Suicide, Suicidality, and Pediatric Medical Transition in United States v. Skrmetti and Beyond

Posted by on Apr 4, 2025 in Per Curiam

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Introduction

Children and adolescents experiencing gender discordance are a vulnerable population.  A part of that vulnerability is expressed in high rates of accompanying mental health diagnoses and symptoms. Among the most frightening mental health issues faced by this population, and by their parents and families, is suicide, and more broadly suicidality, which can be defined as “the risk of suicide, usually indicated by suicidal ideation or intent . . .” or as “suicidal thoughts, plans, gestures, or attempts.”[1]

The risks of suicide and suicidality have been repeatedly invoked in defenses of pediatric medical transition and its specific interventions of puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgery, which are often labeled a part of “gender-affirming care.” The message to parents has often been stark, as admonitions such as “[w]ould you rather have a dead daughter or a live son?” warn parents that a failure to consent to and support medical transition risks the death of their child by suicide.[2] The message to society has been similar: medical pediatric transition is necessary to avoid the deaths of vulnerable children and adolescents. These messages have been widespread, delivered in transgender medical clinics,[3] parent support groups,[4] the Harvard Law Review,[5] the Yale Law School Integrity Project,[6] and in the United States v. Skrmetti litigation currently pending before the United States Supreme Court.[7]

Yet, when Justice Alito, in oral argument in Skrmetti, questioned whether these admonitions are scientifically grounded, he elicited a partial but significant concession from Chase Strangio, the attorney representing the original plaintiffs who challenged Tennessee’s prohibition of pediatric medical transition:

[T]here is no evidence in some — in the studies that this treatment reduces completed suicide.  And the reason for that is completed suicide, thankfully and admittedly, is rare and we’re talking about a very small population of individuals with studies that don’t necessarily have completed suicides within them.[8]

The message that actual suicide is “rare” is discordant with the drumbeat of statements and implications that, as stated in the Harvard Law Review in 2021, “access to … gender-affirming healthcare services is essential—even lifesaving—for trans youth.”[9] The common claims regarding suicidality and attempts, even when they do not mention completed suicides, have left the impression that pediatric gender transition is necessary to avoid completed suicide.    The clarifications that there is a lack of evidence of increased deaths and that completed suicide is “rare” have not generally been provided. Thus, parental, youth, and societal decisions have been influenced by this overriding fear of children and adolescents dying by suicide if they are denied access to pediatric medical transition.

Upon deeper examination, the claims of reduced suicidality, including reduced attempts, from pediatric gender-affirming medical care are also not supported by the available evidence.   This essay will make the opposite argument that, over the longer term, medical pediatric transition increases, rather than reduces, risks of suicidality, attempted suicide, and completed suicide.

I.                 Watchful Waiting versus Gender-affirming Care

Much of current gender-affirming medicine in the United States is focused on giving children what they want as quickly as possible. This leads to mantras such as “children know who they are.”[10] However, giving children what they want now is not a rational basis for medical interventions with potentially permanent, and certainly long-term, impacts.

The prohibition of pediatric medical transition is consistent with the watchful waiting approach to the care of pediatric gender dysphoria patients. Watchful waiting is not the equivalent of conversion therapy; rather, it involves supportive counseling.[11] It is based on data that most cases of gender dysphoria in children and adolescents, in the process of the individual’s development, resolve by adulthood.[12] Watchful waiting was an accepted method of treatment in the field of pediatric transgender medicine in the United States and Canada until ten to fifteen years ago.[13] Variations of watchful waiting are once again a common form of treatment of pediatric gender dysphoria in much of Western Europe, as some countries have determined that the more aggressive medical interventions of puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgery are not supported by scientific evidence, and hence, these interventions are experimental and should only be employed in exceptional circumstances.[14]

The Standards of Care for the Health of Transgender and Gender Diverse People (8th ed. 2022) [hereinafter SOC-8], issued by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), is one of the documents most relied on by advocates of pediatric gender-affirming care. SOC-8 affirms that “prepubescent children are not eligible for medical intervention” and that “gender trajectories in prepubescent children cannot be predicted and may evolve over time.”[15] Hence, even WPATH’s current gender-affirming care standards employ something like watchful waiting for prepubescent children.

The claim that gender discordance existing by puberty and early adolescence necessarily reflects a permanent gender identity has been a justification for the aggressive practices of medical transition prior to adulthood. Upon examination, that claim lacks an empirical basis.  Hence, watchful waiting until adulthood remains a plausible, and indeed superior, approach.

II.               Studies of transgender adults in the United States and Europe find alarmingly high rates of both suicidal ideation and suicide.

Numerous studies in the United States and Europe over decades have found that transgender adults have very high rates of suicidal ideation and suicide, even in the most accepting societies.[16]

A Swedish population-based matched cohort study covering the period from 1973 to 2003 of those who had undergone sex reassignment surgery found “considerably higher risks for mortality, suicidal behavior and psychiatric morbidity than the general population.”[17] “[M]ortality from suicide was much higher in sex-reassigned persons, compared to the matched controls.”[18] The raw data shows 10 deaths by suicide among the 324 sex-reassigned persons, whereas there were 5 deaths by suicide for 3240 matched controls: a rate about twenty times higher.[19]

More recently, a large-scale Danish study following nearly seven million people over four decades of health and legal records found that transgender individuals had 7.7 times the rate of suicide attempts, and 3.5 times the rate of deaths by suicide, as compared with the rest of the population.[20] Further, the risk of death by causes other than suicide for the transgender population was nearly double than that for the non-transgender population.[21] As to mental health concerns, nearly 43% of the transgender population had a psychiatric diagnosis, compared with 7% of the general population.[22]

A study examining Veterans Health Administration electronic medical records from 2000 to 2011 through official “gender identity disorder” codes found “the rate of suicide-related events” among transgender VHA veterans “more than 20 times higher than were rates for the general VHA population.”[23]

More recently, the Williams Institute at UCLA School of Law in 2019 published the results from the 2015 US Transgender Survey, touted as the “largest survey of transgender people in the US to date”[24] This was an online survey of adults (18 and older) which produced 27,715 respondents; like any online survey, it reflects the limitations of such self-selected, online survey results.[25]  In many respects, the sample was not representative of the US population, being much younger, better educated, and with a higher proportion of white respondents.[26] Obviously, as a survey of the living, it could not identify completed suicides. Nonetheless, it is striking that “transgender adults have a prevalence of past-year ideation that is about twelve times higher, and a prevalence of past-year suicide attempts that is about eighteen times higher, than the general US population.”[27] Indeed, 81.7% “reported ever seriously thinking about suicide in their lifetimes, while 48.3[%] had done so in the past year. In regard to suicide attempts, 40.4[%] reported attempting suicide at some point in their lifetimes, and 7.3[%] reported attempting suicide in the past year.”[28]

SOC-8 also acknowledges that “[s]ome studies have shown a higher prevalence” of depression, anxiety, and suicidality “than in the general population, particularly in those requiring medically necessary gender-affirming medical treatment.”[29] SOC-8 and others hypothesize that these much higher rates of suicidality stem from discrimination and minority stress.[30]

But evidence shows that neither discrimination nor minority stress is, in general, associated with completed suicides.[31] For example, as to race, the suicide rate for Black males in the United States was considerably lower in 1950, under the conditions of state-approved segregation, than it was in 2018 (7.5 versus 11.6 per 100,000).[32] The rates of suicide for white males from 1950 to 2018 have been two to three times higher than for Black males.[33] The rates of suicide for males are consistently more than three times the rate for females.[34] Thus, as to completed suicides, white males, often considered the privileged majority, have had, under very different social conditions as to race and gender as have existed from 1950 to the present, by far higher rates of suicide than groups living under minority stress and even state-approved forms of discrimination.

Hence, suicide rates do not correlate with minority status or a lived experience of discrimination. Indeed, the Danish study of very high rates of suicides and attempted suicide comes from one of the most LGBTQ + friendly nations in Europe and, indeed, the world.[35] This is not to say that no discrimination exists, but rather to emphasize that discrimination may not be the most important factor as to suicide rates.

Thus, while anti-discrimination efforts are valuable in themselves, they cannot resolve the much higher rates of suicide and suicidality for transgender adults.

The very high rates of suicide and suicidality for adult transgender persons suggests that the representation commonly made to pediatric patients and their parents, that medical transition will permanently resolve mental health issues and distress and save those patients from suicide and suicidality, is false.

III.             The weight of medical research indicates that pediatric medical transition does not reduce suicide or suicidality, and may even increase pediatric suicide and suicidality; further, prohibitions of pediatric medical transition do not increase suicide.

On July 19, 2024, Professor Louis Appleby, University of Manchester, Department of Health and Social Care adviser on suicide prevention, posted on an official UK government site an independent report, titled, “Review of suicides and gender dysphoria at the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust.”[36] This independent report was in response to online claims “that there has been a large rise in suicide by current and recent patients of the Gender Identity Development Service (GIDS) service at the Tavistock since an earlier restriction of puberty-blocking drugs that followed a High Court decision in a case (Bell v Tavistock) in December 2020.”[37] Professor Appleby indicated:

In this period of 6 years the data show a total of 12 suicides: 6 in the under 18s, 6 in those 18 and above. In the 3 years leading up to 2020-21, there were 5 suicides, compared to 7 in the 3 years after. This is essentially no difference, taking account of expected fluctuations in small numbers, and would not reach statistical significance. In the under 18s specifically, there were 3 suicides before and 3 after 2020-21.[38]

Beyond finding no statistically significant differences in completed suicides before and after the British Court had limited access to puberty blockers, Professor Appleby stressed the inability to attribute suicide to this single factor, given the complexities of the lives of those involved:

Alongside the figures, there is a summary of the problems faced by the young people who died. These include mental illness, traumatic experiences, family disruption and being in care or under children’s services.”[39]

As previously noted, Justice Alito cited page 195 of the Cass Report, which states:

Tragically deaths by suicide in trans people of all ages continue to be above the national average, but there is no evidence that gender affirming care reduce this.[40]

The Cass Report also noted that “children and young people with gender dysphoria are at an increased risk of suicide, but suicide risk appears to be comparable to other young people with a similar range of mental health and psychosocial challenges. Some clinicians feel under pressure to support a medical pathway based on widespread reporting that gender-affirming treatment reduces suicide risk. This conclusion was not supported by the University of York’s systematic review.”[41]

One of the difficulties with the assumption that medical transition reduces suicide and suicidality is the “co-concurring mental health problems” that are common with gender-discordant children and adolescents.[42] Hence, reducing gender discordance may not, in itself, address these co-concurring mental health issues. Further, it is unclear whether the very high rates of suicidality are from “the inherent distress from the gender dysphoria,” the co-occurring mental health issues, or other issues.[43]

There are studies that indicate an extraordinarily high suicide or suicidality rates for those undergoing pediatric medical transition. One of the earliest studies of suicide came from the Netherlands. In a 1988 study of 141 patients who had undergone sex reassignment surgery, three patients committed suicide post-transition, and sixteen attempted suicide, within two to five years of starting transition.[44] By contrast, the Dutch suicide rate has varied from a high of around 14.4 per 100,000 annual suicides in the early 1980s to around 11 per 100,000 in more recent years.  Thus, the three suicides out of 141 patients over a maximum of five years is exceptionally high, with an equivalent rate of at least 425 suicides per 100,000.[45]

The Cass Report discussed a paper from a Belgium gender clinic which had reported five deaths from suicide among 177 adolescents aged 12–18, where all five had commenced cross-sex hormones.[46] This again is an extraordinarily high rate of suicide for adolescents undergoing medical transition.

These high rates of suicide and suicidality for some who undergo medical transition could occur in part because medical gender transition is commonly initiated too early and aggressively in a vulnerable population with concurring mental health issues. The false prognosis of the permanence of gender discordance and gender identity in adolescence leads to the prescribing of unnecessary and even harmful treatments in a population that includes many who, in the context of watchful waiting, would have resolved their gender discordance without undergoing the complicated medical and personal pathway of transition. An ideologically-driven medical practice leads to severe violations of the “first, do not harm” principle of bioethics.

Particularly in the United States, the development of the science is distorted by a strong bias toward the affirmation of gender-affirming care. For example, the New York Times reported that Dr. Johanna Olson-Kennedy, an “advocate of adolescent gender treatments,” had withheld publication of a study on the impact of puberty blockers, because the data did not support her initial hypothesis that puberty blockers would improve mental health.[47] She blamed her decision on a concern that her work would be “weaponized” by opponents of pediatric medical transition, saying that the work “has to be exactly on point, clear and concise:” meaning that she would not publish data that contradicted her belief in the efficacy of pediatric medical transition.[48]  The actual results were that a quarter of the adolescents were “depressed or suicidal” before treatment, with no apparent improvements from that data two years later after puberty blockers.[49]

Like others, Dr. Olson-Kennedy relied on her clinical experiences in touting the efficacy of medical gender transition, viewing such clinical experience as more reliable than medical research studies.[50] However, the legal regime for approval and use of medications in the United States presupposes that human subjects research in the form of clinical trials is superior to physicians’ experiences in treating patients, as to determining the safety and efficacy of medications.  Hence, the FDA usually requires multiple levels of human clinical trials for drug approval, and double blinded placebo trials are considered the gold standard, as they screen out the bias of physicians and patients toward believing in the efficacy of medical treatments.[51] The FDA has not yet approved any medications for the purposes of gender affirming care of medical gender transition.  Hence, such treatments are currently “off-label,” protected by the rule that once the FDA approves a medication for a specific condition and population, physicians are permitted to prescribe such medications for a different purpose and population.[52] The issues of physician bias and susceptibility to marketing incentives are particularly concerning in off-label use.[53]  The issue of physician bias is particularly concerning where there are strong ideological elements involved, as there are in the area of gender-affirming care, which is linked to contentious understandings of gender and sex which go far beyond the medical treatment of persons experiencing gender discordance.[54]

The Cass report noted a clinical consideration which could explain the perception of efficacy: “a short-term boost in mental wellbeing is to be expected when sex hormones are introduced,” which for those taking testosterone would produce “body changes in line with their identified gender within a few months. The start of long anticipated physical changes would be expected to improve mood, at least in the short term, and it is perhaps surprising that there is not a greater effect.”  Hence, longer-term objective studies are required.[55] Thus, clinicians and researchers may be seeing some short-term improvements in mood when gender-discordant patients experience initial success in achieving their transition, which they have been told will have enormous benefit for them, without actually reducing statistically the incidence of suicide and attempted suicide.

