Student Features

Student Commentaries

Exploring the Curious Lenience of International Criminal Law

The decision of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to sentence Duch, the brutal Chairman of S-21 and the Killing Fields at Choeung Ek, to a mere nineteen years in prison exemplifies the disturbing tendency of international criminal tribunals to issue sentences of pedestrian severity to the world’s very worst criminals. This article examines the sociopolitical roots of this phenomenon. Drawing on insights from the political science literature to engage in a comparative analysis of the relationship between democracy and punishment, the article concludes that international criminal tribunals’ lenience likely stems, at least in part, from excessive insulation from, and insensitivity to, democratic pressures. The experiences of the United States—where democratic participation in the machinery of punishment and excessively punitive sentencing have gone hand in hand—counsel against allowing popular sentiment to directly dictate the terms of punishment. Yet international jurists could arrive at a more just sentencing framework by incorporating popular preferences and values into their decision-making processes.

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Profiles & Interviews

An Interview with Larry D. Johnson

The following is an excerpt from the published interview with Larry Johnson. To see the full interview, please click on the link to download the article above or below.

Q: What were the most rewarding aspects of your career in pursuing international law?

I have had 37 years of being a lawyer in United Nations (UN) organizations, including the UN itself, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), so there have been some highlights throughout. Some of them were related to work in the UN Office of Legal Affairs, where we had to deal with the attempt of the U.S. government in 1988 to close the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Mission. That got us involved with the federal district court, where the UN filed an amicus brief. It was a great mix of international law and U.S. constitutional law. The judge sided with us that Congress did not clearly intend to supersede the UN/U.S. Headquarters treaty by adopting a law closing all PLO offices in the United States, including the PLO Observer Mission to the UN. Going back to settled constitutional law doctrine, the judge ruled that as treaties and acts of Congress are both the supreme law of the land. If there is a conflict, whichever is later in time applies as long as it is absolutely clear that it is the intention of the later action, in this case an act of Congress, to supersede the treaty. In this case the judge found, as we had argued, that the requisite congressional intent to violate and supersede the treaty did not exist.

The other highlights were being involved in the creation of international criminal tribunals. The UN Legal Office prepared the statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which was very challenging and exciting. We were in deep water because there wasn’t anything to draw on other than Nuremberg and the courts created in Germany by the Allied Powers after the Second World War. And we had 60 days to do it. A lot of it was just flipping a coin in making policy choices. We assumed that the statute would go through lots of negotiations and tinkering by the Security Council, but at the end of the day, for various reasons, the Council adopted it as it was. So after having begun what seemed to be a very theoretical, politically motivated, and time-consuming initiative, all of a sudden it was adopted “as is” and came to life.

The second tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), was not done by the Secretariat, but rather by members of the Security Council. Following that tribunal and after I had left, the Legal Office was involved in the creation of the tribunals for Sierra Leone and Cambodia. I was back in the Office of Legal Affairs when we created the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This is a whole different animal, because it does not have war crimes as its subject-matter jurisdiction. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is applying the Lebanese domestic law concerning terrorism and bombings with regard to the assassination of the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Q: Critics of ad hoc tribunals such as those you have mentioned have highlighted that the international criminal tribunals prosecute too few people, that they cost too much money, and that the tribunals do not necessarily address the needs of those living in these countries. What are your responses to these critics and your views on the role of these tribunals?

On the number of indictees, actually, at the beginning of both the ICTY and the ICTR, the criticism was that they were indicting too many, and all of a sudden there were a lot of people who were being arrested or were turning themselves in. There were quite a few fugitives for a while, but in the end there are only two fugitives left for the ICTY. The Security Council, on the recommendation of the ICTY itself, said that the tribunals should limit themselves, not to every person who had committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, but to only the most senior who were responsible for the most serious crimes. So that way they began to shorten the list. And in fact some of those indictees, by procedures adopted in the ICTY, if they are middle or lower level perpetrators, can be back to local courts in the region, for example in Zagreb, Belgrade or Sarajevo, once the ICTY is satisfied that due process will be had, and that the trial will not be a sham or a kangaroo court. If the ICTY thinks that one of these domestic proceedings is not going well according to international standards of due process, it has the power to pull it back. In that way, they began to cull some of these indictees who would not be indicted today, but who were indicted in the early years when they could not get their hands on the big fish.

Later, for the tribunals for Sierra Leone and Cambodia, their mandates included that they were to try only the most senior people who had committed the most serious crimes. That’s why Sierra Leone had only a few indictees, around 10–12. And they are all done except for Charles Taylor, who’s being tried now. It’s the same with Cambodia, where there is a relatively small number of indictees because they wanted to get the top leadership.

