Increased Antitrust Merger Enforcement: Considerations for Your Next Deal
Download PDF Michael B. Bernstein, Justin P. Hedge, and Francesca Pisano† I. Introduction Antitrust merger enforcement has become increasingly aggressive in […]
Download PDF Michael B. Bernstein, Justin P. Hedge, and Francesca Pisano† I. Introduction Antitrust merger enforcement has become increasingly aggressive in […]
Download PDF Matthew Kluchenek† I. Introduction Among all the U.S. regulators interested in regulating Bitcoin and virtual currencies, the Commodity Futures
Download PDF Benjamin Lo† Introductory Note In 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission made waves by deciding to regulate the
Jonathan J. Rusch: Since 1977, with the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the United States Department of Justice has played a leading role in applying the Act’s anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions in enforcement proceedings against numerous companies and individuals worldwide. In November 2015, the Department of Justice took the unprecedented step of hiring a Compliance Counsel to guide its prosecutors in decision-making in corporate prosecutions and in benchmarking corporate compliance. This Memorandum is composed as an open letter to the Compliance Counsel, focusing on how she and the Department of Justice should go about that critical benchmarking function.
Jim Hawkins: Eric J. Chang’s provocative article, www.PayDayLoans.gov: A Solution for Restoring Price-Competition to Short-Term Credit Loans—which, as its title suggests, proposes to facilitate price competition in the payday lending market by creating a federal online exchange for payday lenders to post lending rates—has sparked thoughtful reactions among consumer borrowing experts. This Response provides constructive criticism to Chang’s proposal, arguing that such an exchange is unlikely to meet its goal of restoring price competition and offering tweaks that would raise the likelihood of doing so.
James W. Giddens: A significant portion of the failure that fueled the 2008 financial crisis has been attributed to a systemic lapse in senior executive oversight at the major financial institutions. Notwithstanding this failure, these executives have not been held personal liable for their “King Henry moments,” instances where senior executives have allegedly been aware of, or turned a blind eye to, questionable acts that occurred on their watch—often for the executives’ own personal benefit. This Article outlines the current state of the law governing senior executive liability, summarizes recent headline events in the financial industry, and provides a series of recommendations for proportionate reforms to correct current incentive imbalances in the financial industry.
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