IV.            Research on suicide attempts and especially on suicidal ideation cannot predict actual suicide rates and may overstate the risks of actual suicide.

Advocates of gender-affirming care for children often use studies of attempts and ideation as support for the claim that pediatric medical transition reduces the risk of completed suicide.  But suicide is rare even among those who attempt suicide. In the United States, in 2022, about 49,000 people died by suicide, 1.6 million attempted suicide, 3.8 million made a plan for suicide, and 13.2 million seriously considered suicide.[56] Thus, about 3% of those who attempt suicide die, and the proportions are much lower for other categories of suicidality.[57]

Further, groups differ on the percent of attempts that lead to death or actual suicide; thus, females attempt suicide at substantially higher rates than males, even though males have a much higher suicide rate.[58]

Suicide attempts, and suicidal ideation, indicate substantial distress and are of course of substantial concern. However, the huge and varied gap between suicide itself, and the varied forms of suicidality, demonstrates that research on those steps short of actual suicide cannot necessarily predict suicide rates. This is particularly important because the purported risk of a dead child has been used in manipulative ways to obtain consents to treatment and to promote pediatric medical transition.

V.              Abundant evidence supports high rates of desistance and resolution of gender dysphoria.

Given the extremely high rates of suicide and suicidality in the adult transgender population, the possibility of desistance of gender dysphoria under a watchful waiting approach is particularly significant. Those who through the course of childhood and adolescence resolve gender dysphoria may avoid a lifetime of very high rates of suicide, attempted suicide, and suicidal ideation. This is not intended to denigrate the reality that transgender adults may have a rich and fulfilling life, but it is to consider the impacts on suicide and suicidality of unnecessarily directing minors toward medical gender transition.

Early treatment protocols for gender dysphoria were statistically focused primarily on early-onset gender dysphoria, beginning as early as the toddler years, and most often involving biological males with a female gender identity. The experience with this population is that the dysphoria for most resolves by puberty in the context of a supportive “watchful waiting” protocol.[59]

In more recent years there has been a very sharp increase in minors presenting with gender dysphoria.[60]  Unlike the past dominant cohort, most have been biological females, and most have been presenting near, at, or after puberty, rather than early in childhood. This is not controversial: SOC-8 refers to “the exponential growth in adolescent referral rates” and notes that “adolescents assigned female at birth . . . initiating care 2.5–7.1 times more frequently as compared to adolescents who are assigned male at birth.”[61] SOC-8 also acknowledges a “phenomenon occurring in clinical practice is the increased number of adolescents seeking care who have not seemingly experienced, expressed, (or experienced and expressed) gender diversity during their childhood years.”[62] Many have pre-existing mental health concerns.[63]

Recent studies of this apparently late-onset group have also found very high rates of desistance. A German study published in 2024 noted: “The diagnostic persistence over the 5-year follow-up period of less than 50% in all age groups is in line with the literature and presumably reflects the fluidity of the concept of gender identity in childhood and adolescence . . . .”[64] A secondary analysis of records from the US Military Healthcare System found a four year gender-affirming hormone continuation rate of 70.2%, meaning that nearly 30% had discontinued.[65] A Dutch study of gender non-contentedness in adolescence and early adulthood concluded: “Gender non-contentedness, while being relatively common during early adolescence, in general decreases with age and appears to be associated with a poorer self-concept and mental health throughout development.”[66] These studies are consistent with other research indicating a high rate of desistance.[67]

On the other hand, there is evidence that social and medical pediatric gender-affirming care may extend the period of gender discordance between biological sex and gender identity.[68] As these mostly do not involve long-term studies, there remains uncertainty as to how long.

VI.            Many US practitioners of gender-affirming care fail to carry out comprehensive psychosocial assessments prior to commencing medical transition.

Many who practice pediatric gender-affirming care do not even attempt to assess or predict long-term gender identity and do not regularly conduct comprehensive psychosocial assessments, as these are perceived as needless barriers to care. The goal instead is to proceed as rapidly as possible with medical intervention, based on the view that “any delay in treatment prolongs a child’s distress and puts them at risk of self-harm.”[69]

For example, Dr. Colt St. Amand, a listed co-author of SOC-8 and a WPATH certified practitioner and mentor, was quoted as follows by the New York Times in June 2022:

St. Amand thinks the purpose of assessment is not to determine the basis of a kid’s gender identity. “That just reeks of some old kind of conversion-therapy-type things . . . . I think what we’ve seen historically in trans care is an overfocus on assessing identity . . . . People are who they say they are, and they may develop and change, and all are normal and OK. So I am less concerned with certainty around identity, and more concerned with hearing the person’s embodiment goals. Do they want to have a deep voice?  Do you want to have breasts?  You know, what do you want for your body?”[70]

Thus, St. Amand does not attempt to “shield teenagers from taking medication with effects they might later decide they didn’t want . . . . If the drugs don’t suit them . . . they can simply stop.”[71]

Another prominent advocate of gender-affirming care negatively characterized assessments of long-term gender identity as “singling out trans kids, and specifically with a mental-health provider, not medical staff, to interrogate, to go down this comprehensive inquisition of their gender.”[72]

Thus, the provision of professional mental health assessment is characterized as a barrier and burden rather than a positive provision of care. Other critics called such limits “abusive” and “unethical” and as undermining patient autonomy.[73]

These negative views of assessment were elicited in response to an earlier draft of SOC-8, which for pediatric patients recommended “several years” of persistently identifying with another gender and a requirement of a comprehensive diagnostic assessment prior to commencing medical transition.[74] These requirements are minimized in the final draft; for example, gender incongruence should be “marked and sustained” prior to commencing gender-affirming medical care, but no particular period of time is indicated.[75] Thus, the SOC-8 final standards were significantly influenced by advocacy and ideology.

VII.          According to SOC-8 commencing medical transition without comprehensive assessments amounts to practice without empirical support and may not be in the long-term best interests of the patient

The final SOC-8 standards did adhere to the recommendation of a “comprehensive biopsychosocial assessment of adolescents,” despite the pushback against assessment as a “harmful assertion of psychogatekeeping.”[76]  SOC-8 warned:

There are no studies of the long-term outcomes of gender-related medical treatment for youth who have not undergone a comprehensive assessment. Treatment in this context (e.g., with limited or no assessment) has no empirical support and therefore carries the risk that the decision to start gender-affirming medical interventions may not be in the long-term best interest of the young person at that time.[77]

SOC-8 further noted that findings of “low regret can only currently be applied to youth who have demonstrated sustained gender incongruence and gender-related needs over time as established through a comprehensive and iterative assessment.”[78]

SOC-8 relies entirely on Dutch studies and protocols as an evidentiary basis for gender-affirming care in adolescence. Yet, even those American clinics that conduct interdisciplinary assessments generally do not follow the much more extensive Dutch protocols. Thus, Reuters interviewed staff at eighteen gender clinics across the United States and found that “None described anything like the months-long assessments [Dutch clinicians] adopted in their research.”[79]  Indeed, seven of the eighteen clinics “are comfortable prescribing puberty blockers or hormones based on the first visit, depending on the age of the child.”[80]

Further, nothing prevents practitioners who disagree with the need to conduct a “comprehensive biopsychosocial assessment” (or who simply lack the resources to carry such an assessment) from ignoring the SOC-8 recommendations. Those recommendations have no binding authority.

Thus, many practitioners in the United States lack an evidence-based medical justification for their protocols with minors—even according to the assessment of that evidence by SOC-8. These clinics are prescribing medical interventions with life-long consequences on a highly vulnerable pediatric population, without an evidentiary basis for their protocols.

The lack of an evidentiary basis for the actual practice of pediatric medical gender transition in the United States has important implications for the intertwined issues of mental health, suicidality, and suicide. Without reliable long-term data about the psychological impact of pediatric gender transition, there is no way to justify the claim that such care reduces suicide, suicidality, or even assists mental health, on a long-term basis.

CONCLUSION

The messages of pediatric medical transition advocates have been stark: If you are experiencing gender dysphoria/discordance, you are permanently transgender. You will experience great distress, and be in serious risk of suicide, until and unless you undergo medical transition. Your mental health issues will be resolved, or at least significantly alleviated, only when you medically transition. These messages claim to be based on listening to pediatric patients but are actually a recruitment into an ideology. These messages claim to be based on evidence, but in actuality, most of the claims lack the kind of quality evidence generally required in medical care.

By contrast, watchful waiting protocols may affirm the reality of the experience of gender dysphoria/discordance, but do not immediately ascribe a permanent transgender identity to that experience. Patients and parents can be told that the child or adolescent may be transgender, but there are also other possibilities, given the diverse possibilities as to gender identity and sexual orientation. Hence, the goal of treatment would be to accompany the patient and build resilience through what may be a journey of many years as to gender identity and sexual orientation. Mental health issues and diagnoses are to be treated as issues of their own and are not assumed to be resolvable through medical transition. Medical interventions, which risk physical health complications and infertility and may prematurely cement gender identity, are deferred to avoid unnecessary suffering.

The current state of evidence indicates that watchful waiting protocols, properly implemented, are much more likely, over the long term, to reduce suicide and suicidality for the highly vulnerable population of children and adolescents experiencing gender discordance, as compared to the intrusive and aggressive practices of pediatric medical transition.

If the United States Supreme Court in Skrmetti upholds Tennessee’s prohibition of pediatric medical transition, it will not need to have resolved these complex and evolving issues of medical practice for a highly vulnerable population, but rather will have left room for others, including states, to develop public policy over time.  On the other hand, if the Court invalidates Tennessee’s law, it will have created a constitutional straight jacket which will make the Court itself responsible for harms to this vulnerable population.

* * *

 

*Harwell G. Davis Professor of Constitutional Law, Director, Center for Children, Law and Ethics, Cumberland Law School, Samford University.  Although there are substantial deletions, changes, and additions, much of this essay is adapted from an amicus brief on behalf of detransitioner Max Lazzara in United States v. Skrmetti. See generally Brief of Max Lazzara as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, United States v. Skrmetti, No. 23-477, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-477/328204/20241015112955436_23-477_Amicus%20Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L7S-DL5V].

[1] Suicidality, American Psychological Association Dictionary, https://dictionary.apa.org/suicidality [https://perma.cc/QA4F-T3UP]; Student Life, Anderson University: Student Life Counseling Services, https://anderson.edu/student-life/counseling/suicidality/#:~:text=What%20is%20Suicidality,plans%2C%20gestures%2C%20or%20attempts [https://perma.cc/PWB7-Z9FM].

[2] Joint Appendix at 905, United States v. Skrmetti, No. 23-477 (Declaration of Chloe Cole) [hereinafter J.A.]; Emily Bazelon, The Battle Over Gender Therapy, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 15, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/15/magazine/gender-therapy.html [https://perma.cc/QS6N-53ZV]; Aron Hirt-Manheimer, Choosing to Have a Living Daughter, Reform Judaism (June 4, 2021), https://reformjudaism.org/blog/choosing-have-living-daughter [https://perma.cc/7LM4-PM5F] (“Our only choice was to have a dead son or a living daughter.”); Brief of Max Lazarra as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, United States v. Skrmetti, No. 23-477, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-477/328204/20241015112955436_23-477_Amicus%20Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L7S-DL5V] [hereinafter Lazzara Brief].

[3] See Bazelon, supra note 2; Lazzara Brief, supra note 2, at 3–4; J.A. at 905.

[4] See Bazelon, supra note 2; Lazzara Brief, supra note 2, at 4.

[5] See Outlawing Trans Youth: State Legislatures and the Battle over Gender-Affirming Healthcare for Minors, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 2163, 2167–69 (2021).

[6] See Anne Alstott, Meredithe McNamara et al., An Evidence-Based Critique of the Cass Review on Gender-affirming Care for Adolescent Gender Dysphoria  38 (2024) https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/integrity-project_cass-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3HK-6MED] (citing Amy E. Green et al., Association of Gender-Affirming Hormone Therapy with Depression, Thoughts of Suicide, and Attempted Suicide Among Transgender and Nonbinary Youth, 70 J. Adolescent Health. 643 (Apr. 2022)). The Green study cited by the Integrity Project claims it establishes “less attempted suicide in ages 13-17” for those accessing cross-sex hormones but fails to report the finding that “[f]or youth under age 18, the aOR for seriously considering suicide in the past year did not reach statistical significance (aOR = .74, p = .08)” Id. at Table 4.  Nor did the Integrity Project discuss the finding, also for those under age 18, that “[t]he pattern of statistical significance for findings related to past-year suicidality was less consistent, which may indicate challenges related to statistical power when examining fairly infrequent outcomes such as suicidal thoughts and behaviors, particularly among smaller subgroups of individuals.” Id. at 647. The study’s claim that suicidal thoughts and behaviors are “fairly infrequent” seems inconsistent with, for example, a claim in the Harvard Law Review that “[M]ore than one-third of transgender high school students attempt suicide in a given year.”  Outlawing Trans Youth, supra note 5, at 2163. The Integrity Project thus appeared to follow the unfortunately common pattern of picking out results that support their thesis, while ignoring those that did not—a pattern perhaps repeated in the very study they cited here.  At issue still is the reliability of the Green study, which, as a self-reported non-probability study, as the study itself admits, cannot demonstrate causation—meaning it cannot actually prove that the use of cross-sex hormones is responsible for any positive results that appear statistically.  See Green et al., supra note 6, at 648.

[7] See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–33, 39, 48, 87–89, United States v. Skrmetti, No. 23-477.

[8] Id. at 88.

[9] Outlawing Trans Youth, supra note 5, at 2167.

[10] Ed Yong, Young Trans Children Know Who They Are, The Atlantic (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/01/young-trans-children-know-who-they-are/580366/ [https://perma.cc/9C3N-Y85B].

[11] J.A. at 443–45, 504.

[12] Id.

[13] See Bazelon, supra note 2; see generally World Pro. Ass’n for Transgender Health, Standards of Care for the Health of Transexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People (7th ed. 2012).