Q: What do you think are the greatest legal barriers to the UN becoming a more effective institution?

Now you’re getting into UN law. In terms of being an effective organization—for what purpose? I suppose if you look at the primary objective of the UN Charter, which is to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, you are talking about the ability of the UN to maintain international peace and security, which is primarily the function of the Security Council. Obviously there has been a lot written in the past 60 years about how the Security Council is or is not functioning, whether the veto should be revised or expanded to have new countries get the veto or at least new permanent membership—rumor has it that World War II is over—and that the Security Council is too political an institution. I’m not sure the veto is an objective legal obstacle, because if there wasn’t the veto, we would not have the organization we have today. Every member of the UN understood that and accepted the veto when they signed on to the Charter. Plus, if this “legal barrier” were removed, the Council could be adopting resolutions against the fundamental interests of the major Powers who would simply ignore the Council resolution, eroding its credibility over time. There could, as an alternative to the UN, perhaps be several organizations of like-minded states, but there would not be a universal organization. And there are high points, such as the actions leading up to the first Persian Gulf War against Iraq, when the organization actually began functioning exactly as its 1945 authors intended it to, with the five permanent members working together, meeting together, and then going to the whole Security Council. A lot of the members of the organization were not used to that and said, “What is this? The P5 are now uniting and dictating to us, imposing sanctions all over the place!” But in fact that’s what the organization was intended to be like. So the biggest obstacle is dealing with the feeling of many other countries that it’s not their organization, the Security Council is too powerful, and the permanent members are abusing their privileged position. You have to deal with that appearance or reality without tearing down the structure. It is trite but true to say the UN will work effectively when the political will is there of all members to make it work—that is not a legal barrier.

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Q: Critics of ad hoc tribunals such as those you have mentioned have highlighted that the international criminal tribunals prosecute too few people, that they cost too much money, and that the tribunals do not necessarily address the needs of those living in these countries. What are your responses to these critics and your views on the role of these tribunals?

On the number of indictees, actually, at the beginning of both the ICTY and the ICTR, the criticism was that they were indicting too many, and all of a sudden there were a lot of people who were being arrested or were turning themselves in. There were quite a few fugitives for a while, but in the end there are only two fugitives left for the ICTY. The Security Council, on the recommendation of the ICTY itself, said that the tribunals should limit themselves, not to every person who had committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, but to only the most senior who were responsible for the most serious crimes. So that way they began to shorten the list. And in fact some of those indictees, by procedures adopted in the ICTY, if they are middle or lower level perpetrators, can be back to local courts in the region, for example in Zagreb, Belgrade or Sarajevo, once the ICTY is satisfied that due process will be had, and that the trial will not be a sham or a kangaroo court. If the ICTY thinks that one of these domestic proceedings is not going well according to international standards of due process, it has the power to pull it back. In that way, they began to cull some of these indictees who would not be indicted today, but who were indicted in the early years when they could not get their hands on the big fish.

Later, for the tribunals for Sierra Leone and Cambodia, their mandates included that they were to try only the most senior people who had committed the most serious crimes. That’s why Sierra Leone had only a few indictees, around 10–12. And they are all done except for Charles Taylor, who’s being tried now. It’s the same with Cambodia, where there is a relatively small number of indictees because they wanted to get the top leadership.

Article Responses

The Emerging Global Regime for Investment: A Response

Responding to Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 427 (2010).

I.        Introduction

Professor Salacuse argues that today’s network of investment treaties adds up to an emerging global “regime” for international investment.[1] He defines “regime” as do international relations scholars: “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making  procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”[2] and adds that to qualify as a regime the network must “constrain and regularize the behavior of participants, affect which issues among protagonists move  on and off agendas, determine which activities are legitimized or condemned, and influence whether , when, and how conflicts are resolved.”[3]

Salacuse’s conception of the regime does not include other arrangements that set out additional or overlapping principles, norms, and rules for international investment.  Specifically, he does not incorporate the investment rules associated with the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Yet, both the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), which restricts host countries’ imposition of performance requirements on foreign investors, and national schedules under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which ensure market access to certain investors, cover part of the agenda of home countries in earlier negotiations for a truly multilateral agreement on foreign investment.  These rules now surely form part of any emerging global investment regime.  Of course, the “regime” has not generated international law that is binding on non-treaty countries.  As a result, it does not cover a large part of investment flows, particularly those between rich countries.  In addition, it has not yet created a really common set of principles, because language differs considerably from treaty to treaty and only limited common interpretation has emerged from arbitration tribunals.  Subject to these caveats, Salacuse’s conclusion is reasonable: an international regime for investment is emerging through the spread of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), investment provisions in bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs), and dispute settlement clauses of individual investment agreements.[4] Salacuse’s exploration of the emerging investment regime and its key differences from most international regimes clarifies some of the special challenges the regime faces in retaining developing countries as adherents.   Its unusual origins and structure carry important consequences for those who wish to encourage developing countries to remain in the regime.  One feature is the fact that the existing regime makes it difficult for host countries to benefit from learning by experience.  A second problematic outcome is that the scope of “investment” covered by the regime has frequently been stretched beyond what many host countries probably intended when they signed investment treaties.  The third issue is the absence of significant “escape clauses,” safeguards that have played crucial roles in making other international regimes politically acceptable and long-lived.  Finally, the unusual structure makes it extremely difficult for concerned parties to effect constructive change.

