Feb 5, 2024 | Content, Online Scholarship, Perspectives
Michael Yip*
I. Introduction
In October 2023, two dozen countries gathered in Beijing to celebrate the Belt and Road Initiative’s (“BRI”) tenth anniversary. However, in ten years, little is understood about the bank loans that finance this initiative. On the one hand, the loans have been described as “debt traps” or “unsettling” projections of Chinese geo-economic power. On the other, the BRI has been characterized as an “international public good” or—in the words of the UAE’s Economy Minister—even “a gift to the world.” Naturally, both approaches—particularly when taken in isolation—are oversimplifications.
1. The Value of a Legal Perspective
Adopting a legal lens, however, would materially enrich our understanding of how BRI loans work in practical and empirical terms—enabling us to “look behind the headlines.” One aspect that has been overlooked is the “invisible law” that governs the loan agreement and disputes arising from the loan. Although this law—codified in the loan agreement’s choice of law, jurisdiction, and procedural law clauses—is an indispensable (albeit “boilerplate”) part of any banking contract nowadays, it has acquired an added significance in BRI loan documents. These clauses have become a venue in which different legal regimes—Chinese, English, New York, and others—project legal power and jostle with one another to shape China’s global development financing initiative (which itself goes on to project power and compete for prominence and acceptance in international affairs).
2. Key Findings
The data presented below shows that, based on the text of BRI loan agreements, Chinese law and dispute resolution mechanisms have been an increasingly popular choice. This indicates a characteristic of the BRI to induce “extraterritorial observance”: a shorthand term used by this article to describe the patterns and processes by which national laws are—as a matter of common and expected practice—observed by persons outside the country from which the laws originate. (In this case, Chinese law happens to be the object of extraterritorial observance, but history tells us that—because of processes such as globalization, migration, revolution, and colonialism—Soviet, Islamic, English, New York, and European Union laws have undergone a comparable experience.)
However, taking what the clauses in BRI loan agreements expressly say at face value would lose sight of the fact that they govern the loan in ways that cannot immediately be evident upon a cursory reading of the loan documentation. In other words, the governing laws have been—to a material extent—“invisible.” This is for three reasons. BRI loan agreements have often been kept secret; the depth, breadth, and content of the governing law have not been fully enunciated in the loan agreement; and some of the governing law may be found elsewhere in the laws of other countries.
3. Article Roadmap
This article will first explain the origins of the contest between legal regimes; describe the extraterritorial observance of Chinese law; and explain what makes the law governing BRI loans both consequential and invisible, before concluding thereafter.
These considerations are not merely academic. Indeed, when BRI projects go wrong, the “invisible law” determines how China and its borrowers will work out problems—on which, according to Christoph Nedopil, over a trillion dollars of taxpayers’ money, citizens’ livelihoods, and geo-economic power are staked.
II. Does a Competition Between Legal Regimes Exist?
At first glance, a competition between legal regimes may not appear to exist. After all, BRI loan agreements—and their clauses—constitute the final product of a negotiation and documentation process between the borrower and lender, supported by legal and financial advisers. Given this, any “competition” most visibly lies between the loan parties, rather than different legal regimes. This interpretation is supported by Ian Ivory and Cora Kang, who—in their book on the use of English law in BRI transactions—suggested that negotiations may be won or lost as part of a quid pro quo: “Where the question of using PRC law is sometimes raised, this is usually as a tool in negotiations and is traded for some other concession on the deal.”
However, the English judiciary and bar associations published a position paper titled: The Strength of English Law and the UK Jurisdiction. This paper advocated for the predictability of English law, claiming that it “respects the bargain struck by parties” and “will not imply, or introduce, terms into the parties’ bargain unless stringent conditions have been met.” Were disputes to arise, the paper also advocated for the UK’s “incorruptible judiciary” that was described as “structurally and practically independent.”
Those comments were made in 2017, attempting to provide reassurance and bolster confidence that—even after the UK’s departure from the European Union—English law was still suitable to govern cross-border contracts and English judges could still be trusted to adjudicate cases. Although the context of these comments, Brexit, is salient, they are just as applicable to the BRI—which at that point was still in its relative infancy (at four years old) and was, according to sentiment analysis conducted by Bruegel, better able to court interest in the West.
At the time, the judiciary’s and bar association’s comments also formed part of a broader set of advocacy messages by the UK state. They include 2016 remarks by the UK Advocate General for Scotland—a member of the executive branch—which emphasized the value of the UK’s law enforcement and legal services on the Belt and Road. In this light, both sets of comments can be cast as an example of one legal regime attempting to maintain its competitiveness in what Gilles Cuniberti called an “international market for contracts” and (by extension) for BRI loan agreements too. To those ends, there is no reason not to include initiatives such as the BRI as a plausible means to maintaining competitiveness in Cuniberti’s “market.”
By contrast, attempts by the Chinese legal regime to extend (rather than, in the English case, maintain) competitiveness have assumed a different form. Rather than an enticement-led approach (through position papers and other marketing campaigns), China’s approach has been directive-based and action-oriented. For example, the Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Further Providing Judicial Services and Guarantees by the People’s Courts for the Belt and Road Initiative stated that: “The people’s courts shall extend the influence of Chinese laws… and strengthen the understanding and trust of international businesses on Chinese laws.”
III. The Competition and “Extraterritorial Observance” in Numbers
To date, no attempt has been made to measure the contest between legal regimes to govern BRI loans. However, original analysis of AidData’s loan agreement repository undertaken by the author reveals the extent to which the BRI is inducing the extraterritorial observance of Chinese law.
1. Choice of Law Clauses
Choice of law clauses set out “the law that applies when interpreting the agreement and in determining any disputes regarding it.” A typical formulation of the clause can be found in the 2017 loan agreement signed between China and Sierra Leone that financed the upgrade and expansion of the Queen Elizabeth II Port, which reads as follows: “This Agreement and all non-contractual obligations arising out of or in connection with it shall be governed by English law.”
Fig. 1a shows the composition of choice of law clauses occurring in 48 loan agreements entered into by Chinese banks and overseas borrowers following the inception of the BRI. As shown, Chinese law has emerged as the dominant choice by 2020 (71%). However, this observation runs contrary to common practice of selecting a choice of law originating from a third country. This practice has been described by Philip Wood in a 2016 book commemorating the Loan Market Association’s twentieth anniversary as important “not because of familiarity or commercial orientation or any of those soft virtues, but rather to ensure that the loan obligations were insulated against changes to the loan agreement by a statute of the sovereign.” Philip Wood went on to indicate that such changes could include passing legislation to “forcibly” impose a debt moratorium, a debt rescheduling or a foreign exchange control of the loan currency. The primacy of Chinese choice of law clauses, however, most likely reflects Matthew Erie’s and Sida Liu’s view that China, as a “capital exporter, may occupy a dominant bargaining position vis-à-vis the host state.”
Fig. 1b shows the cumulative frequency of choice of law clauses in 101 Chinese-financed loans from 2003 to 2020. As shown, the adoption of Chinese choice of law clauses increased by 1.8 times from the BRI’s inception in 2013 onwards, whereas the same for English choice of law clauses grew by 1.5 times. This rate of adoption has meant that Chinese law clauses not only maintained but also enlarged their extraterritorial observance over time. English law clauses—the first-choice common law preference but nonetheless the second-choice overall—was unable to challenge Chinese law primacy, instead entering into a plateau that by 2020 had not yet been reversed.
2. Jurisdiction Clauses
Jurisdiction clauses “deal with the physical location of where a dispute will be heard, the type of institution (Court or Arbitration Tribunal) that will hear the dispute.” In practice, these clauses will often mimic choice of law clauses because, as Philip Wood noted in relation to syndicated loan agreements: “Once the governing law had been chosen, jurisdiction followed suit since the benefits of an external governing law might well be lost if the courts that enforced it were different, even though technically most courts could then, as now, apply foreign law.”
However, Chinese lending has produced noteworthy exceptions. In the pre-BRI era, an illustrative example is a RMB32 million loan provided by the Export-Import Bank of China (“China Eximbank”) to the Botswana Ministry of Finance and Development Planning for a housing project in the capital. In that loan agreement, the parties agreed upon an English governing law, but elected that disputes would be submitted to the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”). In the AidData repository, other noteworthy hybrid combinations during the BRI era include a US$219 million loan provided by China Eximbank to the Philippine Department of Finance for the “Philippine National Railways South Long Haul Project.” In the loan agreement, Chinese governing law was chosen but the dispute resolution seat was the Singapore International Arbitration Centre.
Fig. 2a shows the composition of jurisdiction clauses, which have aggregated variants such as different physical locations for the same arbitration tribunal or alternative venues if an urgent decision is required. However, as with the case of choice of law clauses and irrespective of the permutations on offer, the preference for the Chinese option—CIETAC—has been dominant (56%). In transactions for which a jurisdiction clause was ascertainable, the London Court of International Arbitration and Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre were in close contention, respectively competing for second and third place.
Fig. 2b shows the cumulative frequency of jurisdiction clauses. As shown, the adoption and extraterritorial observance of Chinese jurisdiction clauses grew by 1.8 times from the BRI’s inception in 2013 onwards. This growth rate mirrors the rate for Chinese choice of law clauses (discussed above), which indicates that the “hybrid combinations” discussed above were outliers rather than the norm. Meanwhile, Hong Kong jurisdiction clauses grew by 1.5 times and those of London grew by 1.7 times.
3. Procedural Law Clauses
Procedural law clauses stipulate the rules by which the dispute resolution seat will administer the adjudication of the dispute. In practice, these clauses will often mimic jurisdiction clauses because—where national courts have been nominated—compliance with their procedures tends to be mandatory. For example, litigants in Chinese and English courts must follow the civil procedure rules for each country in order for their case to be tried. However, the rules of arbitration tribunals give an established right to choose and/or modify the procedural law governing their arbitration.
The “right to choice” in a BRI arbitration context is demonstrated by an US$85 million loan provided in 2010 by the CITIC Bank and China Construction Bank to the Argentinian Ministry of Economy and Public Finance to finance construction of and supplies to the Lina-A Metro in Buenos Aires. In that loan agreement, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre was given jurisdiction, but the procedural law chosen by the parties was that of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law.
What both transactions show is that there is substantial flexibility in the contractual terms governing procedural law – but only where arbitration is concerned. Furthermore, no loan agreements substituted the procedural law of one national arbitration tribunal for those of another national arbitration tribunal. No transaction, for example, gave jurisdiction to the London Court of International Arbitration but chose the procedural law of a Chinese arbitration tribunal. Instead, where substitutions have occurred, they have swapped the procedural law of a national tribunal with multilateral procedural law formulated by an international organization.
Fig. 3a shows the composition of procedural law clauses. As with the choice of law and jurisdiction clauses, the preference for the Chinese option—the rules of CIETAC—has been dominant (54%). Fig. 3b shows the cumulative frequency of procedural law clauses. As shown, the adoption and extraterritorial observance of Chinese procedural law clauses grew by 1.8 times from the BRI’s inception in 2013 onwards.
IV. The Laws are Consequential but Operate “Invisibly”
1. On Consequentiality
The laws described above are consequential in three ways. First, they serve as a gateway for troubled transactions and parties in dispute to seek support from judges and arbitrators on contested points of law. As the BRI matures and moves into its second decade, loan transactions will enter rougher waters and the three clauses discussed will come to the fore—especially as China is pushing to play a more active dispute resolution role in the international legal order through the China International Commercial Court. Doing so enables China to place less reliance on resolving problems through ad-hoc diplomatic channels, as was recently seen when Zambia restructured US$4.1 billion of debt owed to China.
Second, the clauses serve as conduits for extraterritorial observance and channel the legal power that countries exert on each other. The impact of these clauses is at their most pervasive when individual jurisdictions (such as England, New York and—increasingly—China) shape the international legal order to induce others from overseas to voluntarily observe their laws or, alternatively, their approach to the practice of law. For instance, the English jurisdiction, through its Loan Market Association, promulgates standard-form loan agreements—that have often been English law-governed – to lenders and borrowers of all origins. So, in a similar vein, could a standard-form template for BRI loans materialize one day? Possibly. In their landmark work How China Lends, Anna Gelpen et al. have already identified emergent patterns in clauses covering events of default, confidentiality duties and repayment mechanisms across 100 Chinese loan agreements. However, notwithstanding that those patterns are—in their 2024 form—unlikely to constitute a self-standing BRI template, templates materialize slowly. By way of illustration, Philip Wood recollected that the first syndicated loan agreement governed by English law may have drafted in 1968. Since then, it has accumulated nearly 60 years of updates and modifications. Building a template takes time. Let us wait and see.