[14] See J.A. at 332–43, 582–92; Children and young people’s gender services: implementing the Cass Review recommendations, NHS England (Aug. 7, 2024), https://www.england.nhs.uk/long-read/children-and-young-peoples-gender-services-implementing-the-cass-review-recommendations/ [https://perma.cc/T2B8-P459]; Care of Children and Adolescents with Gender Dysphoria: Summary of national Guidelines, Socialstyrelsen (Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare) 3 (Dec. 2022) https://www.socialstyrelsen.se/globalassets/sharepoint-dokument/artikelkatalog/kunskapsstod/2023-1-8330.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LJY-9G2P]; Azeen Ghorayshi, Youth Gender Medications Limited in England, Part of Big Shift in Europe, N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/health/europe-transgender-youth-hormone-treatments.html [https://perma.cc/7RSX-FG76].

[15] World Pro. Ass’n for Transgender Health, Standards of Care for the Health of Transgender and Gender Diverse People at S67 (8th ed. 2022) [hereinafter SOC-8].

 

[16] See J.A. at 398–400.

[17] Cecilia Dhejne et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing Sex Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden, 6 Pub. Lib. Sci. One 1, 1 (2011).

[18] Id. at 5.

[19] Id.

[20] See Annette Erlangsen et al., Transgender Identity and Suicide Attempts and Morality in Denmark, 329 J. Am. Med. Assoc.  2145, 2145–2153 (2023).

[21] Id. at 2150.

[22] Id. at 2148.

[23] John R. Blosnich et al., Prevalence of Gender Identity Disorder and Suicide Risk Among Transgender Veterans Utilizing Veterans Health Administration Care, 103 Am. J. Public Health e27, e27 (2013).

[24] Jody L. Herman et al., Suicide Thoughts and Attempts Among Transgender Adults, UCLA  Williams Inst. 1 (Sept. 2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/suicidality-transgender-adults/ [https://perma.cc/PKD5-JLVA].

[25] Id. at 5.

[26] Id. at 10–11.

[27] Id. at 1.

[28] Id.

[29] SOC-8 at S171 (emphasis added).

[30] Id.; see also Herman, supra note 24, at 2.

[31] J.A. at 396–97.

[32] National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2019/009-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH57-37CD].

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] See Erlangsen, supra note 20; Denmark – a very LGBT+ friendly country, Denmark, https://denmark.dk/society-and-business/denmark-a-very-lgbt-friendly-country [https://perma.cc/3CZP-Q684].

[36] Louise Appleby, Review of Suicides and Gender Dysphoria at the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust: Independent  Report, UK National Health Service (Jul. 19, 2024), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-suicides-and-gender-dysphoria-at-the-tavistock-and-portman-nhs-foundation-trust/review-of-suicides-and-gender-dysphoria-at-the-tavistock-and-portman-nhs-foundation-trust-independent-report [https://perma.cc/3Z2X-22NT].

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Cass, Independent review of gender identity services for children and young people: Final report at 195, ¶ 16.22 (2024)  https://cass.independent-review.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CassReview_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EA6-3ACG] [hereinafter Cass Report].

[41] Id., at 186, ¶ 15.36.

[42] Id., at 186, ¶ 15.37.

[43] Id.

[44] See generally Bram Kuiper & Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis, Sex reassignment surgery: A study of 141 Dutch transsexuals, 17 ARCHIVES SEXUAL Behav. 439 (1988).

[45] 1,894 suicides in 2016, Centraal Buraeu Voor De Statistiek (June 28, 2017) https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2017/26/1-894-suicides-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/W6L2-SELH].

[46] Cass Report, at 186, ¶ 15.41 (citing Gaia Van Cauwenberg et al., Ten years of experience in counseling gender diverse youth in Flanders, Belgium. A clinical overview, 33 Intl.  J. Impotence Rsch. 671 (2021)).

[47] Azeen Ghorayshi, U.S. Study on Puberty Blockers Goes Unpublished because of Politics, Doctor Says, N.Y. Times (Oct. 23, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/23/science/puberty-blockers-olson-kennedy.html [https://perma.cc/DD7M-JG85].

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50] Id.

[51] See Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1: An Overview of Approval Processes for Drugs, 25 J. Am. Coll. Cardiology: Basic Transl. Sci. 170, 170–72 (2016).

[52] Lars Noah, Preempting Red State Restrictions on the Use of FDA-Approved Drugs in Gender-Affirming Care?, 2024 Utah L. Rev. 833, 836–42 (2024).

[53] See generally Gail A. Van Norman, Off-Label Use vs Off-Label Marketing of Drugs: Part 1: Off-Label Use—Patient Harms and Prescriber Responsibilities, 8 J. Am. Coll. Cardiology: Basic Transl. Sci. 224 (2023).

[54] See, e.g., Mahmoud v. Taylor, No. 24-297 (pending United States Supreme Court case regarding parental religious liberty as to lack of notice and opt-out for public school LGBTQ+ curriculum and teaching for K–5 children); Department of Education v. Louisiana, 603 U.S. ___ (2024) (Supreme Court denied a petition for a partial stay by the Biden Administration, leaving in place a preliminary injunction blocking the Department of Education from implementing a rule that would expand the definition of sex discrimination under Title IX to include sexual orientation and gender identity).

[55] Cass Report, at 185, ¶ 15.27; see also Cass Report at 184, ¶ 15.26.

[56] Suicide Data and Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Oct. 29, 2024), https://www.cdc.gov/suicide/facts/data.html#:~:text=Suicide%20deaths%2C%20plans%2C%20and%20attempts%20in%20the%20United%20States&text=1%20death%20every%2011%20minutes,made%20a%20plan%20for%20suicide [https://perma.cc/CRL3-2NRD].

[57] Id.

[58] Id.

[59] J.A. at 650–55; see also James M. Cantor, Transgender and Gender Diverse Children and Adolescents: Fact-Checking of AAP Policy, 46 J. Of Sex & Martial Therapy 307, 307–13 (2020); Jiska Ristori & Thomas D. Steensma, Gender Dysphoria in Childhood, 28 Int’l Rev. of Psychiatry 13, 18–22 (2016); Kenneth J. Zucker, The Myth of Persistence: Response to “A Critical Commentary on Follow-up Studies and ‘Desistance’ Theories about Transgender and Non-conforming Children” by Temple Newhook et al., 19 Int’l J. Of Transgenderism 231, 231–45 (2018).

[60] SOC-8 at S43.

[61] Id.

[62] Id. at S44–45.

[63] Rittakerttu Kaltiala-Heino et al., Two Years of Gender Identity Service for Minors: Overrepresentation of Natal Girls with Severe Problems in Adolescent Development, 9 Child & Adolescent Psychiatry & Mental Health 1, 5 (2015).

[64] Christian J. Bachmann et al., Gender Identity Disorders Among Young People in Germany: Prevalence and Trends, 2013-2022, 121 Dtsch Arzteblatt Intl. 370, 370–71 (2024).

[65] Christina M. Roberts et al., Continuation of Gender-affirming Hormones Among Transgender Adolescents and Adults, 107 J. Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism e3937, e3939 (2022).

[66] Pien Rawee et al., Development of Gender Non-Contentedness During Adolescence and Early Adulthood, 53 Archives Sexual Behav. 1813, 1813 (2024).

[67] J.A. at 652–55.

[68] J.A. at 635–41, 651, 655–660.

[69]  Robin Respaut et al., Why Detransitioners are Crucial to the Science of Gender Care, Reuters (Dec. 22, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-transyouth-outcomes/ [https://perma.cc/ZP7T-GEZP].

[70] Bazelon, supra note 2.

[71] Id.

[72] Id.

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] SOC-8,at S32, S48.

[76] Id. at S48; Bazelon, supra note 2.

[77] SOC-8 at S51.

[78] Id. at S61.

[79] Chad Terhune et al., As More Transgender Children Seek Medical Care, Families Confront Many Unknowns, Reuters (Oct. 6, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-transyouth-care/ [https://perma.cc/WA6E-T4YE].

[80] Id.

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Contra Koppelman: What Mere Natural Law was About – Hadley Arkes

Posted by on Feb 10, 2025 in Per Curiam

Contra Koppelman: What Mere Natural Law was About – Hadley Arkes
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Contra Koppelman: What Mere Natural Law was About

Hadley Arkes

Andrew Koppelman and I have just missed connecting at different meetings over the last several months; I know he was eager to give me his reactions to Mere Natural Law, and now, I’m pleased enough to see, he has had his chance to unloose them.  I appreciate, as ever, his willingness to engage an argument, and I feel especially complimented here by his willingness to draw passages from other books of mine, from years past.  But I’m afraid that while he takes fragments of arguments here and there, he gives us, one might say, some notes without the music.   What he does not convey is the perspective or argument that draws the pieces together.  And in this case he does not really convey to the reader the central argument that marks the distinct character of this new book he was reviewing, making the case anew for Natural Law.

The telling mark comes when he notes that Mere Natural Law carries an allusion to C.S. Lewis’s Mere Christianity.  He took Lewis’s central concern to “explain and defend the belief that has been common to nearly all Christians at all times,” . . . “that there is one God and that Jesus Christ is His only Son.”  And “Arkes” he says, “aims to do the same for natural law.”  But there he takes a turn quite radically off the mark.  The aim of this book, as he surely knows, is to draw on another part of Lewis’s teaching:  that arguments over right and wrong draw on the common sense understandings that can be found even in the arguments among children. And as Lewis pointed out, those arguments make no sense unless it is assumed on all sides that there are standards of judgment at hand, to judge the difference between the arguments that are plausible or implausible, true or false.  Aquinas said that the divine law we know through revelation, but the natural law we know through that reasoning that is accessible distinctly to human beings; we might say the reasoning that is “natural” to human beings.  And so in the arguments on abortion, as Koppelman surely knows, the Catholic Church has never appealed to “faith” or belief.  It has appealed rather to the evidence of embryology, woven with the principled reasoning of the natural law.  And the upshot is to show that there is no ground on which to rule out that nascent life in the womb as a human being that would not rule out many people walking about, well outside the womb.

What was distinct to Mere Natural Law is that I was following James Wilson, one of the premier minds among the American Founders as he drew, pervasively, in his writings and opinions, on Thomas Reid, the great Scot philosopher of “common sense”:  The natural law would find its ground in those precepts of common sense that the ordinary man would not only know as true, but have to take for granted in getting on with the business of life.  It was the thing he had to know before he could start trafficking in “theories.”  And so, before the ordinary man would banter with David Hume about the meaning of “causation,” he knew his own active powers to cause his own acts to happen.  From that perspective, the first principle of moral and legal judgment is emphatically not the one that Koppelman imputes to me as my “foundational claim”: “the good should be promoted and the bad discouraged, forbidden, and at times punished.”  That is a version of Aquinas’s first principle of moral judgment, but the problem is that that maxim would hold as well for the Mafia.  Members of a criminal band know clearly the “goods” they share and the punishment that is due to those who break with the band and seek “witness protection.”

James Wilson found the first principle of moral and legal judgment where Thomas Reid and Kant found it, in that line, as Reid had it: “[T]o call a person to account, to approve, or disapprove of his conduct, who had no power to do good or ill, is absurd.  No axiom of Euclid appears more evident than this.”  If the average man were told that Jones, accused of a serious crime, was undergoing surgery at the time the crime was committed, he would wonder why Jones was being prosecuted. That anchoring “axiom,” as Reid and Wilson had it, could be grasped at once as something true of necessity, and every functional person would readily grasp it.  That simple axiom threads through our law in many radiations, not only in the “insanity defense” but also, as I try to argue, in explaining the wrong of racial discrimination.

James Wilson’s recognition—echoed by John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton—was that everything we reliably know must find its anchor in axioms or necessary truths of this kind.  As Hamilton put it in the Federalist #31, “in disquisitions of every kind there are certain primary truths or first principles  upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.  These contain an internal evidence, which antecedent to all reflection or combination, command the assent of the mind.”   They are to be grasped per se nota as so evidently true in themselves, just as one grasps that anchoring axiom in the “laws of reason”:   that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true. Anyone denying it would find himself falling into self-contradiction and gibberish.

But then here was the further claim of Wilson’s that has not been widely appreciated:  It was not a mere “theory” that two contradictory propositions both cannot be true. No more was it a mere theory that people “may not be held blameworthy or responsible for acts they were powerless to affect.”  Wilson’s claim was nothing less than this:  that any system of jurisprudence must find its ground in these anchoring truths that we can reliably know, because they are true of necessity.  They are the principles of reason that mark the natural law, the law that underlies our positive law.  And any scheme of natural law built on these grounds then cannot be, as Andrew Koppelman labels it, a mere “theory” of the natural law.  It would be the real thing.

To get clear on this point is to take the first step in dissolving Professor Koppelman’s concerns for what Aquinas calls the “determinatio” of the positive law.   We see the signs posting speed limits of 65 mph or 35 mph.  But before we had those provisions of the positive law, as Kant would tell us, there is an underlying natural law that would tell us why we would be justified in having any law in the first place—a law, that is, to restrain the freedom of people to put innocent life at hazard by driving at reckless speeds.  As ever, as Aquinas realized, there is the need to translate the underlying natural law into terms that apply that law in a practical way to the circumstances and terrain before us:  65 mph, perhaps on the open highway, 35 mph on the winding country road.  But of course there may be other judgments on the speed that happens to be right for any road, and they may all be compatible with the natural law.  In the same way, there may be different constitutional orders that may be compatible with the natural law.   And the task as ever is to distinguish between what is arguable and what is truly essential.    We may still need all of our wit and imagination as we ponder the question of whether Jones was really so infirm after surgery, or so under hypnosis, that he could not have committed that crime.  The possibilities here are maddeningly variable.  But the one thing in this mix that will never be contingent or variable is the principle itself.  If Jones was really “incapable of affecting the act, committing the crime,” he is undeniably innocent and there are no circumstances under which that principle would fail to be true.

I did not take Mere Natural Law as the occasion for offering a thick book of commentaries, listing what I found persuasive or less than persuasive in other accounts of the natural law.  I took it as the occasion to offer this crisper account of a natural law grounded in the laws or axioms of reason, the laws accessible to only one kind of creature. I was not offering a “theory” about the different ways in which people may or may not find themselves “flourishing” as they sought to live upright lives.  I was offering an account of what may be distinctly good and commendable—and quite constitutive of a common good—in a jurisprudence based on moral truths that would hold enduringly for anyone who lived under them.  In his encyclical “On the Nature of Human Liberty” (1888) Leo XIII argued that animals could not plausibly be the bearers of “property rights,” for animals were incapable of imparting a moral purpose to inanimate matter. Rights of property, and other rights, flowed only to creatures of reason, those creatures who alone by nature had the capacity to engage in reasoning over the things that were right or wrong, just or unjust. It should not come as a surprise then to Professor Koppelman that James Wilson—and others of us—should hold an understanding of natural law that is built distinctively upon those anchoring axioms of reason.

