Elizabeth Pagel Serebransky, Michael P. Harrell, Jonathan F. Lewis and Charity Brunson Wyatt: While private equity professionals have been keenly aware in recent years of proposed changes to the U.S. tax code…
Edward F. Greene: Dodd-Frank represents the most sweeping changes to the financial regulatory environment in the United States since the Great Depression. While its enactment was important, the Act is seriously flawed…
The Harvard Business Law Review is pleased to announce the publication of its inaugural issue.
Joshua P. Fershee:
The limited liability company (LLC) has evolved from a little used entity option to become the leading business entity of choice. The primary impetus for this change was an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination in 1988 that permitted pass-through tax status for a Wyoming LLC. Then, in 1997, the IRS passed its check-the-box regulations permitting LLCs (and other non-corporate entities) to simply opt-in to the benefits of partnership tax treatment. These two rulings have been viewed as having “had a profound, unprecedented, and perhaps unpredictable impact on the future development of unincorporated business organizations.” Since that time, some scholars argued that the LLC should be treated as a third, and separate, entity unto itself with its own developing body of law. Nonetheless, many courts have applied corporate law to LLCs with seemingly little appreciation of the differences between LLCs and corporations. That may be about to change.
Gaurav Toshniwal:
Two issues related to financial regulation have received significant academic and regulatory attention since the financial crisis: Contingent Convertible Bonds (“CoCos”) and banker compensation. The discussion, however, has largely been silent on the interaction between the two. This brief note explores the potential conflicts that may exist in the design and implementation of CoCos because of the incentive structure created by managerial compensation. Regulators, academics and market participants will need to address these concerns in designing the regulatory framework for CoCo instruments and managerial compensation.
Michael Springer:
Recently, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the suit between AT&T and Vincent and Liza Concepcion on whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California contract law. This case raises a policy issue that will not necessarily be answered by the Supreme Court: the efficacy of the class action lawsuit. While the class action definitely serves a significant purpose, there are other methods of solving the problem it seeks to address. In fact, the very arbitration clause the Supreme Court of California struck down as unconscionable can both serve the same function as a class action suit and do so in a manner that is arguably better for the consumer.
Class action suits serve two main functions. The class action allows plaintiffs to pursue a legal claim that they otherwise would not, and the class action provides incentives for companies to behave in socially desirable ways. The first of these functions, while ostensibly served, hardly carries weight in the world today.