. . .

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[1] See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 427, 431 (2010).

[2] Id. at 431 (quoting Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations 113, 113 (2009)).

[3] Id. (quoting Donald J. Puchala & Raymond F. Hopkins, International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis, 36 Int’l Org. 245, 246 (1982)).

[4] Political scientists who have explored the “regime nature” of current rules on foreign investment have also tended to ignore the investment rules embodied in the WTO and the GATS, although they have generally accepted the view of the system as making up a regime.  Schill argues a somewhat different point, that the current regime is approaching the equivalent of a multilateral regime because of its most-favored-nation provisions and the possibilities of treaty shopping.  See Stephan W. Schill, Investment Treaties: Instruments of Bilateralism or Elements of an Evolving Multilateral System? 9–15 (Global Admin. L. Viterbo IV Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/Schill.pdf.  One might also add to Salacuse’s list unambiguous consent to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (or other) arbitration provided by some countries in their legislation.  When such exists, a country opts into the regime without the need of BITs, RTAs, or clauses in investment agreements.  In spite of the emerging international regime, unilateral actions persist.  The United States still threatens to cut off aid, withdraw its generalized system of preferences (GSP), and vote against multilateral loans for countries that take U.S. property without prompt and adequate compensation.  One might also consider national and multilateral political risk insurance organizations as part of any regime. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), for example, has insured investors against non-payment of arbitration awards.

Article Responses

Agency, Universality, and the Politics of International Legal History

Responding to Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition and Appropriation, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 475 (2010).

I.        Introduction

A widespread “turn to history” has marked international legal scholarship in recent years.[1] In the rich and extensive study to which the present note responds,[2] Arnulf Becker Lorca offers a new contribution to the growing literature on nineteenth-century international law[3] by approaching this period from the semi-periphery. That is, Becker Lorca prioritizes those states which, though not European, were deemed sufficiently “civilized” to engage with the West on something approximating a formally equal basis, or at least with greater power and legitimacy than was ordinarily accorded to “non-civilized” peoples. He argues that nineteenth-century semi-peripheral jurists appropriated and deployed the international law of their time to bolster the sovereignty of their states. It is in such appropriation—and not in some unidirectional process of European expansion or imposition—that he seeks to find an explanation for international law’s incremental “universalization” during the course of the nineteenth century.

Despite its familiar roots in world systems theory,[4] and its increasing currency among international legal scholars, “semi-periphery” is, like many of its cognates and corollaries, a deeply ambiguous term, suggesting considerations of ethnicity, territory, and politico-economic power alike. However, regardless of how it may be defined, at least one thing remains certain: jurists hailing from or in the service of states on the semi-periphery of the international legal order have often fascinated legal historians with their willingness and ability to put even the most overtly value-laden rules of international law to counter-hegemonic use.[5] Close enough to dominant centers of economic and intellectual production to come under their influence, but with national traditions and state institutions resilient enough to resist formal colonization, the semi-periphery was a natural home for informed engagement with the international legal rules that facilitated colonialism and imperialism. By adopting a comparative approach, Becker Lorca aims to demonstrate that such engagement drove international law to become “a global legal order” in the nineteenth century.[6]

The complex patterns of influence and interaction engendered by these relations made themselves felt in a variety of legal instruments. A well-known example, and one which Becker Lorca discusses, is the “standard of civilization,” a kind of metric with which nineteenth-century international lawyers sought to gauge and evaluate competing claims to formal membership in the international legal order.[7] Only by satisfying those attributes that happened to be associated with the standard at a given juncture could a state gain full admission into the “family of civilized nations,” winning recognition as a state in possession of the robust international legal personality requisite for the complete exercise of legitimate sovereign powers. Of course, like most criteria of its type, the standard admitted degrees. Hence, while China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire were seldom recognized as belonging to the “family of civilized nations,” at least not without considerable controversy,[8] even the most crudely positivist jurists felt a need to carve out an intermediate category for cases of the type they were thought to exemplify, thereby distinguishing them from “savage” regions and terrae nullius.[9] Indeed, the influential classification of “civilized,” “barbarous” (or “semi-civilized”), and “savage” (or “non-civilized”) states that was offered by James Lorimer was intended to make room for precisely this type of gradation: Westerners may not have accepted judgments issued by Chinese courts, but they had to grant “partial” recognition to China as a state, given its “barbarous” rather than “savage” character.[10] Though the “standard of civilization” fluctuated over time, it remained a gatekeeper to admission in the international order spawned by the European state system well into the early twentieth century.