Professor Koppelman wants to tag as my main, grievous fault, that I did not deal with what he takes as some of the strongest arguments against my positions. I spent most of Mere Natural Law dealing with arguments made by justices in the Supreme Court, including arguments made by friends such as Justices Scalia and Alito. I was also making arguments that put me at odds with other writers, arguing for an Originalism serenely detached from the moral ground of the natural law as James Wilson, John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton understood it. I will leave it to readers to judge whether I had spent enough time dealing with arguments at odds with my own. But on the other side I would register my own protest that Professor Koppelman has never dealt adequately, say, with the arguments that Robert George, John Finnis, Gerard Bradley and I have made on abortion.  On that I will have more to say in a moment.  But even now in the case at hand:  has he really given, in his review, a clear account of my own central argument in Mere Natural Law, or anything close to the summary I’ve offered in these pages?

As I’ve said, he had many of the notes, but the music was missing. He cited fragments of what I was saying, but offered only truncated accounts of the argument I was making.    And so he says, curtly, that in my view “Minimum wage laws are invalid because they ’seriously abridge personal freedom.’” But any law works by restricting freedom.  It would take a more strenuous argument to show why a law is invalid by showing why it cannot be justified.  That fuller account is what he leaves out in the case of the laws of minimum wages and others. He obviously has in mind my defense of Justice Sutherland striking down the law on minimum wages for women in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923). Sutherland had been a leader in the cause of votes for women, and he did not hold back in supporting laws protective of women.  What Sutherland sought to show in this was that these policies of minimum wages or price controls were simply wrong in principle, that they would be wrong even if it were claimed on occasion that they “worked.”  For these laws were grounded of theories of “determinism”:  e.g., that if a man fell into a class called “employer,” we knew what he was capable of paying any employee, regardless of whether the employer headed a large corporation or a small family business.  Or, that if we knew someone was a woman, we knew the level of income she needed to preserve her morality.  And somehow the drafters of the law knew that a woman who worked as a beginner in a laundry could preserve her morality with an income far more modest than a woman who worked in a large department store.

It surely cannot offer an account of my understanding to say, as Koppelman does, that I hold that a “legislature has no power to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”  No one doubts the power of a legislature to pass a positive law of that kind.  The question is whether a law of that kind is coherent and means what it says.  In all strictness, “sexual orientation” could encompass bestiality, or the passion for sex with animals.  These laws just do not say precisely where they find the wrong they would forbid.    If the drafters sought to become more precise—if they tried to explain where it was plausible  or indefensible to draw adverse inferences about people based of their styles of sexuality—the scheme becomes far more problematic, with conversations people would rather not have.

But finally on the matter of abortion.  Koppleman takes it as a striking fault that, in my arguments on abortion, I’ve not dealt with the kinds of argument offered by Lynne Rudder Baker:  that a human being has the standing of a person, and the protection of the law, only when it has “the capacity for a first-person perspective – to become, in Aristotle’s terms, a rational animal”:

In the early stages of pregnancy, the person does not yet exist.  “It makes no sense to suppose that a nonexisting person has a right to be brought into existence.  Baker observes that her view is consistent with that of Aquinas, who thought that the fetus was not a human individual until it possessed a rational soul, a point that he placed about twelve weeks into gestation.

But surely Koppelman must know that there is nothing the least novel in this argument– or nothing that was not countered by the arguments put forth, say, by Robert George in his Embryo:  A Defense of Human Life (2011) or my own First Things (1986).   There was Alan Gewirth’s curious claim that a fetus could not be a “purposive agent” if it did not have a “physically separate existence” (which of course it has had from its very first moments).[1] But even closer, this is a replay of Bruce Ackerman’s argument that a fetus cannot be a person within the protection of the law because it cannot be “a citizen of a liberal state.” And to be a citizen “it must be able to play a part in the dialogic and behavioral transactions that constitute a liberal polity.”[2]  It is one thing to note the capacity for moral reasoning that distinguishes human beings; and yet it is quite another to say that the right of any person to live must depend on his “articulateness.”  But all of this has been encompassed now by Justice Alito in the Dobbs case.  He noted there the contention of some writers that the fetus should not be entitled to legal protection until it has attributes such as “sentience, self-awareness, the ability to reason, or some combination thereof.”  But with that reasoning, as he said, “it would be an open question whether even born individuals, including young children or those afflicted with certain developmental or medical conditions, merit protection as ‘persons.’”

The fallacies here are old; they do not become more venerable as they are repeated anew.  It takes a heavy dose of theory to talk us out of James Wilson’s understanding that our natural rights begin as soon as we begin to be, which is why, as he said, the common law casts its protection “when the infant is first able to stir in the womb.”  It was once unthinkable to say that a woman becomes unfree when she is restrained from destroying this innocent life she is bearing.  And yet, as I recall, Professor Koppelman was once willing to argue that it would be nothing less than a violation of the 13th Amendment, that a woman would be consigned to servitude, if she were barred from destroying that small life in the womb.  I hope that he has long put that argument aside, but if not, there is another old argument that has not departed the scene and may need to be countered yet again.

There are many more arguments that Andrew Koppelman, in his wide interest, cast up, more than I can possibly deal with here.  But in his large nature, he is always open to getting together for that fuller conversation, and so I’ll look forward to that lunch in Chicago or Washington.

 

 

 

 

 

[1] See Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality 142-43, 159-60 (1978).

[2] Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice and the Liberal State 127 (1980).

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Critiquing Hadley Arkes’s not-so-mere Natural Law Theory – Andrew Koppelman

Posted by on Feb 3, 2025 in Per Curiam

Critiquing Hadley Arkes’s not-so-mere Natural Law Theory – Andrew Koppelman
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Critiquing Hadley Arkes’s not-so-mere Natural Law Theory

Andrew Koppelman*

Law can’t be separated from morality, because law is a kind of human conduct.  So is compliance with the law.  Morality constrains all of human conduct.  So the idea of natural law, a set of moral constraints binding on any possible legal system, has perennial appeal.

Hadley Arkes is a leading contemporary proponent of a revived natural law.  His prominence is deserved.  His work is smart and learned and entertaining.  He writes with admirable moral passion.  He is urgently concerned that persons be treated with dignity and respect, passionate about protecting the weak and vulnerable, especially children, with an especial scorn for racism.  But he is unpersuasive with respect to some of the most important legal issues he takes up:  the scope of the modern administrative state, antidiscrimination law, and abortion.  He often ignores counterarguments.  More than that, he neglects important aspects of the natural law tradition.

His most recent book is Mere Natural Law.  The title echoes, and the book models itself upon, C.S. Lewis’s Mere Christianity.  Lewis aimed to “explain and defend the belief that has been common to nearly all Christians at all times,” centrally “that there is one God and that Jesus Christ is His only Son.”[1] Arkes aims to do the same for natural law.

Arkes’s understanding of natural law is however idiosyncratic.  This separates his project from that of Lewis, who consciously sought to avoid saying anything at all about matters on which Christians were divided: besides having doubts about his own competence to adjudicate theological disputes, Lewis wisely thought that “the discussion of these disputed points has no tendency at all to bring an outsider into the Christian fold.”[2]  Arkes however reasons his way to libertarian, minimal-state conclusions that not all natural lawyers share.  As Lewis feared, this makes natural law appear less attractive than it is, by tying it to inessential, disputed points.

Arkes’s foundational claim is that “the good should be promoted and the bad discouraged, forbidden, and at times punished.”[3]  Every claim of liberty should be evaluated in light of “whether our freedom was being directed to ends that were good or bad, rightful or wrongful.”[4]  Freedom “may be plausibly restricted at many points for good reasons,” and the question of whether rights are thereby infringed “will always hinge then on whether those reasons for restricting freedom are justified or unjustified.”[5]  Judicial review of any statute, he says in an earlier work, “must encompass the question of whether the restrictions or the penalties imposed by the legislation can be substantively justified.”[6]  The question of justification must be addressed by standards not to be found in the Constitution’s text, by “appealing to those standards of moral judgment that could not be summarized, or set forth with any adequacy, in a Constitution.”[7]

Thus there is a strict limit on the legitimate scope of the law.  Some matters, such as how to fund education and for whom, are appropriate judgments for “politicians who have a closer connection to the conditions and sentiments of their own community,”[8] but the judiciary can still appropriately limit legislative power by “the narrow task of drawing out the logical implications that follow from the very idea of law.”[9]  That idea holds that “we are justified in legislating only when the law is governed by an understanding of right and wrong that can tenably claim to be valid, in principle, for everyone.”  Propositions could not legitimately underlie law “if their truths varied with alterations in local culture or with the vagaries of what majorities, in one place or another, are pleased to regard as right and wrong.”[10]  If this understanding were applied, “one result would be far fewer laws on the books than we have today.”[11]

Arkes thus calls into question many restrictions on liberty that are familiar parts of the modern administrative state.  For example, it is not legitimate for the state to require employers to provide benefits to their employees, such as health insurance: “if a service is mandated by the federal government, the federal government should be required to fund that service, not transfer a public service to private persons to bear at private expense.”[12] Arkes admires Franklin Roosevelt’s nemesis, Justice George Sutherland.[13] He rejects the New Deal Court’s deference to economic regulations, because “the regulation of business touches liberties that many people regard as fundamental.”[14]  Minimum wage laws are invalid because they “seriously abridge personal freedom.”[15]

Natural law does not necessarily entail these conclusions.  What is constant among natural law theorists – the real core of mere natural law – is the idea that human nature is constant across cultures, that this nature is teleological and implies certain human purposes that are worthy of pursuit, and that the function of law is to coordinate human activity in order to realize those purposes and forbid actions that thwart them.  Aquinas described law as “an ordination of reason for the common good promulgated by the one who is in charge of the community.”[16]  It has a purpose and should be judged in light of that purpose.

Aquinas inherited from Aristotle the idea that human beings should aim at that which perfects their nature.  Aristotle wrote, “Anyone who intends to investigate the best constitution in the proper way must first determine which life is most choiceworthy, since if this remains unclear, what the best constitution is must also remain unclear.”[17]  In Aristotle, this perfection consisted in “activity and actions of the soul that involve reason”[18] (or, perhaps, philosophical contemplation).[19]  The purpose of a polity is “to make the citizens good and just.”[20]

The realization of this purpose may empower a state to forbid conduct that is not in itself wrongful.  Arkes does not appear to leave room for what Aquinas called determinatio, or what lawyers call malum prohibitum.[21]  Aquinas thought that “there are two ways in which something is derived from natural law – first, as a conclusion from its principles, and second, as a specific application of what is expressed in general terms.”[22]  The latter necessarily is somewhat arbitrary.  We all need to drive our cars on the same side of the street, but one can’t deductively establish which side that should be.  It is not inherently wrongful to park in the business district between 2 and 6 a.m., but a statute prohibiting that conduct is nonetheless legitimate.  The need for coordination entails that there must be lawmaking authority.  “Though the lawmakers’ determinatio is in a sense free,” John Finnis explains, “it must also be made with due consideration for the circumstances which bear on the appropriateness of alternative laws.”[23]

The decline of natural law reasoning in court is in large part the consequence of the increasing detail of determinatio.  The proliferation of written constitutions and statutes, and the publication of most judicial decisions, meant that judges could rely on positive law, and did not need to reason from first principles.  This obviously also made the law more predictable, which is one of the principal benefits of determinatio.  The concern about predictability became more salient as it became clear, in the nineteenth century, that natural law could be invoked on both sides of many of the most salient controversies.[24]  Some modern Thomists think that existing positive law is legitimately promulgated, is therefore worthy of obedience, and suffices to answer most legal questions.[25]

In a complex modern economy, the promotion of human flourishing can entail an immense regulatory apparatus.  The evils to be avoided may require considerable expertise even to detect and diagnose: pollution, financial market fraud, dangerous or ineffective pharmaceuticals, hazardous consumer products, workplace hazards.  In a minimal state, people would be vulnerable to all these harms.[26]  Thus one of the most prominent contemporary neoThomists, Adrian Vermeule, argues that the modern regulatory state promotes the common good.[27]

Arkes thinks that government wrongs an individual if it uses its regulatory powers to commandeer his property for public purposes, as it does for example with the minimum wage, or the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that large employers provide health insurance to their workers.  But he doesn’t seem to notice that property rights are subject to many different legal specifications, and that those specifications are a species of determinatio.

In our system of property rights, some subset of the social output is allocated for collective rather than individual determination of the use to which it will be put.  There is no uniquely justified specification of that subset’s size or use.  Private property has no meaning outside that total system.  Political life did not begin after I was already sitting in the state of nature with my brokerage account.  The actual structure of property rights comes with a proviso that resembles the “rake” in a casino poker game: players know when they start the game that the house will take a percentage of each pot.  Whether health care is to be directly funded by government, or by employer mandates, or (as is the case in the United States) some combination of the two, is a prudential judgment appropriately guided by the moral imperative to minimize morbidity and mortality.

Arkes ranges over a broad range of other specific applications, more than I can take up here.  I’ll focus on gay rights and abortion.