Third, the clauses—and their propensity to nominate one choice of law or jurisdiction to the exclusion of others—drive and divert significant amounts of business for law firms. Over a longer time horizon, the BRI may go on to bring many millions of dollars of business to the law firms with the capability to advise on Chinese law matters. These law firms include both “home-grown” Chinese firms as well as international outfits that have entered into joint ventures with Chinese partners.
2. On “Invisibility”
Yet, the law governing BRI loan agreements operates invisibly and in ways that a mere examination of the documents would not reveal. It does so in three ways. First, as Anna Gelpern et al. have discovered, BRI loan agreements contain “far-reaching” confidentiality clauses that restrict the borrower’s ability to disclose information about the loan. (This differs with commercial practice, in which it is typically lenders who have been prevented from disclosing confidential information, primarily to uphold borrower privacy.)
Second, the content of the law and the situation-specific rules governing BRI agreements will not be fully enunciated in the three clauses. The clauses cannot (and simply do not have the space to) articulate the legal rule for a complete universe of legal problems that may arise in relation to the loan. Accordingly, at best, the clauses serve as signposts to very large bodies of law, which in turn require further expertise to understand and apply. (Furthermore, the varying levels of comprehensiveness and depth of codification within the Chinese, English and other legal systems will not only add further complexity to ascertaining the proper legal rule, but also subject that ascertainment to interpretation and/or modification by judges.) In this sense, the governing law of a BRI loan may not only be invisible to the reader of loan agreement, but also uncertain.
Third, although parties to a BRI loan generally have the autonomy to select their own choice of law, this may be (or attempt to be) overridden by a foreign mandatory law that is “unseen” and on which the text of the loan agreement was silent. For example, in the case of loans governed by Chinese law and involving a private borrower, plausible mandatory laws—as noted in 2022 by Philip Wood—most likely include the borrower country’s insolvency laws. These could conflict with a Chinese governing law expressly chosen by the parties if the borrower entity became insolvent and claims on borrower assets were made by creditors. (The same, however, would not apply to sovereign borrowers who would instead be caught between an expressly-chosen Chinese governing law and soft international obligations such as Paris Club rules.) Elsewhere, a similar (albeit more indirect) example arises in the field of environmental law. A borrower country’s planning and environmental laws would apply to government licences which, in turn, would be required to develop a site into a project and which would typically be listed as part of conditions precedent to the loan being drawn down by the borrower. Finally, with respect to loans governed by a non-Chinese law, plausible sources of mandatory Chinese law include the “social public interest” exception to party autonomy. Given that mandatory laws of any jurisdiction present a “hidden minefield” to BRI parties, their advisers would do well to acquaint themselves with Chinese and non-Chinese approaches to conflict of laws.
V. Conclusion
There is a contest between legal regimes to be attractive and to—wherever and whenever possible—be taken up and observed by international commercial parties. This contest has long predated the BRI. However, the loan agreements underpinning China’s initiative serve as a new arena for contestation in which a new alternative—China’s laws and dispute resolution mechanisms—show early signs of taking primacy over more established alternatives from North America and Europe. The consequences of this “extraterritorial observance” are significant: a legal regime’s entrenchment and prominence in transactions tends to sustain itself, by setting the norm for future transactions and/or by governing the forthcoming disputes. In turn, extraterritorial observance precipitates more business activity for its lawyers. For practitioners, this can indeed be a virtuous cycle.
However, the laws governing BRI loans operate invisibly. As has been the case with any complicated transaction pre-dating the BRI, it may be difficult to ascertain which loans are governed by which laws; which doctrines of expressly-chosen laws apply; and how local laws may mandatorily override the choice of the parties. One day, these laws could be called upon to determine the outcome of the very first BRI banking dispute. Such a dispute will plausibly place billions of dollars at risk; materially shape the direction of BRI lending practices; and bring about the collision of law against another. For these reasons, how invisible laws govern bank loans on the “Belt and Road” deserve an ever-watchful eye.
*Michael Yip is a Research Associate in “China, Law and Development” at the University of Oxford, where he is also the Research Cluster Lead for legal services. Previously, he was a British civil servant and worked at the World Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency, specialising in export and infrastructure finance. Michael also holds an LLM as a Yenching Scholar from Peking University in China.
Cover image credit
Jan 29, 2024 | HILJ-HIALSA International Arbitration Collaboration, Online Scholarship
Danilo Ruggero Di Bella*
Introduction
This piece traces the possible ramifications of third-party states’ actions in the context of investment arbitration. It explains how a third state’s action may have a “butterfly effect”: the third state’s action can prompt foreign investors to initiate investment arbitrations against host states different from the third-party state that carried out the action in the first place. Although to a certain degree, this is not a new phenomenon (multiple investment arbitrations have been triggered by the E.U. Commission urging the repeal of various state aids), it is certainly a rarer occurrence outside of an international organization. Within an international organization, it is relatively easier for the institutional governing body to direct its member states to commit a breach of their international obligations. For example, in Micula v. Romania, the host state breached its obligations towards foreign investors by repealing incentives that could have constituted illegal state aid in the eyes of the E.U. Commission.
Indeed, sometimes, third-party states’ or international organizations’ actions may prompt foreign investors to initiate arbitrations against their host state for a measure that the host state took in response to the initial third-party’s action. At times, unfortunately for the host state, this measure translates into a breach of an obligation the host state owed towards its foreign investors. Hence, a sort of butterfly effect takes shape.
The critical actions that will be discussed are Russia’s characterization of snow crabs as a sedentary species and Norway’s conflicting interpretation of a multilateral treaty, the 1920 Svalbard Treaty (originally known as ‘Spitsbergen Treaty’ after the name given by the Dutch explorer Willem Barentsz to the archipelago). These actions may have triggered a chain reaction of events bearing legal implications for Spain, due to Spain’s violations of its international obligations towards its foreign investors catching snow crabs around the Svalbard archipelago based on Spanish fishing permits.
First, this piece will provide a brief overview of the snow crab industry and its origins. Second, it will discuss Russia and Norway’s controversial stance on the snow crabs. Third, it will explain the inconsistency of Norway’s isolated view of the 1920 treaty regulating the status of Svalbard. Finally, it will illustrate the potential investment arbitrations that can be filed against Spain for revoking the snow crab-catching permits for Svalbard from its foreign investors.
I. The E.U. Snow Crab Fleet
In 2012, E.U. trawlers began harvesting snow crabs, a relatively new species in Europe’s waters. This novel activity is a highly profitable business (reportedly, each snow-crab trawler yields one million euros per month on average), and arguably an environmentally friendly practice. Indeed, snow crabs are infesting Europe’s waters, since they are a non-indigenous species (p.6) migrating from the Russian coast where they were artificially introduced in the 1960s. Being an alien species prone to overbreeding, they end up harming the ecosystem if they are not regularly caught.
The European Commission has been authorizing a few member states—specifically, Spain (ANNEX IB p. 99), Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland (ANNEX III p. 149)—to issue permits to catch snow crabs. A trawler flying the Spanish flag—the Adexe Primero—pioneered the catch of snow crabs in Europe in 2012. The Spanish vessel focused its activities in the “Loophole” area, a small portion of international waters between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, and the waters surrounding the Svalbard archipelago. This vessel carried out its activities on the ground of the fishing permits issued by Spain, specifically, a Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (“NEAFC”) zone permit for the Loophole area and a Svalbard Zone permit for Svalbard waters.
Vessels of the contracting parties to the NEAFC can get a permit from their flag state to freely catch unregulated stocks—such as snow crabs—in international waters (like in the Loophole area). Similarly, vessels of the signatories to the 1920 Svalbard Treaty can get a permit from their respective flag States to fish around Svalbard on the same footing as Norwegians. Both of Adexe Primero’s fishing grounds proved to be so profitable that other E.U. and Norwegian vessels followed suit.
II. Crimea Sanctions and Russia’s View on Snow Crabs
Following EU sanctions on Russia for the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Russia retaliated by obstructing E.U. vessels fishing in the Barents Sea. For instance, on 16 July 2015, the Adexe Primero was seized by a Russian patrol boat while fishing in international waters in the Barents Sea (as proved by the satellite-based vessel monitoring system onboard). The seizure was prompted by the detection of fishing pots with foreign signs in Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”). The pots belonged to the Adexe Primero and to a Norwegian vessel (the Northeastern H-27-AV). It turned out that the pots had drifted on the current into Russia’s EEZ. The Spanish vessel was then released after posting a bond.
In July 2015, Russia’s retaliations built up to a declaration that defined snow crabs—usually fished by E.U. vessels in the international waters of the Loophole—as a sedentary species living on the continental shelf (p. 339). As such, the exploitation of this valuable resource should be up to the coastal states, i.e., Russia and Norway, the latter of which joined Russia’s declaration.
The Loophole in the Barents Sea is located in international waters, as Russia’s and Norway’s EEZ cannot extend further than 200 nautical miles out to the sea (the Loophole is squeezed between the two EEZs). However, the continental shelf can extend up to 350 nautical miles as per Article 76 UNCLOS, thus engulfing the seabed underneath the Loophole. Therefore, the continental shelf below the water column in the Loophole can be subject to Russia’s and Norway’s jurisdiction, despite the water column above being on international waters. By defining the snow crab as a resource of the continental shelf (instead of a high-seas fishery resource), the coastal states (Russia and Norway) gain otherwise nonexistent jurisdiction over this precious resource and the right to exploit it exclusively, while simultaneously eroding one of the freedoms of the high seas, the freedom of fishing under Articles 87 and 116 UNCLOS.
Interestingly, the characterization of crabs as a sedentary species is not univocal and is rather arbitrary, often driven by national economic interests. Japan (a traditionally distant-water fishing country) considers crabs as a high seas fishery resource. Arguably, crabs’ ability to migrate defies their sedentary feature. Other states—mostly, coastal states (such as Canada (p.14))—hold that this crustacean is a sedentary species. It remains unclear whether crabs are sedentary or high-seas species. For example, Brazil considers lobsters sedentary, whereas the UK does not (p. 9). Accordingly, the classification of crustaceans is often a contentious issue.
Following Russia and Norway’s joint declaration, in August 2015, the E.U. recommended that its member states suspend the permits to catch snow crabs in the Loophole. Accordingly, Spain suspended Adexe Primero’s permit to fish in the NEAFC zone. According to the accounts of the E.U. shipowners and captains involved, other E.U. member states instead disregarded the E.U.’s recommendation and allowed their trawlers to keep fishing in the Loophole. Finally, in September 2015, Spain followed the example of the other member states and lifted the suspension of Adexe Primero’s permit for the NEAFC zone. Spain then renewed Adexe Primero’s permit for 2016. However, in March 2016, Spain suspended the permit for the NEAFC zone once again and eventually stopped issuing it altogether, apparently out of deference to Russia’s stance.
III. Norway’s Breaches of International Legal Obligations
The 1920 Svalbard Treaty governs the international status of the Svalbard archipelago. Just a year earlier, in 1919, the geographer and explorer Robert Neal Rudmose-Brown described the archipelago as a no man’s land whose natural resources have been explored and exploited by a variety of states since its discovery. In the aftermath of World War I, the need to establish some sort of local authority to administer the international community living on the archipelago and to avoid the archipelago’s militarization led to the negotiations of the Svalbard Treaty.
The contracting parties to the Svalbard Treaty gave Norway sovereignty over Svalbard but allowed the joint and peaceful exploitation of the archipelago’s natural resources by a variety of nations. The Treaty accords to the nationals of each contracting state the right of economic activity on an entirely equal footing (p. 128) with Norwegian nationals, thus preserving (p.2) the terra nullius status of the region (specifically based on Articles 2, 3, 6, and 7). By virtue of this Treaty, Svalbard became the only land state territory of common use (p.IV) in modern international law.
However, over time, Norway has discriminatorily restricted the commercial access of the other signatories’ citizens based on nationality requirements. Meanwhile, Norway has disavowed the Svalbard Treaty by depriving its provisions of their original meaning: to constrain Norway’s sovereignty over the archipelago in favor of the international community’s acquired rights. Norway has also relied on the Treaty to extend unrestrained sovereignty on the waters surrounding Svalbard up to 200 nautical miles and, accordingly, to expand its maritime boundaries bordering Greenland.
Thus, Norway inconsistently interprets the geographical scope of the Treaty: on the one hand, Norway holds that the Svalbard Treaty applies only up to 12 nautical miles off the archipelago; on the other hand, Norway stretches its maritime boundaries with Greenland up to 200 nautical miles off Svalbard by relying on the same treaty notwithstanding the fact that, according to Norway’s own interpretation of the Treaty, Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard should be constrained to 12 nautical miles around the archipelago.
