed individually to determine the need for a separation of powers.”[71]  Thus, absent an explicit request from the Executive Branch—which is especially unlikely for the immediate inquiry, as the IMF has signaled its approval of a retrofit collective action clause[72]—it seems clear that courts tend to err on the side of deference to the sovereign.

Although scholars have argued that courts’ unwillingness to scrutinize expropriation claims is contrary to the plain language and congressional intent of the Second Hickenlooper Amendment,[73] courts continue to apply the act of state doctrine frequently and with little regard to expropriation limitations.[74]

III.  Would the Mopping-Up Law Be an Expropriation Under International Law?

If investors manage to overcome sovereign immunity, the court would then move into an expropriation analysis.  U.S. courts have not developed a consistent framework with which to analyze questions of expropriation.[75]  In fact, as exemplified above within the Second Circuit, even the same courts vary in their analyses of expropriation claims.[76]  Oftentimes, the facts of the case are more determinative of the ultimate result than the absence or presence of specific criteria.[77]  However, courts have tended to focus on four key factors: the coerciveness of the state’s action with regard to renegotiating or repudiating contracts, the underlying purpose of the action, whether the action was discriminatory, and the amount of loss to the claimant.[78]  This Part will examine each of these factors in turn.

A.    What Degree of Coercion in Repudiating or Renegotiating a Contract Warrants a Finding of Expropriation?

Most courts that have examined whether a repudiated contract is an expropriation under international law have determined that repudiation does not constitute expropriation.[79]  The few courts that have held that breach of contract is an expropriation have done so only upon finding that another prong of the expropriation analysis has been violated.[80]  One exception to this general rule is the Ninth Circuit’s finding in West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A.[81] that contracts constitute property under international law, and the taking of contract rights alone constitutes an expropriation.[82]  However, even with this broad finding, the Ninth Circuit held in favor of the defendants, concluding that “[a] state has a strong interest in its monetary policy” and that “[u]nder international law, the legislature generally is free to impose exchange controls.”[83]  This interest in regulating monetary policy is discussed further in Part IV.

The analysis is slightly different for a renegotiated contract.  At what point does a coercive restructuring become expropriatory?  The question of what constitutes a “voluntary” restructuring has been a major point of disagreement throughout the Greek crisis.[84]  Although scholars differ on what “should” qualify as an expropriation,[85] the only consensus is that the threat or use of physical force in a renegotiation is expropriatory.[86]  Short of that, the law is hazy.[87]  Therefore, because much of the inquiry would likely be fact-based,[88] the court probably would look to the other prongs of the expropriation analysis to determine whether a coercive—but nonviolent—restructuring would be an expropriation.

B.     What Is the Purpose of the Mopping-Up Law?

When addressing a claim of expropriation against a sovereign, courts often focus on the purpose of the state’s action to determine whether the taking is improper.[89]  An important distinction to make here is whether the purpose inquiry is used as an affirmative defense[90] or as part of the analysis to determine whether an expropriation has occurred.  The purpose analysis within an affirmative defense is discussed at length in Part IV; in this Section, the purpose analysis is limited to ascertaining whether an expropriation has occurred.

In determining whether an expropriation has occurred, courts tend to distinguish between commercial and governmental purposes in state action.[91]  Typically, international law is not implicated if the state acts pursuant to a commercial purpose only, whereas international law may be implicated if the state acts pursuant to a governmental purpose.[92]  At first, this may seem counterintuitive; one would think that the sovereign should be given more leeway when acting pursuant to a governmental purpose.  However, because expropriation is a “quintessentially sovereign act,”[93] the state must “slip[] into its . . . sovereign shoes” to be liable to investors.[94]  Therefore, if the state took only actions that a commercial entity could also take, then its breach would not be an expropriation under international law.[95]  Because a retrofit CAC requires the sovereign to take legislative action, further inquiry into this point of the expropriation analysis is unnecessary: the Mopping-Up Law undoubtedly would be recognized as the state working within its governmental capacity, and therefore the sovereign would not be granted the “commercial activity” exception in this prong of the expropriation analysis.[96]

C.    Would the Mopping-Up Law Be Discriminatory?

Some courts have concluded that a sovereign’s action is expropriatory only if it is discriminatory.[97]  Though not all courts adhere to this reasoning,[98] a court is more likely to find an expropriation if it senses some inherent unfairness in the way a sovereign is treating foreign nationals.[99]  The Mopping-Up Law would not raise such questions of discrimination against foreign nationals.  It would treat all investors holding local law bonds—including Greek investors—the same.[100]  Therefore, if a court were to consider discrimination only to the extent of unfairness toward foreign nationals, then it is highly unlikely that it would find the Mopping-Up Law to be discriminatory; indeed, a court might not even consider this particular factor in its analysis.

However, it is possible that a court could view the Mopping-Up Law as discriminatory toward holdout creditors, regardless of nationality.  Although U.S. courts have not yet extended the concept of discrimination to bondholder status, at least one scholar believes that it is within the realm of possibility—but unlikely—for international law to recognize this particular form of discrimination.[101]  Interestingly, the actions of officials inside the Greek restructuring have not indicated any concern about violating this particular factor in the expropriation analysis.  On February 17, 2012, the European Central Bank (“ECB”) announced a swap of its Greek bond holdings for new bonds that are exempt from collective action clauses.[102]  Other bondholders were not offered this option, prompting some to question whether the preferential treatment granted to the ECB—or, put less favorably, the subordination of the non-ECB bondholders—would trigger credit-default swaps.[103]  While this factor is not dispositive in the expropriation analysis, officials guiding the Greek restructuring certainly are not helping their case.[104]

D.    What Degree of Economic Loss Would Result from the Mopping-Up Law?

The final prong of the analysis concerns the degree of economic loss without compensation borne by the potential creditors.[105]  As with the other factors in the expropriation analysis, this particular prong does not provide a clear framework for judicial scrutiny.  Courts have recognized that a total deprivation of property would violate international law, but short of that, the law is unclear.[106]

In analyzing this particular factor, the structure of the Mopping-Up Law is important to keep in mind: the effect of the law on investors would be to allow other bondholders to execute a “take” in the future.[107]  There are two related points here.  First, by enacting and utilizing the Mopping-Up Law, the sovereign itself would not be taking directly from investors—at least, not in the traditional sense.  Instead, unwilling or uncooperative holdouts would be forced to participate in the bond exchange only if a requisite supermajority of investors willingly participated.[108]  Second, questions would remain as to whether any rights had been “taken” at all.[109]  The legislation is designed to work within the agreed-upon terms of the bonds to facilitate a restructuring.[110]  Therefore, a claim that the Mopping-Up Law somehow removed valuable protections from the bonds is dubious, as those protections are not guaranteed in the first instance.[111]

If a court were to determine that the sovereign had taken action that resulted in economic loss, valuation of that loss would still be a problem for investors.  Greek bonds have been downgraded to junk status,[112] and courts have taken into account the “acknowledged state of the [sovereign’s] economy” when valuing a loss.[113]  Therefore, if the bonds’ value decreased as a result of a restructuring that took advantage of the Mopping-Up Law, any resulting economic loss might be measured against the bonds’ junk status today.[114]  Thus, it is possible that the investors’ economic loss could be considered de minimis.

E.         So . . . Would Courts Find the Mopping-Up Law To Be an Invalid Expropriation?

It is unclear whether a court would find the Mopping-Up Law to be an invalid expropriation, although the lack of physical force in the restructuring, the equal treatment of foreign nationals, and the junk status of the bonds weigh against potential creditors’ claims.  Moreover, courts often rely upon a fact-specific analysis,[115] so the apparent restraint of the Mopping-Up Law might sway the court in favor of the sovereign.[116]

The most important point to stress here is that the critical aspects of the court’s analysis are not in the expropriation test itself, but in determining whether sovereign immunity applies or an affirmative defense is available.  The majority of expropriation claims are adjudicated at the threshold questions or the finding of an affirmative defense.[117]

IV.   Is an Affirmative Defense Available?

If the court were to find for the investors in its expropriation analysis, Greece could still present an affirmative defense that would excuse an otherwise invalid expropriation: a compelling public need for action in light of a financial crisis.[118]  Both U.S. courts and international tribunals have recognized that an attempt to mitigate a financial crisis serves an important public purpose and is a qualifying affirmative defense.

A.   Precedent from U.S. Courts

The relevant precedent from U.S. courts is derived from both cases that interpret international sovereign actions and cases that interpret domestic sovereign actions.