Arkes writes that the Supreme Court should have rejected same-sex marriage by offering “a substantive defense of marriage” as “the union of one man and one woman.”[28]  The state can prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, but not sexual orientation, because the former is wrong and the latter is not.  He discusses a Supreme Court case, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado,[29] in which a baker asked for exemption from an antidiscrimination statute that required him to bake a case for a same-sex wedding.[30]  He is unpersuaded that either religion or free speech can be a basis for such an exemption.  There is no legally salient difference between the baker and any other defendant.  Yet he thinks that the baker should prevail.  The implication appears to be, not exemption, but that the statute is constitutionally invalid in all its applications, and that legislature has no power to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  On the contrary, with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Civil Rights Act to protect transgender people from discrimination, “the trend of nihilism may have reached its terminus.”[31]  He thinks that, in that case, the Court should have looked “beyond the text of the statute” to “the differences that must ever separate males from females.”[32]

The substantive defense of opposite-sex marriage, and exclusion of same-sex marriage, that Arkes endorses is that elaborated by Girgis, Anderson, and George.  Arkes complains that proponents of same-sex marriage have not offered reasoned responses to those arguments,[33] but I have done so in some detail (as it happens, with the generous help and advice of Prof. George).  My counterarguments are not nihilistic.  They are just counterarguments, which claim that the conclusions about same-sex marriage do not follow from the natural law premises.[34]  Nor is it explained why “the differences that must ever separate males from females” imply that the state cannot prohibit discrimination against those who construe those differences in ways with which Arkes disagrees.  Racial discrimination, he writes, is wrong because “it denies to black people their very standing as moral agents to bear responsibility for their own acts and receive the praise or blame that is theirs alone.”[35]  This is a wrong “even when it is not clear that the victims have suffered any material injuries.”[36] But of course discrimination against gay and transgender people also has historically involved devaluation of their personhood, treating them as irredeemably defective beings.  Why isn’t a legislature authorized to respond to that?[37]

In a long discussion of abortion, Arkes nowhere acknowledges that there is a serious philosophical debate about whether a fetus is a person, an entity with rights.  He merely speculates that defenders of abortion rights “are incapable of simply reading what the textbooks on embryology or obstetric gynecology have to say.”[38]  He assumes that the physical human organism is identical with the person, so that “from the blastocyst stage the fetus qualifies for respect.”[39]  The most sophisticated defenses of abortion challenge that assumption, and they do so by engaging in detail with embryology.  Scholars who agree with Arkes respond to that literature.[40]  He ignores it.

The claim that abortion is morally permissible need not deny that a fetus is an organism or that is a member of the human species. Lynne Rudder Baker, for example, offers a pro-choice argument that is entirely consistent with natural law premises.[41]  She proposes that personhood is an essence that emerges at a certain point in fetal development.  Her view is essentialist and teleological.  The human-making property of an entity, she argues, is the capacity to have a first-person perspective.  Persons are necessarily embodied, but it is possible to have a body without being a person: corpses are not persons.  “The relation between you and your body – constitution – is the same relation as the relation between Michelangelo’s David and the piece of marble that constitutes it.”[42]  The David and the piece of marble are spatially coincident, but they are not identical.  The piece was marble before and after Michelangelo got his hands on it, but it was not then, and is now, the David.  I was once a fetus, but that does not necessarily mean that the fetus was me.

A fetus has the capacity to develop the capacity for a first-person perspective – to become, in Aristotle’s terms, a rational animal.  But such a remote capacity, Baker argues, cannot make anything the kind of entity that it is.[43]  In the early stages of pregnancy, the person does not yet exist.  “It makes no sense to suppose that a nonexisting person has a right to be brought into existence.”[44]  Baker observes that her view is consistent with that of Aquinas, who thought that the fetus was not a human individual until it possessed a rational soul, a point that he placed about twelve weeks into gestation.[45]

David Boonin similarly argues that, at the early stage of development, there is no consciousness and so no person.  A rational soul must be at least sometimes conscious.  If it is never conscious, then one may wonder in what sense it can be deemed rational.  No consciousness is possible until neural connections begin to form in the fetus’s brain, which happens at about 25 weeks.  Roughly 99% of abortions take place before this point.[46]  Until that stage, fetuses have not even begun to be (to use Arkes’s words) “beings who can give and understand reasons.”[47]

Arkes proposes that the principles of natural law are “readily – and instantly – understood,” “accessible to all functional persons,” “understood by virtually everyone.”[48]  If there is any need to articulate them, this is because they “involve those matters so foundational that we absorb them often without the least awareness that we know them.”[49]  He accurately observes that disagreement with these principles does not prove that they do not exist: with respect to some matters, it is often the case that one side is simply wrong.

On the other hand, the truths that anchor Arkes’s arguments are not ones that “cannot be denied without falling into contradiction.”[50]  Writers who share his premises reject his conclusions.  He is certainly right that the exercise of political power must be justified, but his arguments depend on too cursory an inventory of possible justifications. This leads him to zoom quickly past considerations that he should address and answer.  He heaps scorn on stupid counterarguments as though they were the only ones he needs to address.  One sometimes suspects that he perceives only two alternatives: the nihilist view that morality and law are merely matters of personal preference or agreeing with him about everything.

Law necessarily has a moral foundation.  Exploring that foundation can help us understand what law can and should be.  The project of finding anchoring truths is well worth undertaking, and the natural law tradition has something to contribute to that.[51]  That is why Arkes’s work is important.  But the increasing importance of determinatio explains why natural law is not much relied upon today.  Another is that virtue takes more forms than the natural law tradition recognized: Robert George acknowledges its “fail[ure] to understand the diversity of basic forms of good and the range of valid pluralism.”[52]  The basic commitment to the accountability of political power is important, and Arkes has performed a service by emphasizing it.  But his arguments would be stronger if he engaged in detail with the strongest objections to his position.

* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor (by courtesy) of Political Science, Department of Philosophy Affiliated Faculty, Northwestern University.

[1] C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity 6 (1952).

[2] Id. at 6.

[3] Hadley Arkes, Mere Natural Law: Originalism and the Anchoring Truths of the Constitution 63 (2023) [hereinafter Mere Natural Law].

[4] Id. at 9.

[5] Id. at 91.

[6] Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution 97 (1990).

[7] Id. at 56.

[8] Mere Natural Law, at 59.

[9] Id. at 58–59.

[10] Hadley Arkes, First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles of Morals and Justice 27 (1986). See also Mere Natural Law at 228.

[11] First Things, supra note 10, at 28.

[12] Mere Natural Law, at 195.

[13] See generally Hadley Arkes, The Return of George Sutherland: Restoring a Jurisprudence of Natural Rights (1997).

[14] Id. at 88.

[15] Mere Natural Law, at 52–53.

[16] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I II, q. 90, art. 3, in St. Thomas Aquinas on Ethics and Politics 46 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & tr. 1988).

[17] Aristotle, Politics, 1323a, at 191 (C.D.C. Reeve tr. 1998).

[18] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1098a, at 10 (Terence Irwin tr., 3d ed. 2019).

[19] Aristotle is inconsistent on this point.  See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy 373–77 (1986).

[20] Politics, 1280b, supra note 17, at, 80.

[21] Gerard Bradley offers a similar criticism, without specifically invoking determinatio, in Constitutional Theory beyond Left and Right (review of Beyond the Constitution, supra note 6),  54 Rev. f Pol., Vol. 54, No. 1 (Winter, 1992), pp. 144-150.

[22] Summa Theologiae, I II, q. 95, art. 2, supra note 16, at 53.

[23] John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory 268 (1998).

[24] See generally Stuart Banner, The Decline of Natural Law: How American Lawyers Once Used Natural Law and Why They Stopped (2021).

[25] See generally, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Recovering Classical Legal Constitutionalism: A Critique of Professor Vermeule’s New Theory, 98 Notre Dame L. Rev. 403 (2022).  A.P. D’Entreves distinguishes “technological” understandings of natural law, as solutions to perennial problems of governance and adjudication, from “ontological” understandings, which rest on an account of humanity’s nature and purpose.  See A.P. D’Entreyes, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy 145–158 (2d ed. 1970).  When early courts cited natural law, they were usually invoking the former, and some accounts of natural law simply build on those perennial governance problems.  See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 86–89 (2d ed. 1994).  The distinction helps explain why “neither Continental nor English lawyers made much use of” Aquinas, whose view of the human telos was pervasively religious.  R.H. Helmholz, Natural Law in Court: A History of Legal Theory in Practice 5 (2015).

[26] See generally Andrew Koppelman, Burning Down the House: How Libertarian Philosophy Was Corrupted by Delusion and Greed (2022).  On the importance of determinatio in justifying the modern administrative state, see Adrian Vermeule, Common Good Constitutionalism 46, 136, 152-53 (2022).

[27] See generally Vermeule, supra note 26; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Law & Leviathan: Redeeming the Administrative State (2020).  Arkes praises Vermeule but does not appear to notice this enormous difference in their views.  Hadley Arkes, Vermeule, his Critics, and the Crisis of Originalism, The American Mind (May 6, 2020), https://americanmind.org/features/waiting-for-charlemagne/vermeule-his-critics-and-the-crisis-of-originalism/.

[28] Mere Natural Law, at 11.

[29] 584 U.S. 617 (2018).

[30] Mere Natural Law, at 76.

[31] Id. at 9.

[32] Id. at 15.

[33] See generally Hadley Arkes, When a Man Loves A Woman, Claremont Rev. of Books, Winter 2015/2016.  He also worries that if same-sex marriage is not resisted in principle, “marriage would lose its integrity as a concept and its durability then as an institution.”  Hadley Arkes, The Family and the Laws, in The Meaning of Marriage: Family, State, Market, and Morals 116, 127 (Robert P. George and Jean Bethke Elshtain eds. 2006).  But this prediction is parasitic on his view about what marriage essentially is.

[34] See generally Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U. St. Thomas L. J. 5 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 Am. J.  Juris. 51 (1997); Andrew Koppelman, More Intuition than Argument, 140 Commonweal 23 (Mar. 25, 2013) (review of Sherif Girgis, Ryan T. Anderson, & Robert P. George, What is Marriage? Man and Woman: A Defense (2012)), .  Our disagreement turns on whether the legal institution of marriage must correspond to a good with essential properties.  See Sherif Girgis, Ryan T. Anderson and Robert P. George, Does Marriage, or Anything, Have Essential Properties?, Public Discourse (Jan. 12, 2011) https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/01/2350/ (engaging, and linking to, my arguments on this issue).  Arkes is distinctive from them to the extent that, because he has so little room for determinatio, he wants legal categories to correspond to essences more than they do.

[35] Mere Natural Law, at 102.

[36] Id. at 102.

[37] There are also other purposes of antidiscrimination law, which Arkes does not pause to consider.  See Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights vs. Religious Liberty? The Unnecessary Conflict 43–65 (2020).

[38] Mere Natural Law, at 138.

[39]Id. at 219.

[40] See generally, e.g., Francis J. Beckwith, Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (2007).

[41] See generally Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (2000).

[42] Id. at 9. I became aware of Baker’s argument when I encountered the attempted refutation in Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefson, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (2d ed. 2011).  In my judgment, their attack on mind-body dualism is effective against Descartes but is not responsive to Baker.

[43] Lynne Rudder Baker, When Does a Person Begin?, 22 Soc. Phil. Pol’y 25, 35 (2005).

[44] Id. at 45.

[45] Id. at 41 n.50.  Aristotle’s views, on the other hand, are so distant from ours that no reliable conclusions can be drawn regarding his views on abortion in light of modern knowledge.  See generally Mathew Lu, Aristotle on Abortion and Infanticide, 53 Int’l Phil. Q. 47 (2013).

[46] See David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion 115–29 (2003).

[47] Mere Natural Law, at 27.

[48] Id. at 19.

[49] Id. at 19.

[50] Id. at 23.

[51] Its relation to liberalism is complicated.  The most careful assessment I know, from within the natural law tradition, is Robert P. George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality 189–229 (1993).  On the other hand, Patrick Deneen and Adrian Vermeule, whose work has become quite prominent, radically misunderstand the liberalism they criticize.  See Andrew Koppelman, “It is Tash Whom He Serves”: Deneen and Vermeule on Liberalism, 98 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1525 (2023).

[52] George, supra note 51, at 38.

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The Third Rails of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Guidance on Deriving Historical Principles Post-Bruen – Mark W. Smith

Posted by on Jan 30, 2025 in Per Curiam

The Third Rails of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Guidance on Deriving Historical Principles Post-Bruen – Mark W. Smith
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The Third Rails of Second Amendment Jurisprudence:
Guidance on Deriving Historical Principles Post-Bruen

Mark W. Smith*

 

This article proposes a method by which courts and litigants can resolve recurring questions presented in litigation over the right to keep and bear arms.

Three Supreme Court cases, District of Columbia v. Heller (2008),[2] New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022),[3] and United States v. Rahimi (2024)[4] established a text-first, history-second methodology for deciding whether a present-day law affecting the right to keep and bear arms passes muster under the Second Amendment.

If the conduct prohibited by such a law is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment, a court must then determine whether the law is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,” by examining relevant historical analogue laws at or near the time of the Founding. By examining whether modern and historical regulations “impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense” (the “how”), and whether “that burden is comparably justified” (the “why”), a “principle” may be distilled from the analogues to define the contours of the right. A modern regulation that is consistent with a principle thus derived is consistent with the Second Amendment. A modern regulation that is inconsistent with such a principle is unconstitutional.

A key issue, flagged by Justice Barrett in her Rahimi concurrence, is the appropriate level of generality at which to derive a principle from the historical analysis described by Bruen. In Rahimi, the Court criticized the Fifth Circuit for requiring a “historical twin” and searching for a historical “principle” that was too specific. But the Court likewise rejected a principle proffered by the United States—that the government may disarm any citizen who is not “responsible”—as being pitched at too high a level of generality.

Though it instructed courts to find the right level of generality and eschew rules that are either overbroad or too specific, Rahimi did not make explicit how lower courts should know whether the rule they embrace fits into this Goldilocks zone of just right. This article proposes a way to test whether derived principles are appropriate by identifying certain “disqualifiers.”

This article identifies five disqualifiers or “third rails” that indicate when a court’s analysis is wrong. First, the derived historical principle cannot violate precedents or constitutional principles already established by the Supreme Court. Second, a historical principle cannot be justified by reference to the misuse of firearms by criminals as opposed to the lawful use of firearms by the law-abiding. Third, a historical principle must not undermine the purposes of the Second Amendment. Fourth, a historical principle must not restrict or prohibit firearms-related activities that were common at the Founding. Fifth, a historical principle that denies Second Amendment rights to most Americans is invalid.

This is not an exhaustive list—rather, it is an attempt to kick off a conversation. There are surely other relevant disqualifiers not discussed here, but a principle that runs afoul of any of these disqualifiers is incorrect and must be rejected as a basis for assessing the constitutionality of a modern gun law.

