Harvard Negotiation Law Review

  • Home
  • Scholarly Articles
    • Articles
    • HNLR Online Articles
  • Submissions Information for Authors
  • Student Note Competition
    • 2022 – 2023 Student Note Competition
    • 2020-2021 Student Note Competition Winner
  • Symposiums
    • Symposium 2022
    • Symposium 2020
    • Symposium 2019
    • Symposium 2017 (Fall)
    • Symposium 2017 (Spring)
    • Symposium 2016
    • Symposium 2015
    • Symposium 2014
    • Symposium 2013
    • Symposium 2012
    • Symposium 2011
    • Symposium 2010
  • Contact
  • Executive Board
  • Subscriptions
  • Join HNLR – Spring 2023 Subcite

Archives for April 2015

Negotiating the Non-Negotiable: National Security & Negotiation

by Joshua C. Fiveson*

It requires little reflection to recognize that the word “terror” has saturated popular and academic discourse. This newly prominent yet age-old form of warfare has redefined the modern legal landscape on a domestic and international level, while simultaneously striking fear in the hearts of millions. And despite the multiplicity of working definitions for what constitutes as terrorism, one thing remains constant: at its most fundamental level, terrorism involves Actors with Interests. Unfortunately, this relatively simple realization is lost to the strong positional interests and calcified dogmas of American national security policy. The United States’ current approach imprudently shifts the treatment of terrorism away from the political realm and restricts the resolution of these issues to reciprocal demonstrations of force. But terrorism is inexorably political, and political problems require political solutions. This article seeks to address the inherent inadequacy of this policy and in doing so, expose how foresight can often times be quite short sighted. Read more here.

*Joshua C. Fiveson is an officer in the U.S. Navy, a graduate of Harvard Law School, and a former Harvard Graduate Student Leadership Institute Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Center for Public Leadership. 

Stiffing the Arbitrators: The Problem of Nonpayment in Commercial Arbitration

By Neal M. Eiseman & Brian Farkas*

There is a hole in our arbitral system. Despite being among the most efficient and prevalent means of resolving commercial disputes, and one generally favored by courts,[1] arbitration is dangerously susceptible to the problem of nonpayment. Simply put, a respondent seeking to avoid liability may be able to “game” the system by refusing to pay its share of arbitration fees. All too frequently, this leaves the claimant without an effective remedy to hold the nonpaying respondent accountable. Read more here.

[1] See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 321, 329 (2011) (noting that arbitration is an “efficient, streamlined procedure tailored to the type of dispute”); see infra, Section IV, discussing the federal and state public policy clearly favoring arbitration.

*The authors are practicing attorneys at Goetz Fitzpatrick LLP.

About HNLR

Negotiation, not adjudication, resolves most legal conflicts. However, despite the fact that dispute resolution is central to the practice of law and has become a “hot” topic in legal circles, a gap in the literature persists. “Legal negotiation” — negotiation with lawyers in the middle and legal institutions in the background — has escaped systematic analysis.

The Harvard Negotiation Law Review works to close this gap by providing a forum in which scholars from many disciplines can discuss negotiation as it relates to law and legal institutions. It is aimed specifically at lawyers and legal scholars.

OUR FLAGSHIP SPONSOR

Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School

JOIN OUR MAILING LIST FOR INFORMATION ON UPCOMING EVENTS

Follow Us

  • Facebook
  • X

Copyright © 2025 · Outreach Pro on Genesis Framework · WordPress · Log in