Environmental Law Review Syndicate

By Garrett M. Gee, Staff Member, William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review.

This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate. 

The Rails-to-Trails Act (“Trails Act”) provides localities and nonprofits with a useful tool for transforming dormant rail rights-of-way (“ROWs”) into recreational trails.  16 USC § 1247(d).  The Act streamlines the legal complexity of trail conversion by providing a clear and systemic framework for the railroad to transfer ownership of the corridor to a third party sponsor organization (known as the “interim trail manager”).  Only a ROW in the interstate, common carrier rail network (hereinafter, a “common carrier line”) is eligible for trail conversion under the procedures of the Trails Act.  16 USC § 1247(d).  All railbanked ROWs are subject to reactivation for rail service, so potential trail sponsors should consider this risk when drafting the railbanking agreement and investing in the trail corridor.  Finally, railbanking is a voluntary transaction between the railroad and the trail manager—nothing in the statute obligates the railroad to negotiate or agree to railbanking.  However, because the Act allows railroads to shed property tax liability without foreclosing the possibility of future rail service along the corridor, it is often an attractive proposition for inactive common carrier lines.

By Caitlin Troyer Busch, Stanford Environmental Law Journal.

This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate. Click here to see the original post and leave a comment.

Introduction

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is both lauded and criticized as one of the most powerful environmental laws ever enacted. Proponents of the law praise it for protecting thousands of endangered species over the last forty years, while detractors argue it is a bureaucratic mess that no longer benefits humans, but instead overburdens private landowners and development and values species’ needs above human needs. These claims reflect the disparate values underlying the statute itself. At the time of the Act’s passage, some proponents pushed for endangered species reform on the belief that species have intrinsic value—that is, value that “an entity has in itself, for what it is, or as an end.” Others believed that the value of endangered species lay in their instrumental value to humans, as “means to a desired or valued end,” such as agriculture. Despite these distinct values, the Act was passed in 1973 with little to no opposition. A wide range of stakeholders with differing environmental values came together to craft a far-reaching and unprecedented environmental law. This lack of opposition demonstrates that the Endangered Species Act successfully captured both sets of values in a single, comprehensive environmental statute.