I. A Quick Refresher:  Applying the Heller/Bruen Methodology

Before addressing the disqualifiers, it is helpful to review the Bruen methodology.[5] The Supreme Court explains:

[W]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.” Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U. S. 36, 50, n. 10 (1961).[6]

As the Supreme Court taught in Bruen and Rahimi, the historical work of understanding the Second Amendment involves examining laws that restricted the right to keep and bear arms historically by asking both “how” and “why” those laws limited the right. Then, as Rahimi makes clear, the question is whether the “principle” to be derived from those historical laws—the synthesis of “how” and “why” they regulated the right while remaining consistent with it—would, today, justify (or not justify) whatever modern firearm law is being challenged as unconstitutional.[7]

The notion of underlying or historical principles is not novel in Second Amendment jurisprudence. In Heller, the Court found two historical principles to be case determinative. The first was the historical tradition at common law of regulating “dangerous and unusual weapons.”[8] The second was that arms “‘in common use’ . . . for lawful purposes” are categorically protected.[9] Because handguns are the “quintessential self-defense” weapons chosen by millions of Americans for that purpose, Washington, D.C.’s handgun ban was unconstitutional.[10]

In Bruen, the Court analyzed the “how” and the “why” of historical analogues to adduce a historical principle by which to assess New York’s “proper cause” requirement for handgun licenses.[11] The historical principle derived from analogues that made it illegal to carry handguns concealed was that legislatures could regulate the mode of carriage, but they could not ban carriage entirely.[12] Applying that historical principle, the New York law was unconstitutional.[13]

In Rahimi, the Court examined two different sets of historical laws: (a) surety laws, that required an individual who was suspected of causing trouble to find sureties before carrying arms in public, and (b) the “going armed” laws, which made it unlawful to go armed in public “to the [t]error of the [p]eople.”[14] Rahimi treated these laws together because they had the same “why”—they were both aimed at preventing future violence with firearms.[15] They also had similar “hows.”[16] To be sure, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, they were not perfectly aligned on this point,[17] but as the majority emphasized, they frequently targeted the same behavior and were used somewhat interchangeably.[18]

The historical principle Rahimi derived from these laws was that the government could disarm an individual temporarily where he “present[ed] a credible threat to the physical safety of others.”[19] Applying that principle, the Court held that the temporary prohibition by 18 U.S.C 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of a firearm by someone subject to a domestic violence restraining order, who had been found to pose a physical danger to another, was constitutional.[20]

Rahimi did not provide lower courts with a formula to test if a derived principle passes muster under the Second Amendment. Here, the key issue is the level of generality of the principle underlying, or derived from, historical analogues. As Justice Barrett recognized in her Rahimi concurrence:

Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake of Bruen. One difficulty is a level of generality problem: Must the government produce a founding-era relative of the challenged regulation—if not a twin, a cousin? Or do founding-era gun regulations yield concrete principles that mark the borders of the right?[21]

So, what level of generality is the right one to derive these principles? Rahimi itself shows that error lies on either extreme—the Fifth Circuit drew its analogies too narrowly and required a “historical twin,” while the government in Rahimi pushed for a rule that would swallow the Amendment whole in permitting the government to bar firearm possession by anyone it judged to be “[ir]responsible.”[22] It is clear that the Court is looking for a Goldilocks principle: one that does not embrace a  principle that is too extreme, but is instead “just right.” As part of the examination of historical analogues to determine the principles that underlie our national tradition of firearms regulation, it is crucial that the principles be applied at the appropriate level of generality and in the correct manner.

II. Deriving The Historical Legal Principle

Identifying an underlying historical principle serves at least two purposes. First, it brings coherence to a proposed basket of analogues and informs the meaning of those historical laws. Second, and most importantly, it explains how those laws were consistent with the contours of the Second Amendment. The best way to think about how to derive or formulate a historical legal principle is by ensuring that the “why” and the “how” of the suitable historical analogues are encompassed in the proposed historical principle. In essence, all derived historical legal principles can be written in the following manner: The government may regulate conduct within the plain text of the Second Amendment by [insert the how] because history demonstrates that society has well-founded concerns about [insert the why] that have been embodied in historical analogue laws that meet Bruen’s standards.

III. The Second Amendment Disqualifiers Test Whether
A Proffered Principle Derived From History is Correct

In Rahimi, Justice Barrett made two astute observations.  First, “a court must be careful not to read a principle at such a high level of generality that it waters down the right” and, second, “reasonable minds sometimes disagree about how broad or narrow the controlling principle should be.”[23] This is hardly a concern unique to the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court has wrestled with how to instruct lower courts to pitch their analyses at the appropriate level of generality in all manner of constitutional contexts. In the abortion context, for example, the Court criticized its own precedent “appeal[ing] to a broader right to autonomy and to define one’s ‘concept of existence’” as operating at such “a high level of generality” that they could equally well “license fundamental rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like”;[24] in qualified immunity cases, it frequently admonishes lower courts that “clearly established law” must not be defined “at a high level of generality” but rather must be “particularized to the facts of the case”;[25] and in the family law context, Justice Scalia warned that in assessing the historical scope of familial rights, courts should “consult[] the most specific tradition available” given that more “general traditions provide such imprecise guidance [that] they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society’s views.”[26] These concerns should sound very familiar to students of the Second Amendment.

Perhaps the clearest example of this in the Court’s caselaw can be found in Washington v. Glucksberg, where the Court assessed whether there was a constitutional right to assisted suicide. Glucksberg was essentially Bruen in reverse; because the right to assisted suicide is not found in the Constitution’s text, the plaintiff bore the burden to demonstrate from a historical tradition that the alleged right existed and should be protected. In assessing the claim, the Court wrestled with the appropriate level of generality at which to define the asserted right based on history. The Ninth Circuit below had asked “‘whether there is a liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one’s death,’ or, in other words, ‘[i]s there a right to die?’”[27] Glucksberg had asserted a right “to choose how to die,” to be in “control of one’s final days,” or “the liberty to shape death.”[28] But the Court criticized these questions as too broadly formulated, noting that in the past it had been much more careful in “formulating the interest at stake in substantive-due-process cases,” and rejected the notion that it had previously recognized a “right to die,” and had, instead, found a much more limited right of “competent persons” to “refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”[29] Properly characterized, the question before the Court in Glucksberg was much narrower: whether the “liberty” specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide, which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.[30]

Insisting on a careful description of the right in question is one of the “guideposts for responsible decision making” the Court uses to avoid removing too much from “the area of public debate and legislative action” in substantive due process cases.[31] Similarly, ensuring the proper definition of the limiting principles helps to avoid watering down rights textually protected by the Constitution.

In the Second Amendment context, the underlying principle of regulation, if any, is derived from the synthesis of “how” and “why” historical analogues regulated the Second Amendment right while remaining consistent with the Second Amendment. Whereas the risk in Glucksberg was acknowledging an overbroad right. Given that the Bruen analysis uses history to find limitations on the right, the risk of drawing historical principles at too high a level of generality is that a principle so derived could swallow the rule. We can see this in the way courts ask “why” historical laws limited the right to keep and bear arms. At a high level of generality, some erroneously argue that virtually every historical law existed to promote “public safety” or the “protection against harm from firearms,” so that any similar laws are justified today.

Heller itself made the point about what specific threat is being protected against. It dismissed Justice Breyer’s citation of a 1783 Boston law that prohibited depositing loaded firearms in dwellings and other buildings.[32] Justice Scalia noted that the statute’s text and its prologue made it clear “that the purpose of the prohibition was to eliminate the danger to firefighters” posed by those arms being held there.[33] But the handgun ban in the District was enacted not to protect firefighters but to combat the alleged “drastic increase in gun-related violence.”[34] Both rationales have something to do with “public safety,” but there is a gross mismatch between why the Boston ordinance was enacted and why the District’s law was passed; Heller found no support for the District’s handgun ban in the early law regarding depositing loaded firearms in dwellings.[35]

Two salient and recent examples where the Supreme Court has compared principles proffered by the government and rejected those formulated at a high level of generality are the Court’s discussion of “sensitive places” in Bruen, and the Court’s findings in Rahimi regarding when an individual may be temporarily disarmed from publicly carrying a concealed firearm. In Bruen, the Court rejected the “principle” allegedly ascertained from historical analogues that “‘sensitive places’ where the government may lawfully disarm law-abiding citizens include all “places where people typically congregate and where law-enforcement and other public-safety professionals are presumptively available.”[36] The Court rightly concluded that “expanding the category of ‘sensitive places’ simply to all places of public congregation that are not isolated from law enforcement defines the category of ‘sensitive places’ far too broadly. Respondents’ argument would in effect exempt cities from the Second Amendment and would eviscerate the general right to publicly carry arms for self-defense . . . .”[37]

In government-mandated gun free zone (“sensitive place”) cases, a better principle might be that the government can restrict Second Amendment rights by banning possession of firearms in discrete locations so long as the government provides comprehensive security for individuals within those locations so that individual self-defense is no longer needed.[38] That is a narrowly-drafted principle. Compare it to the wildly overgeneralized test proposed by New York and rejected by the Court in Bruen, and one can see the difference between a narrow principle that reflects the “how” and the “why” of a proposed principle, and one that is posited at too high a level of generality.

Rahimi provides an excellent example of the proper level of generality. Rahimi reviewed both surety statutes and laws against “affrays” or going armed “to the Terror of the People.”[39] From those, Rahimi distilled the historical legal principle that if an individual has been adjudicated to pose a credible threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be temporarily disarmed.[40] Rahimi rejected the government’s claim that it could disarm those who were not “law-abiding” or “responsible.”[41] Chief Justice Roberts objected to the Solicitor General’s argument when she asserted that Rahimi could be disarmed because he was “irresponsible.” The Chief Justice observed that this proposed principle was vague and overbroad.[42] Indeed, a principle operating at this high a level of generality would disarm a vaguely defined, but undeniably large, swath of the population with ordinary self-defense needs.

IV. The Second Amendment Disqualifiers

As illustrated above, the Supreme Court has furnished some examples of levels of generality that are improper or too high, but so far it has not articulated a general test for levels of generality. This article proposes several rules (I call them “disqualifiers” or “third rails,” because, like the third rail on a train, it is fatal for a historical principle to touch one of these disqualifiers) that flow naturally from the Supreme Court’s caselaw, and that will help ensure that any principle so derived will be at the proper level of generality. If the principle derived from a basket of historical analogues touches a third rail, then it fails.  In addition, I’ve proposed one disqualifier (No. 2 below) that is not tied to the level-of-generality problem but offers a response to courts that have taken the wrong perspective in analyzing Second Amendment history.

These disqualifiers do not replace the detailed historical methodologies exemplified in Heller, elaborated in Bruen, and applied in Rahimi, but are meant to “test” whether a principle derived from a basket of suitable historical analogues is sufficiently narrow. The disqualifiers thus function as a confirming or disqualifying analytic.

Disqualifier No. 1:     A Derived Historical Legal Principle
Cannot Violate Supreme Court Precedent

A derived historical legal principle cannot contravene Supreme Court precedent. For example, Heller teaches that arms “in common use” for lawful purposes are protected.[43] So, if a lower court derives a principle that would permit banning arms in common use, then the principle being advocated by the government fails.

Today, so-called “assault weapon” bans and bans on “large capacity” (actually, standard capacity) magazines are being challenged around the country.[44] Any derived principle, which would supposedly justify a ban on the most popular rifle in U.S. history, or on magazines possessed in the hundreds of millions, ought to be dead on arrival as violative of Supreme Court precedent.[45]

Disqualifier No. 2:     A Derived Historical Legal Principle Must Not Be Based on the Misuse of Firearms by Criminals

Another disqualifier requires lower courts to reject any derived historical legal principle which rests on the potential misuse of firearms by criminals. The Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence focuses on the lawful use of firearms by the law-abiding—not criminal misuse. Heller described handguns as “the quintessential self-defense weapon” and held that they were protected as arms “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”—notwithstanding Justice Breyer’s assertion in dissent that handguns were “the overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed criminals.”[46] While Heller acknowledged “the problem of handgun violence in this country,” it explained that the Second Amendment “necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table”—specifically, in that case, bans on arms in common use by the law-abiding.[47] This focus on the law-abiding is not unusual. For example, while the internet is an important medium for the exercise of the First Amendment right of free speech, some people use the internet for illegal acts like distributing illegal pornography or violating copyright protections. Yet, this unlawful use of the internet may not be used to support banning (or heavily regulating) internet use for everyone, including law-abiding citizens.[48]

Another example of this is the frequent (and improper) recitation by courts of the use of AR-15 semi-automatic rifles in mass shootings. ARs have indeed been criminally misused in some highly-publicized mass shootings—although not as often as handguns, which are the most common weapon of mass shooters.[49] Regardless, like misuse in crime generally, misuse in mass shootings cannot be a basis to ban a firearm that is in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. Any derived principle that would justify a ban on semi-automatic rifles would violate, at a minimum, the Supreme-Court-precedent disqualifier (Disqualifier No. 1), and the criminal-misuse disqualifier (Disqualifier No. 2).

Disqualifier No. 3:     A Derived Historical Legal Principle Must Not Contradict the Purposes Advanced by the Second Amendment

The third disqualifier rules out principles that undermine the purposes of the Second Amendment. A primary purpose is the right of law-abiding citizens to be armed to defend themselves and to resist tyranny.[50]  Because Heller confirmed that the Second Amendment protects the right to be “armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of conflict with another person,”[51] it is unlikely that the Founders would have approved, for instance, of a regulatory tradition making it difficult for law-abiding citizens to train with firearms. After all, as the Seventh Circuit explained in Ezell v. Chicago,[52] “[t]he right to possess firearms for protection implies a corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in their use; the core right wouldn’t mean much without the training and practice to make it effective.”[53]

In addition to the right to maintain proficiency in the use of arms, the right to acquire and possess the firearms themselves must be protected in order to vindicate the Second Amendment’s purposes of self-defense, repelling invasions, resisting tyranny, and collective defense.

Disqualifier No. 4:     A Derived Historical Legal Principle Must Not Restrict or Prohibit Firearm-Related Activities that were Common at the Founding

The fourth disqualifier protects firearm-related activities that were common at the Founding. Thus, if a purported principle, if applied historically at the Founding, would have banned or restricted a common activity of that era, the principle must be rejected. As Bruen explained, “when a challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the eighteenth century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.”[54] In Bruen, arguments were advanced that there was no right to public carry at the Founding and that public carriage was a crime. In reality, carrying firearms in public was ubiquitous and a common practice of our most illustrious Founders, including the first several presidents. Any historical principle that would transform the leading members of the Founding generation into criminals cannot be correct.

Disqualifier No. 5:     A Derived Historical Legal Principle Cannot, In Effect, Deny Second Amendment Rights to Most Americans.