As problematic as the “standard of civilization” obviously was, the fact that neither its content nor its parameters was ever fixed, and that it appeared in different incarnations in the hands of different jurists, allowed it to serve a number of political projects. The most ambitiously counter-hegemonic were designed to strike at the foundations of the very political and economic relations which had made it possible for a “standard of civilization” to be articulated in the first place. To take one of Becker Lorca’s examples, Japanese international lawyers of the late nineteenth century often pushed for the abrogation of the unequal treaties into which authorities in Kyoto and Tokyo had entered with Western powers by arguing that their state satisfied each of the elements of the “standard of civilization.” Among other things, a functioning court system was now in place, a professional bench was on offer, extant laws and customs had been codified, and newer, more “modern” laws had been promulgated.[11] Less ambitious and counter-hegemonic, but no less revealing, were those projects in which semi-peripheral jurists employed “civilizational” discourse to distinguish the polities they represented from their regional neighbors or antagonists. Becker Lorca’s strongest examples here are Etienne Carathéodory, an Ottoman lawyer and diplomat of Greek heritage who saw in the “standard of civilization” an opportunity to question pan-Islamism, and Fedor Fedorovich Martens, the famous Baltic-Russian jurist who sought to draw a sharp distinction between the international status of the Russian state and those of its southern and eastern neighbors.[12]

The “standard of civilization” was not an idiosyncratic, easily isolatable outgrowth of an international law that had been placed at the beck and call of the “Great Game” or the “Scramble for Africa,” themselves merely two of the better known examples of nineteenth-century imperialism. Rather, it was one in an assemblage of instruments with which nineteenth-century lawyers sought both to conceptualize and to intervene in an increasingly complex world—a world marked as much by non-European resistance to European expansion as by such expansion itself. It comes as no surprise, then, that Becker Lorca focuses in his article on precisely the kind of creative appropriation one sees at work in semi-peripheral lawyers’ engagement with the “standard of civilization.” On his account, international law “became universal” not through imposition, as though “the rules applicable to the relations between the West and the non-Western world . . . exclusively flowed from the former to the latter,” but through appropriation, a multifaceted process driven by “a global profession that articulated a transnational legal discourse.”[13] Nineteenth-century semi-peripheral jurists shared “a distinctive . . . legal consciousness defined by a ‘particularistic universalism’”—to such a degree, in fact, that a “common pattern of appropriation” grounded in “functional equivalences” can be traced from Russia to Latin America and from Japan to the Ottoman Empire.[14] And this unique “legal consciousness,” this “common pattern of appropriation,” was one that permitted, even encouraged, innovative “reinterpretation” of “the doctrinal structure of international law.”[15] Instead of simply “learning how to play by the new rules of international law that Western powers sought to impose on them,” semi-peripheral jurists also learned how to go about “changing the content of those rules.”[16]

. . .

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[1] For discussion, see Martti Koskenniemi, Why History of International Law Today?, 4 Rechtsgeschichte 61 (2004); Matthew Craven, Introduction: International Law and its Histories, in Time, History and International Law 1 (Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Maria Vogiatzi eds., 2007).

[2] Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition and Appropriation, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 475 (2010).

[3] See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 32–114 (2005); Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (2001); Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (2004); David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, 65 Nordic J. Int’l L. 385 (1996); Casper Sylvest, International Law in Nineteenth-Century Britain, 75 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 9 (2004).

[4] For classic exposition, see Immanuel Wallerstein, Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis, 3 Theory & Soc’y 461 (1976). As is well known, world systems theory seeks to describe and explain the emergence and development of global politico-economic systems by analyzing relations between “core,” “semi-peripheral,” and “peripheral” states. These relations change over time, generating different hegemonic regimes, divisions of labor, and modes of development. See, e.g., 1, 2, 3 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (1974, 1980, 1989); Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System (Giovanni Arrighi & Beverly J. Silver eds., 1999); The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? (Andre Gunder Frank & Barry K. Gills eds., 1993).

