Download PDF Matthew Kluchenek†I.               Introduction Among all the U.S. regulators interested in regulating Bitcoin and virtual currencies, the Commodity Futures […]
Download PDF Benjamin Lo†Introductory Note In 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission made waves by deciding to regulate the
Jonathan J. Rusch: Since 1977, with the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the United States Department of Justice has played a leading role in applying the Act’s anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions in enforcement proceedings against numerous companies and individuals worldwide. In November 2015, the Department of Justice took the unprecedented step of hiring a Compliance Counsel to guide its prosecutors in decision-making in corporate prosecutions and in benchmarking corporate compliance. This Memorandum is composed as an open letter to the Compliance Counsel, focusing on how she and the Department of Justice should go about that critical benchmarking function.
Jim Hawkins: Eric J. Chang’s provocative article, www.PayDayLoans.gov: A Solution for Restoring Price-Competition to Short-Term Credit Loans—which, as its title suggests, proposes to facilitate price competition in the payday lending market by creating a federal online exchange for payday lenders to post lending rates—has sparked thoughtful reactions among consumer borrowing experts. This Response provides constructive criticism to Chang’s proposal, arguing that such an exchange is unlikely to meet its goal of restoring price competition and offering tweaks that would raise the likelihood of doing so.
William D. Roth: In response to a 2011 Supreme Court ruling that restricted the use of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act as a cause of action for fraud, SEC Chair Mary Jo White expressed in 2014 her agency’s intent to use Section 20(b) to litigate cases where Section 10(b) would no longer be viable. This Article assesses whether Section 20(b) can be an effective litigation tool for the SEC and private plaintiffs by dissecting the provision’s function and purpose, and by delving into its relevant legal doctrinal questions.
John Crawford and Tim Karpoff: A notably bitter battle over financial reform in the wake of the crisis of 2008 has centered on the Swap Pushout Rule: a Dodd-Frank mandate that federally insured depository institutions—i.e., banks—refrain from entering into certain derivatives contracts. After several of the largest U.S. financial institutions successfully lobbied to roll back the Rule, the rollback inspired intense criticism, but the critiques have not accurately reflected what is really at stake for the banks or the public. While the Rule was sold as an anti-bailout measure, this Article argues that the Rule would have been ineffective as a means of preventing further bailouts of systematically important bank holding companies. The Article further argues that the primary reason systematically important bank holding companies care about the Rule is that it costs more to fund these swaps if they are booked at a different legal entity, such as a broker-dealer, rather than at a bank.
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