Russia and the EU object to Norway’s interpretation of the Treaty (as every other contracting party does), since if it was not for the Svalbard Treaty, Norway could not set its border at 200 nautical miles off Svalbard. Hence, either the Svalbard Treaty applies up to 200 nautical miles off Svalbard and Norway retains its current maritime border with Greenland, or the Treaty applies up to 12 nautical miles and Norway’s maritime borders (as well as its territorial jurisdiction) should be downsized accordingly.
Should the territorial scope of application of the Treaty be up to 12 nautical miles off Svalbard’s baseline, the portion of water between its outer edge and Greenland’s EEZ would be considered high seas. Should Svalbard’s continental shelf stretch further than 12 nautical miles into the high seas, the Svalbard Treaty would apply to that zone anyway, since the continental shelf is a prolongation of Svalbard’s land territory.
Therefore, regardless of the geographical scope of the Svalbard Treaty (either up to 12 or 200 nautical miles), this instrument should apply to the activity of snow crab fishing around Svalbard, because such activities occur on its continental shelf. Norway indeed considered snow crabs as a resource of the continental shelf in its 2015 joint declaration with Russia. Accordingly, the nationals of all contracting parties to the Svalbard Treaty should be allowed to catch snow crabs on Svalbard’s continental shelf just as Norwegians do.
Norway’s 2015 joint declaration with Russia concerning the sedentary nature of snow crabs might have seemed beneficial at the time to gain jurisdiction over this natural resource on the continental shelf underneath the Loophole. However, the same declaration backfires with respect to Norway’s interests in Svalbard. Indeed, the declaration indirectly obligates Norway to accord equal commercial rights to foreign snow crab trawlers on Svalbard’s continental shelf which, being a prolongation of Svalbard’s land territory, is covered by the application of the Svalbard Treaty. In other words, under Norway’s own interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty, E.U. trawlers should be able to harvest snow crabs on Svalbard’s continental shelf for the same reason they cannot catch them in the Loophole area. Of course, this is an unintended consequence of Norway’s policies on the two bodies of water (the Loophole and the Svalbard waters). The common denominator of the two policies is that they are both driven by national interest: both seek to let only Norwegians exploit snow crabs.
In June 2013, the Adexe Primero began fishing in Svalbard waters thanks to a permit granted by Spain based on the Svalbard Treaty. However, following Norway’s arrest of a couple of E.U. trawlers, in January 2017, Spain suspended the permit indefinitely, despite the EU’s recommendation to disregard Norway’s prohibition to catch snow crabs around Svalbard. Spain was indeed the only E.U. member state to adopt such a suspension (unlike Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland). Initially, Span’s suspension was meant to be only temporally. However, it became a de facto revocation of the permit, as the suspension was never lifted.
Norway’s discriminatory actions have already led to investment arbitrations concerning the catching of snow crabs in Svalbard waters. Could Norway’s flawed interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty lead to similar repercussions for other states?
IV. Are Investment Arbitrations Drifting Towards Spain?
As noted, the E.U. member states who were granted snow crab catching permits by the E.U. reacted in different ways to Russia and Norway. On one hand, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland stood firm on their position and kept allowing their vessels to catch snow crabs in the Loophole and around Svalbard. On the other hand, Spain had repeatedly suspended Adexe Primero’s permits and, eventually, stopped issuing them altogether out of fear of Russia and Norway. Thus, Russia’s erosion of the freedom of fishing in the high seas (by defining snow crabs as a resource of the continental shelf) and Norway’s violation of the Svalbard Treaty may have led Spain to breach in turn its international obligations towards its foreign investors.
Spain’s repeated suspensions of the snow crab catching permits and their ultimate revocation have disrupted the activity of the Adexe Primero and its shipowner, Mariscos Polar SL, a company registered in Spain for the purpose of fishing snow crabs in arctic waters and whose shareholders hold Moldovan and Russian nationalities.[1] These Russian and Moldavian investors may invoke respectively the Spain-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) and the Spain-Moldova BIT to bring an expropriation claim against Spain. Spain directly expropriated the snow crab-catching permits and indirectly expropriated the foreign investors’ company operating thanks to those permits. Furthermore, the cumulative effects of the continual suspensions of the permits—culminating with their revocation—may well amount to a creeping expropriation.
Spain’s consequential expropriation of Mariscos Polar is worsened by the fact that the actions leading to this taking were not proportional. First, there was a lack of proportionality since Spain did not provide alternative fishing grounds to avoid the total disruption of Mariscos Polar’s business.[2] Second, the absence of proportionality is highlighted by the fact that Spain was the only E.U. member state to adopt such a harsh measure. Hence, even if Spain’s drastic actions may have been taken because of Russia and Norway, their lack of proportionality and compensation does not exempt Spain from its international obligations towards its foreign investors. Importantly, Article 6 of the Spain-Russia BIT and Article 5 of the Spain-Moldova BIT cover not only direct expropriations but also “any other measures with similar effects.” Hence, the applicable BITs allow for indirect and creeping expropriation claims.
Since fisheries are governed by an E.U. Common Policy, the treatment Spain accorded to Mariscos Polar should be contrasted against the treatment that other E.U. member states in the same position as Spain accorded to enterprises operating in the same sector as Mariscos Polar. If such treatment is more favorable than the one accorded by Spain, then Spain failed to accord Mariscos Polar the most favorable treatment it could have possibly accorded. Since the other E.U. Member-States did not suspend their snow crab permits, Spain breached the most favored nation (“MFN”) clause in Article 5(2) of the Spain-Russia BIT and Article 4 of the Spain-Moldova BIT.
Further, a Russian investor bringing a claim under the Spain-Russia BIT could also rely on the MFN clause to broaden the scope of the dispute resolution clause. This way, the investor may bring fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) and full protection and security (“FPS”) claims. For example, the investor may import the more favorable treatment accorded by the Spain-Lebanon BIT, whose dispute resolution clause extends also to violations other than unlawful expropriations. Whereas the Moldovan investor would not need to invoke the MFN clause for this purpose, since the dispute resolution provision of the Spain-Moldova BIT is not limited to expropriation claims.
Spain breached the FET standard towards its foreign investors insofar as it failed to protect their legitimate expectations concerning their investment, by generating an uncertain legal framework for catching snow crabs. Notably, the investors’ legitimate expectations were also backed up by the E.U.’s recommendation to ignore Norway’s prohibition of fishing in Svalbard.
Moreover, Spain failed to accord adequate legal protection against Norway’s subsequent claims to the fishing rights that Spain granted to its investors in the first place. Spain could have protected such rights by resorting to an international arbitration against Norway based on the 1929 Spain-Norway Treaty on Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration. Not only did Spain fail to accord appropriate legal protection to her foreign investors to ensure the normal ability of their business to function, but it also deprived the investors of the title (viz. the fishing permit) to advance a possible investment claim against Norway (by invoking the Russia-Norway BIT).
Accordingly, the foreign investors may claim from Spain compensation for the damages suffered, the restitutio in integrum of the revoked permits, and their adequate legal protection through an international legal proceeding between Spain and Norway.
Conclusion
The snow crab affair illustrates how third-state actions may have a butterfly effect on the host state in international investment law. This is especially likely where the initial actions were ill-grounded and driven purely by national interests and the host state’s response did not take into proper consideration its international obligations towards its foreign investors. Crucially, should Spain disregard the interests of its foreign investors concerning the fishing of snow crabs in Svalbard waters, Spain would implicitly waive its international rights stemming from the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. Those rights include all maritime, industrial, mining, and commercial rights over the natural resources of the Svalbard archipelago. Thus, in the future, Norway may validly rely on Spain’s acquiescence to relinquish such rights—as per article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT—to prevent Spain from benefitting of Svalbard natural resources on an equal footing.
*Danilo Ruggero Di Bella is an attorney-at-law – member of the Madrid Bar and the Canadian Institute for International Law Expertise (CIFILE) – leading the law firm Bottega DI BELLA (www.bottegadibella.com). He holds a Master in Lawyering from Alicante University and an LLM in Investment Treaty Arbitration from Uppsala University. Danilo graduated in Law from Florence University with a specialization in public international law from Radboud University Nijmegen. He can be reached at: danilo.dibella@bottegadibella.com.
[1] Author interview with owners of Mariscos Polar SL.
[2] Author interview with owners of Mariscos Polar SL.
Cover image credit
Jan 29, 2024 | Annual Symposia, Symposia
Conference Information
Please join us on Saturday, March 2nd at Austin Hall on the Harvard Law Campus for our 2024 International Law Conference entitled The Future of International Economic Law, hosted by the Harvard International Law Journal and Law and International Development Society.
This year’s conference features four panels and one keynote speech and focuses on the changing nature of multilateral cooperation in international economic law. Each discussion will cover key topics related to this theme, drawing on experts from the legal industry, academia, and intergovernmental organizations. Panels will focus on (1) foreign investment and emerging market development, (2) sovereign debt restructuring with the rise of new powers, (3) the future of international financial law, and (4) avenues for global trade reform.
This year our keynote speech will be delivered by Mr. Hassane Cisse, an expert in international development law and former Deputy General Counsel of the World Bank Group. Mr. Cisse will focus his comments on global governance and institutional reform issues facing international organizations.
The conference will include a complimentary breakfast and lunch.
Dec 19, 2023 | Online Scholarship, Perspectives
Introduction
The diplomatic relationship between the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic is further complicated by the Massacre River affair. Tensions between the two countries, which share the island of Hispaniola, have never been so high in recent decades. The subject of dispute is the construction of an irrigation canal fed by the Massacre River, which the two countries share. Plunged into a deepening humanitarian crisis and plagued by insecurity and armed gang violence, Haitians see the construction of the irrigation canal as a matter of survival, food sovereignty, or a kind of last gasp. However, the Dominican authorities argue that the canal would divert water from the Massacre River, violating the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration of February 20, 1929, concluded by the two countries. This situation creates tensions between the two nations and highlights the issues and challenges relating to the management and use of water from the Massacre River. At a time when this dispute is causing major friction between the two peoples, it is more crucial than ever for the two states to strengthen their diplomatic relations if they are to avoid stirring up dark memories of the past.
I. The Facts
The Massacre River is a small coastal river that flows into the Atlantic Ocean and is a border waterway between the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In August 2018, Haitian President Jovenel Moïse launched the construction of an irrigation canal on the Massacre River. Water from the Massacre River was to irrigate 3,000 hectares of highly fertile land in the Maribahoux plain in northeastern Haiti, to alleviate the misery of the inhabitants. The project drew protests from the Dominican Government. On April 26, 2021, several Dominican soldiers from the Cuerpo Especializado en Seguridad Fronteriza Terrestre (CESFRONT) intimidated the Haitian workers. On May 27, 2021, with a view to finding a diplomatic solution, the two States convened a meeting of the bilateral Joint Commission at the Ministry of External Relations of the Dominican Republic. The Commission’s technical secretaries signed a joint declaration recognizing that the proposed irrigation canal would not alter the natural course of the waters. Since the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, the project has slowed down, but Haitian farmers, supported by several civil society organizations, started digging again in August 2023, hoping that water would one day reach their cultivation fields. Today, this irrigation canal is the subject of heated controversy between the two countries. While the Haitian Government is open to dialogue to find a favorable outcome, on Friday, September 15, 2023, Dominican President Luis Abinader decided to close all borders. In a press release issued on the same day, the Haitian government declared that the Maribahoux plain irrigation project would continue. At a time when the Haitian people are facing an acute social, humanitarian, and political crisis, the management of this conflict is of crucial importance. To better understand the current dispute over the Massacre River between the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, it is essential to bear in mind the long-standing and still-latent conflict over this international waterway.
II. The History
The history of the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is essentially one of tensions and exactions. This border was to change with conquest, reunification, independence, and tyranny. The Massacre River was the scene of fierce rivalry between the French, who felt the river belonged to the western part of the island of Saint-Domingue, and the Spanish, who wanted the river to separate their lands from those of the French on the mountainous side. The river’s name reflected the tensions between the two parts of the island. It was called the Massacre River because the two peoples had often come to blows on its banks. The Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 already mentioned the Massacre River. Some historians claim that the river’s name evokes the incessant skirmishes between French buccaneers and Spanish soldiers on its banks, while others maintain that it is a reference to the memory of one of the many wars of extermination that wiped out the indigenous Arawak population. Whichever hypothesis is adopted, it should be noted that the island seemed destined for a tragic confrontation, an anticipatory sign of the violence that was to accompany the birth of Haiti and its relations with the neighboring Republic. It was the Treaty of Aranjuez (1777) that established this river as the boundary of sovereignty between France and Spain.