Any proffered principle that means to support a present-day firearms regulation that prohibits the general population, i.e., “the people” from exercising their Second Amendment rights is improper. An example of such a regulation is the “proper cause” requirement struck down in Bruen. That was limited to carry, but no principle can be countenanced that does not allow “all Americans” the right to possess a firearm.[55] Examples include “premises licenses” in New York, and “permit to purchase” laws in other states. Although certain specific people can be disarmed (e.g., violent felons), those are exceptions, not the rule. Anything that debars significant swaths of the general public from having arms would be a huge overgeneralization that touches a third rail. A similar principle applies to “sensitive places” legislation that ostensibly allows concealed carry, but then outlaws it in most public places. This includes laws, such as those in New York and New Jersey, that reverse the usual presumption that an owner of property accessible to the public can ban carry, but the burden is on the property owner to do so. The burden cannot be on the citizen-carrier to affirmatively get permission in advance. As Judge VanDyke explained in criticizing a Ninth Circuit decision blessing many of these locational restrictions, the only way the panel could uphold them was to “extract[ ] very broad principles from the historical record that could support the constitutionality of almost any firearms  restriction.”[56]

V. Applying the Second Amendment Disqualifiers

In any Second Amendment case, except those in which the Supreme Court has already decided the issue (i.e., arm ban cases), lower courts must perform the Bruen text-first, history-second analysis to determine whether the challenged law is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”[57] The disqualifiers perform a different function. They are designed to catch errors after the Heller/Bruen analysis has been initially performed and to indicate when historical lines have been drawn with too broad a brush. As shown below, this is where many lower courts go astray.

Fortunately, the disqualifiers are often easy to apply when considered in good faith, and do not require a deep dive into historical analogues. Much of the work has already been done by the Supreme Court. In Heller, the Court told us what historical principle will support an arms ban.[58] In Bruen, it told us what historical principles govern the right to carry firearms.[59] And in Rahimi it explained the historical principles that permit temporarily disarming those who have been judicially found to pose a credible threat of  physical harm to another.[60] Those three holdings alone resolve the lion’s share of Second Amendment issues percolating today, and the lower courts in most cases simply need to faithfully follow Supreme Court precedent.

A. Semiautomatic Rifles (“Assault Weapons”) and Magazines

Several states ban certain ordinary semi-automatic firearms, which they label “assault weapons.” Those states often pair that ban with a ban on so-called “large capacity magazines.”

Courts have offered several “principles” to justify such bans. Take, for example, Bevis v. Naperville,[61] where the Seventh Circuit recognized the “principle” that arms that are especially useful in military service can be banned.[62] In Bianchi v. Brown,[63] the Fourth Circuit recognized a historical principle of regulating “excessively dangerous” weapons.[64] In Hanson v. District of Columbia,[65] the D.C. Circuit found an ostensible tradition of banning arms capable of “unprecedented lethality.”[66] And the First Circuit in Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island,[67] wrongly recognized a tradition to protect against the greater dangers posed by “more dangerous” weapons.[68] Along these same lines, in Vermont Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs v. Birmingham,[69] the district court found that our country had a “history of regulating mass threats to public safety.”[70]

Each of these purported principles runs afoul of a disqualifier. Heller already did the historical homework and derived the rule of decision to determine what types of arms the Second Amendment protects. The Court first noted that there was a tradition of banning the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”[71] As the flipside of this, the tradition at the Founding was that men enrolled in the militia would bring with them the sorts of arms typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.[72] Taken together, this gives us the “principle” announced in Heller that an arm “in common use” cannot be “dangerous and unusual,” and thus cannot be banned.[73]

If we compare that principle, against the principles announced by lower courts in recent “assault weapon” ban cases, we find a conflict. Those purported principles would allow bans on “common” arms, provided, for example, that the lower court was convinced that those common arms were “excessively dangerous.”[74] Because the lower courts have no authority to deviate from the Supreme Court’s precedent, each of these principles violates Disqualifier No. 1, and cannot be the controlling rule.

These purported principles also violate Disqualifier No. 2, which prohibits recognition of a principle that focuses on criminal misuse of a weapon instead of lawful use, and Disqualifier No. 3, which renders infirm any principle that is contrary to the purposes of the Second Amendment. One critical purpose of the Second Amendment, as courts have repeatedly recognized since Heller, is self-defense. Self-defense is hampered by laws that require law-abiding citizens to eschew common, effective arms that their attackers can readily obtain.

B. Prohibited Persons (Violent Felons)

There are many lower court cases addressing which persons may be prohibited from possessing a firearm. Rahimi distilled the historical legal principle that if an individual has been adjudicated to pose a credible threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be temporarily disarmed.[75] That principle violates no third rail because it promotes individual self-defense and burdens the right only for those specific individuals who pose an unacceptable danger of criminally misusing firearms. Rahimi rejected the government’s much broader prohibition, operating at a high level of generality, that it could disarm those who were not “law-abiding” or “responsible.”[76]

Despite Rahimi’s rejection of the notion that persons who are not “responsible” may be disarmed, at least two courts after Rahimi have adopted principles that are at least as broad and overgeneralized. The principle arrived at by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Jackson[77] was that our history “prohibit[s] possession of firearms by persons who have demonstrated disrespect for legal norms of society.”[78] Similarly, the district court in United States v. Gutierrez[79] purported to find a “historical tradition of categorically disarming groups perceived as not ‘dependable adherents to the rule of law’ . . . .”[80] Such vague, meaningless standards were rejected as a matter of principle in Rahimi, and the Court found they “did not derive from our case law.”[81]

C. Age Restrictions on Adults

Under the laws of several states, while adults generally can own and carry firearms for self-defense, the rights of adults between 18 and 21 years old are truncated. Often states make it impossible for them to carry handguns for self-defense. And while federal law does not forbid them from owning a handgun, it forecloses them from buying one in the regulated commercial marketplace.[82]

In defending such laws, governments frequently make two arguments for why they should nevertheless be treated differently than the rest of “the people”:  (1) at the Founding, 18-year-olds were generally not considered adults, but were allegedly “minors” for most purposes and could have their rights truncated accordingly,[83] and (2) in the latter half of the nineteenth century, several states (though less than a majority) passed laws limiting the ability of minors under 21 to acquire certain weapons (generally, handguns, Bowie knives and dirks).[84] But neither of these arguments adduces a principle, which permits disarming 18-year-olds today.

This case is even easier than the Heller/Bruen analysis itself. Disqualifier No. 4 provides that the derived principle must not restrict or prohibit firearm-related activities that were common at the Founding. For 18 to 20-year-olds, there were no laws on the books disarming them. On the contrary, before, during, and after the ratification of the Second Amendment, every state had a militia statute requiring 18-year-olds to enroll and participate in their state’s militia; and the federal Militia Act of 1792 also required 18 to 20 year-olds to serve.[85] As part of that duty, they were required to acquire and own firearms and bring them to militia muster. Any purported principle that would prohibit those common “firearm-related activities” violates Disqualifier No. 4 and cannot be used to justify present-day statutes.

D. Sensitive Places a/k/a Government-mandated Gun Free Zones

Following Bruen, many traditionally anti-gun states, which now must respect the right to carry a handgun, responded by passing laws preventing a person from carrying in “sensitive places.”

In Antonyuk v. James,[86] the Second Circuit erroneously derived the principle that vulnerable populations need to be protected and, based on that principle, deemed places “sensitive” where vulnerable populations gather.”[87] But this principle violates Disqualifier No. 3 because it disregards the purpose of the Amendment to protect the right of self-defense,[88] and violates Disqualifier No. 4 because it would be contrary to Founding-era practice.

In Wolford v. Lopez,[89] the Ninth Circuit declared that stadiums and museums were “sensitive places,” but public transit facilities and hospitals were not.[90] It also held that firearms could be presumptively banned at businesses in Hawaii, but not businesses in California. In a sure sign that something was amiss, the panel itself, even as it reached this nonsensical result, complained that its conclusion “appear[s] arbitrary” and that the places where firearms could and could not be banned “lack[ed] . . . an apparent logical connection.”[91] What was missing was a relevant principle that would support the challenged legislation. But Bruen gives us very strong hints about what that principle should be.

In Bruen, the Court suggested that there were certain “sensitive” places where arms could be banned, and it pointed to laws from the Founding that treated three places as sensitive: courthouses, legislative assemblies, and polling places.[92] Properly analyzing these laws means asking what principle permitted firearms to be banned there consistent with the Second Amendment. There is one common thread running through these places, yielding a principle that conforms to the Second Amendment’s function: at the Founding, the government provided security at these locations thus ensuring the safety of the public.[93] So, where the government provides comprehensive security and adequately protects its citizens in a discrete location, like a courthouse or the secure area of an airport today, it does not violate the Second Amendment to permit the government to ban firearm possession or carriage there. But where the government does not provide comprehensive security, it has no right to forbid law-abiding citizens from carrying there (after all, if a person intends to commit murder, he will not flinch at violating a gun-free zone law).

Historically speaking, where the government feared an attack but was not able or willing to provide comprehensive security itself, its response was not to ban firearms but to require them. At the Founding, as today, places of worship were unfortunately places where enemies of society would attempt to commit crimes, which is why, at the Founding, many states required churchgoers to arm themselves.[94]

Conclusion

The Supreme Court cautions that the principles derived from our historical tradition of firearm regulation must not be extracted at such a high level of generality that they eviscerate the fundamental right to bear arms. In addressing the level of generality, courts and litigants must check their work. Separately, courts must focus their analysis on the proper, legal use, of firearms, not on their misuse by criminals.  The “third rails” or disqualifiers help assess whether the principles derived from the government’s basket of allegedly suitable historical analogues are drawn too broadly or are otherwise invalid. A principle touches a “third rail” if:

  1. The asserted principle would violate existing Supreme Court precedent, such as the holding that arms in common use by Americans for lawful purposes are protected.
  2. The asserted principle would be based on a concern for criminal misuse rather the rights of the law-abiding.
  3. The asserted principle would disregard the purpose of the Amendment to protect the right of self-defense and thwart tyranny, invasion, and criminality.
  4. The asserted principle would permit restrictions on what were common firearms-related activities at the Founding. In other words, if the Founders engaged in a practice, courts should not endorse a principle that would let the government turn the Founders into felons.
  5. The asserted principle cannot, in effect, deny Second Amendment rights to most Americans.

Incorporating these disqualifiers into the constitutional analysis, the Bruen/Heller methodology breaks down as follows:

Step one:  Determine whether the conduct being regulated by the challenged firearms law implicates the Second Amendment’s text.

Step two:  If yes, then the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a longstanding historical tradition of firearms regulation dating back to the Founding.  The government must do so by supplying the court with a sufficient quantum of well-established, representative historical analogue laws.

Step three:  The court must assess “why” and “how” those analogues burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense, while discarding any historical laws that are improper to be considered as analogues. More formally, the questions are “whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense” and “whether that burden is comparably justified.”[95]

Step four:  From the remaining suitable analogues, the courts must extract a relevant historical legal principle (the “derived principle”).  That principle must be derived from the why and the how of those analogues.

Step five:  The derived historical legal principle must not violate the Second Amendment’s third rails.

Step six:  If the derived historical legal principle passes muster (i.e., it does not violate any of the third rails), the court must then determine whether the modern firearms law is consistent with that legal principle.

[*] Mark W. Smith is a Visiting Fellow in Pharmaceutical Public Policy and Law in the Department of Pharmacology, Oxford University and a Distinguished Scholar and Senior Fellow of Law and Public Policy, Ave Maria School of Law. He hosts the Four Boxes Diner YouTube Channel (youtube.com/TheFourBoxesDiner), which addresses Second Amendment scholarship, history and issues, and whose educational videos have been viewed over 46 million times. His scholarship has been cited by federal courts and by attorneys before the United States Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and in United States v. Rahimi. He is a graduate of the NYU School of Law.

[2] 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

[3] 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

[4] 602 U.S. 680 (2024).

[5] My recent scholarly work discusses the application of the Heller/Bruen methodology: See generally Mark W. Smith, Dangerous, but not Unusual: Mistakes Commonly Made by Courts in Post-Bruen Litigation, 22 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 599 (2024) available at https://www.law.georgetown.edu/public-policy-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2024/10/GT-GLPP240029.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK8A-GZ3K] (detailing the Bruen methodology as applied to modern Second Amendment lawsuits); Mark W. Smith, What Part Of “In Common Use” Don’t You Understand? How Courts Have Defied Heller In Arms-Ban Cases – Again, 41 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y Per Curiam (Fall 2023) (explaining how arms-ban cases are to be decided under Heller precedent), available at https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/what-part-of-in-common-use-dont-you-understand-how-courts-have-defed-heller-in-arms-ban-cases-again-mark-w-smith/ [https://perma.cc/N6HS-CKAS]; Mark W. Smith, Much Ado About Nothing: Rahimi Reinforces Bruen And Heller, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y Per Curiam (Summer 2024), available at https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/wp-content/uploads/sites/90/2024/07/Smith-Much-Ado-About-Nothing-vf2.pdf [https://perma.cc/97WH-SQGJ] (explaining that the Rahimi decision is an ordinary and routine application of the pre-existing Bruen methodology); Mark W. Smith, NYSRPA v. Bruen: A Supreme Court Victory For The Right To Keep And Bear Arms—And A Strong Rebuke to “Inferior Courts,” 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y Per Curiam (Summer 2022), available at https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/wp-content/uploads/sites/90/2022/08/Smith-Bruen-vF1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3N4-TS8C] (summarizing Supreme Court’s Bruen decision).

[6] Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17 (2022).

[7] Before a court can even consider deriving a principle, the government must identify a basket of suitable historical analogue laws. To be valid, a proposed historical analogue must be an actual law, including the common law, from the Founding era. Mark W. Smith, “Not All History Is Created Equal”: In the Post-Bruen World, the Critical Period for Historical Analogues Is when the Second Amendment Was Ratified in 1791, and not 1868 (Oct. 1, 2022) (working paper) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4248297 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4248297 [https://perma.cc/TSZ5-RY2Z]); Mark W. Smith, Attention Originalists: The Second Amendment Was Adopted in 1791, Not 1868, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y Per Curiam (Fall 2022). Historical laws with racist or otherwise unconstitutional foundations cannot be considered as analogues. As Justice Kavanaugh stated in his Rahimi concurrence, “courts must exercise care” not to rely on “the history that the Constitution left behind.” United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1915 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Analogues must also be “well-established” and “representative.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 21. A handful of outliers that either existed for only a short time, or did not affect substantial swaths of the national population, cannot establish a historical tradition.