1.   Actions Concerning International Sovereigns

  U.S. courts generally offer wide latitude to sovereigns dealing with fiscal crises.[119]  For example, in West v. Multibanco Comermex S.A.,[120] the Ninth Circuit concluded that although Mexico’s exchange control regulations were expropriatory[121] and therefore the claim could be adjudicated on its merits,[122] Mexico’s strong public purpose rendered its actions lawful.[123]  Because “Mexico’s institution of exchange controls was an exercise of its basic authority to regulate its economic affairs,”[124] its actions did not “constitute takings under international law.”[125]  The Second Circuit came to a similar finding in Braka v. Bancomer, S.A.[126] on affirming the district court’s dismissal on act of state grounds.  The district court concluded, “Mexico’s act in this instance cannot be construed as a simple repudiation of a government entity’s commercial debt [because] the mechanisms used by Mexico are conventional devices of civilized nations faced with severe monetary crises, rather than the crude and total confiscation by force of a private person’s assets.”[127]  The Mopping-Up Law not only would be enacted in response to a fiscal crisis, but in fact would be attempting to mitigate such a crisis.[128]  Therefore, courts may afford the same deference to Greece that Mexico enjoyed in West and Braka.

Another important consideration for this prong of the analysis concerns the nature of the investment.  If the investor was aware of the credit risk upon entering the investment and was receiving higher yields as a result, why should the court bail out potential creditors when the investment does not deliver as expected?  As the Ninth Circuit observed, “The courts of this country should not operate as an international deposit insurance company . . . .  The actions of the [sovereign] and the losses [it] occasioned were within the purview of the risks associated with those potentially extraordinary returns.”[129]  International tribunals have noted similar sentiments.[130]  These comments are especially relevant for analysis of the Mopping-Up Law, as scholars have assessed the local-law Greek bonds to have higher yields than the Greek bonds governed by English law.[131]  One particular study concluded, “[T]he markets seem to recognize the greater vulnerability of local-law governed bonds to debtor misbehavior as compared to bonds governed by foreign law. The evidence shows that Greek bonds governed by different laws were priced differently even prior to the crisis.”[132]  This study continues on to note that the pricing premiums likely reflected the price that investors were willing to pay for holdout protections.[133]  Therefore, courts may be skeptical of investors’ cries for fairness when the investors had assumed a greater risk when they had invested in local-law governed bonds.[134]

2.   Actions Concerning Domestic Sovereigns

U.S. courts have shown similar deference to important public purposes in cases concerning domestic sovereign entities.  The central case about the protection of public contracts from legislative interference is United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey.[135]  The case arose when New York and New Jersey attempted to repeal a statutory covenant enacted a decade earlier to protect the holders of bonds issued by the Port Authority of New York.[136]  The Supreme Court held that the repeal of the covenant was unconstitutional because it violated the Contract Clause,[137] but the critical aspect of the Court’s decision for purposes of the present analysis lies in the test that U.S. Trust set forth.[138]  The third step in the U.S. Trust test asks whether the legislative modification was “reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”[139]  This “important public purpose” test has validated legislation ranging from imposing price controls on intrastate gas markets[140] to legislatively reducing the annual salaries of state employees.[141]

Similarly, in the Gold Clause Cases,[142] the Supreme Court deferred to the federal government’s interest in regulating the nation’s monetary policy.  In 1933, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring that all clauses that stipulated payment in gold in public and private contracts were against public policy.[143]  This effectively forced all payments on contract obligations to be made in devalued currency, regardless of the terms of the contract.[144]  The Court concluded that Congress’s comprehensive power over monetary policy, especially in a financial crisis, outweighed any fairness concerns.[145]  Most relevant to the immediate inquiry is the particular Gold Clause Case of Perry v. United States,[146] which concerned government bonds.  The Court held that the joint resolution as it applied to government bonds was unconstitutional, as the government was impairing its own obligations.[147]  However, in determining actual loss, the Court concluded that the nation’s economic conditions must be taken into account.[148]  Because the damages would be “nominal,”[149] the plaintiff “fail[ed] to show a cause of action for actual damages.”[150]  This would be similar to a court finding that the Mopping-Up Law was, in fact, expropriatory, but that any economic loss would be considered de minimis and therefore not recoverable.[151]

Granted, courts’ overall analyses of actions by domestic sovereign entities are far from analogous with their analyses of actions by international sovereigns.  Nevertheless, the examination of an important public purpose in domestic legislation lends credence to the notion that international sovereigns will be afforded similar deference if their actions further an important public purpose.

B.     Precedent from International Tribunals

Because U.S. courts often derive guidance from international law,[152] the reasoning in international tribunals and arbitral bodies can be illuminating.  The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) provides arbitration for public debt disputes,[153] and in some cases has found that a compelling public need may trump the interests of a private entity or investor.[154]  For example, in Olguín v. Republic of Paraguay,[155] the tribunal noted that the taking “occur[ed] within the broader context of a national financial crisis,”[156] and ultimately concluded—albeit on different grounds—that the sovereign default was not an expropriation.[157]  In another international case, the Italian Corte di Cassazione focused only on whether the sovereign acted in response to a financial crisis, and—finding in the affirmative—consequently declined jurisdiction.[158]

A more recent example of public necessity trumping investors’ rights is in Iceland.  When Iceland’s three largest banks collapsed in 2008, its legislature passed emergency legislation that put the interests of ordinary account holders ahead of the banks’ bondholders.[159]  The bondholders challenged the legislature’s action, but Iceland’s Supreme Court upheld the emergency law in light of the financial crisis that the legislation was intended to alleviate.[160]  The Court concluded:

[A] major threat was present to the whole society because of the catastrophic effect of the collapse of the largest commercial banks, which could end with the collapse of economic life in the country.  The legislature, for these reasons, had not only a right but above all a constitutional duty to protect the welfare of the public.[161]

Ragnhildur Helgadóttir, Professor of Constitutional Law at Reykjavik University, was likely unsurprised at this ruling, as she concluded in an October 2011 presentation that a financial crisis could fall into the scope of emergency powers when “more than financial interest[s] [are] at stake,” such as the consequences that inevitably would accompany a systemic economic collapse.[162]  Similarly, Prime Minister of Iceland, Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, said that there was “no other option” than to have the majority of the banking collapse borne by the bondholders.[163]  Therefore, recent international precedent indicates that when a sovereign is left with few options, courts will not stand in the way of a proportional legislative response that infringes upon private investors’ economic rights.

Conclusion

Decades ago, a prominent international law scholar concluded that sovereign bond default does not necessarily trigger international responsibility:

[A]s international law stands today, a debtor state commits an international delinquency by annihilating a debt entirely through repudiation, confiscation, or virtual destruction (interference with the substance of the debt), but . . . international law has not yet reached the point where all lesser acts causing defaults and damage to creditors give rise to legal protests based on international law.[164]

International law has developed for nearly eighty years since Professor Feilchenfeld’s conclusion, and the law has, in fact, reached the point at which legal protests arise from sovereign actions that fall short of a complete taking; yet the success of such claims is still largely fact-specific and unpredictable.  However, two conclusions from this Note’s analysis are quite clear: U.S. courts are hesitant to take potentially controversial stands in foreign policy without unequivocal support from another government branch, and courts are deferential to sovereigns whose actions are proportional and in response to apparent crises.

Normative questions remain.  Should courts grant immunity to a sovereign nation because the sovereign’s actions precipitated a financial crisis?  Why should private investors shoulder a disproportionate amount of a sovereign’s debt burden?  Greece is far from faultless in its role in the current debt crisis.[165]  However, no one is likely to argue that Greece is getting off scot-free.  It has implemented a series of severe austerity measures and is fighting simply to keep its head above water.[166]  An exchange offer with a retrofit collective action clause would be painful, yes, but it also would be proportional and restrained in light of the crisis in the Eurozone.  Courts likely will take note of this restraint, and so should investors.

 


Preferred citation: Melissa A. Boudreau, Restructuring Sovereign Debt Under Local Law:  Are Retrofit Collective Action Clauses Expropriatory?, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 164 (2012), https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hblr//?p=2283.

* Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2013; University of Maryland, B.A. 2007.  Many thanks to Professor Mitu Gulati for his invaluable assistance throughout the Note-writing process. Copyright © 2012 by Melissa A. Boudreau.

[1] Niki Kitsantonis & Matthew Saltmarsh, Greece, Out of Ideas, Requests Global Aid, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/business/global/24drachma.html.

[2] Q&A: Greek Debt Crisis, BBC News, Nov. 10, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13798000.

[3] See generally Euro in Crisis, Fin. Times, http://www.ft.com/indepth/euro-in-crisis (last visited May 6, 2012).

[4] See Douwe Miedema, Europe Might Force Greek Deal on Creditors – Source, Reuters, Nov. 2, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/02/idUSL5E7M23PA20111102.

[5] Id.

[6] Unilateral Action Threatened by Greece Is Also Available to Other Sovereigns, Weekly Credit Outlook (Moody’s Investors Service, London), February 6, 2012, at 2 (noting that local law governs 88%–100% of the outstanding sovereign debt of eleven Eurozone member states); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Greek Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism 3 (The Chicago Working Paper Series Index, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 541, 2010), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/541-eap-Greek.pdf (“[R]eports suggest that a similar pattern [in local-law governed bonds] emerged with a number of the other Eurozone periphery countries that are in crisis today, including Spain, Portugal and Ireland.” (citation omitted)). See generally Jens Nordvig, Currency Risk in the Eurozone: Accounting for breakup and redenomination risk, Nomura Securities International (Jan. 2012).