[5] See, e.g., Liliana Obregón, Completing Civilization: Creole Consciousness and International Law in Nineteenth-Century Latin America, in International Law and Its Others 247 (Anne Orford ed., 2006); Lauri Mälksoo, The History of International Legal Theory in Russia: A Civilizational Dialogue with Europe, 19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 211 (2008); Umut Özsu, “A Subject Which Excites the Deepest Interest throughout the Civilized World”: The Greek-Turkish Population Exchange and the Craft of Diplomatic Nation-Building, 24 Leiden J. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2011).

[6] Becker Lorca, supra note 2, at 475.

[7] For prominent analyses of the “standard of civilization” on which I draw, see, for example, Georg Schwarzenberger, The Standard of Civilisation in International Law, 8 Current L. Probs. 212 (1955); Anghie, supra note 3, at 84–87; Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (1984).

[8] Take the Ottoman Empire, the first non-European state to gain such admission. Even as late as 1894, Westlake could still write that

[t]he case of Turkey must . . . be left out of sight, because of the anomalous position of that empire, included on account of its geographical situation in the political system of Europe, but belonging in other respects rather to the second group of contrasted populations. She may benefit by European international law so far as it can be extended to her without ignoring plain facts, but her admission to that benefit cannot react on the statement of the law, which is what it is because it is the law of the European peoples.

John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law 103 (1894).

[9] The need to develop such classificatory schemes was felt widely at the time, and not only among lawyers. In 1859, for instance, John Stuart Mill wrote that “[t]o suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no statesman can fall into.” John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in 21 The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 111, 118 (John M. Robson ed., 1984) (1859). For lucid analysis of the distinction between “semi-civilized” and “non-civilized” states, crucial for organizing international legal relations and determining the kinds of politics semi-peripheral jurists could plausibly pursue, see Jörg Fisch, Internationalizing Civilization by Dissolving International Society: The Status of Non-European Territories in Nineteenth-Century International Law, in The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War 235, 252 (Martin H. Geyer & Johannes Paulmann eds., 2001).

[10] 1 James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities 444 (1883).

[11] Becker Lorca, supra note 2, at 497–98.

[12] Id. at 500, 542–45.

[13] Id. at 508, 546.

[14] Id. at 475, 483. See also id. at 503, 521. Comparisons on this scale may seem far-fetched or anachronistic, given the obvious differences that existed between the legal instruments in operation. Nevertheless, it is significant that, as late as the mid-nineteenth century, many British jurists did not draw sharp distinctions between the extraterritorial privileges British officials enjoyed over large swaths of Africa and the Pacific and the more formal extraterritorial jurisdiction they were authorized to exercise in Turkey and China. See, e.g., W. Ross Johnston, Sovereignty and Protection: A Study of British Jurisdictional Imperialism in the Late Nineteenth Century 29 (1973). This would suggest that at least certain legal comparisons can legitimately be drawn between the different semi-peripheral states of the period, and also, perhaps, between semi-peripheral states on the one hand and peripheral states on the other. From a voluminous literature, see Richard S. Horowitz, International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire During the Nineteenth Century, 15 J. World Hist. 445 (2004); C. A. Bayly, Distorted Development: The Ottoman Empire and British India, Circa 1780-1916, 27 Comp. Stud. S. Asia, Afr. & Middle East 332 (2007); Melissa Macauley, A World Made Simple: Law and Property in the Ottoman and Qing Empires, in Shared Histories of Modernity: China, India and the Ottoman Empire 273 (Huri Islamoğlu & Peter C. Perdue eds., 2009).

[15] Becker Lorca, supra note 2, at 477.

[16] Id. at 482.

Article Responses

The Particularistic Universalism of International Law in the Nineteenth Century

Responding to Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition and Appropriation, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 475 (2010).

I.        Introduction

Becker Lorca’s essay is divided into three main parts—(a) the appropriation of classical international law, (b) international legal regimes, and (c) the particularistic universalism of non-European international lawyers.  Each section makes it possible to problematize the current state of research in the history of international law.[1]

The first part sets out the essay’s main thesis: nineteenth-century international law has not been imposed on non-Western peoples but has been appropriated by non-European jurists (or “semi-peripheral jurists,” as Becker Lorca defines them), who have modified non-Western peoples’ rules in ways functional to their countries’ interests.  To identify this appropriation process as the source driving the global expansion of European international law is to deny the view that such law expanded unilaterally through the pressure of Western powers.  Rather, the expansion rested on a dialectical interaction between Western and non-Western states.

This appropriation thesis, strongly supported by a variety of primary sources, offers a new interpretation of the way international law developed in the nineteenth century.[2] Especially notable is Becker Lorca’s analysis illustrating how international European law was received by recombining its constitutive elements—legal positivism, sovereignty, and the standard of civility—thus creating a tension between the self-proclaimed universality of international law and the specificity of national interests.