[8] District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).

[9] Id. at 624.

[10] Id. at 629.

[11] Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29.

[12] Id. at 70.

[13] Id. at 71.

[14] United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 697 (2024).

[15] Id. at 682.

[16] Id.

[17] Id. at 767 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

[18] Id. at 681 (majority opinion).

[19] Id. at 700.

[20] Id. at 701.

[21] Id. at 739 (Barrett, J., concurring).

[22] Id. at 701 (majority opinion).

[23] United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1926 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring).

[24] Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 256–57 (2022).

[25] White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017).

[26] Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion).

[27] Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722–23 (1997).

[28] Id.

[29] Id. (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)).

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 720–21.

[32] See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 631 (2008).

[33] Id.

[34] Id. at 694 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

[35] Id. at 631 (majority opinion); see also id. at 632–33 (citing colonial-era laws penalizing shooting off guns on New Year’s Eve, firing guns in city streets and taverns, or within the Town of Boston). The danger to be guarded against was stray bullets, not using firearms to commit violent crime as with the District’s handgun ban. The “whys” simply did not add up, and the “public safety” rationales were not at all comparable.

[36] New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 30–31 (2022).

[37] Id. at 31.

[38] Id. at 30–31.

[39] United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 697 (2024).

[40] Id. at 702.

[41] Id. at 701.

[42] Id. at 701–02.

[43] District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).

[44] See discussion in Part IV, below.

[45] See generally Smith, supra note 5 Dangerous, but not Unusual:  Mistakes Commonly Made by Courts in Post-Bruen Litigation, at 606, 619–20, 624–39; Smith, supra note 5 What Part of “In Common Use” Don’t You Understand?: How Courts Have Defied Heller in Arms-Ban Cases — Again, at 3–5.

[46] Heller, 554 U.S. at 629, 625; id. at 682 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

[47] See id. at 636 (majority opinion).

[48] See generally Mark W. Smith, A Judicial Teaching Point:  The Lesson of the Late Justice John Paul Stevens in Sony v. Universal City Studios as a Response to Civil Lawfare, 1 Arizona State Univ. Corporate and Business L.J. Issue 2, 71, 72–75 (June 2020) (discussing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (the misuse of VCR equipment for unlawful purposes is not a basis to ban the widespread use of VCRs for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes)) available at https://cablj.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Final-Smith.pdf.

[49] Weapon types used in mass shootings in the United States between 1982 and September 2024, by number of weapons and incidents, Statista.com (Dec. 9, 2024), https://www.statista.com/statistics/476409/mass-shootings-in-the-us-by-weapon-types-used/ [https://perma.cc/9THT-TXQ8].

[50] Story, Joseph, Commentaries on the Constitution 3:§ 1890 (“The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them”)  (available at https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs10.html#:~:text=The%20right%20of%20the%20citizens,the%20people%20to%20resist%20and). During oral argument in Heller, Justice Kennedy asked counsel for the District, somewhat skeptically, if the right to keep and bear arms “had nothing to do with the concern of the remote settler to defend himself and his family against hostile Indian tribes and outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies and things like that?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290). Justice Kennedy’s inquiry is informative because it identifies the many threats the early settlers faced at the Founding.

[51] Heller, 554 U.S. at 584.

[52] 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).

[53] Id. at 704.

[54] New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 26 (2022).

[55] Id. at 70.

[56] Wolford v. Lopez, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 98026, at *12 (9th Cir. 2025) (VanDyke, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

[57] Id. at 17.

[58] District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).

[59] Bruen, 597 U.S. at 70.

[60] United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 695–97 (2024).

[61] 85 F.4th 1175 (7th Cir. 2023).

[62] Id. at 1202.

[63] 111 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2024).

[64] Id. at 446.

[65] 120 F.4th 223 (D.C. Cir. 2024).

[66] Id. at 237.

[67] 95 F.4th 38 (1st Cir. 2024).

[68] Id. at 48.

[69] No. 2:23-cv-710, 2024 WL 3466482, at *1 (D. Vt. July 18, 2024).

[70] Id. at *30.

[71] District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).

[72] Id. at 624–25.

[73] See generally Smith, supra note 5 Dangerous, but not Unusual:  Mistakes Commonly Made by Courts in Post-Bruen Litigation, at 606, 619–20, 624–39; Smith, supra note 5 What Part of “In Common Use” Don’t You Understand?: How Courts Have Defied Heller in Arms-Ban Cases — Again, at 3–5.

[74] Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438, 446 (4th Cir. 2024).

[75] United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 702 (2024).

[76] Id. at 701.

[77] 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024).

[78] Id. at 1127.

[79] No. 1:22-CR-00329, 2024 WL 4041321, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2024).

[80] Id. at *8.

[81] Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 701.

[82] Federal law is bizarre and perverse because it pushes 18-year-olds into the unregulated secondary market—an 18-year-old cannot buy a handgun at a sporting goods store (which would require a background check), yet he can buy one out of someone’s trunk in the parking lot.

[83] Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677, 690  (8th Cir. 2024); Lara v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, 91 F.4th 122, 131–32 (3d Cir. 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 2024 WL 4486348 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2024); see also Hirschfeld v. BATFE, 5 F.4th 407, 422–23, 435–36 (4th Cir. 2021), vacated as moot, 14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021) (Although Hirschfeld was decided pre-Bruen, its mode of analysis anticipated much of what Bruen would establish.)

[84] Worth, 108 F.4th at 696–98; Hirschfeld, 5 F.4th at 437–40; see also Lara, 91 F.4th at 134 & n.15 (recognizing the argument but declining to consider such laws as too late in time entirely).

[85] See Militia Act of 1792, Art. I (May 2, 1792), Constitution.org, https://www.constitution.org/1- Activism/mil/mil_act_1792.htm [https://perma.cc/D4DQ-UUM3]; NRA v. BATFE, 714 F.3d 334, 340 n.8 (5th Cir. 2013) (Jones, J., dissenting) (collecting ratification-era militia laws).

[86] No. 22-2908, 2023 WL 11963034, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 24, 2024).

[87] Id. at *48–49.

[88] Disarming people who most benefit from the ability to engage in self-defense makes no sense.

[89] 116 F.4th 959 (9th Cir. 2024).

[90] Id. at 1003.

[91] Id.

[92] New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 31 (2022).

[93] See Smith, supra note 5 Dangerous, but not Unusual:  Mistakes Commonly Made by Courts in Post-Bruen Litigation, at 644–53 (detailing the Bruen methodology as applied to modern Second Amendment lawsuits).

[94] See generally Benjamin Boyd, Take Your Guns to Church: The Second Amendment and Church Autonomy, 8 Liberty Univ. L. Rev. 653, 697–99 (2014) (collecting colonial- and Founding-era historical law for requiring firearms at church services).

[95] Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29.

 

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Misconstruing the Electoral Count Act: A Response to Evan A. Davis and David M. Schulte – Seth Barrett Tillman

Posted by on Jan 1, 2025 in Per Curiam

Misconstruing the Electoral Count Act: A Response to Evan A. Davis and David M. Schulte – Seth Barrett Tillman
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Misconstruing the Electoral Count Act: A Response to Evan A. Davis and David M. Schulte

Seth Barrett Tillman*

In an article appearing on The Hill,[1] Evan A. Davis and David M. Schulte put forward the position that president-elect Trump is barred by Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment from becoming President. Or, to put it more plainly, in spite of the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Anderson,[2] Congress is free to ignore the Court’s decision and to determine that Trump was and remains disqualified. In those circumstances, the vote of presidential electors cast for Trump was a nullity. Given that the only remaining and otherwise lawful votes cast by presidential electors were cast for Vice President Kamala Harris, it is Harris who prevailed in the election, and she should be seated under the rules of the Electoral Count Act (1887) (as amended through 2022).[3]

Davis and Schulte explain:

A vote for a candidate disqualified by the Constitution is plainly in accordance with the normal use of words “not regularly given” [in the Electoral Count Act]. Disqualification for engaging in insurrection is no different from disqualification based on other constitutional requirements such as age, citizenship from birth and 14 years’ residency in the United States.

To make an objection under the Count Act requires a petition signed by 20 percent of the members of each House. If the objection is sustained by majority vote in each house, the vote is not counted and the number of votes required to be elected is reduced by the number of disqualified votes. If all votes for Trump were not counted, Kamala Harris would be elected president.[4]

Simply put, Davis and Schulte’s analysis is not correct.

Challenges under the Electoral Count Act come in two varieties: Type-I and Type-II challenges. Generally speaking, Type-I challenges are allegations of preappointment illegality involving presidential electors, 3 U.S.C. § 15(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I), and Type-II challenges are allegations of postappointment illegality involving presidential electors, 3 U.S.C. § 15(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II).[5] Again, generally speaking, a Type-I challenge involves an allegation that a purported presidential elector was not lawfully appointed or “certified.”[6] By contrast, a Type-II challenge involves an allegation that an elector’s “vote” was not “regularly given.”[7]

The Constitution requires that a prevailing candidate for President in the Electoral College has a majority vote of all “appointed” electors.[8] Where the two Houses of Congress under the Electoral Count Act nullify a state’s slate of electors based on a Type-I challenge, there is a two-fold effect. First, the votes cast by those presidential electors are not counted. Second, the denominator, that is, the number of electors considered lawfully “appointed,” is reduced by the number of electors which were rejected.[9] But Type-II challenges are different. In a Type-II challenge, involving post-appointment illegality, where the challenge is upheld, the votes cast by those presidential electors are not counted, but the denominator is not reduced precisely because there was no challenge to the elector’s or the electors’ appointments.[10]

Davis and Schulte argue that Congress should adopt the position that the presidential electors’ votes for Trump were not “regularly given.” Of course, that is strictly a Type-II challenge, which leaves the denominator unaffected. Were every Trump elector thrown out by the Joint Session of Congress, then the final electoral vote would be Trump-0 to Harris-226 with 538 lawfully “appointed” electors. Because Harris would still lack a majority of all lawfully “appointed” electors, that is, she would still lack 270 of 538 lawfully “appointed” electors, no President would be elected by the presidential electors. In those circumstances, the process for electing the President would fall to the House, where the election would be held under constitutional and other elections provisions unique to House contingency elections for the President.[11] In the soon to be seated 119th Congress, the Republicans will have a (narrow) majority of all House seats, and the Republicans will have a majority (that is 29) of 50 state House delegations,[12] and, in all likelihood, the Republicans will elect the Speaker—and so, the Republicans will control the floor during all House proceedings to elect the President. Sooner or later, a Republican House, with a Republican Speaker, will elect a Republican President—the Republican majority will certainly not elect Harris.

This result is hardly surprising. A recurring fact pattern in electoral politics is that the prevailing candidate dies or is otherwise determined ineligible. Under the English Rule, in certain circumstances, the next placed candidate carries the election.[13] Not so here. Under the traditional American Rule, on such facts, the runner-up is not declared the winner. Rather, the election has failed to produce a winner, and a vacancy is declared. This has been the majority, if not the universal rule across U.S. jurisdictions since the Founding Era.[14] Why would the presidency be any different?

Were Davis and Schulte’s advice heeded, Harris would not become President. Their advice, at most, will only delay the Republicans from holding the presidency.

* Seth Barrett Tillman is an associate professor in the Maynooth University School of Law and Criminology, Ireland / Scoil an Dlí ages na Coireolaíochta Ollscoil Mhá Nuad.

[1] Evan A. Davis & David M. Schulte, Congress has the power to block Trump from taking office, but lawmakers must act now, The Hill (Dec. 26, 2024, 8:00 AM ET), https://tinyurl.com/rfmuxry5.

[2] 601 U.S. 100 (2024) (per curiam).

[3] Electoral Count Act, 49th Cong. 2d Sess., ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373 (1887), as amended by Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act of 2022, 136 Stat. 5233, Pub. L. 117–328.

[4] Davis & Schulte, supra note 1 (emphasis added).

[5] See Derek T. Muller, Electoral Votes Regularly Given, 55 Ga. L. Rev. 1529, 1540 (2021) (“This Essay has argued that ‘regularly given’ refers to a limited set of post-appointment controversies.”); Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 541, 617 n.462 (2004) (explaining that an objection alleging that electors’ votes were not “regularly given” is “an inappropriate ground for objecting” where “there was no post-appointment misbehaviour” by the purported electors); Michael Stern, How to Count to 270: The Electoral Count Act and the Election of 2000, Point of Order (Jan. 14, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/ymp8dayv (explaining that “the legislative history of the [Electoral Count Act] seems to show clearly that the phrase ‘regularly given’ refers to the conduct of the electors (such as voting for ineligible candidates), not to how the electors were chosen”).

[6] 3 U.S.C. § 15(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I).

[7] 3 U.S.C. § 15(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II).

[8] See U.S. Const. art. II, amended by id. amend. XII.

[9] See 3 U.S.C. § 15(e)(2).

[10] See id.

[11] See U.S. Const. art. II, amended by id. amend. XII. See generally William Josephson, Senate Election of the Vice President and House of Representatives Election of the President, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 597 (2009).

[12] A look at the partisan composition of the incoming state delegations for the 119th Congress, Ballotpedia News (Dec. 6, 2024, 6:27 AM), https://tinyurl.com/3z5f6p39.

[13] See, e.g., In re Parliamentary Election for Bristol S.E., [1964] 2 QB 257 (Gorman & McNair, JJ.) (Eng.) (declaring, after his prevailing in an election, that Anthony Wedgwood Benn, M.P., was barred from holding a U.K. House of Commons seat, as a result of Benn’s having succeeded to a House of Lords seat which had been held by his late father, and further determining that the runner-up candidate takes the seat as a matter of law, absent any new election).

[14] See Chester H. Rowell, A Historical and Legal Digest of all the Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives of the United States from the First to the Fifty-Sixth Congress, 1789–1901, at 220 (1901) (reporting majority’s committee report, in Smith vs. Brown (40th Cong.), which stated: “the English rule had never been applied in this country and was hostile to the genius of our institutions”); Jack Maskell, Cong. Research Serv., RL31338, Disqualification, Death, or Ineligibility of the Winner of a Congressional Election (2002). See generally Result of election as affected by votes cast for deceased or disqualified person, 133 A.L.R. 319 (1941 to current).

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