[7] Richard Milne, Deal Over Greek Bonds to Set Template, Fin. Times, Nov. 21, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ff8b3d14-1463-11e1-85c7-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1gS4gtsVP.

[8] Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[9] See Matina Stevis, Greece to Introduce Retroactive Collective Action Clauses to Bonds – Troika Source, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120109-704688.html (“The Greek government will retroactively introduce collective-action clauses (CACs) to its existing bonds, a source from the troika of Greece’s creditors—the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Union—told Dow Jones Newswires Monday.”); Patrick Jenkins & Richard Milne, Greek Bondholders Poised to Accept Higher Losses, Fin. Times, Jan. 8, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/acaa7900-3891-11e1-9ae1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ipczGdVy (“Collective action clauses are likely to be introduced into Greek bonds by the PSI deal . . . .”); Yiannis Papadoyiannis, PSI Agreement Draws Ever Closer, Kathimerini, Dec. 20, 2011, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_20/12/2011_419381 (“There already are some alternative solutions on the table in case the private sector participation rate is limited. One of these options . . . is the forced participation of the minority that wanted to abstain from the PSI through a collective action clause (CAC).”). See also John Dizard, Greek Debt Crisis No Nearer Resolution, Fin. Times, Dec. 11, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4b931eec-1f5a-11e1-ab49-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1hHvrJOY5 (“I’ve been suggesting for over a year that the only way to make sure that over 90 per cent of the existing bondholders are pushed into making the exchange will be through the passage through the Greek parliament of a ‘retrofit collective action clause’ covering the roughly 93 per cent of Greek debt that is governed by Greek law.”).

[10] Greek Government’s Terms for Bond Swap with Creditors: Statement, Bloomberg, Feb. 24, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-27/greek-government-s-terms-for-bond-swap-with-creditors-statement.html.

[11] Rules for the amendment of securities, issued or guaranteed by the Greek Government by consent of the Bondholders (36 Α’/23.02.2012) (Gr.) available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/bcc26661-143b-4f2d-8916-0e0e66ba4c50/k-omolog-pap.pdf.

[12] Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure Greek Debt (Duke Law Working Papers, Paper No. 47, 2010), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/working_papers/47.  This paper was published under a slightly different name in the International Financial Law Review (Restructuring a Nation’s Debt, 29 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 46 (2010-2011)).  However, because the current volume is available only to IFLR subscribers, this Note will cite to the Duke Law Working Papers version that is readily available to all online.

[13] John Dizard, Opinion, In an Ideal World, Kafka Would Restructure Greece, Fin. Times, July 31, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/da876352-b9c9-11e0-8171-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1hHvrJOY5.

[14] See Rules for the amendment of securities, issued or guaranteed by the Greek Government by consent of the Bondholders (36 Α’/23.02.2012) (Gr.) available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/bcc26661-143b-4f2d-8916-0e0e66ba4c50/k-omolog-pap.pdf.

[15] Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 12, at 12.

[16] Id. at 2.

[17] Id. at 5–6.

[18] See id. at 10–11 (“[I]ndustrialized countries are less likely than some of their emerging market brethren to risk eroding future investor confidence by opportunistically changing their own law in order to reduce government debt service burdens.”).

[19] Russia and Uruguay, for example, both restructured local-law bonds.  Id. at 6.

[20] See id. (“In each of these prior cases, however, the local law bonds were also denominated in local currency and formed only part of the overall stock of the debt being restructured. While the Euro is certainly now the local currency of Greece, it is a good deal more besides that.”).

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 2.

[23] Steven L. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L.J. 1189, 1190 n.5 (2004).

[24] Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986), is the first U.S. case in which exit consents were recognized and validated in commercial bonds.  Exit consents have also been used in sovereign debt restructurings, such as those in Ecuador and Uruguay.  Dr. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu: That Is the Question in Sovereign Bonds After the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga, 15 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 745, 765 (2009).

[25] See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 59, 71 (2000) (describing the Katz v. Oak Industries exchange offer with exit consents).

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 12, at 2.

[29] But see Gulati & Zettelmeyer, Making a Voluntary Greek Debt Exchange Work (Duke Law Faculty Scholarship, Paper No. 2481, 2011), at 10, available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2481/ (“In the Greek case, all that needs to be done is for the bondholders in the exchange to be given better terms.  If the exchanging bondholders are given new contracts that provide the comforting warmth of strong contract protections . . . then that will make it perilous to remain out in the cold with a contract that provides no protection.”).  Therefore, while a traditional exit consent structure is infeasible for these local-law bonds, a “reverse engineered Exit Exchange offer” effectively could provide similar benefits within the bonds’ limited parameters.  Id. at 9–10.

[30] Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 12, at 11.

[31] Id.

[32] See id. at 12 (“Once the supermajority of creditors is persuaded to support an amendment to the payment terms of the instrument, their decision automatically binds any dissident minority.”).

[33] See id. (“Viewed another way, the Mopping-Up Law would merely replicate at the level of the sovereign borrower the same protection enjoyed by corporate borrowers in many countries, including Greece. For example, we understand that in corporate reorganization proceedings under Greek bankruptcy law, if a plan of reorganization is accepted by two thirds of the affected creditors[,] . . . it will . . . bind all creditors.”).

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id. at 12–13.

[37] See generally Harvey M. Jacobs, U.S. Private Property Rights in International Perspective, in Property Rights and Land Policies 52 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong, eds., 2009).

[38] Peter Charles Choharis, U.S. Courts and the International Law of Expropriation: Toward a New Model for Breach of Contract, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2006).

[39] Id. at 7.

[40] Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 (2006).

[41] Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).

[42] FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).

[43] See Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 434 (“Sections 1604 and 1330(a) work in tandem: § 1604 bars federal and state courts from exercising jurisdiction when a foreign state is entitled to immunity, and § 1330(a) confers jurisdiction on district courts to hear suits brought by United States citizens and by aliens when a foreign state is not entitled to immunity.”).

[44] See generally FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–07 (2006).

[45] FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.”).

[46] Id.

[47] See, e.g., Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We may look to international law as a guide to the meaning of the FSIA’s provisions.”); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 497–98 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Congress intended the FSIA to be consistent with international law.”).

[48] See, e.g., Peterson v. Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 416 F.3d 83, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A]n expectation interest in payments[] does not qualify as a right in tangible property and the [FSIA] expropriation exception does not apply . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted); Brewer v. Iraq, 890 F.2d 97, 101 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Defendants’ breach of contract did not create ‘rights in property.”’); Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp. 2d 736, 749–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“As numerous courts have held, for purpose of the expropriations exception to the FSIA, the property taken . . . means physical property and not the right to receive payment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

[49] Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 1 (1998).

[50] 168 U.S. 250 (1897).

[51] Id. at 252.

[52] W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990).  The Court went on to conclude that the doctrine “requires that, in [courts’] process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.”  Id. at 409.

[53] See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“[The act of state doctrine] arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers.”).

[54] See id. (“[The Judicial Branch’s] engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.”).

[55] See Ramsey, supra note 49, at 17 n.63 (citing a number of courts that found that the act of state doctrine applied in claims of expropriation of contract rights).

[56] 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2006).

[57] Id.

[58] See, e.g., Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo S.A. v. Entex Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Congress intended [the Amendment] to be limited to cases involving claims of title with respect to American owned property nationalized by a foreign government in violation of international law, when the property or its assets were subsequently located in the United States.”); Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., Inc., 652 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[The Amendment] has been interpreted . . . as applying only to cases in which the expropriated property has found its way back into the United States.”); Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1372 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[T]he intent [of the Amendment] was to exclude all contract claims from the amendment.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. See also Ramsey, supra note 49, at 45 n.174 (“[The Amendment] . . . is problematic as a protection for contractual obligations . . . .”).

[59] 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc).

[60] Id. at 519.

[61] Id.

[62] Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1444 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev’d, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).

[63] Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 519.

[64] Id. at 522.

[65] See id. at 520 (“In light of the government’s elucidation of its position, we believe that our earlier interpretation of United States policy was wrong.”).

[66] Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Allied Bank, 757 F.2d 516 (No. 83-7714), available at http://www.archive.org/details/AlliedBankInternationalV.BancoCreditoAgricolaDeCartago.

[67] Id. at 10.

[68] Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521 n.3.

[69] Id. at 522.

[70] See Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224 (“[T]he relevant considerations mitigate against judicial intervention.”).

[71] Id. at 224.

[72] See International Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 11/351, Greece: Fifth Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, Rephasing and Request for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Greece, 31, 33 (Dec. 2011) available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11351.pdf (“A next key step now under consideration is the inducement(s) to use to ensure near-universal participation (including the possible legislation of CACs in domestic law bonds). The steps taken to date give confidence that the operation will be able to attract the needed level of creditor support and that it will go forward consistent with contemplated parameters. . . . [T]he Greek and European authorities are encouraged to consider tools to attain near-universal creditor participation.”).