III. Corpus Juris
In the context of bilateral relations between the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the law applicable to international waters is corpus juris dating from the mid-twentieth century. The law governing international watercourses has been codified in legal instruments such as the Treaty on the Delimitation of the Frontier between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti of January 21, 1929, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration of February 20, 1929, the Boundary Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti of February 27, 1935, and the Additional Protocol to the Treaty of January 21, 1929, Regarding the Delimitation of the Frontier Between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti of March 9, 1936 (“Additional Protocol”).
The most important legal instrument remains the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration of February 20, 1929, which views international waters as shared natural resources and contains some of the principles and rules that would later be elaborated in broader forums such as the United Nations. The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of May 21, 1997 (“United Nations Convention”) essentially regulates international watercourses, which are defined as “watercourse[s], parts of which are situated in different States.”
The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration of February 20, 1929 codifies the use of the waters of the rivers Libón and Artibonite, as recalled in Article 6 of the Additional Protocol: “The waters of the rivers Libón and Artibonite belong equally to the two riparian States, and use thereof shall be subject to the provisions of Article 10 of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration signed in the city of Santo Domingo . . . on February 20th, 1929.”
Article 10 of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration of February 20, 1929 enshrines the right of either state “to make just and equitable use, within the limits of their respective territories, of the said rivers and streams for the irrigation of the land or for other agricultural and industrial purposes.”
In other words, this Treaty prefigures the principle of equitable and reasonable sharing found in Article 5 of the United Nations Convention, which emphasizes that “Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner . . . [and] participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.”
Moreover, Article 10 of the Treaty also lays down the obligation not to cause significant damage: “[T]he two High Contracting Parties undertake not to carry out or be a party to any constructional work calculated to change their natural course or to affect the water derived from their sources.” A similar formulation of this principle can be found in Article 7 of the United Nations Convention, which establishes the obligation not to cause significant damage to other watercourse States.
The question of equitable and reasonable use can be assessed in light of the criteria set out in Article 6 of the United Nations Convention. Although the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic are not parties to this Convention, it would be logically and legally possible to interpret the provisions of the Treaty in accordance with the principles of international law, considering, for example: “Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character; The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States . . . .”
In the case relating to the territorial jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (1929), the Permanent Court of International Justice interpreted the principles of equitable, reasonable, and non-damaging use of the watercourse through the notion of community of interests uniting riparian States around an international watercourse:
“But when consideration is given to the manner in which States have regarded the concrete situations arising out of the fact that a single waterway traverses or separates the territory of more than one State, and the possibility of fulfilling the requirements of justice and the considerations of utility which this fact places in relief, it is at once seen that a solution of the problem has been sought not in the idea of a right of passage in favour of upstream States, but in that of a community of interest of riparian States. This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the user of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in relation to the others”.
Equitable and reasonable use also presupposes consultation in a spirit of cooperation. For example, a state cannot decide unilaterally on the allocation of a watercourse if other riparian states want to see their own interests considered. The obligation to notify and consult helps to resolve tensions and controversies, as recalled by the International Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills case (2010). Thus, the obligation to notify is essential in the process, and it should lead the parties to work together to assess the risks of the project and negotiate any modifications likely to eliminate them or minimize their effects. The principle of fair and reasonable use can therefore also be applied by prior notification of the project.
IV. Discussion
In the Massacre River affair, the Haitian Government undertook the construction of an irrigation canal in 2018 to water the Maribahoux plain. This is the first project launched by the Haitian Government on the Massacre River, while the Dominican Government has already built several aqueducts and irrigation canals. Opposing the canal construction project, the Dominican government argued that the project constituted a detour of the river and a threat to the environment. The two States consulted each other to assess the project’s risks. In May 2021, they adopted a Joint Declaration stating that, on the basis of the information provided by the representatives of the Republic of Haiti and in the spirit of understanding and exchange of information in accordance with what is stipulated in the Treaty, the project being carried out on the Massacre River for the abstraction of water does not constitute a detour of the watercourse. It was therefore clear from the facts that the project undertaken by the Haitian government was not likely to divert the watercourse and reduce the flow of water and did not undermine the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development.
The Joint Declaration was based on a study conducted by the Dominican National Institute of Hydraulic Resources (INDRHI) in 2021. This study recognized that the project would require a flow between 1.5 and 3 cubic meters per second, which represents 20.33% of the average annual flow of the Massacre River. Thus, the flow would still be below the extractions made on the Dominican side. Finally, the researchers added that two-thirds of the Dominican agricultural land irrigated with the Massacre River’s water is located upstream of the canal under construction.
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that Haitian farmers continued in August 2023 in the absence of Haitian government control. If the spontaneous initiative of the farmers to pursue the irrigation project is to be understood from the point of view of their urgent economic and social needs, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration of February 20, 1929, confers only on states, and not on the citizens themselves, the right to undertake construction work on watercourses. It is therefore incumbent upon the current government to regain control of the project in accordance with the standards established by bilateral treaties and international legal instruments. In a press release dated September 15, 2023, the Haitian Government declared its intention to take all measures to ensure that irrigation of the Maribahoux plain is carried out in accordance with scientific standards, under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development and of the Environment. For the time being, however, the irrigation project is being carried out according to the sovereignty of a people completely neglected by their government.
Dominican President Luis Abinader’s decision to close his borders with the Republic of Haiti would contravene the Joint Declaration of May 27, 2021, which paved the way for coordinated institutional management, and the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration. In the context of this dispute, it would perhaps be more interesting to envisage a peaceful and amicable outcome, by considering “all relevant information on the water table, hydrological studies, environmental impacts and other information outlined in the May 2021 Joint Statement.” Furthermore, in the spirit of joint management of shared water resources, the two parties could draw up a technical protocol for the coordinated management of transboundary watersheds. Finally, the Organization of American States could play an important role in facilitating an amicable settlement through mediation. Failing agreement, recourse to international arbitration remains the most appropriate method for resolving this dispute.
The Dominican Republic’s decision also appears to disregard the first paragraph of Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration of February 20, 1929, which underlines the obligation to resort to investigation and conciliation procedures:
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to submit to arbitration all disputes of an international character which may arise between them as a result of one of the Parties claiming a right as against the other, under the terms of a treaty or otherwise, when it has not been possible to settle this claim by diplomacy and when the claim is of a legal nature inasmuch as it is capable of decision according to the principles of law.”
This clause of consent to international arbitration obliges each party to initiate prior amicable and diplomatic attempts to settle a dispute. If the attempt at diplomatic resolution fails, the disputing party may bring the dispute before an arbitrator or an arbitration tribunal, depending on the agreement of the parties. By failing to attempt a diplomatic or arbitral resolution, President Luis Abinader has thus strayed from the path of peaceful resolution mapped out by the Treaty.
Article 5 of the same Treaty sets out the way the arbitral tribunal is to be constituted:
“The arbitrator or tribunal to decide the controversy shall be appointed by agreement between the Parties. Failing agreement, the following procedure shall be observed: each Party shall appoint two arbitrators, only one of whom may be a national of the said Party or chosen from among the persons nominated by the said Party as members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague; the other member may be of any other American nationality. These arbitrators will, in their turn, choose a fifth arbitrator, who shall be the President of the tribunal.”
While the Dominican Government is choosing the worst option, preferring a justice of force based on reprisals instead of relying on the strength of justice, it could simply have chosen the amicable option, and in the event of its failure, the arbitration procedure. It is high time we remembered that gunboat diplomacy is no longer fashionable.
The Dominican Government has already acknowledged that the Haitian project is an irrigation project that in no way endangers downstream ecosystems. The onus is now on the Dominican Government to demonstrate that the current intake on the Massacre River constitutes a damaging and inequitable use of water resources and is detrimental to the environment.
No state can guarantee itself exclusive use of shared water resources. The Republic of Haiti is therefore entitled to pursue the Maribahoux plain irrigation project. However, it must be stressed that this must be done in accordance with technical and scientific requirements, and in compliance with environmental standards.
In the midst of this major controversy, and especially in the midst of the climate crisis, the Haitian government should take the opportunity to take a step to the side by demanding that the Dominican Republic provide precise information on the various works it has undertaken on the Massacre River, with a view to determining whether the Dominican authorities are not significantly reducing the flow of water that Haitians could use downstream.
V. Perspectives
To re-establish a healthy and lasting diplomatic relationship between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the poetics of dialogue are more than necessary. For the future of these two neighboring brothers, the methods of peaceful settlement of disputes must remain essential tools. Diplomacy is the key to peaceful coexistence on the island. It is important to emphasize this in the context of intense tension between the two nations, where Haitians living in the Dominican Republic are sometimes subjected to inhumane, undignified, and degrading treatment.
The Massacre River case teaches both neighboring countries that it is time to take the initiative for a specific river treaty project, particularly in a context where access to and management of water resources pose crucial environmental and social challenges. This would be even more interesting given that the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration still in force today is over a hundred years old. But things have changed since then. In addition to the issues of irrigation production for agricultural purposes and use for industrial purposes set out in Article 10 of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration, other issues such as energy production, access to fresh water for human consumption, environmental protection, and preservation of cultural heritage are gaining in importance. Beyond the Treaty’s principles of equitable and reasonable use, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and the principle of equality of use, new approaches are emerging in international law to meet essential human needs and new environmental challenges. This calls for a watercourse treaty adapted to recent social, environmental, and climatic developments, which will be an important step forward in the management of watercourses, based on a global vision. This issue is even more relevant given that the Libón River – an international waterway originating in Haiti – could also in the future be the subject of intense tensions between the two countries in the context of mining operations in the border zone by two Canadian companies, Unigold and Barrick Gold.
As soon as it affects their diplomatic and trade relations, the Massacre River dispute benefits neither Haiti nor the Dominican Republic. To reach a peaceful settlement of this dispute, it is more than necessary to return to the negotiating table in accordance with their treaty obligations. Both parties can count on the Organization of American States (OAS), which has a proven track record in mediation in the Central American region. To facilitate the peaceful resolution of the dispute, the two governments must communicate all relevant information and research data available concerning the water table, the hydrological regime and potential environmental impacts. If the attempt at diplomatic resolution fails, the parties may then submit their dispute to international arbitration. Moreover, to prevent or manage their potential conflicts in the future, the two states need to rethink the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration, which is already almost a century old. The Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic may consider negotiating a forward-looking treaty accounting for new social, humanitarian, climatic, and environmental challenges. This initiative may prove important for a better coexistence of the two neighboring brothers.
*Milcar Jeff Dorce holds a PhD in Public Law from the University of Bordeaux, Center for European and International Research and Documentation. He specializes in international investment law and arbitration.
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Dec 8, 2023 | Online Scholarship, Perspectives
Manasa Venkatachalam*
Introduction
With the swelling of nationalism globally, the definition of national identities is becoming increasingly restrictive. This phenomenon is extremely evident in India, where the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (CAA) expressly relies on national origin and religion as factors to determine eligibility for citizenship. In this climate of individualistic, national identities, it is important to evaluate how this sense of belonging ties into legal frameworks governing identity, and in particular, definitions of citizenship. Given the involvement of ethnic, national, and religious factors that have become increasingly evident in the granting of citizenship in several parts of the world, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) becomes a relevant tool to assess such issues from an international legal perspective. This article utilizes the ICERD to examine this leading question: how far can states go in creating criteria to exclude those from citizenship based on ethnic or religious grounds?
Scholars belonging to the Third World Approaches to International Law school often point out how citizenship was created to sustain a colonial and imperial order, and thus, citizenship laws are aimed at excluding “backward” peoples who were viewed as incapable of possessing property and exercising rationality (see, e.g., Bhandar, p. 35; Shahid & Turner, p. 7). The historical exclusion of indigenous communities, women, and people of color from the privilege of citizenship illustrates how citizenship status is used as a tool of “othering” (Edwards). This practice continues in the post-colonial era despite global developments like the ICERD.
The proposal to codify an international prohibition on racial discrimination emerged from the recently independent Pan-Africanist segment of the United Nations. Concerned by the othering and racist discrimination inherent in colonial imperialism, Global South states engaged in forceful multilateral human rights diplomacy to build support for an international prohibition on racial discrimination (see Schabas, p. 248-52). Their efforts resulted in the U.N. General Assembly’s approval of the ICERD in 1965 (Preamble, para. 4; Keane & Waughray, p. 4; Boyle & Baldaccini, who point out how the ICERD painted racism as being “solely about the consequences of Western imperialism”). Even the International Court of Justice (para. 86) has observed that the Convention was drafted “against the backdrop of the 1960s decolonization movement.”