I start out by introducing the important thesis that Becker Lorca terms the particularistic universalism of international law in the nineteenth century, a development that began with the historic turn which followed the natural law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and climaxed with the legal positivism of the nineteenth century.  I then expand this thesis by noting how particularistic universalism grew historically out of the plurality of universalistic conceptions of international law proclaimed by different legal civilizations, rather than just by Western civilization.  With that done, I critically discuss the standard of civilization by analyzing it not only in legal terms but also from an anthropological and sociopolitical standpoint.  Finally, I underscore the continuity of the West’s civilizing and hegemonic ideology encapsulated in international law and spanning from the early modern age to the contemporary world, regardless of however much it takes on different conceptual forms.

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[1] See generally Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition and Appropriation, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 475 (2010).

[2] Becker Lorca’s thesis is markedly different, for example, from that argued by Onuma Yasuaki holding that the nineteenth century saw a collapse of non-Western legal regimes, especially the Chinese and the Islamic ones, making it possible for Western international law to universalize, thus imposing its hegemony on non-Western states.  See Onuma Yasuaki, When Was the Law of International Society Born? – An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective, 2 J. Hist. Int’l L. 1, 64 (2000).

Profiles & Interviews

An Interview with John B. Bellinger III

The following is an excerpt from the published interview with John Bellinger. To see the full interview, please click on the link to download the article above or below.*

Q: As you moved from law school to private practice and the government, what most surprised you about the practice of international law?

I was most surprised in government how little understanding of the importance of international law there is even at the highest levels of our own government in all three branches—the executive, particularly in congress, and even amongst the judiciary.

As I said earlier today, in other countries international law is something that is absolutely accepted. But in the United States amongst the population, and even in our government, at best there is not an understanding of the importance of international agreements or international tribunals, and at worst there is an active hostility—a belief that international law and international institutions are somehow undermining the sovereignty of the United States. So that was certainly a challenge for me when I was Legal Adviser.

 

Q: If you had the opportunity to be the Legal Adviser again, what, if anything, would you do differently?

This is an issue that I look back on. Every Legal Adviser essentially has to play the hand that is dealt to him. You don’t really get to pick and choose that much because you are the lawyer to the Secretary of State and for the rest of the administration.

I ended up spending a disproportionate amount of my time on post-9/11 terrorism issues—detention in Guantanamo and various other things—which were important to discuss with our allies. But it was not always terribly enjoyable work to have to go and explain controversial policies to audiences that were very hostile toward those policies, and I sometimes wonder whether, had I spent less time on those issues, I could have spent more time picking other interesting treaty issues and traveling to other places to work out international disputes.

And it was certainly at some personal cost to myself, because I had to be the face of some of these unpopular issues. So I do look back and wonder whether I should have spent so much time on all of those issues. But I felt that it was important to explain issues that other countries didn’t understand even if I didn’t necessarily agree with our own policies.

Q: Speaking of international institutions, Joan Donoghue was sworn on September 13, 2010 as a Judge of the International Court of Justice. After there has been all this attention last summer for the selection of a new Supreme Court Justice, what was it like being on the nominating committee for an international judge?

Well this was very exciting, I kept telling members of the press that they needed to write one fewer article about my Harvard Law School classmate, Elena Kagan, of whom I am very fond and very proud, and write at least one article about the fact that we were putting the first American woman on the International Court of Justice.

This is exciting! Judge Tom Buergenthal who had served for nearly ten years resigned this summer. The appointments to the International Court of Justice are made not by governments but based on nominations made by the U.S. “National Group,” which comprises the four members of each country in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. So in our case the national group consists of Harold Koh (the Legal Adviser), me, David Andrews (former Legal Adviser to Clinton), and Steve Schwebel (who used to be the president of the International Court of Justice).

So we had to have all four of us to agree to—or at least to have a majority to support—a candidate. We had a number of well qualified candidates to consider, and all of those were people very knowledgeable about international law. We wanted to put the best candidate that we possibly could on the Court. The person we agreed on was Joan Donoghue, who had been a long standing member of the Legal Adviser’s Office. She left to go to the private sector and I had brought her back in to be my principal deputy—so I was very fond of Joan. There was a long interregnum while Harold’s confirmation was being debated when Joan was the acting Legal Adviser so she got to know the Secretary of State quite well. Harold had spent nearly a year with her and became very impressed with her. And we did not actually have, in the end, disagreement about who the candidate ought to be, but this was someone who we could agree on —an indisputably well qualified international lawyer who had served in the administrations of both parties, and whom the National Group consisting of people who had served in both governments agreed on. And this was an exciting appointment, which I wish had gotten greater public attention.