[73] See Choharis, supra note 38, at 48–49 (“Where there are sufficient links to the contested property to satisfy jurisdiction for purposes of due process, U.S. courts should not decline to hear cases based upon judicial squeamishness about judging the legality of foreign sovereign acts.”). See also Malvina Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 Am. J. Int’l L. 68, 70–71 (1985) (“While some lower courts have limited the Hickenlooper Amendment to property located in the United States, and there is legislative history to support the narrow construction adopted by the Restatement, there is also legislative history to the contrary.”).

[74] See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 49, at 17 n.63 (citing a number courts that found that the act of state doctrine applied in expropriation claims).

[75] See Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 327, 329 (1994) (“[I]nternational law has not kept pace with the developments that have taken place in the last thirty years in foreign direct investment.”).

[76] Compare Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 822 F.2d 230, 238 (2d Cir. 1987) (“In general, if a state merely expropriated a debtor’s assets and treated all of its creditors alike, both foreign and domestic, the state would not be liable under principles of international law to foreign creditors for a taking of their property.”), with First Fid. Bank, N.A. v. Ant. & Barb.—Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1989) (“A breach of a commercial contract . . . is not a violation of international law unless the breach . . . occurs for governmental rather than commercial reasons and the state is not prepared to pay damages for the breach.” (citation omitted)).

[77] See, e.g., discussion in Part II.B supra regarding Allied Bank.

[78] Choharis, supra note 38, at 11.

[79] See, e.g., Brewer v. Socialist People’s Republic of Iraq, 890 F.2d 97, 101 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[P]laintiffs’ contract rights were not expropriated—rather, the contract itself was repudiated by defendants. . . . [S]uch a repudiation is not equivalent to expropriation.” (citation omitted); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 647 F.2d 320, 325 (2d Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (“[C]ommercial violations . . . do not constitute breaches of international law.”); Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“We cannot elevate our American-centered view of governmental taking of property without compensation into a rule that binds all civilized nations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Daventree Ltd. v. Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp. 2d 736, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[P]laintiffs’ failure to privatize claims do not arise from the taking of tangible property without compensation, but instead from the Sovereign defendants’ failure to honor an alleged contractual obligation to carry out an orderly privatization program. Therefore, because those claims pertain to contract rights or the right to receive payments, the expropriations exception does not apply . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

[80] See supra text accompanying note 76. See also Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[B]reach of a commercial contract alone does not constitute a taking pursuant to international law.”).

[81] 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987).

[82] See id. at 830 (“[A]lthough the certificates of deposit may be characterized as intangible property or contracts, they are ‘property interests’ that are protected under international law from expropriation.”).

[83] Id. at 831.

[84] See Matt Levine, Mandatory Greek CDS Post, Dealbreaker, Oct. 27, 2011, http://dealbreaker.com/2011/10/mandatory-greek-cds-post/ (discussing whether the Greek “pseudo-voluntary pseudo-default” exchange qualifies as a credit event for CDS purposes).

[85] Compare G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?, 38 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 307, 338 (1962) (“Where a State compels an alien to sell his property for less than its true value either to the State or to a third party, a compensable claim arises”), with W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the BIT Generation, 74 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 115, 121 (2004) (“[E]xpropriation must be analyzed in consequential rather than formal terms. What matters is the effect of governmental conduct—whether malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance, or some combination of the three—on foreign property rights or control over an investment, not whether the state promulgates a formal decree or otherwise expressly proclaims its intent to expropriate”), and Choharis, supra note 38, at 86 (“While the forced renegotiation of a contract is not as well-established, if the state uses its governmental powers to coerce more favorable contractual terms, this too would violate international law.”).

[86] See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements, 72 Am. J.Int’l L. 17, 22 (1978) (“The leading cases [in the state-investor coercion field] come from national tribunals considering claims asserted under international law. . . . [A]bout all those cases seem to settle is the point, which one hopes is obvious, that raw physical pressure vitiates consent.”).

[87] For example, Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) is the only U.S. case to conclude that a forced but nonviolent renegotiation of a contract was expropriatory.  As noted above in Part II.B, however, the precedential value of Allied Bank is questionable.

[88] See, e.g., supra note 71 and accompanying text.

[89] See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429 (1964) (“There is, of course, authority, in international judicial and arbitral decisions, in the expressions of national governments, and among commentators for the view that a taking is improper under international law if it is not for a public purpose.”).  But see Choharis, supra note 38, at 20 n.78 (noting that courts generally do not address the state’s purpose when analyzing a forced renegotiation of a contract “because of the limited circumstances that courts and scholars argue warrant finding that such forced renegotiations may violate international law”).

[90] In other words, an expropriation no doubt has occurred, but questions remain as to whether that expropriation was invalid.

[91] See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 712 rptrs’ n.8 (“The prevailing view is that, in principle, international law is not implicated if a state repudiates or breaches a commercial contract with a foreign national for commercial reasons as a private contractor might, e.g., due to inability of the state to pay or otherwise perform, or because performance has become uneconomical . . . . It is a violation of international law if, in repudiating or breaching the contract, the state is acting essentially from governmental motives . . . rather than for commercial reasons, and fails to pay compensation or to accept an agreed dispute settlement procedure.”).

[92] Id.

[93] Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).

[94] Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 711, 744 (2007).

[95] See id. at 745 (“Lack of performance does not amount to a treaty breach unless it is proven that the state has gone beyond its role as a mere party to the contract and has exercised the specific functions of a sovereign authority.”).  For a cogent analysis of the policy implications involved in this distinction between commercial and sovereign actions, see generally Choharis, supra note 38, at 27–29.

[96] “Commercial reasons” include those that a private contractor could proffer in breaching a contract.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also Waibel, supra note 94, at 745 (“Could a private corporation have successfully carried out a similar restructuring implemented by a country? In other words, did the government use specific regulatory, administrative, or governmental powers in its sovereign bond exchange? . . . A host state acting as a contractual party does not interfere with the normal exercise of the investors’ rights, but rather fails to perform the contract.”).

[97] See First Fid. Bank, 877 F.2d at 193 (“A breach of a commercial contract . . . is not a violation of international law unless the breach is discriminatory . . . .”).

[98] See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 822–23 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding an expropriation even though Mexico did not distinguish between foreign nationals).

[99] See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 822 F.2d 230, 237 (2d Cir. 1987) (“As a general principle of international law, a state is liable to a private person who is a national of another state if it takes the foreign national’s property and the taking is ‘discriminatory.’ A taking pursuant to a program that excludes from compensation all aliens or all aliens of a particular nationality is discriminatory.”).

[100] See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 12, at 6 (“A significant percentage (perhaps more than 30 percent) of the bonds are believed to be owned by Greek institutional holders.”).

[101] See Waibel, supra note 94, at 747 (“Whether this particular form of discrimination violates international law depends on whether international law requires countries to treat all creditors equally. It is at least doubtful, however, that international law incorporates such a general equal treatment obligation, over and above an obligation not to discriminate against creditors by nationality.”).

[102] Richard Barley, ECB Teaches Bondholders Greek Lesson, Wall St. J., February 17, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204059804577229351454312864.html.

[103] Paul Dobson & Abigail Moses, ECB Greek Plan May Hurt Bondholders While Triggering Debt Swaps, Bloomberg Businessweek, February 19, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-19/ecb-greek-plan-may-hurt-bondholders-while-triggering-debt-swaps.html.

[104] Commentators noted these concerns over a month before the ECB deal was made.  For a thorough analysis, see Joseph Cotterill, To ring-fence the ECB in Greece . . . or not, Fin. Times Alphaville, January 10, 2012, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2012/01/10/823321/to-ring-fence-the-ecb-in-greece-or-not/.

[105] If the loss is compensated, it likely would be considered a valid expropriation.  See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 712(1)-(2) (validating expropriation if compensation is “just” or “compensatory”).

[106] See Choharis, supra note 38, at 34–35 (“[A]uthorities offer little additional guidance on what degree of loss is necessary to constitute an expropriation. Few courts have mentioned the issue of the degree of loss necessary to result in an expropriation, and they have done so only incidentally, usually quoting secondary sources. The only principle that can be distilled from these dicta is that total deprivation of property violates international law. Short of that, the courts provide little or no guidance.”).

[107] See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

[108] See supra notes 32, 34 and accompanying text.

[109] See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

[110] See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

[111] See infra notes 131–134 and accompanying text.

[112] Greek Bonds Rated ‘Junk’ By Standard & Poor’s, BBC News, Apr. 27, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8647441.stm.

[113] Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 893 (2d Cir. 1981).

[114] See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 712 cmt. d, rptrs’ n.3 (1987) (advocating compensation “based on value at the time of taking”).

[115] See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 71.

[116] See supra text accompanying note 34.

[117] See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text; supra note 58 and accompanying text; infra note 119 and accompanying text.

[118] See Waibel, supra note 94, at 739 (“[I]nternational law [is] underdeveloped in a central respect. Under the general principles of law found in many municipal systems, extraordinary circumstances may occasionally warrant a modification of contractual claims. The lack of payment capacity and the use of general regulatory powers in national economic emergencies are pertinent examples.”).