In many ways, the ICERD represents law-making by and for the “Third World.” The Convention’s history makes it an interesting tool to use to examine issues of racial discrimination in the Global South. Still, the ICERD is not without its issues. One significant problem is that Article 1(3) of the ICERD excludes review of domestic nationality laws from the scope of its protection. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has subsequently touched upon the ambit of the exceptions to the prohibition of racial discrimination regarding nationality in its interpretation of the term “national origin.” However, the ICJ confined its analysis to the ICERD and did not consider whether the prohibition on racial discrimination has independent customary character. The International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) recent work (p. 16) on documenting jus cogens norms has introduced a new factor to consider: whether the prohibition of racial discrimination is a peremptory norm. Since peremptory norms are non-derogable,[2] if the prohibition on racial discrimination has peremptory status, all exceptions to this prohibition become irrelevant. This makes the applicable law a lot simpler and the exceptions to the prohibition on racial discrimination in Articles 1(2) and 1(3) of the ICERD inoperative. Using India’s 2019 Citizenship (Amendment) Act (“CAA”) as an example, this article attempts to resolve the conflict between the ICERD’s prohibition of racial discrimination and the carve-out provided under ICERD Article 1(3), which exempts legal provisions concerning nationality from the scope of ICERD’s protection. In doing so, this article purposely distances itself from the explanations offered by the ICJ in Qatar v. UAE, choosing to instead focus on a different approach than the judgment: the possible peremptory nature of the prohibition of racial discrimination.
I. The ICERD and Nationality
The ICERD is one of the most widely ratified human rights treaties in the world. It has 182 states parties. This makes it a powerful tool to regulate discrimination in citizenship laws and practices (see Hoornick, p. 224). Article 1 of the ICERD prohibits racial discrimination, and Article 5(d)(iii) extends this prohibition to guarantee the enjoyment of the right to nationality regardless of race, color, or national or ethnic origin. However, there are certain exceptions to this prohibition that weaken the ICERD as a tool to combat discriminatory citizenship practices. Mainly, Article 1(3) cabins the ICERD’s scope to exclude review of legal provisions of states parties concerning nationality, citizenship, or naturalization as long as such laws do not discriminate against any specific nationality. Thus, the ICERD presents contradictory positions on the issue of discrimination in the grant and denial of citizenship.
Article 1(3), ICERD: Gaps and Relevance
Paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 1 detail exceptions revolving around citizenship to the prohibition on racial discrimination in Article 1. Article 1(3) of the ICERD reads: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.” Article 1(2) excludes the application of the ICERD from “distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens.” While the exception provided under Article 1(2) featured more prominently in Qatar v. UAE (see para. 83), Article 1(3) has not received such jurisprudential attention. This could be an indication of states’ and courts’ attitudes towards the sovereign sacredness attached to laws governing citizenship, as emphasized in the ICJ’s Nottebohm judgement.[2] The question that has gone unanswered owing to this lack of discussion is whether grounds other than discrimination against a particular nationality can be used to maneuver around ICERD Article 1(3).
Before delving into an analysis of the ICERD, it is important to highlight the practical importance of this inquiry. The current government in India is led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. The party’s representatives, specifically the Union Home Minister, have made several statements indicating their anti-Muslim sentiment and how the CAA and the impending National Register of Citizens (“NRC”) are coordinated policies to remove Muslims from the country.[3] Consequently, the next section will highlight the disparate grant of citizenship in India and the international legal consequences of these policies.
II. India, the CAA, and the NRC
The CAA amends the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955 to make specific classes of illegal migrants eligible for citizenship. Prior to this amendment, any person who satisfied the definition of an illegal migrant would not be eligible for Indian citizenship, and neither would their children (see s. 2(b) of the 1955 Act). However, the CAA establishes that if a person (1) belongs to the Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, or Christian community, (2) is from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, or Pakistan, or (3) entered India on or before 31st December 2014, such a person is now eligible for Indian citizenship.
The Union Government also plans on introducing a NRC for the entirety of the nation. The NRC would contain the names of all “genuine” Indian citizens, requiring persons to submit evidence to prove citizenship per the criteria in the 1955 Act (see Arts. 3 to 6). A similar system has been implemented in the Indian state of Assam. While this policy has not yet been enacted on the national level, the intention of the CAA and the NRC, as the Home Minister noted, is to “weed out” immigrants that the government deems illegal.
Data from the State of Assam illustrates the effect a nationwide NRC and CAA could have. In 2017, the first draft of the NRC was published for Assam. It excluded 19 million people out of 32.9 million applicants for citizenship. The final NRC for Assam was published in 2019 and excludes 1.9 million people from the list, deeming them all not citizens of India. While citizenship in Assam has always been regulated slightly differently ever since the influx of migrants and refugees from Bangladesh in the 1970s, this data offers insight into the impact that the CAA and NRC could have on the rest of the nation.
The Indian CAA and Discrimination Under ICERD Article 1(1)
In short, the CAA does distinguish and exclude individuals based on identities protected by the ICERD, nullifying basic human rights guaranteed to such persons.[4] It excludes any persons other than those from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh from the benefits of citizenship, which can be argued to amount to discrimination based on national origin.[5] As of April 2023, India hosts over 213,000 refugees and asylum seekers, most hailing from Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, China or Myanmar (UNHRC 2022, p. 9). Around 92,000 of these people originated in Sri Lanka, 72,291 from Tibet, and 30,308 from Myanmar (UNHRC 2023), and these are only those registered with the government (UNHRC 2022, p. 9). On the other hand, 14,466 refugees and asylum-seekers are from Afghanistan (UNHRC 2023), and even fewer are from Bangladesh and Pakistan. The law also clearly distinguishes between persons based on religion, as it only covers persons from Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, or Christian communities.
Additionally, the CAA violates several human rights, including the right to nationality and the right against statelessness. The right to a nationality, though disputed, seems to have entered today’s body of customary international law. Making its earliest appearance in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it has been transposed in varying forms into six of the nine core human rights treaties,[6] all of which have widespread ratification, strongly indicating state practice and opinio juris.[7]
The deprivation of the right to nationality has far-reaching consequences. Nationality is the “right to have rights.” Though human rights are inherent, citizenship is often the right that enables the enforcement of all rights; it is the connection between the State and its citizens that ensures the former’s protection of the latter (see Kesby). The deprivation of the right to nationality, consequently, is a deprivation of the vehicle for access to fundamental rights and protection under domestic law.
And, of course, nationality and statelessness are intimately linked. Dubbed a corollary of the right to a nationality (ILC, p. 27), the obligation to prevent and reduce statelessness is now widely considered customary (Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico, paras. 139-141; Blackman, p. 1183; Adjami & Harrington, pp. 102-3 for an in-depth explanation).[8] Statelessness, simply put, is the absence of nationality (1954 Convention, Art.1; Rütte, p. 242). For this reason, the duty to prevent statelessness has been described as a negative right arising from the right to a nationality (Blackman, p. 1176). When combined with the norm of equal and effective protection of the law (Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrant, para. 101; UDHR, Art. 1; ICCPR, Art. 26; ICESCR, Arts. 3, 7; CRC, Art. 2; CEDAW, Art. 1), states must abstain from creating discriminatory mechanisms to grant citizenship (Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico, para. 141).
The CAA was enacted with the purpose of providing citizenship to a select few based on national origin and religion and, consequently, depriving the rest of the same. Additionally, irrespective of its purpose, the CAA certainly impeded the right to nationality of persons of national origin in countries other than the three mentioned. These distinctions imply that the CAA impairs the enjoyment of human rights on an equal footing, engaging the CERD’s definition of racial discrimination.
III. Article 1(3) ICERD: A Free Pass for India?
On a purely textual analysis, Article 1(3) of the ICERD would exclude the CAA from the ICERD’s protections. India’s law clearly covers issues of nationality and citizenship, and it does not distinguish against any nationality per se. (It does distinguish on national origin, but national origin has generally been regarded as different than nationality (ICJ, Qatar v. UAE, para. 105)).
A different way to look at the issue is to assess whether the prohibition on racial discrimination has peremptory status. The ICJ declined to take this approach in Qatar v. UAE. But the obligation to not undertake racial discrimination has been deemed erga omnes by the ICJ (see dicta in Barcelona Traction (para. 34)), and the ILC deemed it a jus cogens norm in 2022 (see Annex (e)). Treaty provisions that conflict with peremptory norms are non-derogable and void per customary treaty interpretation rules.[9] Thus, any exception to the prohibition of racial discrimination would be nullified, including Articles 1(2) and (3) of the ICERD. Unfortunately, the ICJ did not touch upon this in its judgment in UAE v. Qatar. Had it, would the outcome have been different?
An obvious reason as to why the ICJ did not venture into this territory is the severity of the approach. Recognizing ICERD’s prohibition on racial discrimination as reflective of customary international law would deal a considerable blow to the sovereign discretion of States in matters of nationality. Courts are legitimate when they are perceived as having the authority to make decisions, and the ICJ is not exempt from this idea. Legitimacy capital is thus linked to authority: when international courts act in a manner that could be perceived as exceeding the scope of authority granted to them, they lose authority (see Grossman et al., p. 5). Consequently, a decision from the ICJ that would use jus cogens as a means to override significant treaty provisions representing the sovereign will of States is highly unlikely, given the shockwaves it would generate with respect to its legitimacy. That being said, such a decision would still be a legally acceptable and effective means to expand the prohibition on racial discrimination.
Conclusion
Public international law has long recognized the State’s sovereign discretion in dictating terms for membership (Donner, p. 17). A permanent population is necessary for statehood; thus, the ability to control the membership of this population is a vital aspect of sovereignty (Mantu, p. 25). However, the focus on individual human rights is eroding this sovereignty-backed discretion. One tool contributing to this erosion has been the prohibition of racial discrimination.
Still, the untapped potential of the ICERD to evaluate selective nationality laws is striking. Selective citizenship laws deprive persons of vital fundamental rights, but remain under the international legal radar. The ICERD must be used to the fullest as a counter to such laws. With the ICERD’s growing usage in international litigation, the time for a challenge to discriminatory laws like India’s CAA may be ripe.
*Manasa Venkatachalam completed her B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Gujarat National Law University, India, and an Advanced LL.M. in Public International Law from Leiden University, Netherlands. She has worked with NGOs, law firms and international organizations over the years, engaging with several facets of human rights and international law. She started working with Blue Ocean Law in July 2023 and is assisting the firm in representing Vanuatu at the International Court of Justice for the Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change. She is currently based out of Amsterdam. You can find her on LinkedIn and X.
[1] The ILC, for instance, defines it as follows: “A peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law (jus cogens) having the same character” (see Conclusion 3).
[2] See p. 20, where the ICJ determines: “It is for Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that nationality by naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance with that legislation. It is not necessary to determine whether international law imposes any limitations on its freedom of decision in this domain.”
[3] For example, Amit Shah has commented that “[f]irst we will pass the Citizenship Amendment bill and ensure that all the refugees from the neighbouring nations get the Indian citizenship. After that NRC will be made and we will detect and deport every infiltrator from our motherland” and that “[w]e will remove every single infiltrator from the country, except Buddha, Hindus and Sikhs.”
[4] This follows the definition of racial discrimination per Article 1(1) of the ICERD, which defines racial discrimination as [a]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”
[5] See Judge Robinson’s definition of “national origin” in his Qatar v. UAE dissent (paras. 7-8): “According to the ordinary meaning of the words “national” and “origin”, the term “national origin” refers to a person’s historical relationship with a country where the people to which that person belongs are living… National origin refers not only to the place from which one’s forebears came; it may also refer to the place where one was born.”
[6] ICERD, Art. 7; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 24(3); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Art. 9; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Art. 18; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Art. 29.
[7] On this, see the ICJ’s judgement in Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (paras. 99-100), explaining how jus cogens norms are determined.
[8] This is reinforced via the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Art. 1(1); the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, Art. 29, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 7(1), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 24(3).
[9] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53; Application of Genocide Case (Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures) (Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht), para. 100; ILC, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, para. 365; B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 250(2) RdC 217–384, 289.
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Dec 7, 2023 | Content, Online Scholarship, Perspectives
Yohannes Takele Zewale*
Editors’ Note: Although HILJ Online: Perspectives typically publishes short-form scholarship, we occasionally publish exceptional longer pieces—such as this one.
Abstract
Descriptive representation for persons with disabilities in parliaments is not as prevalent as representation based on other identities, such as gender, race, ethnicity, and youth. However, a beacon of progress has emerged from the Global South, with only five countries—Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Egypt—constitutionally recognizing the right to descriptive representation for persons with disabilities. Although the reasons behind this recognition in underdeveloped democracies are not yet studied, this Article explores these factors by analyzing their laws and conducting interviews with politicians, advocates, and leaders of organizations for persons with disabilities in these African countries. By doing so, this Article aims to shed light on the noteworthy strides these countries have made in integrating persons with disabilities into their parliamentary bodies ahead of Western countries. The findings suggest that factors such as the lack of real power shared by their governments, cultural and systematic differences between these African countries and the West, strategic preferences of the Disability Rights Movement, recent constitutional review processes, and other similar factors contribute to the recognition of the right to descriptive representation of persons with disabilities ahead of Western democratic countries.