Q: What is your opinion on the ICJ’s Kosovo decision? How do you resolve the tension between self-determination and international law or do you feel there is no tension?

The Kosovo case was also very exciting. I was heavily involved in the Kosovo independence issue. Harold Koh ultimately argued the advisory opinion case before the International Court of Justice, but the Bush Administration had worked very closely with the Kosovars—first trying to hold back from unilaterally declaring independence prematurely to avoid bloodshed, but essentially to have a balanced approach to the issue.

I was surprised at how favorable the International Court of Justice decision was towards Kosovo. I fully expected that the International Court of Justice would rule that the independence was legal; I could not have imagined that they would somehow try to “put the toothpaste back in the tube.” But I was also equally confident that there would be some kind of loose language about self-determination, declarations of independence, or UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that would be unhelpful in some way. And instead it was an excellent opinion that really tracked the arguments that had been made by the United States and others. So I was surprised at how well the opinion turned out.

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Q: As you moved from law school to private practice and the government, what most surprised you about the practice of international law?

I was most surprised in government how little understanding of the importance of international law there is even at the highest levels of our own government in all three branches—the executive, particularly in congress, and even amongst the judiciary.

As I said earlier today, in other countries international law is something that is absolutely accepted. But in the United States amongst the population, and even in our government, at best there is not an understanding of the importance of international agreements or international tribunals, and at worst there is an active hostility—a belief that international law and international institutions are somehow undermining the sovereignty of the United States. So that was certainly a challenge for me when I was Legal Adviser.

Q: If you had the opportunity to be the Legal Adviser again, what, if anything, would you do differently?

This is an issue that I look back on. Every Legal Adviser essentially has to play the hand that is dealt to him. You don’t really get to pick and choose that much because you are the lawyer to the Secretary of State and for the rest of the administration.

I ended up spending a disproportionate amount of my time on post-9/11 terrorism issues—detention in Guantanamo and various other things—which were important to discuss with our allies. But it was not always terribly enjoyable work to have to go and explain controversial policies to audiences that were very hostile toward them, and I sometimes wonder whether, had I spent less time on those issues, then I could have spent more time picking other interesting treaty issues, traveling to other places to work out international disputes.

And it was certainly at some personal cost to myself, because I had to be the face of some of these unpopular issues. So I do look back and wonder whether I should have spent so much time on all of those issues. But I felt that it was important to explain issues that other countries didn’t understand even if I didn’t necessarily agree with our own policies.

Q: Speaking of international institutions, Joan Donoghue was sworn on September 13, 2010 as a Judge of the International Court of Justice. After there has been all this attention last summer for the selection of a new Supreme Court Justice, what was it like being on the nominating committee for an international judge?

Well this was very exciting, I kept telling members of the press that they needed to write one fewer article about my Harvard Law School classmate, Elena Kagan, of whom I am very fond and very proud, and write at least one article about the fact that we were putting the first American woman on the International Court of Justice.

This is exciting! Judge Tom Buergenthal who had served for nearly ten years resigned this summer. The appointments to the International Court of Justice are made not by governments but based on nominations made by the U.S. “National Group,” which comprises the four members of each country in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. So in our case the national group consists of Harold Koh (the Legal Adviser), me, David Andrews (former Legal Adviser to Clinton), and Steve Schwebel (who used to be the president of the International Court of Justice).

So we had to have all four of us to agree to—or at least to have a majority to support—a candidate. We had a number of well qualified candidates to consider, and all of those were people very knowledgeable about international law. We wanted to put the best candidate that we possibly could on the Court. The person we agreed on was Joan Donoghue, who had been a long standing member of the Legal Adviser’s Office. She left to go to the private sector and I had brought her back in to be my principal deputy—so I was very fond of Joan. There was a long interregnum while Harold’s confirmation was being debated when Joan was the acting Legal Adviser so she got to know the Secretary of State quite well. Harold had spent nearly a year with her and became very impressed with her. And we did not actually have, in the end, disagreement about who the candidate ought to be, but this was someone who we could agree on —an indisputably well qualified international lawyer who had served in the administrations of both parties, and whom the National Group consisting of people who had served in both governments agreed on. And this was an exciting appointment, which I wish had gotten greater public attention.

Q: What is your opinion on the ICJ’s Kosovo decision? How do you resolve the tension between self-determination and international law or do you feel there is no tension?

The Kosovo case was also very exciting. I was heavily involved in the Kosovo independence issue. Harold Koh ultimately argued the advisory opinion case before the International Court of Justice, but the Bush Administration had worked very closely with the Kosovars—first trying to hold back from unilaterally declaring independence prematurely to avoid bloodshed, but essentially to have a balanced approach to the issue.