[119] See Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[Mexico exercised] the recognized governmental function of setting monetary policy. Mexico acted in response to a fiscal crisis and its mandate touched all foreign currency obligations, private as well as public”); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Were we to disregard the exchange regulations by enforcing the [plaintiffs’] certificates of deposit, we would render nugatory the attempts by Mexico to protect its foreign exchange reserves. While we are doubtful of our ability to foresee what will vex the peace of nations, we have no doubt that disregarding the Mexican regulations would be very vexing indeed.”).

[120] 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987).

[121] Id. at 830.

[122] Id. at 831.

[123] Id.

[124] Id. at 832.

[125] Id. at 831.

[126] 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).

[127] Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).

[128] See Papadoyiannis, supra note 9 (“Bank sources told Kathimerini that the efforts to find a solution have intensified in the last few days, emphasizing the absolute need for PSI+ to succeed. If that fails, given the country’s loan requirements in the first quarter of 2012, Greece will find itself at a dead end with unpredictable consequences.”).

[129] West, 807 F.2d at 833.

[130] See, e.g., Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, para. 64 (Nov. 13, 2000) (“[T]he Tribunal must emphasize that Bilateral Investment Treaties are not insurance policies against bad business judgments.”).

[131] Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 6, at 24.

[132] Id.

[133] Id. at 25.

[134] See id. (“These purchasers took advantage of the higher yields on this risky debt. Other investors took lower yields in exchange for lower risk (or greater holdout rights).”).

[135] 431 U.S. 1 (1977).  The most favorable case to support the Mopping-Up Law is Faitoute Iron and Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942), in which the Supreme Court upheld a state modification of a bond contract.  However, because Faitoute’s broad holding was somewhat limited by U.S. Trust, a fair analysis of the present question should instead focus on the narrower (and less favorable) U.S. Trust test.

[136] Id. at 13.

[137] Id. at 32.

[138] See Michael L. Zigler, Takings Law and the Contract Clause: A Takings Law Approach to Legislative Modifications of Public Contracts, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1447, 1455 (1984) (“The Court’s opinion established a three-step test for determining whether a legislative action is an unconstitutional impairment of a public contract. To be a violation of the contract clause, the state action must (1) not be pursuant to its reserved powers; (2) constitute a substantial impairment of the contractual obligation; and (3) be neither necessary nor reasonable.”).

[139] United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25.

[140] See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 416–17 (1983) (“[T]he Kansas Act rests on, and is prompted by, significant and legitimate state interests . . . [in] protect[ing] consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices caused by deregulation . . . [and] in correcting the imbalance between the interstate and intrastate markets.”).

[141] See Baltimore Teachers Union, Am. Fed’n of Teachers Local 340, AFL-CIO v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1993) (“We . . . conclude that the salary reductions were reasonable under the circumstances.”).

[142] Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).

[143] Norman, 294 U.S. at 291–92.

[144] Id. at 292–93.  For a modern analog, see New Law Limits Claims by Vulture Funds, Reuters, Apr. 8, 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/04/08/uk-britain-debt-idUKTRE63748920100408 (discussing how the U.K. enacted legislative measures—with no successful legal challenges—in placing restrictions on the recovery of heavily discounted debts).

[145] Id. at 316.

[146] 294 U.S. 330 (1935).

[147] Id. at 350–51 (1935) (“There is a clear distinction between the power of the Congress to control or interdict the contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise of its constitutional authority and the power of the Congress to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements when it has borrowed money under the authority which the Constitution confers.”).

[148] Id. at 355 (1935) (“The question of actual loss cannot fairly be determined without considering the economic situation at the time the government offered to pay . . . the face of his bond, in legal tender currency.”).

[149] Id.

[150] Id. at 358.

[151] See supra note 114 and accompanying text.

[152] See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 831 n.10 (9th Cir. 1987) (“It is appropriate to look to international law when determining whether the institution of exchange control regulations constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of FSIA. We note, however, that in ascertaining the content of international law, we may look to various sources of law, including United States law.”).

[153] International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (last visited May 2, 2012).

[154] See Waibel, supra note 94, at 745 (“[I]f the exercise of governmental powers is both in the public interest and non-discriminatory, the act in question would not be considered an expropriation [by the ICSID tribunal], with the consequence that no compensation was due on that basis. In national economic emergencies the legitimate scope of governmental measures in the public interest might be greater; hence, economic policy measures adopted in response to financial crises would need to rise to a higher level of intensity to constitute expropriation.” (citation omitted)).

[155] Olguín v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, Award (July 26, 2001), 18 ICSID REV. 160 (2003) (unofficial English translation).

[156] Id., para. 69.

[157] Id., para. 84.

[158] Borri v. Argentina, 88 Rivista di diritto internazionale 856, paras. 4, 4.2, 5 (May 27, 2005) (“While the issuance of bonds is per se ‘private’, the Argentine legislative acts extending the payment term were undeniably acta iure imperii and thus exempt from domestic jurisdiction.”).

[159] Tom Braithwaite, Reykjavik Steps In with New Powers, Fin. Times, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/64b062aa-94d3-11dd-953e-000077b07658.html#axzz1iRylBZol.

[160] Jim Pickard & Clare MacCarthy, Icelandic Court Rules to Repay British and Dutch, Fin. Times, Oct. 28, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/18152320-018d-11e1-8e59-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1iRylBZol.

[161] Hæstiréttur Íslands (Icelandic Supreme Court), Case No. 340/2011, (Oct. 28, 2011) (unofficial English translation).

[162] Ragnhildur Helgadóttir, Professor, Reykjavik University School of Law, Constitutions and Government Responses to Financial Crises (Oct. 2011) (“If economic or financial crises are serious enough to warrant government intervention, let alone government intervention which may run afoul of the constitution and international obligations, the crisis will presumably affect other interests than financial.”). For a more extensive analysis of the emergency powers, see Ragnhildur Helgadóttir, Economic Crises and Emergency Powers in Europe, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 130 (2012), https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hblr//?p=1981.

[163] Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, Prime Minister of Iceland, International Conference at Reykjavik, Welcoming Remarks (Oct. 27, 2011) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2011/isl/pdf/js.pdf (“In effect . . . the lion [sic] share of the banking collapse was borne by foreign creditors. There was no other way, there was no other option, considering that the banks’ assets were ten times Iceland’s GDP.”).

[164] Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, Rights and Remedies of Holders of Foreign Bonds, in 2 Bonds and Bondholders, Rights and Remedies 130, 170 (Silvester E. Quindry ed., 1934).

[165] See Louise Story, Landon Thomas, Jr. & Nelson D. Schwartz, Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt Fueling Europe’s Crisis, N.Y. Times., Feb. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/business/global/14debt.html?pagewanted=1&hp (“[R]ecords and interviews show that with Wall Street’s help, [Greece] engaged in a decade-long effort to skirt European debt limits.”).

[166] See Ioannis Kokkoris, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal & Kiriakos Papadakis, The Greek Tragedy: is there a Deus ex Machina?, in Managing Risk in the Financial System 159–60 (John Raymond Labrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, & Dalvinder Singh, eds., 2011) (“The biggest challenge that Greece is now facing is how to effectively implement the tough measures required in order to comply with IMF/EU requirements and more importantly to sustain these measures through the delicate situation of its economy.”).

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George M. Williams jr*

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act[1] applies a number of heightened standards to bank holding companies with consolidated assets of $50 billion or more and to nonbank financial companies that have been subjected to supervision by the Board of Governors because of their systemic importance. Among these standards are new liquidity and capital requirements (the “Liquidity Standard”)[2] and a new requirement (the “Resolution Plan Requirement”) to prepare and maintain a resolution plan that articulates how the relevant company could best be dismembered if it represented a threat to the financial stability of the United States.[3] One of the, perhaps unintended, effects of these new standards may be to provide an additional reason for rethinking the form and purpose of financial statements prepared by financial institutions.

The recent financial crisis and the resulting increase in the recognition of how important capital and liquidity requirements are for financial institutions have already exposed some of the ways in which financial statements in their current form are inadequate for complex financial institutions.[4] The usual way of dealing with this inadequacy is to require the institutions to provide supplementary information, rather than to rethink the nature of the basic financial statements.[5] Having the supplemental information is helpful and is often sufficient to re- or deconstruct the standard financial statements, and making the financial statements of certain companies look completely different from those of others does, after all, have disadvantages.

The Liquidity Standard and the Resolution Plan Requirement are examples of how extensive these demands for supplemental information can become. The core requirement of the new liquidity standards is the imposition of periodic stress-testing coupled with liquidity and corporate governance standards.[6] Other portions of the Liquidity Release elaborate on the precise types of information and testing required, establish new capital and leverage requirements and introduce new limits on credit exposures to counterparties.[7]

The Resolution Release requires covered companies to provide resolution plans that extensively articulate how they could be liquidated with minimal harm to the financial system.[8] The provisions of the Resolution Plan Requirement that set forth the precise details are lengthy, and relate to entity structure, investment strategy, documentation of practices and extensive financial data.[9]

The Temporal Dimensions of Capital and Liquidity

Although the requirements spelled out in the Liquidity Release, on the one hand, and the requirement to prepare resolution plans, on the other, nominally relate to different aspects of a financial company’s business, the intense focus on and interlinks between capital, liquidity and liabilities suggests a deeper relationship. The possibility of such a relationship makes it worthwhile to consider the ways in which capital, liquidity and liabilities are related and how these relationships could affect the structure of financial statements for financial institutions.