1. Introduction
Descriptive representation refers to a representation in which representatives have similar backgrounds to the voters they represent, with the trust that voters are more effectively represented by legislators similar to them in key demographic characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, or religion.[1] With descriptive representation, the composition of the representative body necessarily shows the demographics and experiences of the citizenry.[2] In other words, representatives are “in their own persons and lives, in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent.”[3] This type of representation occurs, for example, when legislators with disabilities represent persons with disabilities or when female legislators represent their female constituents.
In her seminal work, Hanna Pitkin argues that the model of Descriptive Representation posits that a representative of a minority group should, to some extent, reflect that group’s common experiences and outward manifestations.[4] However, as articulated by scholars like Anne Phillips, the descriptive representation model goes beyond mere external characteristics, encompassing the ideals and interests of minority groups.[5] Nonetheless, its efficacy in ensuring representation for persons with disabilities remains underrealized. Hendrik Hertzberg highlights the pitfalls of majoritarian plurality electoral systems, where voters often prioritize regional representation, potentially neglecting the specific concerns of marginalized groups.[6] This oversight becomes more pronounced in the case of persons with disabilities, whose dispersed nature is not adequately addressed by such electoral frameworks. Barbara Arneil and Nancy Hirschmann’s research underscores the slower progress in political science regarding disability, revealing a lack of attention to the needs of this substantial segment of society.[7] Stefanie Reher’s observation about the glaring oversight in the descriptive representation of persons with disabilities, constituting one-fifth of the population, emphasizes the urgent need for rectification.[8] In a society that values inclusivity and equal representation, addressing this gap in descriptive representation for persons with disabilities is not just a matter of political theory but a fundamental step toward ensuring the political well-being of a marginalized and underrepresented community.
However, descriptive representation of persons with disabilities in parliaments is less common than descriptive representation based on other identities, such as gender, race, ethnicity, and youth.[9] Yet, in recent years, some countries have begun to constitutionalize the representation of persons with disabilities.[10] These countries may surprise anyone who expects the West to take the lead in recognizing human rights, including the right to representation for persons with disabilities. When measured in indices such as electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, government functionality, political participation, and political culture, countries like Uganda, Egypt, Kenya, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe are categorized as having lower levels of democracy.[11] Nevertheless, they are ahead of the West in terms of having an inclusive legislature and constitutionally recognized descriptive representation of persons with disabilities. Unfortunately, no research has been conducted to determine the factors behind the constitutional recognition of descriptive representation of persons with disabilities in these five African countries.[12] Thus, this Article explores the factors behind the early recognition of the right to descriptive representation for persons with disabilities by these five African countries, surpassing more developed democracies.
In the rest of this Article, Part II will provide a comprehensive summary of the laws implemented in various African countries that allocate parliamentary seats for persons with disabilities. Part III will delve into the findings derived from the collected interview data to synthesize the rationales behind these countries’ decision to grant the right to representation for persons with disabilities, especially in light of their relatively lower levels of democracy. Part IV will comprise a detailed discussion expanding upon the previous sections’ insights, exploring the legislative measures’ implications and consequences, and highlighting any challenges, successes, and potential recommendations for further improvement. And Part V will provide concluding remarks.
2. Background on Descriptive Disability Representation Laws in Africa
Based on the most comprehensive available evidence, it appears that only five countries in Africa have officially recognized and implemented descriptive representation of persons with disabilities within their parliaments. What makes these five countries—Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Egypt—truly fascinating is not just that they recognize the right of persons with disabilities to have descriptive representation in parliament. Equally noteworthy, they consciously decided to enshrine this right directly in their constitutions rather than relying on subsidiary laws. By granting this right a constitutional status, these countries have demonstrated their firm and legally binding commitment to ensuring parliamentary inclusion for persons with disabilities.
For instance, the Ugandan Constitution established a unicameral legislature,[13] which is required to enact laws favoring historically marginalized groups.[14] As a response to this constitutional call, the parliament adopted a law reserving five of the 458 seats in parliament for persons with disabilities; accordingly, there shall be five representatives with disabilities, at least one of whom being a woman.[15] A national electoral college of persons with disabilities, with five representatives from each electoral district, selects those who will occupy the five reserved seats in parliament.[16] Furthermore, every village, parish, sub-county, and district council must include at least one man and one woman with a disability.[17]
Both the Rwandan Constitution and Zimbabwean Constitution established bicameral legislatures, with Rwanda’s Chamber of Deputies and Senate[18] and Zimbabwe’s National Assembly and Senate.[19] While Rwanda and Zimbabwe both have one and two legislative seats reserved for persons with disabilities, the former has seats in the Chamber of Deputies,[20] while the latter has seats in the Senate.[21] The method they choose for selecting these representatives is similar to that of Uganda’s national electoral college of persons with disabilities.[22]
Further, the Kenyan Constitution established a bicameral legislature consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate.[23] These two houses must reflect a fair representation of marginalized groups, including persons with disabilities,[24] requiring the state to ensure the “progressive implementation of the principle that at least five percent of the members of the public in elective and appointive bodies are persons with disabilities.”[25] Additionally, the Constitution sets aside a minimum number of legislative seats for marginalized groups, including persons with disabilities.[26] Accordingly, parliamentary political parties nominate 12 members, based on proportional representation, to represent special interest groups, including persons with disabilities.[27] Two senatorial seats are reserved for two members, one man and one woman, representing persons with disabilities.[28] Also, a County Assembly must consist of members of marginalized groups, at least two of whom are persons with disabilities.[29] The members representing persons with disabilities are nominated or appointed by the winning political parties.[30]
Lastly, the Egyptian Constitution established a bicameral legislature consisting of an upper house (i.e., the Senate) and a lower house (i.e., the House of Representatives).[31] The Constitution requires the state to grant appropriate representation for minorities, including persons with disabilities, in the House of Representatives and local councils.[32] The House of Representatives consists of 596 seats.[33] Of these, 448 seats are filled through majoritarian elections, 120 are filled through party lists, and the president selects 28 representatives.[34] The country is divided into four constituencies for the list component: two 15-member and two 45-member constituencies.[35] At least one person with a disability must be listed on each list in the former, while at least three must be nominated in the latter.[36] Parties that receive more than 50 percent of the vote are given all of the seats in the constituency, ensuring that at least eight candidates with disabilities are elected to parliament.[37] Apart from the eight candidates, the president may use his power of nomination to designate additional disabled representatives.[38]
The fact that these five countries allocate parliamentary seats for persons with disabilities raises a fundamental question: How did these countries realize the right to representation of persons with disabilities in parliament ahead of Western countries with more developed democracies? This question could be answered by research interviews that advance various potential justifications.[39]
3. Rationales for Early Disability Representation Recognition
Certainly, the principle of parliamentary representation is traditionally viewed as a cornerstone for ensuring the political participation rights of any group. However, this principle undergoes nuanced scrutiny in reserving parliamentary seats for persons with disabilities, particularly in countries with varying levels of democracy. Interviewees from Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Egypt have shed light on a multifaceted exploration of the rationales behind this decision. Their insights delve into the intricate fabric of political cultures within their nations, the broader African continent, and Western democracies. Unveiling four key rationales, namely, the absence of genuine power-sharing, cultural and systematic disparities in political ideologies, a strategic choice by the Disability Rights Movement, and the transformative impact of recent constitutional reviews, this section synthesizes the intricate dynamics that influence the decision to grant representation rights to persons with disabilities.
3.1 No Real Power Shared
First, interviewees shed light on power-sharing dynamics in these five African countries, particularly focusing on parliamentary representation for persons with disabilities. A key theme emerged during the interviews, emphasizing that allocating parliamentary seats for persons with disabilities in these countries does not signify genuine power sharing. Instead, it is closely tied to the prevailing authoritarian rule, challenging the perception of these nations as fully democratic. The interviewees argue that, in contrast to Western democracies, the legislatures in these African countries are perceived as symbolic entities, with real power concentrated in the executive branch. They assert that these legislative bodies are, in their words, “sham institutions” where the executive branch reigns supreme. Surprisingly, persons with disabilities find representation in these symbolic legislatures rather than in the executive branch, where actual power resides. This peculiar pattern raises questions about the sincerity of political inclusion for persons with disabilities.
For example, Kenyan interviewees lament the absence of ministers or deputy ministers with disabilities in any of the 22 ministerial offices under President William Ruto. They emphasize that the representation of persons with disabilities in the Kenyan Parliament is hindered by fundamental legal gaps, preventing it from serving as a model for broader inclusion within the executive. Addressing this issue, they argue, requires substantial effort both within parliament and in executive circles. Rwandan interviewees support the “no real power shared” argument by suggesting that even if persons with disabilities secure representation in parliament, they are unlikely to challenge the power dynamics of the incumbent government. The prevailing sentiment is that obtaining a few seats in these symbolic legislatures does not threaten the government’s autocratic rule. Rwanda and Zimbabwe serve as examples where, despite political representation for persons with disabilities in parliament, real power remains concentrated in the executive branch.
Similarly, Egyptian interviewees highlight the absence of ministers or deputy ministers with disabilities in current ministerial offices, reinforcing the idea that genuine power-sharing remains elusive. Their collective perspective is that these countries cannot be considered champions of democracy simply because they allocate some parliamentary seats to persons with disabilities, placing them ahead of developed countries in terms of this specific metric. Additionally, the interviewees reference a Kenyan judge and human rights activist who cautioned against celebrating governments merely for reserving parliamentary seats for minority groups. The judge emphasized the inconsequential nature of parliamentary representation if real power remains entrenched in the executive branch. Interviewees from Uganda align with this sentiment, advocating for the simultaneous fight to involve persons with disabilities in the executive, not merely in parliament.
Contrary to the prevailing skepticism, one interviewee acknowledges the tireless efforts of the Disability Rights Movement and its legislative representatives to leverage parliamentary representation to enhance the social, economic, and political involvement of persons with disabilities. This perspective suggests a nuanced understanding of the potential impact of parliamentary inclusion despite government assumptions of no genuine power-sharing. Further, there is a glimmer of optimism regarding Uganda’s progress in political representation for persons with disabilities. Some interviewees argue that Uganda surpasses other countries in this regard, citing examples of persons with disabilities engaging at the ministerial level. They laud figures like Hellen Asamo, a renowned disability rights advocate and Member of Parliament, who also serves as the Minister of State for Gender, Labour, and Social Development (Disability Affairs).[40] This comprehensive representation in Uganda is seen as exemplary and worthy of emulation by other countries.
Generally, the interviews underscore a common thread—the perception that parliaments in these African countries hold limited authority compared to established democracies, with real power concentrated in the executive branch. However, despite this belief, the Disability Rights Movement recognizes parliamentary inclusion as an empowering tool to advocate for the rights of persons with disabilities. The challenge remains to bridge the gap between symbolic representation in parliament and substantive inclusion in the executive, ensuring that political power is genuinely shared among all citizens.
3.2 Cultural and Systematic Differences in Politics
Second, interviewees revealed intriguing insights into how different cultures and political systems approach the fundamental issue of ensuring representation for minority groups, particularly the disability community, to safeguard their interests. For instance, Egyptian interviewees provided a unique perspective, suggesting that in countries with established mechanisms safeguarding minority interests, such as many Western nations, the focus on parliamentary representation may not be as critical. Similarly, Ugandan interviewees assert that Western democracies already have robust systems, beyond parliamentary representation, dedicated to protecting minority rights, including those of the disability community. They pointed to the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a prime example, emphasizing its role within the judicial system. These interviewees speculated that Western societies might not prioritize parliamentary representation for persons with disabilities, assuming their rights are already adequately protected by existing laws. This viewpoint reflects a divergence in strategies between Western and African nations regarding protecting minority rights.
However, Zimbabwean interviewees offered a different perspective, contending that while anti-discrimination laws in the West, like the Civil Rights Act, have improved the socio-economic participation of persons with disabilities, they may not necessarily enhance their parliamentary representation. They argued that parliamentary representation, if appropriately utilized, could provide comprehensive protection for persons with disabilities because the parliament, as a key decision-making body, shapes laws that directly influence socio-economic and political legislation. Dismissing the argument that Western societies neglect parliamentary representation due to the existence of civil rights laws, they stressed the unique role that parliamentary representation plays in crafting inclusive legislation.