I was surprised at how favorable the International Court of Justice decision was towards Kosovo. I fully expected that the International Court of Justice would rule that the independence was legal; I could not

Q: As you moved from law school to private practice and the government, what most surprised you about the practice of international law?

I was most surprised in government how little understanding of the importance of international law there is even at the highest levels of our own government in all three branches—the executive, particularly in congress, and even amongst the judiciary.

As I said earlier today, in other countries international law is something that is absolutely accepted. But in the United States amongst the population, and even in our government, at best there is not an understanding of the importance of international agreements or international tribunals, and at worst there is an active hostility—a belief that international law and international institutions are somehow undermining the sovereignty of the United States. So that was certainly a challenge for me when I was Legal Adviser.

 

Q: If you had the opportunity to be the Legal Adviser again, what, if anything, would you do differently?

This is an issue that I look back on. Every Legal Adviser essentially has to play the hand that is dealt to him. You don’t really get to pick and choose that much because you are the lawyer to the Secretary of State and for the rest of the administration.

I ended up spending a disproportionate amount of my time on post-9/11 terrorism issues—detention in Guantanamo and various other things—which were important to discuss with our allies. But it was not always terribly enjoyable work to have to go and explain controversial policies to audiences that were very hostile toward them, and I sometimes wonder whether, had I spent less time on those issues, then I could have spent more time picking other interesting treaty issues, traveling to other places to work out international disputes.

And it was certainly at some personal cost to myself, because I had to be the face of some of these unpopular issues. So I do look back and wonder whether I should have spent so much time on all of those issues. But I felt that it was important to explain issues that other countries didn’t understand even if I didn’t necessarily agree with our own policies.

Q: Speaking of international institutions, Joan Donoghue was sworn on September 13, 2010 as a Judge of the International Court of Justice. After there has been all this attention last summer for the selection of a new Supreme Court Justice, what was it like being on the nominating committee for an international judge?

Well this was very exciting, I kept telling members of the press that they needed to write one fewer article about my Harvard Law School classmate, Elena Kagan, of whom I am very fond and very proud, and write at least one article about the fact that we were putting the first American woman on the International Court of Justice.

This is exciting! Judge Tom Buergenthal who had served for nearly ten years resigned this summer. The appointments to the International Court of Justice are made not by governments but based on nominations made by the U.S. “National Group,” which comprises the four members of each country in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. So in our case the national group consists of Harold Koh (the Legal Adviser), me, David Andrews (former Legal Adviser to Clinton), and Steve Schwebel (who used to be the president of the International Court of Justice).

So we had to have all four of us to agree to—or at least to have a majority to support—a candidate. We had a number of well qualified candidates to consider, and all of those were people very knowledgeable about international law. We wanted to put the best candidate that we possibly could on the Court. The person we agreed on was Joan Donoghue, who had been a long standing member of the Legal Adviser’s Office. She left to go to the private sector and I had brought her back in to be my principal deputy—so I was very fond of Joan. There was a long interregnum while Harold’s confirmation was being debated when Joan was the acting Legal Adviser so she got to know the Secretary of State quite well. Harold had spent nearly a year with her and became very impressed with her. And we did not actually have, in the end, disagreement about who the candidate ought to be, but this was someone who we could agree on —an indisputably well qualified international lawyer who had served in the administrations of both parties, and whom the National Group consisting of people who had served in both governments agreed on. And this was an exciting appointment, which I wish had gotten greater public attention.

Q: What is your opinion on the ICJ’s Kosovo decision? How do you resolve the tension between self-determination and international law or do you feel there is no tension?

The Kosovo case was also very exciting. I was heavily involved in the Kosovo independence issue. Harold Koh ultimately argued the advisory opinion case before the International Court of Justice, but the Bush Administration had worked very closely with the Kosovars—first trying to hold back from unilaterally declaring independence prematurely to avoid bloodshed, but essentially to have a balanced approach to the issue.

I was surprised at how favorable the International Court of Justice decision was towards Kosovo. I fully expected that the International Court of Justice would rule that the independence was legal; I could not have imagined that they would somehow try to “put the toothpaste back in the tube.” But I was also equally confident that there would be some kind of loose language about self-determination, declarations of independence, or UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that would be unhelpful in some way. And instead it was an excellent opinion that really tracked the arguments that had been made by the United States and others. So I was surprised at how well the opinion turned out.

have imagined that they would somehow try to “put the toothpaste back in the tube.” But I was also equally confident that there would be some kind of loose language about self-determination, declarations of independence, or UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that would be unhelpful in some way. And instead it was an excellent opinion that really tracked the arguments that had been made by the United States and others. So I was surprised at how well the opinion turned out.

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