 

Time and Capital

Capital can be considered either as the number that results from subtracting the value of a company’s liabilities from the value of its assets or as the amounts that have been contributed as consideration for certain kinds of financial instruments, such as common or preferred stock or deeply subordinated, long-term debt.[10] These values can differ, but each purports to represent the ability of a company to withstand losses and continue in business.

In the context of insolvency, capital expressed as the excess of assets over liabilities isolates the point in time where society has determined that it is unfair for a company to continue in business, in the sense that the certainty of loss justifies some notion of structured sharing. On the other hand, capital expressed as consideration received highlights the extent to which the capital remains available over time, with common capital generally never having to be returned while deeply subordinated debt must eventually be repaid. This focus emphasizes the relative usefulness of different kinds of capital, especially the relative ineffectiveness of subordinated debt if repayment roughly coincides with severe financial stress or insolvency. If capital must be repaid at a particular point in time, then to some extent it is not quite (regulatory) capital, at least if capital is considered to be assets over which no one has any claims except shareholders (or their equivalent).

These differences in repayability also introduce a temporal factor into the nature of capital that is typically obscured by the standard company balance sheet. Time is furthermore implicit in the notion that capital must be available as a buffer to intermittent shocks and as a way of accommodating creditors at insolvency, meaning that capital must be reliably available over a range of times. While the standard balance sheet presumes by its structure that capital will be available at insolvency, in reality—at least for financial institutions—the time prior to insolvency or prior to a potential insolvency is perhaps even more crucial, because insolvency can be unpredictable[11] and because the time frames during which creditors and investors (and, in all likelihood, managers) believe they must act become increasingly abbreviated when insolvency appears likely.

Time and Liquidity

The concept of liquidity further expands the role of time in the presentation of a company’s financial position. If liquidity is thought of as the ability to obtain funds in the market, then planning for liquidity requires consideration of both the times at which funds might be needed as well as their likely availability. Similarly, if liquidity is thought of as a store of assets that will be readily accepted as means of payment, then calculating the available level of liquidity requires keeping track of when inflows from investments and transactions are expected to occur. Amounts in deposit accounts and in the form of Treasury securities can in effect be treated as inflows that can occur at any time.

Deposits and Treasurys also represent a third aspect of the way time plays a role in the nature of capital and liquidity. In calculating the extent to which a company’s assets exceed the claims of its creditors and the extent to which the sale of assets can generate liquidity, the ability of assets to retain their value over time is crucial. The closer an asset is to being treated as if it were money, the greater its ability to fulfill at any given time the role to be played by liquidity or capital. This is particularly true for systemically important financial institutions (whether they are bank holding companies or not). Preventing the collapse of the financial system or reducing the risk of such a collapse depends in part on the availability of sufficient funds and fund-like assets to repay the counterparties of the insolvent company and to convince other participants that the system will not freeze up or collapse. The inability (or perceived inability) to obtain such funds in turn signals the possibility of failure (or, equivalently, exclusion from the financial system).

The distribution across time of collateral provided by or to a financial institution is another instance in which the timing of the potential uses of financial instruments or devices can be as significant as their aggregate amount. For example, the aggregate amount of all collateral made available by a financial institution in connection with its borrowings might appear adequate while at the same time actually failing to be so because of an insufficiency of collateral for financings that might need to be re-collateralized in two days or two months. Similarly, a review of the collateral posted to cover various obligations might show that the collateral preferred for certain kinds of obligations, such as repurchase agreements, might be losing value and require supplementation (or replacement) at a rate or in a manner that differs from the behavior of collateral posted for other purposes. This could signal the arrival of financial difficulties at a particular time more clearly than a look at aggregate collateral.

In addition to playing an important role in understanding a company’s financial circumstances in the ordinary case, time becomes increasingly important whenever insolvency is, or appears to be, imminent. Typically, understanding the aggregate cash inflows and outflows over a modestly long period of time (e.g., a quarter or a year) might suffice for understanding the nature and risks of a particular company. In the zone of insolvency or at a time of generalized financial crisis, however, not only the aggregate flows of a one-day period but also even their relative order can be crucial.[12]

Restructuring the Financial Statement

Shortcomings of the Standard Balance Sheet

The basic form of a balance sheet largely obscures all of the ways in which time plays a role in the state of a company’s finances. The principal reflection of the role that time plays is found in categorizations such as “current assets,” “current liabilities” and “long-term debt.” Other information that is relevant to time is found, among other places, in notes to the financials, in the discussion that accompanies the financial statements in reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by publicly-traded bank holding companies or in the specialized reports filed by regulated institutions with their regulators, such as the call reports that are available from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Information of that kind needs to be combined in some way with the balance sheet and income statement in order to render those statements useful. That still leaves the question of what a balance sheet, even if so supplemented, is supposed to represent. Even though in some sense a balance sheet represents what would happen if a company were liquidated on the date as of which the balance sheet speaks, it does not generally reflect the values that could actually be realized in such circumstances, principally because the valuation conventions on which the balance sheet is based reflect a going-concern assumption, an assumption that obviously plays no further role once an insolvency actually arises.

Given these different ways in which time constitutes an essential part of a company’s financial structure—even for balance-sheet purposes, and not just in the sense that revenues are measured over time—finding a way of representing directly what might be called the time structure of the balance sheet might more adequately model the state of a financial institution than do balance sheets in their current form. Any such representation should allow the various relationships between capital and liquidity to appear and should be capable of natural contraction and expansion in order to reveal the different degrees of detail that are relevant in times of crisis and non-crisis. One possible way of accomplishing such a task may be to create a model of a company’s financial situation that can be viewed at either a level of minute detail or at other levels of aggregation.

Building in Extensible Time Frames

This might be done by converting the basic “vertical” distinction of a standard balance sheet (the separation of assets from liabilities) into a “horizontal” distinction of time frames,[13] thereby creating the ability to separately represent the dynamics over time of different classes of assets and their associated liabilities. For example, a liability to be paid on June 1 would be grouped together with an asset that is intended to be used to satisfy the liability and is liquid or capable of being liquidated.[14] In many ways, this would amount to building some of the notes to the financial statements directly into the statements themselves. There are surely other ways. The purpose of the following discussion is to conduct a thought experiment and consider the usefulness and consequences of the experimental model, particularly with respect to the regulatory goal of understanding, and perhaps partially taming, systemic risk.

Aggregating cash flows (including anticipated borrowings, purchases, interest and dividend payments and receipts) over designated time frames would directly represent anticipated liquidity conditions. The trustworthiness of any such representation would naturally decrease out into the future. It should be noted, however, that conventional financial statements also contain estimates of various future values. Practices could be established to standardize estimates of future payments and receipts. In addition, as future payments change in their status from reasonably anticipated to contractual and from contractual to essentially certain, the way in which the changes take place will be visible as movements in the entries in the “balance sheet,” for example from a column indicating anticipated payments or receipts to one indicating a contractually agreed payment or receipt. Changes of this kind might prove indicative of various kinds of potential success or difficulty.

Different “kinds” of capital could be stratified in terms of their ability to be liquidated within particular time frames and in connection with the satisfaction of particular kinds of liabilities. For example, large investments in corporate real estate would put a company in a different capital position than would small or modest investments of that sort, as would large holdings in certain investment funds as opposed to large holdings of Treasurys. Highly liquid assets would be treated as available at any time to cover any required outflow (i.e., they would be treated in effect as if they were an offsetting cash inflow at the desired point in time), while real property, for example, could be classified as available to cover only obligations that might mature only in the more distant or indefinite future. Collateral supporting the obligations of the financial institution could be similarly stratified, since the distribution of the collateral over time[15] and the changes in the amount and nature of the collateral deployed relates closely to liquidity needs and uses.

A convention would have to be developed for what would constitute the “balance sheet” for a given day, such as the last day of a given reporting period. One possibility might be a summary four-quarter look into the future, with all inflows and outflows after that date either ignored or aggregated as if they took place simultaneously. There might not need to be a separate line for, say, common stock, since the relevant fact is the lack of any constraint forcing a payment at a particular time, although there could, of course, automatically be such a line because the very lack of such constraints might compel or strongly suggest a particular graphic or structural positioning of that information. On the other hand, a “capital” security with required payments could show up in a horizontal line that represents the spread of the required payments over time. Asset valuation adjustments that now are distinguished from one another by either showing up in the income statement or as an adjustment on the balance sheet could now all be represented in different ways on the balance sheet, based on the ways in which they affect actual or projected inflows and outflows. For example, the likely future value of assets that are currently illiquid and perhaps impaired could be shown as having a value at some future date, resulting in the categorization as unavailable for current payments but still ultimately convertible into cash, and any payments currently being made on such assets could be shown as expected receipts at the appropriate times. This would fit with the intuitive notion that an amount that is uncollectable is collected in the extremely distant future, at infinity.