A significant dimension highlighted by several interviewees was the cultural disparity in political philosophies between the West and Africa, specifically regarding the priority given to individual versus group rights. Western democracies typically prioritize individual rights, such as food, housing, and health, over group demands like representation. In contrast, emerging African democracies, guided by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), prioritize group rights. The ACHPR, particularly in articles 19-24, underscores the importance of group rights in Africa. Yet, considering that persons with disabilities may not fit the criteria defining a specific group under the ACHPR, interviewees speculated that the collective nature of African societies and the African human rights system might have prompted the demand for representation as a group right. This distinction in approach, influenced by factors like organization, history, culture, language, psychology, territory, and political form, could explain why the representation of persons with disabilities is prioritized differently and more rapidly in African countries compared to Western democracies. The interviews suggest that acknowledging these cultural and political nuances is crucial to understanding the distinct emphasis on parliamentary representation for persons with disabilities in African democracies.
3.3 Chosen Strategy by the Disability Rights Movement
Third, interviewees considered how, in comparison to its Western counterpart, the Disability Rights Movement in Africa is a relatively recent phenomenon,[41] gaining momentum after the enforcement of numerous international human rights conventions.[42] According to insights from Zimbabwean interviewees, this movement is deeply influenced by the philosophy embedded in these conventions, particularly grasping the right to comprehensive political participation.
Further, interviewees perceive the movement to have strategically prioritized realizing the right to representation for persons with disabilities. This strategic emphasis is seen as a means to accelerate their broader advocacy efforts for various claims by persons with disabilities. A disability rights advocate from Rwanda, who is visually impaired, underscores the challenging living conditions in these countries, where persons with disabilities face multidimensional problems, surpassing challenges encountered in developed nations. The interviewees suggest that in these African countries, where persons with disabilities are marginalized across socio-economic, cultural, and political spheres, representation in decision-making bodies, especially in parliament, emerged as a crucial strategy. The rationale behind this strategic focus is articulated by one interviewee, emphasizing that parliamentary representation serves as a powerful tool to confront the manifold discrimination and marginalization faced by persons with disabilities.
By having members of the disabled community participate as representatives in parliament, the movement envisions a relatively straightforward path to demanding the respect of rights and proposing solutions to the systemic challenges encountered by persons with disabilities. The sentiment is clear—having persons with disabilities within the decision-making institution of parliament transforms them into active contributors and solution providers to the issues confronting their community. The interviewees highlight the strategic importance of parliamentary representation, who believe that being part of the decision-making process enables advocates to actively address and resolve the concerns raised by the disability community. This proactive engagement within parliament is viewed as a vital step in the broader struggle for the rights and well-being of persons with disabilities in the face of complex challenges in their respective countries.
3.4 Impact of Recent Constitutional Review Processes
Fourth, interviewees considered how, except for Uganda[43] and Rwanda,[44] several African countries, like Kenya,[45] Zimbabwe,[46] and Egypt,[47] have recently undergone constitutional reviews to foster democratic systems. These constitutional changes are viewed by interviewees as pivotal, ushering in more inclusive representation, especially for persons with disabilities. Notably, the interviewees emphasize that these constitutional shifts were influenced by the momentum gained in the Disability Rights Movement’s global campaigns. The adoption of significant human rights instruments, including the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities[48] and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),[49] played a crucial role in shaping these inclusive constitutional provisions. Interviewees assert that these constitutional revisions, influenced by international conventions, have been instrumental in achieving disability-inclusive parliamentary representation.
For instance, Kenya introduced the reserved seat system in 2010 following the enactment of its new Constitution. Kenyan interviewees credit this constitutional change for a notable improvement in the lives of persons with disabilities. Representatives in the legislature, empowered by the Constitution, have successfully advocated for laws protecting disability rights and addressing economic challenges. Additionally, they have championed the implementation of constitutional provisions, reserving at least 5 percent of government jobs for persons with disabilities. Current efforts are focused on further legislation to increase the representation of persons with disabilities in both houses of parliament. However, Kenyan interviewees also expressed concerns about the gaps and limitations in the current parliamentary representation system, emphasizing the need for continued improvement. Despite these challenges, they acknowledge promising strides compared to countries denying persons with disabilities the right to parliamentary representation.
Further, newly enacted in 2014, the Egyptian Constitution allocates eight parliamentary seats for persons with disabilities, a notable achievement in fostering diversity and inclusivity. Interviewees highlight that this inclusive representation has catalyzed progress in promoting and protecting disability rights since its inception. Before this constitutional change, disability policies and services in Egypt were limited, but the 2014 Constitution triggered a shift towards greater recognition and inclusivity. Similarly, Uganda’s experience reveals that the representation of special interest groups, including persons with disabilities, began during the drafting of its 1995 Constitution. The government’s openness to the voices of minority groups, influenced by changes in international human rights and the impactful role of the women’s movement, played a significant role in this accomplishment. The effective leadership of disabled representatives in Uganda’s parliament has led to remarkable progress in the political, economic, and social spheres for persons with disabilities. Laws and policies on inclusive education and the recent amendment of the Persons with Disabilities Act in 2020 reflect the tangible impact of these representatives in shaping legislative agendas.
Generally, the recent constitutional reviews in these countries have provided unprecedented opportunities for persons with disabilities to hold legislative seats as recognized minority groups. The constitutional drafting and adoption processes have not only empowered disability rights advocates but have also compelled countries to reserve seats for persons with disabilities, marking a significant step toward greater inclusivity and representation.
4. Challenges, Successes, and Recommendations
Understanding descriptive representation of persons with disabilities involves looking at challenges, achievements, and how inclusivity is changing. Exploring how descriptive representation works, the diversity within the disability community, the laws around voting rights, and the group rights emphasized in African contexts reveal the evolving nature of descriptive representation and what it means for human rights.
4.1 Participation of Persons with Disabilities in the Representation Process
The recognition by these countries of the right of persons with disabilities to be represented in parliament is a commendable achievement, considering the potential challenges involved. These nations deserve applause for reaching this milestone ahead of others. Building on this success requires a collaborative effort between the disability community and the government. Given that these countries may not have as long a history of practicing democracy as the West, they are still establishing or developing their democratic institutions. In this context, acknowledging the rights of persons with disabilities to parliamentary representation offers a unique opportunity for their democracy to flourish inclusively.
Nevertheless, as highlighted by interviewees, including persons with disabilities in parliament should not be viewed in isolation. While entering parliament is a significant avenue for political participation, it is not the sole or ultimate objective. The executive must extend and implement inclusive practices observed in parliament, as these institutions are interdependent. Parliamentary representation loses its meaning if the executive cannot effectively implement the policies formulated by legislators. It is essential to work towards a system based on the rule of law rather than the rule of individuals, even if this is not the current reality. Progress in developing inclusive practices in parliament can serve as a model for other institutions in these developing democracies.
Additionally, actively involving persons with disabilities in electing and sending representatives to parliament is crucial, as the CRPD outlines. However, in some African countries, among the five under consideration, this may not be the case. For example, unlike in Uganda and Rwanda, where representatives with disabilities are elected through an electoral college involving direct participation, Kenya relies on winning political parties to nominate representatives for persons with disabilities without necessarily consulting the individuals themselves.[50] Many persons with disabilities in Kenya oppose this form of nomination, advocating for increased opportunities to be elected or nominated by their community. Two main reasons drive this preference.
Firstly, relying solely on political parties for nomination undermines the law meant to ensure the representation of persons with disabilities in parliaments. If a political party disregards persons with disabilities as a marginalized group deserving of priority, their concerns and interests are left unrepresented. Moreover, the principle of “progressive realization” stipulated in the Kenyan Constitution,[51] meant to guide the gradual implementation of inclusive representation, has been misused as an excuse for neglecting the adequate representation of persons with disabilities.
Secondly, nominated members of parliament and the Senate with disabilities are often expected to prioritize party interests over the disability agenda. Studies show that big parties are accused of being insensitive to minority concerns, focusing primarily on the majority or the wealthy.[52] Party-controlled nomination and election can negatively impact minority interests, as representatives prioritize the party’s objectives.[53] In Kenya, where persons with disabilities do not actively involve themselves in the nomination and voting process, party leaders may influence and manipulate them against their best interests. For instance, as interviewees suggest, Senator Mwaura, nominated as the representative for persons with disabilities, lost his position in 2022 due to his failure to advance the party’s agenda beyond disability-related issues.
To prevent such situations, empowering persons with disabilities to have control over the representation process is crucial, rather than relying solely on political parties for nominations. This empowerment ensures that the interests and concerns of persons with disabilities are prioritized and protected. Moreover, the active involvement of persons with disabilities in developing and implementing laws related to descriptive representation is essential for compliance with the CRPD.[54] The CRPD emphasizes close consultation and engagement with persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in developing and implementing legislation, policies, and decisions about disability issues.[55] This principle aligns with the slogan “nothing about us without us” from the Disability Rights Movement, emphasizing the importance of empowering persons with disabilities to choose their representatives.[56] This slogan not only reflects the fundamental principle of participation in the CRPD[57] but also serves as a binding obligation for state parties,[58] which is evident throughout the treaty.[59]
4.2 Diversity Among Persons with Disabilities
Representation must embrace the diversity inherent among persons with disabilities, recognizing that disability encompasses a range of sub-groups.[60] The term “disability” serves as an umbrella, covering various types, such as visual, hearing, physical, and intellectual disabilities.[61] As disability studies scholar Elizabeth Barnes notes, the diversity within this label is remarkably heterogeneous.[62] Mental disabilities differ significantly from deafness, and blindness presents distinct challenges from achondroplasia.[63]
The diversity among persons with disabilities extends beyond their specific disabilities. While they encounter oppression or discrimination in generalizable ways, the diverse nature of disabilities results in varied needs and interests. Difficulties in seeing, hearing, or walking elicit different and specific responses tailored to the type of disability.[64] Despite these differences, disability types are often unintentionally or purposely merged into a single category.[65] Persons with disabilities are aware of their differences, but a person with one disability may not fully understand the needs of someone with a different disability. For instance, a visually impaired individual may struggle to grasp the specific needs of a person who is deaf. This lack of familiarity extends to the wider community, creating challenges in mutual understanding. Active involvement in the nomination and voting process by persons with disabilities is crucial to ensuring their diverse needs are adequately represented and prioritized.
The CRPD underscores the importance of recognizing diversity among persons with disabilities in policy formulation, emphasizing that persons with disabilities constitute a diverse population[66] and acknowledging the diversity of disabilities as a crucial aspect of respecting differences.[67] Descriptive representatives should mirror this diversity, especially in legislatures where certain seats are allocated to persons with disabilities. Yet, in some African countries, the current application of descriptive representation falls short of CRPD standards. For example, in Egypt, though eight seats are reserved for disabled representatives, they are exclusively occupied by individuals with physical disabilities. Similarly, in Kenya and Uganda, the majority of representatives with disabilities have physical disabilities, with limited representation from other disability types. This homogenous approach contradicts the CRPD’s emphasis on recognizing and respecting the diversity of disabilities.[68]
Moreover, the number of seats allocated for persons with disabilities must reflect the breadth of disability diversity.[69] In countries like Rwanda[70] and Zimbabwe,[71] where only one or two seats are reserved, a single representative is expected to represent all types of disabilities, overlooking the diverse needs of persons with disabilities. Insufficient seat allocation not only results in underrepresentation of the interests of persons with disabilities but also risks perpetuating the election of representatives from the same disability group in every election cycle. This limitation undermines the fundamental principle of diversity within the disability community and leaves certain groups consistently underrepresented.
Countries that reserve seats for persons with disabilities in only one legislative house, as in the cases of Rwanda or Egypt, face additional challenges. In less democratic countries, the upper houses often lack effective law-making power, rendering representation in only one house less impactful. A balanced approach, as seen in Kenya, where persons with disabilities are represented in the National Assembly and the Senate, ensures more comprehensive and effective representation.[72] Thus, embracing the diversity among persons with disabilities is not just a moral imperative; it aligns with the principles outlined in the CRPD. Descriptive representation that reflects the varied needs and interests of persons with different disabilities is crucial for building an inclusive and equitable society.