Such a representation of a financial company’s transactions over specified time frames essentially makes the statement that a financial company simply is a financial company because it continuously engages in liquidity transactions. The failure of such liquidity transactions in effect opens a time gap, another way in which time plays a role in the structure of financial statements and financial activity. The existence of an unclosable or unbridgeable time gap constitutes insolvency, regardless of whether the gap arises from the inability to liquidate otherwise unencumbered assets or from the lack of assets.

A crude approximation of a remodeled balance sheet might have the following structure:

Benefits of Time Frames

A representation of a company’s financial situation in this form would appear to be useful both in managing liquidity in an ongoing business and in planning for a resolution in the event of an insolvency or similar crisis. The relationships between certain kinds of assets and liabilities would be represented directly. All levels of detail would be directly accessible and capable of either aggregation or magnification. All time frames would be immediately accessible, so that planning could be carried out for different time frames, including minute-by-minute (maybe) in a crisis.

In some respects, a representation and analysis in this manner of a company’s capital and liquidity resembles the ways in which stress testing affects (or potentially affects) our understanding of the company’s financial condition. Testing of that sort forces consideration of time frames of varying lengths and of the ways in which affected financial exposures can be dealt with and has become a standard regulatory device, at least in connection with the supervision of large financial institutions.[16] Something like this is precisely what the matching of inflows and outflows into the future represents and accomplishes. A stress test requires consideration of the ways in which the size and relative timing of the projected or contracted inflows and outflows might be affected, and how to plan for and alleviate the consequences.[17] A modified “balance sheet” with a “horizontal” time component accommodates such variation, testing and planning quite easily and, furthermore, suggests in a fairly direct way what the relevant factors are and what the consequences of changing their values might be. In other words, developing a modified balance sheet for at least certain financial institutions would simplify the conduct of stress-testing and would, in fact, provide a factual and conceptual framework for articulating what a stress test does.

The single counterparty exposure limits contained in the Liquidity Release also reflect an awareness of flows, and not just a static conception of liability, in the following way: An exposure can be reduced by obtaining a guarantee or other form of credit support; however, even though the one exposure is reduced, another exposure is created, namely to the guarantor. The networking of exposures models, implicitly, the potential direction and timing of flows.

The ways in which the treatment of capital and liquidity in the Basel III Framework relate to the modified “balance sheet” described above are slightly more indirect. The discussion of capital in the Basel III Framework emphasizes the kinds of capital that are completely or largely free of any provision that would compel or provide an incentive for payment or repayment. In the discussions on adjustments (e.g., with regard to deferred tax benefits and good will) the emphasis is understandably on the extent to which the value assigned to the capital indicates the availability of real means to make payments. Any requirements that capital be repaid or redeemed, that payments, whether in the form of interest or dividends, be made with respect to capital, or that some kinds of capital, upon the occurrence of certain events, become less restricted and more available for the payment of creditors in general[18] obviously link the idea of kinds or qualities of capital to the idea of time. The availability of capital that is not subject to requirements that it be returned remains a rather general notion except at insolvency, since the fact that it is unrestricted does not mean that capital is currently available. It could, for example, for locked up in illiquid investments.

The liquidity requirements established as part of the Basel III efforts attempt to overcome somewhat that (potential) lack of availability in several ways.[19] A Liquidity Coverage Ratio mandates that the “stock of high-quality liquid assets” must equal or exceed the “total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days.”[20] “High quality liquid assets” are identified by reference to both “fundamental characteristics,” such as low credit risk and ease of valuation, and “market-related characteristics,” such as the size of the relevant market and the diversity of buyers and sellers in that market.[21] “Total net cash outflows” include outflows that are likely to occur under conditions of market stress.[22] The liquid assets that count toward the satisfaction of this ratio must be unencumbered and may not serve as hedges or as collateral.[23] Net cash outflows are calculated by subtracting a portion of the expected cash inflows from the expected outflows in the stress scenario.[24]

In addition, a “Net Stable Funding Ratio” must be met, which requires that the “available amount of stable funding” must always exceed the “required amount of stable funding.”[25] “Stable funding” is characterized as “the portion of those types and amounts of equity and liability funding expected to be reliable sources of funds over a one-year time horizon under conditions of extended stress. The amount of such funding required of a specific institution is a function of the liquidity characteristics of the various types of assets held, [off-balance-sheet] contingent exposures incurred and/or the activities pursued by the institution.”[26] Note, however, that what counts as stable funding does not have to be liquid at any time prior to the time at which it is needed to cover payment requirements. For example, amounts that constitute common capital might at any given point in time be invested in assets that are not currently available for liquidation. As a consequence, “stable funding” must be understood to mean something like “capable of being liquidated without too much trouble and without conflicting with liabilities associated with such sources of funding.” In other words, stable funding consists of access to assets that are not constrained or are loosely constrained by any commitments that can, hopefully, be sold to cover cash needs with respect to assets that cannot otherwise be easily monetized. In this respect, the manner in which required stable funding is calculated resembles the calculation of one-year’s worth of liquid risk-based capital. It is somewhat unclear whether values characterized as equity and equity-like will necessarily be available as sources of funding just because they are nominally not subject to payment constraints. To some extent, the various monitoring procedures proposed by the Basel III Liquidity Framework may provide information that could at least partially overcome the lack of any necessary connection between equity and liquidity.

It is fairly clear how a balance sheet that is “stretched out” horizontally to reflect timing could accommodate both liquidity coverage ratios and net stable funding ratios. It would do so by allocating various assets to the payment of either stressed or expected payouts over the required time periods. Using such a remodeled balance sheet would make the intended function of both ratios graphically apparent. The remodeled balance sheet would, however, in all likelihood require more precise decisions to be made about (i) which of the assets whose value might be encompassed by the number representing equity capital are actually reasonably capable of monetization in the time frames required, and (ii) which times are the relevant times at which monetization must occur. Changes in the values represented by the remodeled balance sheet would appear not just as aggregates but as sub-aggregates allocated to specific times or time periods, potentially creating a (near) continuum of changes over projected time. By disaggregating much of the information represented by the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio, a remodeled balance sheet potentially enables insights into the ways that the distribution of flows across time (including the different distributions of inflows and outflows and the distribution of the differences or net values), rather than just the aggregate values on a calculation date, might affect or predict the financial well-being of a large, active financial institution.

In addition to time, the practicalities of dealing with a potential crisis and with the proposed requirements for living wills compel the incorporation of at least one more dimension, namely “space,” in any remodeled balance sheet. Information must be available regarding not only the times and amounts of inflows and outflows, but also about the persons to and from whom flows are owed or expected.[27] For example, all swaps between an insolvent financial company being resolved by the FDIC and the same counterparty must, if transferred, be transferred to the same replacement for the insolvent company, whether the transferee is an existing market participant or a new bridge institution.[28] Any determination of possible setoffs obviously requires an awareness of all transactions between the insolvent institution and each particular customer, client or counterparty. Part of being alert for potentially risky situations consists in monitoring the behavior, creditworthiness and asset concentrations of each other company with which a significant financial company does business. The kind of “space” involved is the position of the significant financial company in the total network of other financial institutions that constitutes the financial system, although this “space” can in all likelihood be determined only for the nearest neighbors of the significant financial company (i.e., those with which it directly engages in transactions).

In principle, the ways in which a significant financial company’s exposures (cash inflows and outflows, collateral) relate to other financial companies can be indicated in a remodeled balance sheet by typographical convention. For example, at each point in, or for each period of, time, the portion of each number displayed horizontally in the remodeled balance sheet that relates to another financial company can be displayed separately in a vertical column. This would allow separate (i) disaggregations of relationships with a given financial company at each point in time; (ii) aggregations of all exposures to a given financial company at each point in time; and (iii) analyses of the development over time of both the disaggregated and the aggregated exposures.

Remodeling balance sheets of large financial institutions to reflect both the temporal and spatial aspects of the institutions’ activities would display directly the way assets, inflows and outflows vary over time and shift (in terms of the other parties involved) over space. A joint representation of inflows and outflows over both space and time should provide, at a fairly basic level, some direct indication of what financial company’s systemic position is and how it is constituted. Representations of systemic importance are uncommon and controversial. One virtue of a spatially and temporally remodeled balance sheet might be its potential ability to resolve some of this controversy. By its very nature, a remodeled balance sheet would also permit the rapid adaptation of plans as trends change, for example, as relevant time periods close to the present increase in importance.

Any indication of an individual financial company’s systemic position would need to be complemented by similar information regarding the other large financial companies with which any given financial company is linked. Whether such information would in theory be available in all relevant cases would in all likelihood depend on whether all the relevant financial companies are regulated and whether their regulators impose similar reporting standards. If it were practical to collect remodeled balance sheets, prepared on a consistent basis, from most or all of the significant financial companies, not only the systemic importance of each institution but the fundamental behavior of the system as a whole might be more easily observed.