4.3 Legal Capacity and Voting Rights
Ensuring the right to vote and run for office is paramount for all categories of persons with disabilities. The CRPD firmly establishes the right of every person with a disability to be recognized as a person before the law.[73] Unlike the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, its predecessor, the CRPD, refrains from outlining circumstances that could strip individuals of this right or limit their voting rights.[74] Instead, it emphasizes that persons with disabilities have the right to enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life, including the fundamental right to vote.[75] Furthermore, the CRPD reaffirms the unwavering commitment of international human rights law to uphold the right of persons with disabilities to participate in political life.[76]
The CRPD unequivocally states that a person’s status as a person with a disability, including a mental one, cannot serve as a ground to deny the right to vote.[77] The case of Zsolt Bujdosó et al. v. Hungary (2011) further emphasized that the CRPD compels state parties to ensure the full and effective participation of persons with disabilities in political and public life on an equal basis with others, including safeguarding their right to vote.[78] The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities firmly rejected any reasonable restrictions or exceptions for specific groups of persons with disabilities, ruling that excluding the right to vote based on perceived or actual mental disabilities constitutes disability discrimination in the CRPD.[79]
Despite these clear directives, approximately 80 percent of countries globally persist in restricting or depriving persons with mental disabilities of their right to vote.[80] This is often based on the diagnosis of a disability (status approach), the perceived negative consequences of a decision (outcome approach), or the assessment of deficient decision-making skills (functional approach).[81] For example, in Uganda, an electoral college exclusively composed of persons with disabilities elects approved representatives, each of whom is required to have the right to vote.[82] However, the Parliamentary Elections Act of Uganda deems a person ineligible for election as a member of parliament if they are considered of unsound mind.[83] Consequently, Ugandans with mental disabilities are barred from participating in the electoral college, thereby denying them both the right to vote and the opportunity to stand for election.[84] This exclusion means that persons with mental disabilities remain without descriptive representation despite having unique interests and policy preferences.
Without the lifting of voting restrictions based on disabilities, persons with mental disabilities will continue to face limited opportunities for genuine descriptive representation. Furthermore, by denying specific subgroups of persons with disabilities the right to vote, we risk diminishing the overall representation of persons with disabilities in legislative bodies. The consequences extend beyond those individuals whose voting rights are curtailed, impacting the broader goal of inclusive and equitable representation.
4.4 Group Rights, Quotas, and Future Implications
In Africa, group rights for persons with disabilities take precedence, reflecting the communal nature of African societies and the African Human Rights System. Descriptive representation for persons with disabilities has been prioritized by these countries even before Western nations, as evident in both the ACHPR and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which recognizes descriptive representation as a group right.[85]
During the drafting of the Protocol, discussions initially considered quotas of five percent and reserved seats for persons with disabilities,[86] mirroring similar considerations during the drafting of the CRPD.[87] Although the proposal for a 5 percent quota was ultimately excluded from the final version of the Protocol, the provision ensuring descriptive representation in legislatures was retained.[88] This fact underscores the emphasis on group rights in African politics, contributing to realizing the right to representation for persons with disabilities in the studied countries. Interviewees highlighted that legislative or electoral quota laws in their respective countries supported the right to representation even before such measures were implemented in the West. The implementation of the right may require temporary measures like quotas, acknowledging that societal mindset and institutional inclusion might not be fully prepared for direct elections to ensure the representation of persons with disabilities.
Even in Western democracies, ensuring parliamentary representation for minority groups is challenging. While developed countries adopt additional measures for other minority groups, such as majority-minority districting for black minorities in the United States,[89] these approaches may not suit the unique circumstances of persons with disabilities. Disability’s inherent nature, not confined to specific categories, makes majority-minority districting impractical.[90] Countries like Uganda and Kenya grant descriptive representation for persons with disabilities constitutional status, declaring it a human right, similar to other fundamental rights. In contrast, in the Western context, descriptive representation remains a political decision or privilege rather than an explicitly asserted human right. Recognizing descriptive representation as a group right may have significant implications for shaping future human rights philosophy, expanding our understanding of political rights, and promoting inclusivity within the political process.
While international human rights mechanisms predominantly focus on safeguarding individual rights, certain treaties explicitly recognize distinct rights attributed to groups.[91] The exercise of the right to representation as a group right requires individuals representing the group to hold positions in a legislature. Persons with disabilities can assert their right to representation in legislatures by appointing representatives to occupy the seats to which they are entitled. Apart from the African Disability Protocol, no international human rights treaty currently recognizes the right to descriptive representation as a group right. However, if African countries domestically recognize this right, it may set a precedent for its establishment as a group right under international human rights law. This potential development would contribute to a more comprehensive and inclusive political process, expanding the scope of political rights.
5. Conclusion
The landscape of descriptive representation for persons with disabilities in parliaments reveals disparities compared to representation based on gender, race, ethnicity, and youth. Recently, five African countries—Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Egypt—have constitutionally acknowledged the right to descriptive representation for persons with disabilities. This early recognition can be attributed to several factors. Interviewees highlight that including persons with disabilities in parliaments, without extending this representation to the executive branch, may indicate a perception of limited parliamentary power, providing a space for shared representation. Despite potential government beliefs, the Disability Rights Movement sees parliamentary inclusion as an empowering tool for advocating the rights of persons with disabilities.
The divergence in political and legal culture between these African countries and the West, marked by differences in the development of democracies and the prioritization of individual versus group rights, may have played a role in the early recognition of descriptive representation for persons with disabilities in African parliaments. Additionally, the preference for securing legislative seats for persons with disabilities may stem from the myriad forms of discrimination and challenges they face in Africa. Recent constitutional review processes have also influenced the recognition of descriptive representation, with these constitutions achieving higher inclusive representation than other countries. Key human rights instruments, such as the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities and the CRPD, have been crucial in driving positive changes.
However, challenges persist in certain African countries, where persons with disabilities are excluded from participating in the nomination and election of their representatives, and the execution of representation falls short of accommodating the diverse needs of persons with disabilities in compliance with the CRPD. In contrast, while strategies like majority-minority districting contribute to descriptive representation in the Western context, it remains a subject of political discourse. Recognizing the significance of countries that explicitly acknowledge the right to representation for persons with disabilities in their laws is crucial, as it not only marks an achievement but also holds the potential to shape the future philosophy surrounding human rights.
* Yohannes Takele Zewale is an S.J.D. Candidate at Syracuse University College of Law.
[1] Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent “Yes,” 61 J. Pol. 628, 629-30 (1999).
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 90–94 (1967).
[5] Id. ; Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (1998).
[6] Hendrik Hertzberg, Politics: Observations and Arguments (2004).
[7] Barbara Arneil & Nancy J. Hirschmann, An Introduction, in Disability and Political Theory 1, 1–10 (Barbara Arneil & Nancy J. Hirschmann eds., 2016).
[8] Stefanie Reher, Do Disabled Candidates Represent Disabled Citizens?, 52 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 1, 1–6 (2021).
[9] Mona Lena Krook, Electoral Quotas and Group Representation, in Research Handbook On Political Representation 198, 199 (Maurizio Cotta & Federico Russo eds., 2020).
[10] Id.
[11] Ranking of Countries by Quality of Democracy, Democracy Matrix (2020), https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking.
[12] Krook, supra note 9 (However, while Krook underscores that certain countries, including Egypt, have begun to acknowledge descriptive representation of individuals with disabilities, she did not elaborate on the reasons why these African countries achieved recognition of such representation in their parliaments ahead of western countries).
[13] Helene Combrinck & Tobias Pieter van Reenen, The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa: Progress After 5 Years, 14 Sur Int’l J. Hum. Rts. 133 (2011); see also Ugandan Const. art. 77.
[14] Ugandan Const. art. 32.
[15] Id. art. 78; Ugandan Parliamentary Election Act, art. 8.
[16] Ugandan Parliamentary Election Act, art. 8(2)(d); Krook, supra note 9, at 269.
[17] Ugandan Local Government Act, arts. 10, 23.
[18] Rwandan Const. art. 64.
[19] Zimbabwean Const. art. 118.
[20] Rwandan Const. art. 75(4).
[21] Zimbabwean Const. art. 120(1)(d).
[22] Rwandan Const. art. 75(4); Zimbabwean Election Act, § 45(A)(2).
[23] Kenyan Const. art. 93.
[24] Lucianna Thuo, Realising the Inclusion of Young Persons with Disabilities in Political and Public Life in Kenya, 4 Afr. Disability Rts. Y.B. 25 (2016).
[25] Kenyan Const. art. 54(2).
[26] Id. arts. 97-98, 177.
[27] Id. arts. 90, 97(1)(C).
[28] Id. art. 98(1)(D).
[29] Kenyan Election Act art. 36(1)(F) (2011); see also Kenyan Const. art. 177(1)(C).
[30] Kenyan Const. arts. 90, 97.
[31] Egyptian Const. arts. 101, 248.
[32] Id. arts. 180, 244.
[33] Jan Claudius Völkel, Sidelined by Design: Egypt’s Parliament in Transition, 22 J. N. Afr. Studies 595, 607 (2017).
[34] Id.
[35] Egyptian Law No. 46 on the House of Representatives arts. 1-5 (2014).
[36] Id.
[37] Id.
[38] Egyptian Const. art. 102.
[39] In this Article, I present findings from a research project conducted between 2022 and 2023. Since the issue lacks prior research, qualitative methods such as interviews and observation were proposed. Accordingly, I gathered a diverse group of 15 individuals, nine men and six women, with disabilities to participate in this research. The interviewees included disability rights advocates, leaders of organizations representing persons with disabilities, and politicians with disabilities. They were from Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Egypt. IRB approval was secured; informed consent was obtained from interviewees.
[40] Minister of State for Disability, Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, https://mglsd.go.ug/asamo-hellen-grace/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2023).
[41] Julie Livingston, Insights from an African History of Disability, 2006 Radical Hist. Rev. 111, 111–125 (2006).
[42] Id.
[43] Uganda 1995, Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uganda_2005 (last visited Oct. 22, 2023).
[44] Rwanda 2003, Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Rwanda_2015 (last visited Oct. 22, 2023).
[45] Kenya 2010, Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Kenya_2010 (last visited Oct. 22, 2023).
[46] Zimbabwe 2013, Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013 (last visited Oct. 22, 2023).
[47] Egypt 2014, Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014 (last visited Oct. 22, 2023).
[48] U.N. Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, Res. 48/96 (Dec. 20, 1993).
[49] U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter “CRPD”].
[50] Kenyan Const. arts. 90, 97(1)(c).
[51] Id. at art. 54.
[52] Nancy L. Rosenblum, On the Side of The Angels: An Appreciation of Parities and Partisanship 401 (2008).
[53] Julian Bernauer, Ethnic Politics, Regime Support and Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe 65 (2015).
[54] CRPD, supra note 49, at preamble.
[55] Id. at art. 4(3).
[56] Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository 75 (2007), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1285&context=facpubs.
[57] CRPD, supra note 49, at art. 3.
[58] Id. at art. 4(3).
[59] Id. at arts. 29, 33(3).
[60] Kenjiro Sakakibara, Work Exclusion and Disability Types: The Heterogeneity of Disability as Social Exclusion in the 2011 Irish Census Microdata, 28 Irish J. Sociology 65, 66 (2020).
[61] Id.
[62] Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability 9 (2016).
[63] Id.
[64] Sakakibara, supra note 66.
[65] Id.
[66] CRPD, supra note 49, at preamble.
[67] Id. at art. 3.
[68] Id. at preamble.
[69] Id. at arts. 1(2), 6.
[70] Rwandan Const. art. 75(4).
[71] Zimbabwean Const. art. 120(1)(D).
[72] Kenyan Const. arts. 97-98, 177.
[73] CRPD, supra note 49, at art. 12(1).
[74] Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1: Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the Law, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1 (May 19, 2014) [hereinafter “CRPD General Comment No. 1”).
[75] CRPD, supra note 49, at art. 12(2).
[76] Id. at art. 29.
[77] CRPD General Comment No. 1, supra note 73.
[78] Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Communication No. 4/2011 [Zsolt Bujdosó v Hungary], U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011 (Oct. 16, 2013).
[79] Id. ¶ 9.4.
[80] Dinesh Bhugra et al., Mental Illness and the Right to Vote: A Review of Legislation Across the World, 28 Int’l Rev. Psychiatry 395, 394–99 (2016).
[81] CRPD General Comment No. 1, supra note 73.
[82] Guidelines for Election of Representatives of Persons with Disability in Parliament 2017, The Ugandan Electoral Commission, https://www.ec.or.ug/info/guidelines-election-mps-representing-persons-disabilities-pwds (last visited June 2, 2023).
[83] Id.
[84] See Ugandan Const. art. 80.
[85] A.U. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36440-treaty-protocol_to_the_achpr_on_the_rights_of_persons_with_disabilities_in_africa_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2023) [hereinafter “ADP”].
[86] A.U. Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa, art. 16(d), https://www.achpr.org/news/viewdetail?id=129 (last visited Oct. 9, 2023).
[87] U.N. Working Group, Compilation of Proposals for Elements of a Convention (5-16 January 2004), https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/comp-element6.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2023).
[88] ADP, supra note 84, at art. 21(2)(D).
[89] Majority-Minority Districts, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Majority-minority_districts (last visited on June 4, 2022).
[90] Willi Horner-Johnson, Disability, Intersectionality, and Inequity: Life at the Margins, in Pub. Health Persp. on Disability 91, 95–103 (Donald J. Lollar et al. eds., 2d ed. 2021).
[91] E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, art. 27; Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989; and U.N. Declaration of Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities of 1993.
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