Even a collection of remodeled balance sheets of all financial companies in the U.S. or world financial system would presumably be incapable of revealing the potential existence of a dangerous exogenous shock, such as a housing crisis—simply because it is exogenous. Nevertheless, it seems possible that the appearance in remodeled balance sheets of certain kinds of data will be suggestive of a coming exogenous shock, which could be further studied and perhaps verified using other kinds of data. In addition, remodeled balance sheets may show more clearly than ordinary balance sheets how a shock might propagate, both from institution to institution and from some aspects of the financial system to others.

It might be argued that value-at-risk models that are continuously updated already take into account the temporal aspects of balance sheets (or of the overall financial situation of a company). While models of that kind do in fact consider future exposures by calculating their present value, they essentially erase the distribution of exposures with respect to one another because the results are numerical aggregations. This has two effects. First, the focus of the calculations amounts to a generalized insolvency test which neither relates to the potential results of an actual insolvency on the date of calculation nor provides a direct indication of the timing of the potential difficulties. Rather, it reflects what might be called the likely results of a controlled run-off of a liquidating trust for the company in question. This is not to deny that the results of making the necessary calculations can serve a usual early warning function. Second, given a proper distribution of values and times, the results of calculating value-at-risk can conceivably obscure the existence of periods of significant risk for a company if those risks arise from mismatches in the availability of funds in comparison to the temporal distribution of liabilities. A remodeled balance sheet provides the necessary temporal distributions without interfering with any calculations of value at risk. By providing these distributions in detail, however, such a balance sheet potentially raises the question of whether such calculations are necessary, or, phrased differently, whether the information such calculations provide useful information in addition to that provided by the balance sheet. To take a simple mathematical analogy, calculating value-at-risk might be like integrating (or trying to integrate) certain expressions when what we really want to find out is whether the curves represented by the expressions are discontinuous at any points (where, by analogy, the discontinuities represent liquidity or solvency problems). The answer might be that it provides redundant information that is nevertheless useful for quick or more tractable evaluations or evaluations by outsiders who are not entitled to all of the information in an extensive, remodeled balance sheet.

In this regard, it is interesting to consider the information that a remodeled balance sheet would provide in connection with certain more specific requirements of the Liquidity Regulation and the Resolution Regulation.

Under the Liquidity Regulation it will be necessary, among other things, to keep track of which assets are unencumbered, what the credit exposures are to counterparties, and how financial companies are to control their liquidity and capital needs and exposures by corporate governance mechanisms. Which assets are unencumbered (in the sense of being subject to a lien) and which have not already been allocated to serve as a hedge or source of future payment would already be indicated (or be capable of being indicated) by the kind of modified balance sheet described earlier, as would credit exposures to any combination of counterparties. The fact that information of this kind, as well as more standard information about flows and projected flows, would in effect constitute the balance sheet would provide any corporate governance arrangement that might be implemented with a very large portion of the information the governing persons and bodies might need, and do so in an accessible, replicable and stress-testable form. Much of the information necessary for capital planning would also be available “free” as a result of the modified balance sheet.

As far as the informational requirements of the Resolution Requirement are concerned, a remodeled balance sheet would appear to supply directly, even without explicit consideration of an insolvency, almost all of the required information. It addition, given the interrelationships that such a balance sheet would display, many of the plans and strategies seem likely to be easier to articulate, since they could be linked directly to the financial interrelationships. In all likelihood, a substantial number would not need to be articulated at all, except in a trivial sense, since they would reveal themselves on the face of a detailed version of the balance sheet. A remodeled balance sheet would also provide a significant amount of the information required for the credit exposure reports that may also ultimately be implemented in connection with the Resolution Regulation, once the counterparty credit limits have been finalized.[29] Roughly speaking, the Resolution Regulation seems in essence to require the financial picture of an organization that would be given by a remodeled balance sheet plus some names and addresses that would make finding the right people, machines and documents easier in a crisis.

Conclusion

The important roles accorded to liquidity and resolution plans in Dodd-Frank and the centrality of liquidity in any understanding of large financial institutions as they are structured today and, more importantly, as they interact with other financial institutions, all suggest that something like a modified balance sheet should not just be a response to these regulatory demands but should instead be a candidate for itself being the central regulatory demand, around which other demands could be organized and take shape.

A recent report[30] by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on how it would have resolved Lehman Brothers Holdings if the resolutions provisions of Title II of Dodd-Frank had been in effect at the time provides an interesting, indirect and somewhat ironic—given the content of the Resolution Regulation—confirmation of this conclusion. The report describes the principal advantages of Title II over bankruptcy proceedings: the availability (i) of dedicated sources of liquidity to prevent relevant markets from seizing up and (ii) of bridge institutions for holding derivatives and thereby preventing their termination while holding other activities that should be preserved or maintained. These advantages purportedly follow from an understanding of the unique ways in which the insolvencies of certain kinds of financial institutions might affect certain markets or even the larger economy.[31] These effects are considered to be significantly different from the effects of the insolvencies of large industrial companies. The nature of the new possibilities created by Title II makes it immediately clear what kinds of information and planning are necessary to benefit from them.[32] This kind of information and planning can be derived directly from modified balance sheets, as described above, without starting from any supposed special requirements of resolution plans and, unlike the requirements set out in the Resolution Regulation, without any particular reference to the way a financial company would be resolved under the Bankruptcy Code.

 


Preferred citation: George M. Williams jr, Capturing Time in Financial Statements, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 150 (2012), https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hblr//?p=2140.

* George M. Williams jr is a partner at Dewey & LeBoeuf where he specializes in corporate, banking and securities law and is also the chairman of the firm’s Corporate Opinion Committee.  The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the firm or its clients.

[1] Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

[2] Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 604 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Liquidity Release].

[3] Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323 (proposed Nov.1, 2011) [hereinafter Resolution Release].

[4] For example, discussions of when or if asset values are to be marked to market, difficulties in valuing asset-backed securities, the relative lack of information about a company’s liquidity and collateral position, and the opacity of balance sheets with regard to the nature (other than arithmetic) of shareholders’ equity all reveal a need for having more information than that provided in ordinary financial statements. For a discussion of some of these data issues, see Dimitrios Bisias et. al., A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics 38–39, (Office of Financial Research, Working Paper No. 0001, Jan. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Risk Analytics], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Documents/OFRwp0001_BisiasFloodLoValavanis_ASurveyOfSystemicRiskAnalytics.pdf.

“[L]egacy supervisory accounting systems sometimes fail to convey adequately the risk exposures from new complex contingent contracts, and from lightly regulated markets with little or no reporting requirements. In fact, supervisors do not even have consistent and regularly updated data on some of the most basic facts about the industry, such as the relative sizes of all significant market segments.”

Id. at 9.

[5] This can be seen by reviewing the periodic reports of public bank holding companies.

[6] Liquidity Release, supra note 2, at 599.

[7] A counterparty can actually consist of a number of related individuals or entities.

[8] See generally Resolution Release, supra note 3, at 67,323.

[9] See generally Informational content of a resolution plan, 12 C.F.R. § 381.4 (2012).

[10] These two perspectives are implicit throughout the structure of balance sheets, corporation law definition of capital and surplus and regulatory releases regarding risk-based capital, such as those found in the appendices to Regulation Y of the Federal Reserve Board.  12 C.F.R. pt. 225 app. A–G (2012).

[11] This is due uncertainties such as asset prices, the availability of funding, forbearance, customer and market reactions, and regulatory decisions.

[12] For example, whether sufficient funds are available will depend on whether large inflows or outflows occur early or late in the day, and whether closing out all transactions occurs periodically or all at once.

[13] For something similar in terms of a more purely cash-flow analysis, see Liquidity Release, supra note 2, at 607 n. 66.

[14] For example, by placing it above or below the liability on parallel, horizontal lines.

[15] That is, the time at which it could be called upon for payment purposes.

[16] For a condensed description, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems 46–47, (June 2011)  available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. The Liquidity Release requires ongoing stress-testing, conducted in a prescribed manner. See Liquidity Release, supra note 2.

[17] See Risk Analytics, supra note 4, at 100; Liquidity Release, supra note 2.

[18] In other words, various kinds of conditional capital.

[19] See generally Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter Basel III Liquidity Framework], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf.

[20] Id. at 3.

[21] Id. at 4–5.

[22] Id. at 4.

[23] Id. at 6.

[24] Id. at 12.

[25] Id. at 25.

[26] Id. at 25–26.

[27] See the remarks supra regarding counterparty exposure limits.

[28] Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 1, § 210(c)(9).

[29] Resolution Release, supra note 3, at 67,327.

[30] The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5(2) FDIC Q. 31 (2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/ 2011_vol5_2/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol5No2_entire_v4.pdf.

[31] These effects are considered to be significantly different from the effects of the insolvencies of large industrial companies due to the unique nature of financial businesses, the tightness and complexity of their interrelations, and the manner in which markets can freeze when the value of a whole class of assets becomes suspect.

[32] This includes comprehensive information regarding capital and liquidity needs, asset and liability classes and the respective counterparties and collateral, as well as the computational power and general financial databases necessary to keep track of, evaluate and manage all of these matters.

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